The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

[ljadw]

[dshaday]

Hi John

Dennis

You wrote:
"It is quite true and correct to say that Wehrmacht troops were often involved in operations with the Waffen SS . That is why I was careful in my description of the military successes I attributed to the Waffen SS."

It is more correct to say that the Waffen SS operations were almost always conducted as part of an Army operation. This is true of both Demjansk and the Cherkassy, which were Army operations in which the Waffen SS played a role.

Yes, saying that “the Waffen SS operations were almost always conducted as part of an Army operation” is a much better and more accurate way to say it. It is more correct at both the higher and local levels.

The Waffen SS was under Army command. It relied on Army infrastructure and rear support to operate. It operated with Army combat units to achieve the military goals assigned to them. Being on the same side.

Demjansk was not just a Waffen SS success but was due to the performance of the Army, Luftwaffe, and Waffen SS plus a significant contribution from the weather.

I could write a similar short essay on Cherkassy.

Please note, I am not saying that the Waffen SS did not perform well in these operations but that success was achieved because of an equally good performance by army units as well.

I have no disagreement with you here.

I was pointing out successes of the Waffen SS in my list, and was focused on that. In no way did I mean or want to say that the Wehrmacht was not heavily involved, or that it’s role was insignificant. That is why I deliberately used terms in my list like “led the breakout” and “were instrumental” regarding the Waffen SS.

The Wehrmacht units involved in Demjansk and Cherkassy actions should be given credit for their military successes. As should the Waffen SS units. Each can claim a military success. Remember, the Waffen SS was not part of the Wehrmacht.

For example, as you pointed out in your quote, SS Totenkopf was a major component of the break out force even though it was only one of the 6 or 7 divisions encircled. I have also read that it contributed significantly to the holding of the pocket.
I also see a similar story for SS Wiking in Cherkassy.

Thanks for the reference you suggested, I will see if I can find it.

All the best

Dennis

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Dennis,

The primary reason why Belgrade was taken without a fight was that the Yugoslavs had declared it an open city and decided not to defend it. It was nothing to do with an act of brilliance by the W-SS. They were doing little more than moving into a military vacuum where a German 5th column was already active.

This is a classic example of Waffen-SS myth building. Common sense should lead any observer to question whether it was likely that a single company, however brilliantly led, would suffice to capture an enemy capital without losses if it was actively defended. Full marks to the unit concerned for moving fast and with initiative, but it was no military epic.

There are other examples of faux military epics being attributed to the W-SS. SS-Heimwehr Danzig is a case in point. It failed in almost all its missions in September 1939, yet in 1944 Himmler gave a mock heroic speech on its supposed achievements and it even has an English language book dedicated to it!

The Greeks were not intent on surrendering specifically to the Waffen-SS, just to any Germans rather than any Italians. 1st W-SS Division, which certainly performed well in the campaign, were the nearest Germans.

The presence of the Waffen-SS or its predecessors in every campaign from the remilitarization of the Rhineland onwards (except Norway and North Africa) was never militarily necessary. However, for reasons of political prestige, the NSDAP had to be seen to be to the fore. As the Nazi Party-in-arms, this necessarily meant that W-SS units were almost always present. As you concede, any competent Army mechanized formation, of which there were many, could have performed exactly the same military role. However, they could not perform the same political role.

What really distinguishes the Waffen-SS is political, not military.

Cheers,

Sid.

[dshaday]

Hi RichTO90

For sure there are any number of tactical and even operational successes that could be attributed to the W-SS. Strategic? No, I think not.

One possible strategic example could be operation Panzerfaust, led by Sturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny in Hungary October 1944.

The forces used were a mix of Police/SS, Waffen SS and Army units available in the area. The majority appear to have been Waffen SS. The raid used to kidnap Horty’s son was led by Skorzeny (using police and stand-by troops from SS-Fall.Jg. Bat. 600). After which the Castle Hill was surrounded, and taken mainly by Waffen SS troops from “Maria Theresia” cavalry division and tanks from 3/ s.H.Pz.Abt 503 using bluff. Elements of SS-Jaeger Battalion 502 with Arrow Cross supporters occupied the Budapest radio Station.
This effectively allowed Horty to be removed from power and his peace declaration squashed. Apparently, Hitler was well pleased with Operation Panzerfaust’s results and low casualties.

