German Generals who retired or sidelined during the war

[AJFFM]

Hello to you all

While I was reading a book on the Polish campaign (next Sept. 1st it would 75 years since the war began) I noted that a number of German generals who commanded at division, corps and Army level somehow retired during the war despite not suffering any major defeats (that I know of) while older generals like Keitel, Bock and others continued to serve despite failures.

Examples include Marshals like List and Manstein, Generalobersts like Ruoff and Haase and numerous lower rank generals.

What were the main reasons for those retirements especially given the fact that many were involved in the early successes of the Wehrmacht in WWII?

[DocHawkeye]

Pretty much failing to tell Hitler everything he wanted to hear. Many German Army commanders were pressured into early retirement by Nazi leadership for failing to satiate Hitler's every whim. It only got easier to end up on Hitler's bad side as the war went on too. That's why even guys like Guderian were sacked, what, like two or three times? I don't think German Army leadership was as privy to the necessity of pleasing Hitler-in order to get your way-as the Nazis were. Guys like Goebbels and Himmler figured it out years ago. Course' they may also have just been so afraid of Bormann that so much as losing contact with Hitler might result in them ending up in a ditch somewhere.

Keitel served to the end of the war because like other prominent Nazis, he always told Hitler what Hitler wanted to hear. Nothing else. Bock likely the same. I think by 1945 the only General on Hitler's good side who wasn't consistently lying about the results he was achieving was Kesselring.

[ViKinG]

Fedor von Bock was sacked as well

Luc

[Cult Icon]

Manstein's command suffered a string of major defeats and was sacked in early 1944.

[AJFFM]

Fedor von Bock continued to serve into 1943 unlike many of the generals who were sacked/retired after Moscow or even before Barbarossa and never returned like v. Leeb.

Manstein's brilliantly managed the campaigns around both sides of the Dnieper in the winter of 43-44 and if those campaigns proved anything it proved his calibre as an excellent commander. Hitler sacked him for his defiance and challenge to Hitler's authority and his successors proved to be colossal failures as the 1944 summer campaigns proved.

[Cult Icon]

Hitler fired him for constantly retreating, and then promising Kharkov backblow II but not delivering. Manstein may have done well given the unfavorable situation, but still there was a string of defeats in the south. It makes sense to remove him, although replace him with who?

Delay is delay; victory is in the other direction..

[askropp]

Bock was fired in July 1942 after he complained about the splitting of forces between Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

[AJFFM]

I think Manstein made it clear that victory won't come without flexibility and never claimed he could win in the Dnieper Basin without first retreating. Even so Manstein was light years better than the people who replaced him (despite the availability of other generals who were just as good like Model) and in the end continued to serve well into 1944.

What I am interested in the the large number of generals especially those born between 1880 and 1890 who served earlier as either regimental and divisional commanders with considerable success and found themselves sidelined or without a job quite early.

[Cult Icon]

In the end, in the mind of Hitler Manstein's claims were just this: BS, Running away. Manstein's last major victory was in March 1943. No matter what is to blame (supposedly),he lost numerous times afterwards even with a lot of resources at his disposal. Model replaced Manstein, as he had a record of stubborn defensive performance in the north but with limited retreats and backwards 'repositioning'.

Most German generals had major failures post 1942.

I think Manstein made it clear that victory won't come without flexibility and never claimed he could win in the Dnieper Basin without first retreating. Even so Manstein was light years better than the people who replaced him (despite the availability of other generals who were just as good like Model) and in the end continued to serve well into 1944.

von Kleist being fired in the Caucasus comes to mind. 'Major failures' is however, subjective; The German generals all failed, majorly in 1941 even with lots of tactical wins. So then the definition becomes hard to define.

[AJFFM]

In the end, in the mind of Hitler Manstein's claims were just this: BS, Running away. Manstein's last major victory was in March 1943. No matter what is to blame (supposedly),he lost numerous times afterwards even with a lot of resources at his disposal. Model replaced Manstein, as he had a record of stubborn defensive performance in the north but with limited retreats and backwards 'repositioning'.

Hitler wanted to get rid of Manstein and used his defeats (which were interrupted by a series of remarkable tactical/operational victories) as an excuse. Model (who did not replace Manstein) was no different than Manstein in his assessment of the general situation and withdrew even more than Manstein did with the significant difference is that unlike Manstein he never had a very successful counter stroke that saved troops or restored lines. Nor defeats in NA, Italy, in the air war or even in the east were enough to fire very incompetent generals who kept their jobs because they were Nazis or controllable.

Most German generals had major failures post 1942.

I think Manstein made it clear that victory won't come without flexibility and never claimed he could win in the Dnieper Basin without first retreating. Even so Manstein was light years better than the people who replaced him (despite the availability of other generals who were just as good like Model) and in the end continued to serve well into 1944.

von Kleist being fired in the Caucasus comes to mind. 'Major failures' is however, subjective; The German generals all failed, majorly in 1941 even with lots of tactical wins. So then the definition becomes hard to define.

If you are taking about strategic leadership yes. On the other hand the Germans continued to register impressive operational victories till the very end of the war (their last operational victory in the east was at Bautzen in April 45).

My point is that the war was decisively over by Nov. 1942 with the Allied landing in NA and Soviet counter offensives in Stalingrad and Rzhev. The field commanders who have shown their calibre on both tactical and operational levels in earlier campaigns both in victory and defeat would have been useful in managing the long retreat home.

[histan]

The careers of German generals were managed by the HPA. Appointments were based on to a large extent on performance assessments made by superior officers. Thus a division commander would be assessed by his corps commander with additional comments by his army and army group commanders. A second important factor was his health and the medical assessment of whether he was fit for an operational command at the front (particularly the Eastern Front).

If you look at the careers of the generals that you identify as "sidelined", you will discover two things:
The first is that many of them had to leave their commands in the winter of 1941-42 because of ill health. The second is that others proved incapable of dealing with the operational demands of campaigning on the Eastern Front (as assessed by their superiors).

A significant number of these corps and division commanders were assessed as suitable for commanding training commands and so you will see the retired generals who were recalled at the outbreak of war to fill these commands being replaced by the experienced former corps and division commanders who had experience of modern warfare that they could bring to training.

Regards

John