Hi Dennis,
The 65% and 30% figures above come from an article in the book German Professions, 1800-1950.
The article is "The Past as Future: The German Officer Corps as Profession".
The book and most of the article are viewable on Googlebooks.
The article also notes that in the winter of 1942-43 the Abitur hurdle was removed and field promotions allowed.
Cheers,
Sid.
Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
Hi
I saw this short document on the net. It has some interesting information of a general nature.
Document: Officer procurement in the Waffen SS
http://downloads.sturmpanzer.com/FMS/NARA_FMS_D178.pdf
Some of my own salient extracts from the article:
Some links with the Army Officer training system
The schools organised for this purpose (i.e. Bad Toz and Braunschweig) were patterned almost exactly after the German Army’s officer candidate schools, with the German Army Service Regulations Manual “D20”as their guide.
The instructors were qualified former officers who patterned the new school after the German Army’s officer candidate school at Munich. The initial instructors were a mix of former Army officers and former Police officers/long-service NCOs. To what extent the Wehrmacht participated in organising the school can be seen from the fact that the commandant from the German Army’s officer candidate school at Munich was given permission by a leading SS officer to be present at the examinations, and to offer criticism and advice in training matters. Moreover, the German Army’s officer candidate school at Munich assigned instructors to the SS officer candidate school at Bad Tolz.
The intervals between courses at the SS training schools were utilised to further the education of instructors and to improve co-ordination. This was accomplished by sending teams of instructors to officer candidate schools of the Army, and Luftwaffe. Field trips into various parts of Germany, mostly to points of historical interest, were conducted; they were combined with lectures on tactics and lasted for several weeks. In this manner the knowledge and creative faculties of the instructors were broadened to a considerable extent.
The SS did not have special training schools for Panzer (?sound odd to me?) and mortar trained personnel. Hence SS officer candidates for these arms were sent to the appropriate Army schools.
The SS candidates had to participate for several days in Wehrmacht maneuvers (special exercises of reconnaissance battalions, anti-tank units, etc), as well as in the German Army’s fall maneuvers (regiments and up), to become familiar with the practical application of tactics. Visits to Luftwaffe air fields and other installations supplemented this training. Each year the SS officer candidates spent several weeks at a troop training centre; this not only improved their marksmanship but also advanced their tactical and other military knowledge.
Some figures
100 officer cadets enrolled in the first year at Bad Tolz in April 1934. (Braunschweig did not begin until April 1935).
In April 1935 Bad Tolz and Braunschweig enrolled 100-120 candidates at each school.
During 1944 approx 7,000 officers were commissioned. Of which 6,000 were from the candidate schools (meaning about 10,000 had been initially enrolled) and 1,000 from field commissions for bravery in the field.
Training of reserve officers of the Waffen SS began in the autumn of 1940. Prior to this all Junker graduates were active SS officers. During the war, the average officer cadet would require 18 months for active officers and 15 months for reserve officers.
The average failure rate at the academies for the mid- term examinations is 30% (during war years also?). It is rare for candidates to fail the final exams.
Officer selection
All SS recruit/soldiers with potential or demonstrated ability were identified for officer candidate consideration.
All recruits (even in wartime) with the following were automatically listed as potential Waffen SS officer candidates:
• graduates of a secondary school,
• college students/graduates,
• existing Allgemeine SS officers
• those in possession of sufficient education, suitable position in life and suitable character
Those recruits or soldiers who showed during training and initial service that they were officer material, although they did not have the above qualifications, were to be recommended by their units for potential officer candidates.
The individual would be classified as an “Officer Candidate” at this stage. (An additional file/form would presumably be kept on these soldiers? The procedure seems independent of applicant action up to this stage?).
Selection for officer training was initiated by the issue of a certificate by the SS Department for Officer Procurement to members of this pool. The selected individuals remained in the officer procurement group, but would be known as an “Accepted Officer Candidate”. He would have to pass a preliminary examination, after which the candidate would usually be sent to a preliminary training course prior to formal studies at the SS academy. On completion of this course the cadet would again be tested for mental flexibility and general knowledge before going to the academy.