Results were strategic in that this operation kept Hungary in the war and fighting on the Axis side till the end in Europe. Despite Horty’s plan to make peace with Stalin in late 1944.

I have incomplete information on the role played by army units in this operation as most accounts I see focus on the SS. In any case, they too deserve credit for their part in this successful operation.

Regards

Dennis

[dshaday]

Hi Sid

The primary reason why Belgrade was taken without a fight was that the Yugoslavs had declared it an open city and decided not to defend it. It was nothing to do with an act of brilliance by the W-SS. They were doing little more than moving into a military vacuum where a German 5th column was already active.

This is a classic example of Waffen-SS myth building. Common sense should lead any observer to question whether it was likely that a single company, however brilliantly led, would suffice to capture an enemy capital without losses if it was actively defended. Full marks to the unit concerned for moving fast and with initiative, but it was no military epic.

Belgrade was declared an open city a day before the invasion (in peace time) on 5 April. The Germans did not respect the status, and bombed it severely anyway (the bombings were already scheduled in the German attack plans).

The Jugoslavs already had anti-aircraft guns (which should not be in an open city) installed in the city. They fired at the German bombers on day 1. The Jugoslav air-force also intercepted the German bombers over Belgrade. After that, I cannot see how anyone can assume that the Jugoslavs would continue to guarantee an open, undefended city.

In any event, the SS unit was fired on in Belgrade. It took 1,300 armed prisoners and their weapons. These POWs did not end up slipping away to fight in the hills.

I fully agree that this incident only happened through luck, daring, air-raid-chaos and a demoralised Jugoslav army. This kind of success is not what you would typically expect. However, it is factual (not a myth) and arguably a military success.

There are other examples of faux military epics being attributed to the W-SS. SS-Heimwehr Danzig is a case in point. It failed in almost all its missions in September 1939, yet in 1944 Himmler gave a mock heroic speech on its supposed achievements and it even has an English language book dedicated to it!

The trick is not to believe the propaganda propagated in wartime - Axis or Allied.
Also, no one here has claimed this action as an example of military success by the SS. I see no real point in bringing it up.

The Greeks were not intent on surrendering specifically to the Waffen-SS, just to any Germans rather than any Italians. 1st W-SS Division, which certainly performed well in the campaign, were the nearest Germans.

Dietrich was likely the nearest General rank officer in the front line. Etiquette would be for the Greek general to surrender to a German general. That would have appealed to the Greeks, and was likely an important factor in which German unit they chose to surrender to.

... As you concede, any competent Army mechanized formation, of which there were many, could have performed exactly the same military role.

Not so fast. Are you trying to put words into my mouth? I believe my comment was somewhat specific, appropriate and, did not use those words.

All the best

Dennis

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Dennis,

This post has disappered into the ether twice, so my apologies for the delay in replying.

Operation Panzerfaust did, indeed, have strategic implications. However, it was an internal security operation and it took place far behind the front.

Skorzeny's was the only such force available because the Army's Brandenburgers had fallen out of favour after the dismissal of the Abwehr's Admiral Canaris earlier in the year. Skorzeny had thereafter plundered them for specialists. For example, almost all the fluent US English speakers he used in the Ardennes were ex-Brandenburgers. As with the Waffen-SS elsewhere, Skorzeny's commandos were the clone of an Army predecessor - the Brandenburgers.

Operation Panzerfaust can usefully be contrasted with Skorzeny's failure during the July Bomb Plot. Even though his base was only 30 kilometers north of Berlin, and his unit was fully motorized, he failed to react in time to influence the outcome. Skorzeny's record was distinctly mixed and all the successes rightly or wrongly attached to his name took place well behind his own lines.

Skorzeny was the self-promoter par excellence, and anything he says about his own activities should be viewed with this in mind.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Dennis,

You write, "After that (Luftwaffe abuse through bombing of Belgrade's Open City status), I cannot see how anyone can assume that the Jugoslavs would continue to guarantee an open, undefended city."

