Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps

[dshaday]

Hi Sid

While browsing the Internet on the Waffen SS social structure I saw this interesting university Master's thesis on the German Army for WW2. It was done in 1988. You might have seen it already, but just in case you haven't:

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a198043.pdf

Chapter 4 is particularly interesting. You can see some of the similarities and differences of the Army and SS selection criteria for officers. Note also the large number of WW1 Army NCO's who were given commissions in the new Reichswehr. The bibliography could be useful also.

Regards

Dennis

[j keenan]

Figures for graduation using the date they were promoted to SS-Ustuf. from the SS-Junkerschulen Tölz and Braunschweig source Dienstaltersliste 1.12.38
1934/4,3 were at Braunschweig 35, 1 at Tölz 34
1935/63
1936/195
1937/131
1938/261
Just a rough count but should be there or there abouts

1934/4 candidates were promoted to SS-Ustuf. two 20.4.34,the other two 1.6.34, 9.11.34 with one 20.4.34 at Tölz 1934, the other three at Braunschweig 1935.
The 1934 total your talking about would not have graduated till 1935 been promoted to SS-Ustuf. 20.4.35

Using Dienstaltersliste 1.12.38 here are the SS-Ustuf. promotions between 34-38 who were not shown on the Junkerschulen list Leibstandarte and SS-Deustschland,Der Führer,Germania.
I have only counted these 2 units because there are over 9,000 SS-Ustuf. promotions in this time period,of which a large percentage are Alg.SS.
Totenkopf and the different training schools are not included and other SS-VT personnel
1934/10
1935/46
1936/32
1937/28
1938/24

[dshaday]

Hi Sid

Sorry for the late reply but I remembered some of your comments here that I could not resist.

2) On 20 December 1941 the Wiking Division was on the Mius Front. It was not withdrawn. However, it did give up some of its line to the Slovak Rapid Division to its north. It should be noted that a few months later, while it was still in the same position on the Mius Front, its was the subject of complaints from General Eglseer of 1st or 4th Mountain Division for its indiscipline in rear areas.

But not for its actions on the front.

3) You quote Eisenhower, "while the SS elements as usual fought to annihilation, the ordinary German infantry gave themselves up in ever-increasing numbers." This is not to compare like with like. There were no horsedrawn"ordinary German infantry" consisting of German conscripts, reluctant Germanized Poles and Alsatians, and attached Ostruppen battalions in the W-SS in Normandy. The Reich Germans in the W-SS were fully mechanized volunteers with more wheels to escape difficult situations.

In fact the Waffen SS in Normandy and western Europe included conscripts (since 1941 it was no longer a purely volunteer force and included conscripts). The Das Reich Division had one regiment with a high proportion of Alsatians (who De Gaulle classed as "forced") who were involved in the Oradour incident. There were also Polish-Germans (eg the SS soldier Jan Jesionek who testified against Kurt Meyer, was of Polish/German extraction and a conscript in the 12th SS Div). I seriously doubt that the mechanised transport had an input in the will of the SS to fight -which is what Eisenhower was talking about.

In any case Eisenhower was clear in his personal opinion of who had the stronger will to continue fighting, even when things looked bleek. He made the comparison.

I haven't yet had a chance to read the two articles you link to, but the bibliography seems very dated (which doesn't necessarily disqualify it from accuracy).

The oft quoted book by Wegner ( The Waffen SS - Organization, Ideology and Function ) is also not recent -1990. Yet we both know its value, as it is the basis of many modern books. It is in the bibliography.


Regards

Dennis

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Dennis,

I have had a look at your above link. Its stats aren't directly equatable with Goldsworthy/Wegner, but some interesting facts emerge.

% of Aristocrats in the German Army officer corps:

(p.82) 1880 - 65%
(p.82) 1913 - 30%
Average of promoted majors over 1924-32 - 20.3%
General officers in 1944 - 19% (and presumably ever lower in more junior officer grades).

This indicates that there was a steady decline in the presence of aristocrats in the Army officer corps prior to and entirely independent of the NSDAP and Waffen-SS. The reciprocal of this is that there was a steady increase in opportunities to enter the officer corps for applicants of other lower social backgrounds.