At the academy there was a rigorous half yearly exam. Followed by another exam at the end of the academy course. After this the SS officer candidates were transferred to the appropriate special-service school (ie their end speciality).
All the best
Dennis
I saw this short document on the net. It has some interesting information of a general nature.
Document: Officer procurement in the Waffen SS
http://downloads.sturmpanzer.com/FMS/NARA_FMS_D178.pdf
Some of my own salient extracts from the article:
Some links with the Army Officer training system
The schools organised for this purpose (i.e. Bad Toz and Braunschweig) were patterned almost exactly after the German Army’s officer candidate schools, with the German Army Service Regulations Manual “D20”as their guide.
The instructors were qualified former officers who patterned the new school after the German Army’s officer candidate school at Munich. The initial instructors were a mix of former Army officers and former Police officers/long-service NCOs. To what extent the Wehrmacht participated in organising the school can be seen from the fact that the commandant from the German Army’s officer candidate school at Munich was given permission by a leading SS officer to be present at the examinations, and to offer criticism and advice in training matters. Moreover, the German Army’s officer candidate school at Munich assigned instructors to the SS officer candidate school at Bad Tolz.
The intervals between courses at the SS training schools were utilised to further the education of instructors and to improve co-ordination. This was accomplished by sending teams of instructors to officer candidate schools of the Army, and Luftwaffe. Field trips into various parts of Germany, mostly to points of historical interest, were conducted; they were combined with lectures on tactics and lasted for several weeks. In this manner the knowledge and creative faculties of the instructors were broadened to a considerable extent.
The SS did not have special training schools for Panzer (?sound odd to me?) and mortar trained personnel. Hence SS officer candidates for these arms were sent to the appropriate Army schools.
The SS candidates had to participate for several days in Wehrmacht maneuvers (special exercises of reconnaissance battalions, anti-tank units, etc), as well as in the German Army’s fall maneuvers (regiments and up), to become familiar with the practical application of tactics. Visits to Luftwaffe air fields and other installations supplemented this training. Each year the SS officer candidates spent several weeks at a troop training centre; this not only improved their marksmanship but also advanced their tactical and other military knowledge.
Some figures
100 officer cadets enrolled in the first year at Bad Tolz in April 1934. (Braunschweig did not begin until April 1935).
In April 1935 Bad Tolz and Braunschweig enrolled 100-120 candidates at each school.
During 1944 approx 7,000 officers were commissioned. Of which 6,000 were from the candidate schools (meaning about 10,000 had been initially enrolled) and 1,000 from field commissions for bravery in the field.
Training of reserve officers of the Waffen SS began in the autumn of 1940. Prior to this all Junker graduates were active SS officers. During the war, the average officer cadet would require 18 months for active officers and 15 months for reserve officers.
The average failure rate at the academies for the mid- term examinations is 30% (during war years also?). It is rare for candidates to fail the final exams.
Officer selection
All SS recruit/soldiers with potential or demonstrated ability were identified for officer candidate consideration.
All recruits (even in wartime) with the following were automatically listed as potential Waffen SS officer candidates:
• graduates of a secondary school,
• college students/graduates,
• existing Allgemeine SS officers
• those in possession of sufficient education, suitable position in life and suitable character
Those recruits or soldiers who showed during training and initial service that they were officer material, although they did not have the above qualifications, were to be recommended by their units for potential officer candidates.
The individual would be classified as an “Officer Candidate” at this stage. (An additional file/form would presumably be kept on these soldiers? The procedure seems independent of applicant action up to this stage?).
Selection for officer training was initiated by the issue of a certificate by the SS Department for Officer Procurement to members of this pool. The selected individuals remained in the officer procurement group, but would be known as an “Accepted Officer Candidate”. He would have to pass a preliminary examination, after which the candidate would usually be sent to a preliminary training course prior to formal studies at the SS academy. On completion of this course the cadet would again be tested for mental flexibility and general knowledge before going to the academy.
At the academy there was a rigorous half yearly exam. Followed by another exam at the end of the academy course. After this the SS officer candidates were transferred to the appropriate special-service school (ie their end speciality).
All the best
Dennis
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
Hi Dennis,
A good find and very interesting stuff.
I haven't had time to absorb it all yet and will get back to you.