One can never assume anything in war, but the fact of the matter is that Belgrade was undefended. Had any troops in the city opposed the W-SS entry they would have been guilty of a war crime.

If the occupation of Belgrade against no resistance is to be counted as a Waffen-SS military success, then it sets the bar spectacularly low! Given the catastrophic wider situation for the Yugoslav Army and lack of resistance in the city, it was at best a mopping up operation, though the lack of W-SS casualties implies that even this might be a flattering assessment.

Not only is the trick "not to believe the propaganda propagated in wartime" (assuming one can identify it, of course) but one should be equally wary of the post-war propaganda in the multiple post-war publications that serve to artificially boost the Waffen-SS at the expense of the far more important German Army. SS-Heimwehr Danzig benefitted from both wartime and post-war propaganda. I mentioned both, but you have overlooked the latter.

The objection to bringing up the poor performance of SS-Heimwehr Danzig illustrates this problem. If one wants to just publicize Waffen-SS successes (and these are widely available in numerous publications) one is simply perpetuating the existing distortion of history and inviting a whitewash.

Quite apart from examining the validity of claimed W-SS military successes, one should also investigate the presumed failures. The fact of the matter is that Waffen-SS successes were often counterballanced by Waffen-SS failures. If these aren't mentioned (and the failures are far more difficult to ferret out from the welter of Waffen-SS hagiographies) then a distorted image of the Waffen-SS will be perpetuated.

To clarify, are you contending that it is not true that ".....any competent Army mechanized formation, of which there were many, could have performed exactly the same military role."? That was very much my impression from your earlier post. My apologies if I was in error.

Cheers,

Sid.

[dshaday]

Hi Sid

Operation Panzerfaust did, indeed, have strategic implications. However, it was an internal security operation and it took place far behind the front.

Operation Panzerfaust did happen behind the front. It was still a military operation, that occurred on foreign soil (not internal security). The vast majority of personnel used were front line quality soldiers, as the possibility of open conflict and a siege was always there. If it went badly, Hungarian army units could have become fully involved against the Germans.

As I have pointed out, the Waffen SS led the operation and played a crucial role in it. The Wehrmacht was also actively involved and also exposed to potentially heavy combat.

Skorzeny’s credentials or history is irrelevant regarding Operation Panzerfaust.
He was tasked with the operation by Hitler. The operation was very successful (something like 7 killed and 26 wounded in total by all sides) and had no destruction of buildings in the capital. Hungary stayed in the war.

It is true that Skorzeny used members of SS-Jagdverband Ost. Most (but not all) of who were formally members of a single Brandenburger unit raised from volkdeutsh from Russia (absorbed into the SS in 1944). I know that Skorzeny’s second in command during Operation Panzerfaust was SS-Sturmbannführer von Fölkersam (ex-Brandenburger and a Baltic volksdeutsch).
Skorzeny would have been silly not to use that talent.

Regards

Dennis

[Orwell1984]

I would argue that the earlier Operation Margarethe in March 1944 had more of an impact on Hungary's decision to stay in the war than Operation Panzerfaust in October 1944.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Margarethe
By the time of the events of Operation Panzerfaust, the Germans had already taken control of much of Hungary's infrastructure and military capacity. This was one of the reasons why Horthy's appeals had little impact on Hungarian line troops. Margarethe aimed at taking over the whole country, Panzerfaust aimed at removing an individual who had become a problem.

[dshaday]

Hi Orwell

I would argue that the earlier Operation Margarethe in March 1944 had more of an impact on Hungary's decision to stay in the war than Operation Panzerfaust in October 1944.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Margarethe

Margarethe was an operation planned by the Army and involved a lot more German forces (including some Waffen SS divisions). It certainly put Hungary and its resources under German control (though not at full occupation, as with a Governor and German law). The Hungarian Regent (and his heir/son) was deliberately left in power although under close watch.

As we know, Operation Panzerfaust happened about 7 months later when Horty’s son tried to again make an armistice with the Russians. The plans were still in progress with the Russians and not yet ready to go.