I cannot find any reference to the number of aristocrats in the W-SS officer corps. However, the aristocracy was not averse to joining the wider SS: "270 German princes and princesses were Nazi Party members. A sampling of 312 “old aristocratic” families found 3,592 Party members. Every noble family east of the Elbe River had at least one member in the Party. A third of Nazi-aristocrats joined the Party before Hitler became Chancellor; a majority supported the Nazis, or like groups, before this date. Nobles were the most fascistic of any demographically identifiable cohort." (An unsourced internet quote). The author Michael Burleigh noted on p.195 of The Third Reich, A New History, "Aristocrats were submerged into a new synthetic elite within an organisation which espoused egalitarian meritocracy along with racial rather than social elitism."

To what degree this aristocrat penetration reached the Waffen-SS, I do not know, but it would certainly be worthy of research.

% of ex-Army NCOs in the Army officer corps.

(p.42) In the Reichswehr 25% of officers wrere ex-NCOs.
(p.47) In 1938, if one discounts the mass induction of 1,600 Austrian officers for whom there is no breakdown, 25% of new Alt Reich officers were ex NCOs.

The text also mentions that the Army ran special courses for promising NCOs so that they could improve their education level prior to application.

The proposition that there was a virtually impenetrable ceiling beyond which NCOs could not progress in the Army seems to be a myth. The motivation of those ex-Army NCOs who preferred to join the Waffen-SS in the 1930s would therefore appear not to be the complete impossibility of further advancement.

Although not directly equatable with the above 1938 statistic, which relates to the lowest Army officer rank, it is worth pointing out that the proportion of ex-Army NCOs in the more senior Waffen-SS ranks between Sturmbannfuhrer and Obergruppenfuhrer was 8.8% according to Goldsworthy/Wegner (p.240).

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Dennis,

With regard to the percentage of Waffen-SS officers with NSDAP part membership, Goldsworthy, referring to Wegner, says this (p.32):

"By 1933 69% of the future officers of the Waffen-SS were members of the Nazi Party. A further 20% of these officers would join the Nazi Party at a later stage."

If true, this would mean that almost nine out of ten W-SS officers were also members of the Nazi Party.

(N.B. As Goldsworthy is quoting Wegner, I presume he may be referring to W-SS officers above Sturmbannfuhrer.)

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Dennis,

You originally wote, "General von Mackensen of 3rd Panzer Corps extolled the Leibstandarte in a letter to Himmler for its 'discipline, refreshing energy and unshakeable steadfastness, a real elite unit'. The Russians held a similar view. Major General Artemko of the 27th Army Corps, when captured in 1941, stated to his interrogators that 'his men breathed a sigh of relief when the Viking Division was withdrawn from the line and replaced by a regular army unit' (Mackensen to Himmler, 20 December 1941 and Heydrich to Himmler, 6 November 1941, RFSS Microfilm 108, cited in Hahne, 1969, p 467)".

My points were that (1) the Wiking Division was not withdrawn from the front in December 1941 and (2) there were complaints within the German Army about the Wiking's discipline. I would further add that the comment of one captured Soviet Major cannot be held to indicate that the Russians, collectively, "held a similar view."

Finally, while the typical German Army division was full of foot- and horse-bound reservists, the Wiking was a motorized volunteer formation. It ought to have been more intimidating because of the tactical flexibility it had and the self motivation of its members.

I would repeat that such internal backslapping within the Axis forces was commonplace. It certainly extended to the Slovaks and Romanians as well.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Dennis,

With regard to Alt Reich conscripts in the W-SS as early as 1941;

As I understand it, and I am happy to be corrected, the Waffen-SS was allowed to accept a maximum (and very low) percentage of each annual conscription class as volunteers. Again as I understand it, Reich Germans could not be conscripted directly into the W-SS until after Himmler became head of the Ersatzheer (Replacement Army) following the July 1944 bomb plot.

The Waffen-SS found a way round these restrictions by (1) accepting Reich volunteers below conscription age (hence the bulk of 12th SS Division) and by reaching direct agreements with allied giovernments to conscript from their local volksdeutsche communities en masse in early 1943 (hence the bulk of the manpower of 16th and 17th SS Divisions, I think.)

Cheers,

Sid.

[dshaday]

Hi Sid

Hi Dennis,

I have had a look at your above link. Its stats aren't directly equatable with Goldsworthy/Wegner, but some interesting facts emerge.