Many thanks,
Sid.
A good find and very interesting stuff.
I haven't had time to absorb it all yet and will get back to you.
Many thanks,
Sid.
Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
Hi Sid
I had forgotten to your earlier post to me on 3 Sept, post#71. Sorry for the tardy response.
All the best
Dennis
I had forgotten to your earlier post to me on 3 Sept, post#71. Sorry for the tardy response.
dshaday wrote:
At this stage there is no mention if what happened in 1938 was typical, or a one-off.
Personally, I don't think we can discount the Austrian officers in the statistics for the Wehrmacht as they also came with (from memory of the article) 6 infantry divisions worth of soldiers. So a figure of 20% should still be used for Army NCO to Officer promotion in 1938.Sid Guttridge wrote:Well, we do know it was a one-off in one area because it includes 1,600 Austrian officers. However, as this includes everyone from generals to junior lieutenants and they are not differentiated by background we have to discard them from our calculations and fall back on the Alt Reich inductions, of whom 25% were ex-NCOs.
I would agree with you that we do not have a trend with just two pieces of data 18years apart. So I do not see how we can suspect something similar for the in between period.Sid Guttridge wrote: What we do know is that the 25% figure appears twice - for the Reichswehr in the 1920s and for officer inductions in 1938. This may not be enough to be a trend in itself, but it offers the hint of a trend. Furthermore, as Reichswehr men were supposedly trained to command levels two ranks above their own, it is reasonable to suspect that something similar was also occurring in the mid-1930s as the Army expanded massively.
I do not recall anyone saying there was an impenetrable career ceiling for Army NCOs.Sid Guttridge wrote: What we seem to know from Wegner is that 8%-9% of middle and senior ranking officers in the Waffen-SS were ex-NCOs. What we know from other sources is that the Army may have had a peacetime culture between the wars of inducting around 25% of its new officers from its own NCOs. From these not directly equatable statistics, it is impossible to tell whether an Army NCO was more likely to achieve advancement if he switched to the Waffen-SS. In any case, the proposition that there was a virtually impenetrable ceiling beyond which NCOs could not progress in the Army seems to be a myth.
That is why I said that "New Army officer applicants still had to meet minimum Army entry qualifications. This would be education (arbiter or Army entry exam equivalent). Not to mention all-round character profile (which can include class/status and background)." Note my mention of special equivalency examinations, which as you rightly clarify, assisted enlisted candidates lacking in formal education.Sid Guttridge wrote:With regard to the Abitur, the link you gave says, "Outside candidates were expected to have an extensive pre-university education level. The Abitur was desired but not required. In its place, the candidate could take special equivalency examinations, a system which assisted enlisted candidates lacking in formal education." From this it appears that the Abitur was not a sine qua non, even for outside candidates, and that the Army offered another avenue for its own other ranks without the desired civilian educational background who sought to enter officer ranks.
All the best
Dennis
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Sid Guttridge
- Member
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Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
Hi Dennis,
Still on the case.
I came across this on p.632 of Nazism 1919-1945, Volume 3.
The book is a University of Exeter publication and consists of reproductions in English of hundreds of original documents;
"In a series of meetings held at the Defence Ministry on 20-21 December (1933), Blomberg and the Army chiefs determined the basis of the new programme. The following is an excerpt from a memorandum of these meetings.........
Officer requirements:
1) Shortening of training. Among other things, school leavers' certificates (Abitur) should not be required as a matter of principle.
2) Reappointment of former officers up to age 40 (from L.O., police, S.A., and from those in private employment).
3) Officers from the ranks of the N.C.O.s.
4) Transfer from the staffs..... "
This implies policy continuity between the earlier statistical snapshots of the Reichswehr in the early 1920s and the Heer in 1938-39. NCOs were apparently recognized source of Army officers in the early 1920s, the early 1930s and the late 1930s. The Waffen-SS seems to have had no monopoly on social advancement by this means.
Cheers,
Sid.
Still on the case.
I came across this on p.632 of Nazism 1919-1945, Volume 3.
The book is a University of Exeter publication and consists of reproductions in English of hundreds of original documents;
"In a series of meetings held at the Defence Ministry on 20-21 December (1933), Blomberg and the Army chiefs determined the basis of the new programme. The following is an excerpt from a memorandum of these meetings.........