By the time of the events of Operation Panzerfaust, the Germans had already taken control of much of Hungary's infrastructure and military capacity. This was one of the reasons why Horthy's appeals had little impact on Hungarian line troops. Margarethe aimed at taking over the whole country, Panzerfaust aimed at removing an individual who had become a problem.

Horty’s single appeal on the radio (before the radio was taken over) was not followed up by him with any formal orders through the Hungarian military system to soldiers at the front and in Hungary. There was confusion and indecision in the Hungarian military and probably the government. That was because Horty was forced to flee and became isolated. Soon afterwards he was blackmailed into abdicating, and installing a new pro-fascist leader (in place of his son).

I would say that Panzerfaust restored the big gains made for the Germans by Margarethe, without a civil war or mutiny/strike at the front by Hungarian forces. So Margarethe did all the hard work, and Panzerfaust was essential in not having it unravel. Making sure Hungary stayed in the war. Just my thoughts.

All the best

Dennis

[dshaday]

Hi Sid

Hi Dennis,

You write, "After that (Luftwaffe abuse through bombing of Belgrade's Open City status), I cannot see how anyone can assume that the Jugoslavs would continue to guarantee an open, undefended city."

One can never assume anything in war, but the fact of the matter is that Belgrade was undefended. Had any troops in the city opposed the W-SS entry they would have been guilty of a war crime.

It is exactly because one “can never assume anything in war” that Belgrade’s status as being undefended is in question. The Waffen SS entry was opposed. Belgrade was not defended well.

Please note: I did not actually write that “Luftwaffe abuse through bombing of Belgrade's Open City status” occurred. It is wrong to try and quote me on that with quotation marks. Those are your words and interpretation - this is below your normal standard.

If the occupation of Belgrade against no resistance is to be counted as a Waffen-SS military success, then it sets the bar spectacularly low! Given the catastrophic wider situation for the Yugoslav Army and lack of resistance in the city, it was at best a mopping up operation, though the lack of W-SS casualties implies that even this might be a flattering assessment.

That is your opinion and interpretation of course - I mostly disagree with it. Readers will decide for themselves.

Not only is the trick "not to believe the propaganda propagated in wartime" (assuming one can identify it, of course) but one should be equally wary of the post-war propaganda in the multiple post-war publications that serve to artificially boost the Waffen-SS at the expense of the far more important German Army. SS-Heimwehr Danzig benefitted from both wartime and post-war propaganda. I mentioned both, but you have overlooked the latter.

You made no direct mention of post-war propaganda re SS Danzig. Unless you mean the reference to an English language book of implied wartime origin? In all fairness I have never heard of a post-war hype on SS Danzig.

Just as there are post war publications artificially praising the Waffen SS, there are agenda ridden posters condemning the Waffen SS as much as possible.

The objection to bringing up the poor performance of SS-Heimwehr Danzig illustrates this problem. If one wants to just publicize Waffen-SS successes (and these are widely available in numerous publications) one is simply perpetuating the existing distortion of history and inviting a whitewash.

Only you have mentioned Heimwehr Danzig, and some sort of problem.

My only (general ) comment on your SS Danzig example is that this thread is about Waffen SS military successes.

There is no question mark after the topic name. See posts #1 followed by # 97, # 103 for the real reason for this thread. Your posts want to focus on the Waffen SS failures/limitations. That is the message behind my comment.

Post #1 is the reason why I posted a list of Waffen SS centric examples. I am trying to directly answer a poster’s specific question. I am not trying to push a Waffen SS barrow. You are obviously reading too much into things.

Quite apart from examining the validity of claimed W-SS military successes, one should also investigate the presumed failures. The fact of the matter is that Waffen-SS successes were often counterballanced by Waffen-SS failures. If these aren't mentioned (and the failures are far more difficult to ferret out from the welter of Waffen-SS hagiographies) then a distorted image of the Waffen-SS will be perpetuated.

Since you mention it, I would say that a distorted image and culture exists on this forum right now. But not in the way you think.