% of Aristocrats in the German Army officer corps:

(p.82) 1880 - 65%
(p.82) 1913 - 30%
Average of promoted majors over 1924-32 - 20.3%
General officers in 1944 - 19% (and presumably ever lower in more junior officer grades).

In the thesis on the internet, I can find no mention on page 82 (or any other page) of aristocrats in the German Army officer corps being 65% in 1880, or 30% in 1913. Perhaps you are referring to another book/source?

The thesis mentions:
In 1932, 23.8%. of all officers were nobles.

By 1932 52% of general rank officers were nobles.
By 1939 33% ” “ “ “ “
By 1944 19% ” “ “ “ “ p45

This indicates that there was a steady decline in the presence of aristocrats in the Army officer corps prior to and entirely independent of the NSDAP and Waffen-SS. The reciprocal of this is that there was a steady increase in opportunities to enter the officer corps for applicants of other lower social backgrounds.

New Army officer applicants still had to meet minimum Army entry qualifications. This would be education (arbiter or Army entry exam equivalent). Not to mention all-round character profile (which can include class/status and background). To me, this means significantly more middle class officer applicants.

% of ex-Army NCOs in the Army officer corps.

(p.42) In the Reichswehr 25% of officers wrere ex-NCOs.
(p.47) In 1938, if one discounts the mass induction of 1,600 Austrian officers for whom there is no breakdown, 25% of new Alt Reich officers were ex NCOs.

The Reichswehr figure of 25% NCO-to-officers (p.42) is for the start of the Reichwehr - which would be about 1920. This demographic would have changed after that.

At this stage there is no mention if what happened in 1938 was typical, or a one-off. The figures quoted on page 47 (as above) say:
In 1938 the Army expanded by 7,600 officers: 2,000 recruits, 2,500 lateral transfers from the police, 1,500 non-commissioned
officer promotions, 1,800 reactivations from inactive service, and 1,600 Austrian officers incorporated into the Wehrmacht.
New outside officer applicants were therefore 26% of the total for 1938. NCO promotions were 20% of the total.

The 1938 transfers from the Police was interesting. Were the policemen ex-Army officers from WW1? So, for the SS (who also recruited from the Police) could this imply WW1 service ex-army officer background? I don't know.

The text also mentions that the Army ran special courses for promising NCOs so that they could improve their education level prior to application.

I cannot find this mentioned In the thesis on the internet that I linked to. Perhaps you are referring to another source? Would be nice to know how the promising NCOs were identified and selected (and how many).

The proposition that there was a virtually impenetrable ceiling beyond which NCOs could not progress in the Army seems to be a myth. The motivation of those ex-Army NCOs who preferred to join the Waffen-SS in the 1930s would therefore appear not to be the complete impossibility of further advancement.

Personally, it looks like early days yet to make that leap. Especially as we "know" ex-Army NCOs did go to form a significant proportion of officer positions in the armed SS (as per Wegner).

Regards

Dennis

[j keenan]

1938 12% of the SS holding the rank of SS-Standartenführer or higher came from the aristocracy.
Source Ailsby

[dshaday]

Hi

1938 12% of the SS holding the rank of SS-Standartenführer or higher came from the aristocracy.
Source Ailsby

Do you recall if that is for the SS as a whole, or for the armed units which were to become the Waffen SS ? It is a very interesting statistic.

Regards

Dennis

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Dennis,

The 65% and 30% figures come from p.192 of an article "German Officer Corps as Profession", which is on the net.

The additional figures you give are consistent with those I gave on the decline of aristocrats in the officer corps.

You write, "New Army officer applicants still had to meet minimum Army entry qualifications. This would be education (arbiter or Army entry exam equivalent). Not to mention all-round character profile (which can include class/status and background). To me, this means significantly more middle class officer applicants." Quite possibly and, I would suggest, necessarily. The professional officer corps of any society is an arm of the middle class. Quite apart from the great equalizer of leadership aptitude, advanced technical and management skills are required of specialist and senior officers and these are not readily found in the civilian working classes.

You write, "The Reichswehr figure of 25% NCO-to-officers (p.42) is for the start of the Reichwehr - which would be about 1920. This demographic would have changed after that." Almost certainly, but we don't seem to have any information as to the scale or what direction this change might have taken.