Officer requirements:
1) Shortening of training. Among other things, school leavers' certificates (Abitur) should not be required as a matter of principle.
2) Reappointment of former officers up to age 40 (from L.O., police, S.A., and from those in private employment).
3) Officers from the ranks of the N.C.O.s.
4) Transfer from the staffs..... "
This implies policy continuity between the earlier statistical snapshots of the Reichswehr in the early 1920s and the Heer in 1938-39. NCOs were apparently recognized source of Army officers in the early 1920s, the early 1930s and the late 1930s. The Waffen-SS seems to have had no monopoly on social advancement by this means.
Cheers,
Sid.
Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
But to what rank could an NCO rise ?
If you take Dietrich,Eicke,ex-army ncos who went on to command an army in Dietrich's case and a division in Eicke's case would they have done the same if they had stayed in the army ?
If you take Dietrich,Eicke,ex-army ncos who went on to command an army in Dietrich's case and a division in Eicke's case would they have done the same if they had stayed in the army ?
Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
In the spring of 1942 the HPA carried out, at Hitler's request, an analysis of the officer corps. The main focus of this analysis was the changes in the age of officers and the length of time spent in a rank before promotion to the next. They also produced the following table showing the composition of the officer corps at the start of the war and at two subsequent dates.
Source NARA T-78 R-40
Regards
John
Regards
John
Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
Thanks for the above John answers a lot of questions
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Sid Guttridge
- Member
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Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
Hi jkeenan,
The problem is that for the higher ranks staff officer training is required due to the growing professional complexities that go with senior rank, which necessarily requires an increasing level of formal education. Staff college is the equivalent to in-house university education within the armed forces. While skipping the school-leaver's abitur as a necessary qualification for promotion from senior NCO to junior officer was practicable, it becomes increasingly difficult to ignore educational limitations the higher up the officer corps one goes.
If you look earlier in the thread, you will find this to be so in the SS as well. The higher up its rank structure one goes, the higher the proportion of commanders drawn from the formally educated middle classes.
Former junior NCO A. Hitler was a case in point. He could have all the bright ideas, drive and ambition he wanted, but he was technically incapable of organizing the state or military structures he commanded. He was fortunate in that he inherited so advanced, organized and efficient state and armed forces to put his plans into effect. All his conquests were achieved by the German Army without any indispensable contribution by the Waffen-SS, which was, in any case, militarily a clone of the army anyway.
Dietrich was similar. In his highest appointments he was surrounded by army staff officers, who made up for his professional limitations. I'll have to look out my Totenkopf history to check on Eiche.
Statistically it is unlikely that either would have reached such ranks in the Army because they were just two amongst thousands of ex-NCOs. However, histan's useful chart above shows four ex-NCOs as Army major generals by April 1942, so if not Dietrich and/or Eiche, some other ex-NCOs would certainly have made it to senior rank in the Army.
Any proposition that the Waffen-SS was the only way for an ex-army NCO to reach officer ranks is clearly untrue. At the outbreak of war there were at least 400 of them over the rank of Captain in the regular Army.
I would suggest that in joining the Waffen-SS, ex-Army NCOs were either making a political decision, and/or one inclined to speed their advancement outside the more competitive environment of the Army. They can have had limited expectation of serving in the field with the Waffen-SS's predecessors before 1939, as until then all SS members still had their military obligations to the Army.
Cheers,
Sid.
The problem is that for the higher ranks staff officer training is required due to the growing professional complexities that go with senior rank, which necessarily requires an increasing level of formal education. Staff college is the equivalent to in-house university education within the armed forces. While skipping the school-leaver's abitur as a necessary qualification for promotion from senior NCO to junior officer was practicable, it becomes increasingly difficult to ignore educational limitations the higher up the officer corps one goes.
If you look earlier in the thread, you will find this to be so in the SS as well. The higher up its rank structure one goes, the higher the proportion of commanders drawn from the formally educated middle classes.