To clarify, are you contending that it is not true that ".....any competent Army mechanized formation, of which there were many, could have performed exactly the same military role."? That was very much my impression from your earlier post. My apologies if I was in error.

OK, I will briefly clarify.
The achievements I listed are virtually all by the classic SS divisions. I hold them to be more than just competent (you know that thread discussing the ”elite” word).

To obsess consciously or subconsciously on the Waffen SS Vs Wehrmacht game is a tangent (see post #97).

Regards

Dennis

[sandeepmukherjee196]

hi everyone ! a lot has happened here since i last visited:) lemme try and catch up with some rejoinders pl? first on the never ending debate on the waffen ss ness "ethos".. am copy pasting here a write up by a german youth whose paternal grandfather was in the heer and the maternal GF was in the waffen ss .. will give you a ring side view of the 'ethos' difference when things were cracking up in defeat..when reading the waffen ss GF's part.. pl focus on his description of the w/ ss combat troops' and officers' conduct and not his ( he was telling his story after decades of western trashing and vilification of what he fought for) :[/b]

" My name is Thorsten Wiehe, I am a 26 years old German who has lived and worked in Coventry since 1998. My fiancée of nine years is British, and in the past decade I have come to know and love this country and its people.
With the 60th anniversary of D-Day coming up, I look at the way this momentous event in history is commemorated by the British with great admiration as I believe it is absolutely crucial that what happened that day is will never be forgotten. I also find it fascinating to compare the way our two nations look at the events that occurred:
For understandable reasons Germans tend to commemorate the war in a very sombre fashion. There are documentaries and memorial ceremonies for the dead, but the general approach is very much focused on the facts of what happened and not on the personal experiences and sacrifices of the German soldiers involved. Interestingly Germans seem to identify more with allied soldiers, mainly because 95% of movies and documentaries on the subject are of Anglo-American import and obviously tend to portray the events from their side. The fact that many ordinary German soldiers were fighting every bit as much for survival as the Allied soldiers is often overlooked back home.
I would like to tell a little of the other side of the story: Both of my grandfathers fought in the war, and even though were very reluctant to share their experiences, I have learned a great deal about their part in the war over the years. I hope that those who read this will see that not every German soldier was an evil killing machine, but many were as much a victim of their time as their allied counterparts.
My dad’s father, Johann Wiehe, who sadly died in January 2003, was always very reluctant to talk about the war. He only started opening up when he got to know my British girlfriend, for reasons that will soon become apparent. He was born in 1920 in a small farming village, and got drafted into the Wehrmacht in 1940. He was trained as an anti-tank gunner attached to an infantry division, and took part in the initial assault on Russia and the rush towards the Volga at the time when the Wehrmacht seemed to be unstoppable. In the winter of 1942/1943 his division dug in outside of Stalingrad, where the most memorable of his stories occurred: His unit received orders to move off and meet a Russian counterattack, but my granddad was unable to join his comrades as his toes had to be amputated due to frostbite. The battery which he should have manned received a direct hit and he would most certainly have been killed, so the loss of his toes saved his live. He eventually became one of the last people to be flown out of the ‘Kessel’, and since then he regarded the 6th of December as his second birthday.
He spent most of 1943 recovering from his injuries and was then transferred to the area around Calais as part of a reserve division. I do not know much about his movements during the time of the invasion, but he was eventually captured in Belgium, near the town of Mons, in August 1944. As a POW he was shipped to England and was interned in a camp near Southampton until 1948, when he was released. He always spoke very highly of the British and said that being captured was the best thing that could have happened to him.
He took a particular liking to my British girlfriend and her family, I think that for him it represented some sort of closure seeing two people from countries that went to war when he was young fall in love. I have always had the uttermost respect for my grandfather, even though he fought for the side which was clearly in the wrong he was a good person and absolutely condemned war and violence for the rest of his life.
I asked him once whether he agreed with the Nazi’s political agenda and thought that the war was just. He said that before he was drafted in he had never travelled further than 20 miles from his village, and that Greater Germany’s glory was the very last thing on his mind when he was digging up potatoes and helping his father feed the family. Talking about all this was very painful to him, especially because his younger brother who was 16 at the time was marched off to the Eastern Front in 1945 and never returned. I have recently managed to locate his grave in the Czech Republic, unfortunately by that time my granddad had already passed away.
The story of my mum’s father Helmut Barkowsky is a little more colourful. He was born in Koenigsberg (now Kalinigrad) / East Prussia in 1926 and was drafted into the Waffen SS in 1942. I was quite shocked when he told me that he had been a member of the most infamous branch of the German terror machine, but he made it quite clear that he did not want to be associated with Hitler’s SS in any way. Although guilty of many crimes the Waffen SS in the West had little to do with the black uniformed, skull-and-crossbones toting maniacs, they were more like a better equipped branch of the Wehrmacht fighting alongside regular army units. By the time my granddad joined the ranks of the so-called elite, it had been decimated to such an extend that they were filled up with 16 year old boys like my grandfather, who was stationed in St. Lo a few miles from the Normandy beaches.
Rather than being a front line soldier my granddad was a motorbike messenger for the signals corps and as such spent most of his time travelling between the various regional headquarters and shuttling officers back and forth. He tells vivid stories of having to dodge the ever increasing Allied air attacks, sometimes having to fix his motorcycle up to ten times on a single journey after sustained attacks from the air. He particularly disliked planes with tail gunners, as those used to take pot-shots at him at regular intervals.
He has assured me that when the invasion came it was not as much of a surprise as is often made out, but that it made little difference once the assault took place. One thing he keeps pointing out is the superior quality of Allied equipment and supplies, he says it was very frustrating having to make to with what was available when the British and Americans seemed to have everything they needed.
His division was destroyed trying to hold up the Allied advance, but he managed to remain unharmed until March 1945, by which time the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS units had retreated well into German territory. One event he recalls with particular sadness was the defence of a small town in Western Germany, where he was sent to deliver the order to hold out to the last man to a gun battery on a hill overlooking the valley. When he arrived the American assault had just begun, and he witnessed the gun crews firing salvo after salvo into the ranks of Americans advancing up the hill, killing dozens of them.
To this day he wonders how the American commander could have marched his troops into such an obvious firing zone so recklessly, they just kept coming until the battery ran out of ammunition. My granddad urged the crews to abandon their useless guns and regroup in the town, but they refused to give up their position and he never saw them again.