You write "At this stage there is no mention if what happened in 1938 was typical, or a one-off." Well, we do know it was a one-off in one area because it includes 1,600 Austrian officers. However, as this includes everyone from generals to junior lieutenants and they are not differentiated by background we have to discard them from our calculations and fall back on the Alt Reich inductions, of whom 25% were ex-NCOs.

What we do know is that the 25% figure appears twice - for the Reichswehr in the 1920s and for officer inductions in 1938. This may not be enough to be a trend in itself, but it offers the hint of a trend. Furthermore, as Reichswehr men were supposedly trained to command levels two ranks above their own, it is reasonable to suspect that something similar was also occurring in the mid-1930s as the Army expanded massively.

What we seem to know from Wegner is that 8%-9% of middle and senior ranking officers in the Waffen-SS were ex-NCOs. What we know from other sources is that the Army may have had a peacetime culture between the wars of inducting around 25% of its new officers from its own NCOs. From these not directly equatable statistics, it is impossible to tell whether an Army NCO was more likely to achieve advancement if he switched to the Waffen-SS. In any case, the proposition that there was a virtually impenetrable ceiling beyond which NCOs could not progress in the Army seems to be a myth.

With regard to the Abitur, the link you gave says, "Outside candidates were expected to have an extensive pre-university education level. The Abitur was desired but not required. In its place, the candidate could take special equivalency examinations, a system which assisted enlisted candidates lacking in formal education." From this it appears that the Abitur was not a sine qua non, even for outside candidates, and that the Army offered another avenue for its own other ranks without the desired civilian educational background who sought to enter officer ranks.

Cheers,

Sid.

[j keenan]

1938 12% of the SS holding the rank of SS-Standartenführer or higher came from the aristocracy.
Source Ailsby

I think you fail to understand the SS/Waffen-SS as an officer you could be posted between the the two,so depending on who's posted where means you can't prove what your trying to prove.
The other point is the NCO promotion through the ranks to Officer 1.How far would he go in peace time 2.In war time ?
In peace time would he be able to become part of the General Staff,or only as far as a junior rank ?
In war would he be able to make it all the way to Feldmarschall ?

[dshaday]

Hi

1938 12% of the SS holding the rank of SS-Standartenführer or higher came from the aristocracy.
Source Ailsby

I think you fail to understand the SS/Waffen-SS as an officer you could be posted between the the two,so depending on who's posted where means you can't prove what your trying to prove.

I am not sure who you were addressing this part of your post to. If it was to me, then I will take it that the figure of 12% in 1938 is for nobility in the SS as a whole. If we are talking about a specific year though, I would have thought that an author could have differentiated between officers currently posted in "Waffen SS" and General SS units.

I fully agree with you about SS officers being liable to postings between the organisations at any time in their career. Himmler wanted this to happen as a matter of policy. So yes, this makes generalisations with statistics a little fuzzy. Especially if the stats are over several years of history. Maybe Wegner, in his own way, got around it by the statistical analysis of his Waffen SS officer sample/database?

All the best

Dennis

[j keenan]

Wegner used 582 officers for his analysis so his work proves nothing to be honest,as by wars end there were over 26,000 officers that had served in the Waffen-SS alone.Using Dienstaltersliste 1.12.38 there were over 9,000 SS-Ustuf. promotions covering all of the SS from 34-38 again making Wegner worthless in my opinion unless he was just using one rank over a time period maybe ? But still doesn't show you the true make up of the SS officer Korps.So until someone plods through all the files giving that background info we will never know!It's all guess work

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi jkeenan,

I am not sure you understand the principles of sampling. In the UK, voter research surveys normally sample just over a thousand people out of some 40 million voters and consistently come up with results that closely reflect real electoral results.

A survey of 582 Waffen-SS officers would therefore appear to be a very viable sampling of the even if it was of the entire W-SS officer corps.

However, from Goldsworthy, it appears that Wegner actually surveyed only the senior W-SS officer ranks in an even more comprehensive way.

We can only work from the information available. If you want more detailed information, I would suggest you approach the W-SS authors here on AHF. I have repeatedly asked on open thread here that they analyse their own officer lists, but they consistently do not do so.

Cheers,

Sid.