Former junior NCO A. Hitler was a case in point. He could have all the bright ideas, drive and ambition he wanted, but he was technically incapable of organizing the state or military structures he commanded. He was fortunate in that he inherited so advanced, organized and efficient state and armed forces to put his plans into effect. All his conquests were achieved by the German Army without any indispensable contribution by the Waffen-SS, which was, in any case, militarily a clone of the army anyway.
Dietrich was similar. In his highest appointments he was surrounded by army staff officers, who made up for his professional limitations. I'll have to look out my Totenkopf history to check on Eiche.
Statistically it is unlikely that either would have reached such ranks in the Army because they were just two amongst thousands of ex-NCOs. However, histan's useful chart above shows four ex-NCOs as Army major generals by April 1942, so if not Dietrich and/or Eiche, some other ex-NCOs would certainly have made it to senior rank in the Army.
Any proposition that the Waffen-SS was the only way for an ex-army NCO to reach officer ranks is clearly untrue. At the outbreak of war there were at least 400 of them over the rank of Captain in the regular Army.
I would suggest that in joining the Waffen-SS, ex-Army NCOs were either making a political decision, and/or one inclined to speed their advancement outside the more competitive environment of the Army. They can have had limited expectation of serving in the field with the Waffen-SS's predecessors before 1939, as until then all SS members still had their military obligations to the Army.
Cheers,
Sid.
Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
Hi
I will need some help to understand this table properly (especially as I do not speak German) and the on-line translator is a bit dubious. The data posted by histan seems to be a gem worth understanding properly.
The table to the left shows total Army officer strengths for the dates nominated, is this correct?
What are the figures in brackets for each rank ? Is this the parameter “P3”? So what is P3 actually?
I assume that the table to the right shows the officer corp composition (minus P3, whatever P3 is). Is this correct? So the table’s column headings could be translated as:
“Current serving (active) officers” “Re-activated Officers” “From Reserve Officers” “From N.C.Os” Is this correct?
I am puzzled that the numbers in the two tables do not seem to harmonise. For example, why are there no NCOs who are promoted to leutnant or oberleutnant?
What is the best way to read the tables?
With regards to former NCOs, is the table on the right showing the total number of former NCOs that are occupying each officer rank for that particular date?
I find it interesting that the first date is just before the start of the war (after a large expansion in officers in anticipation of hostilities); that the next date corresponds approx to the ending of the main fighting in Russia for the first season (with the heavy officer losses) and the last date is close to the start/run-up of the next campaigning season in Russia where the Army would have presumably received a lot of replacements.
All the best
Dennis
I will need some help to understand this table properly (especially as I do not speak German) and the on-line translator is a bit dubious. The data posted by histan seems to be a gem worth understanding properly.
The table to the left shows total Army officer strengths for the dates nominated, is this correct?
What are the figures in brackets for each rank ? Is this the parameter “P3”? So what is P3 actually?
I assume that the table to the right shows the officer corp composition (minus P3, whatever P3 is). Is this correct? So the table’s column headings could be translated as:
“Current serving (active) officers” “Re-activated Officers” “From Reserve Officers” “From N.C.Os” Is this correct?
I am puzzled that the numbers in the two tables do not seem to harmonise. For example, why are there no NCOs who are promoted to leutnant or oberleutnant?
What is the best way to read the tables?
With regards to former NCOs, is the table on the right showing the total number of former NCOs that are occupying each officer rank for that particular date?
I find it interesting that the first date is just before the start of the war (after a large expansion in officers in anticipation of hostilities); that the next date corresponds approx to the ending of the main fighting in Russia for the first season (with the heavy officer losses) and the last date is close to the start/run-up of the next campaigning season in Russia where the Army would have presumably received a lot of replacements.
All the best
Dennis
Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
The P3
could be the number of supplementary officers (former officers who were retired from the old German army or from the Reichswehr which also included officers with specialist careers.Who had been recalled to active military service to fill the need for experienced officers in the rapidly expanding army.There duty assignments was restricted to certain positions and there promotions slower then those of regular officers.
could be the number of supplementary officers (former officers who were retired from the old German army or from the Reichswehr which also included officers with specialist careers.Who had been recalled to active military service to fill the need for experienced officers in the rapidly expanding army.There duty assignments was restricted to certain positions and there promotions slower then those of regular officers.
Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
Hi
Maybe the poster histan who provided the raw data in post #82 can comment?
All the best
Dennis
Does anyone actually know answers to any of my questions (above,) without having to resort to guesses?dshaday wrote:Hi
I will need some help to understand this table properly (especially as I do not speak German) and the on-line translator is a bit dubious. The data posted by histan seems to be a gem worth understanding properly.
The table to the left shows total Army officer strengths for the dates nominated, is this correct?
What are the figures in brackets for each rank ? Is this the parameter “P3”? So what is P3 actually?
I assume that the table to the right shows the officer corp composition (minus P3, whatever P3 is). Is this correct? So the table’s column headings could be translated as:
“Current serving (active) officers” “Re-activated Officers” “From Reserve Officers” “From N.C.Os” Is this correct?
I am puzzled that the numbers in the two tables do not seem to harmonise. For example, why are there no NCOs who are promoted to leutnant or oberleutnant?
What is the best way to read the tables?
With regards to former NCOs, is the table on the right showing the total number of former NCOs that are occupying each officer rank for that particular date?
I find it interesting that the first date is just before the start of the war (after a large expansion in officers in anticipation of hostilities); that the next date corresponds approx to the ending of the main fighting in Russia for the first season (with the heavy officer losses) and the last date is close to the start/run-up of the next campaigning season in Russia where the Army would have presumably received a lot of replacements.
All the best
Dennis
Maybe the poster histan who provided the raw data in post #82 can comment?
All the best
Dennis
-
Orwell1984
- Member
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- Joined: 18 Jun 2011, 19:42
Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
If you search this forum using the phrase P3, the following thread is found:
P3 aka Zentralabteilung OKH
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=51021
This should help explain what P3 is.
P3 aka Zentralabteilung OKH
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=51021
This should help explain what P3 is.
Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
Hi Orwell1984
The search continues.
Dennis
Unfortunately the "P3" mentioned in that thread is for a Department in the Army. The table in post #82 looks to have a numerical value that has been called P3 referenced in it. I suspect that these are two different things. They both just happen to be called P3.Orwell1984 wrote:If you search this forum using the phrase P3, the following thread is found:
P3 aka Zentralabteilung OKH
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=51021
This should help explain what P3 is.
The search continues.
Dennis
-
Orwell1984
- Member
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Re: Social structure of the Waffen-SS officer corps
Actually Dennis, if you look closely at the thread I linked to you, you'll see the thread I linked to shows P3 is the department of the Army that deals with General Staff Officers.
The title of the survey histan published is " Overview about the summary of the Officer Corps without P3". P3 is a type/classification of officer that is being excluded.
Since P3 is the department that deals with General Staff Officers and I,n all my searching, is the only reference for P3 in German records I could find I feel safe in concluding that this is a survey that is distinguishing General Staff Officers from the regular body.
Another interesting clue is that histan reports that this survey was conducted, at Hitler's request, in early 1942. This fits in time in which Hitler began to take actions against the General Staff influence, becoming dissatisfied with their performance/loyalty to him. In December 1941, they were blamed by Hitler for the poor winter preparations of the Army in Russia. In September 1942, he went so far as to accuse them of cowardice.
So unless you can find another definition for P3, I think it can be interpreted as shorthand for General Staff Officers and the time period of the document fits in with a time period where Hitler was interested in minimizing their influence.
The title of the survey histan published is " Overview about the summary of the Officer Corps without P3". P3 is a type/classification of officer that is being excluded.
Since P3 is the department that deals with General Staff Officers and I,n all my searching, is the only reference for P3 in German records I could find I feel safe in concluding that this is a survey that is distinguishing General Staff Officers from the regular body.
Another interesting clue is that histan reports that this survey was conducted, at Hitler's request, in early 1942. This fits in time in which Hitler began to take actions against the General Staff influence, becoming dissatisfied with their performance/loyalty to him. In December 1941, they were blamed by Hitler for the poor winter preparations of the Army in Russia. In September 1942, he went so far as to accuse them of cowardice.
So unless you can find another definition for P3, I think it can be interpreted as shorthand for General Staff Officers and the time period of the document fits in with a time period where Hitler was interested in minimizing their influence.