At this time he says that it was blatantly obvious to everyone that there was no point to carry on fighting, yet many officers would not even contemplate the notion of defeat. At the end of March, after delivering a despatch to a forward observation post, an officer approached him demanding that he took him to the nearest town in his motorbike sidecar. My granddad refused and said that he had just come up that road and that it was already in the hand of the Americans, but the officer pulled his Luger and threatened to shoot him for insubordination if he did not comply.
Having no choice he drove the officer down the road, but after a few miles a hand grenade was flung into the sidecar by American soldiers hiding in a ditch. The grenade killed the officer instantly and tore my granddad’s leg to shreds, as well as knocking him unconscious. He woke up a few minutes later and found his motorbike still in working condition (minus the sidecar), so he drove to the next dressing station and had a cigarette while he watched the remains of his leg being sawn off. For me this sounds like a story from a movie, but he says that he did not feel a thing due to shock and exhaustion. He was eventually captured when the field hospital he was in surrendered to the advancing Allies. He finds the loss of his leg so close to the end of a war that was already lost when it began as utterly frustrating and pointless. When I asked him what he thought of the reasons behind the war he simply pointed to a map and said ‘It had nothing to do with the ordinary people and soldiers, they should have locked the damned politicians in a room and have them fight it out. Anyway, just look at it. And who in their right mind would pick a fight with Russia AND the United States? Utter madness…!’.
One thing my granddad is very proud of is that he only fired his rifle three times in anger during the entire war. ‘First time was an accident, I was fooling around and shot a chicken. The second time I had to shoot a horse which had collapsed onto its rider to save him. The third time I was so hungry I shot a deer in the woods and ate it with my comrades.’ I cannot be one hundred percent sure whether this is the case or if he just doesn’t want to admit to killing people, but I would like to think of it as being the truth.
After the surrender my granddad was interned and interrogated for being a member of the Waffen-SS, but he was released in late 1945 without being charged for any misconduct. By this time the Russians had already closed their sector so he was unable to return to his home in East Prussia. He left a wife and a daughter which he did not see again until the fall of the wall in 1990. He re-married in the 1950’s, my mother and her siblings were quite surprised when granddad told them that they had a half-sister they had known nothing of until then.
I cannot imagine what it must have been like to live through those times, and I think it is absolutely essential that people remember the suffering and sacrifices our parents and grandparents made and which have allowed us to lead the lives we do now.
I think that even though they were fighting for the wrong cause the stories of my grandfathers are worth remembering, they like so many others got caught up in the events of their time and were forced to do things they have regretted for the rest of their lives.

have fun folks !

[dshaday]

Hi Sandpmukherjee106

As much as the article is interesting to read from a human perspective, I would say that it does not belong in this discussion. The value for historical learning is also somewhat limited. Please don't take it the wrong way.

Firstly, this forum section is a non-biographical one.

Secondly the information has no connection to military successes of the Waffen SS (one way or the other).

Thirdly, the content has a lot of opinion based on, strictly speaking, fragmented memory. Letters and diaries etc from the time are much, much better.

All the best

Dennis

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Hi Dennis..the purpose of posting this particular piece was not about waffen ss victories.. it was about the never ending debate on the waffen ss ethos.. many people here have been sceptical about any special ethos being attributed to the waffen ss .. i agree that this piece has been a bit rambling and with a lot of non-war-non-combat stuff .. but pl do focus on the difference in attitude under mortal combat situations between the ordinary heer soldier and the waffen ss men in the last days.. as is being borne out by the twin grandfather tales here.. the paternal Gf things "the best think that happened to him was becoming a british prisoner" ( and he was an anti tank gunner to boot .. jesuz !).. in august 1944 ( not allied POW vs 'soviet captivity in a sausage machine' situation of late april -early may '45).. as against that mark the 'last stand sans ammo' situation faced by the waffen ss battery in march'45 and the insistence ( fatal as it turned out)of the ss officer to undertake the deadly mobike ride over the american held road..
thats all there is to it dennis.. repeat this one wasnt abt w ss victories.. if u have followed my posts and the counter posts by folks here .. we have been hving a lively debate on this ethos business..
ciao

[sandeepmukherjee196]

my friends here have been saying that we have been spending too little time on actual waffen ss victories and ops.. so am reposting some old stuff pl? with your permission? :
i think the term "ss victory" has to be discussed separately under (1) strategic victory, (2) tactical victory and (3)heroic actions against heavy odds..it must be remembered that the waffen ss came into its own.. as in it flourished at a time when germany had already started losing the war..so the question of strategic victories is rather limited...still their campaigns at kharkov (43) and arnhem (44) may count ? at kharkov, just after the stalingrad debacle, the entire german military viability was at stake.. if the waffen ss had not succeeded at that time.. well.. the russian front may well have collapsed in the central and southern sectors.. at arnhem.. if bittrich's formations had not wiped out the british paras.. and had not been able to hold the line at elst .. south of the rhine.. again.. the war may have taken a different course with monty's forces gate crashing into the ruhr area through the back door and finishing off germany's war industries at one stroke..then they might have just driven into the heartland before christmas..another small but significant waffen ss contribution in this league may be the rescue of mussolini in september 43 from gran sasso by skorzeny's men ( albeit with luftwaffe help).. if not for that coup the course of the war in italy may have been different...as for tactical victories there would be several i am sure? and valiant actions in the face of defeat.. well.. thats what they are best known for .. right? that action at the post office at falaise by sixty 12th ss HJ men trying to buy time for formations to escape the pocket !..waffen ss stay behinds fought like mad in berlin too after the surrender of weidling on 2nd may.. but to put the record straight.. so did heer men at stalingrad for weeks after the surrender by von paulus..
sandeepmukherjee196
Member
India

Posts: 6
Joined: 07 Aug 2014, 11:04
Top