The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

[seaburn]

Tks Dennis - Some of these I know a little about - but not too much about others. I presume there will be a 'lively' rebuttal debate to follow!

[ljadw]

d/ In the battle of Kursk the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Panzer Divisions advanced the furthest and virtually crippled the Soviet 5 Guards tank Army around Prokhorovka.

e/ The 1st SS Panzer Corps was rushed to Kharkov in early 1943 to help stem the Soviet advance. They succeeded in doing so and, by the end of March, had actually retaken the city and helped stop the Soviet offensive. Hitler was so impressed that he declared the Corps to be 'worth twenty Italian divisions' (Hitler's Table Talk, 5 April 1942, pp 402-3, cited in Reitlinger, 1981, p 156).


In defence:
f/ When the Soviets cut off the Totenkopf and five army divisions at Demyansk in February 1942, Eicke's division led "the nucleus of a mixed force of surrounded army and waffen SS formations that hung onto the Valdai Hills, prevented a major Russian breakthrough, and stabilized the weakened right flank of Army Group North." Later spearheading the breakthrough to German lines. Charles W. Sydnor Jr., Soldiers of Destruction: The Death's Head Division, 1933-1945, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), page 211

g/ In December 1943, the Red Army broke through the German lines in the Ukraine and surrounded nearly 60,000 troops at Cherkassy. The 5th SS Viking provided critical mobile armoured defence of the pocket and led the breakout to the west into the German relief force.

On these occasions, at Demyansk and Cherkassy, the Waffen SS had helped to prevented another potential Stalingrad-type loss.

h/ In Normandy in 1944, remnants of nineteen German divisions were trapped in the Falaise Pocket. Waffen SS units were instrumental in keeping open a corridor until a significant number of the units had escaped.

i/ At Arnhem in 1944 SS units were instrumental in delaying the advance of British paratroopers to the bridge, and in later defeating the main body. They were instrumental in the general defence of the region, and thwarting the Allied offensive.

All the best

Dennis

1)Sydnor is an apologetists of the WSS

2)Charkow was not a WSS victory

3)Neither was Arnhem :the allies were stopped by ad hoc formations

4)Proof that the WSS saved the situation at Falaise ?

4)

[dshaday]

Hi ljadw

1)Sydnor is an apologetists of the WSS

Let’s say that Sydor is an apologist. Now, where is he wrong in the case of Demjansk?

Did Totenkopf form the nucleus of the defence forces in the pocket? I have read elsewhere that they did.
Did Totenkopf spearhead the breakout to German forces? I have read elsewhere that they did.
At this point alone Demjansk can qualify as a military success for the Waffen SS as the soldiers survived the Soviet attempts to destroy them through encirclement and siege.

The Bonus point question is whether this defence did indeed substantially “prevented a major Russian breakthrough, and stabilized the weakened right flank of Army Group North”. Sydor thinks so. Is he wrong?

2)Charkow was not a WSS victory

The SS Panzer Corp did attack and take Kharkov, we know that. So taking a major industrial city and transport hub, sounds like a military success to me (by the Waffen SS).

Is perhaps your use of the word “victory” crucial here? I will need clarification from you on that one.

3)Neither was Arnhem :the allies were stopped by ad hoc formations

At Arnhem it was (from memory) the SS training battalion that initially slowed down/delayed the British paratroopers so that German counter measures at Arnhem could be implemented . Those paratroopers that seized one end of the bridge were eventually defeated in the main by remnants of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions that were in the area. In due course the remainder of the British paratroopers around Arnhem were also defeated, in the main, by them.

The denial of the Arnhem bridge foiled the allied offensive. This sounds like a military success primarily due to the Waffen SS.

4)Proof that the WSS saved the situation at Falaise ?

No question that the encirclement at Falaise was a disaster for the Germans. That will never change.
As previously discussed though, the efforts of the Waffen SS units helped to allow more soldiers to escape that otherwise would have. To me, this is a limited military success. A bit of a borderline case.

Regards

Dennis

[ljadw]

6 divisions were committed at Charkov: 6,11 and 17 Pz and 1,2 and 3 SS;thus it is not correct to say that Charkow was a WSS victory At Arnhem : a lot of non WSS units were committed,even from the KM.Also the Wossowski batallion of the HG division .Thus,here also it is not correct to say that Arnhem was a WSS victory .

[dshaday]

Hi ljadw

6 divisions were committed at Charkov: 6,11 and 17 Pz and 1,2 and 3 SS;thus it is not correct to say that Charkow was a WSS victory At Arnhem : a lot of non WSS units were committed,even from the KM.Also the Wossowski batallion of the HG division .Thus,here also it is not correct to say that Arnhem was a WSS victory .

Now I understand your point.
I am talking about Waffen SS military successes, as per the thread title. This does not limit discussion to military actions where the Waffen SS was the only force involved in the engagement.

In the specific case of the capture of Kharkov that I listed, I am only aware of Waffen SS troops being involved. They alone captured the city.

I did not refer to the whole Kharkov offensive as being a solely Waffen SS operation. Although the Waffen SS played a critical role in achieving the results gained in that successful offensive.

It is quite true and correct to say that Wehrmacht troops were often involved in operations with the Waffen SS . That is why I was careful in my description of the military successes I attributed to the Waffen SS.

Consequently, I still stand by my original post as being correct.

Regards

Dennis

[Ponury]

In 1939. SS did not flashed. Same defeat, with the exception of the murderers of Einsatzkomando.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Jaworów

After the battle the regiment was disbanded SS "Germania". Poles lowered them nice whips.

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw

6 divisions were committed at Charkov: 6,11 and 17 Pz and 1,2 and 3 SS;thus it is not correct to say that Charkow was a WSS victory At Arnhem : a lot of non WSS units were committed,even from the KM.Also the Wossowski batallion of the HG division .Thus,here also it is not correct to say that Arnhem was a WSS victory .

Now I understand your point.
I am talking about Waffen SS military successes, as per the thread title. This does not limit discussion to military actions where the Waffen SS was the only force involved in the engagement.

In the specific case of the capture of Kharkov that I listed, I am only aware of Waffen SS troops being involved. They alone captured the city.

I did not refer to the whole Kharkov offensive as being a solely Waffen SS operation. Although the Waffen SS played a critical role in achieving the results gained in that successful offensive.

It is quite true and correct to say that Wehrmacht troops were often involved in operations with the Waffen SS . That is why I was careful in my description of the military successes I attributed to the Waffen SS.

Consequently, I still stand by my original post as being correct.

Regards

Dennis

We have to disagree : IMO,you can't dissect battles .

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi sandeepmukherjee,

Yup, I think you may be missing at least one point I am making.

Yes, it is obvious ".....that any nations military as a whole would draw from tje common pool of resources available to that nation,"

However, No, it is not true that by my "line of reasoning, the fallschirmjaeger resources and marine infantry of the kriegsmarine too were made available to the luftwaffe and navy at the cost of the army? each had a specific ethos." Ethos is not the issue. The issue is original military specialization and contribution that justifies their independent status. It is clear that the Luftwaffe (including the paratroops) and the Navy had unique specializations (though the German failure to develop a proper marine infantry on the UK or US model may have been an error).

By contrast, the Waffen-SS developed no unique military specializations. It simply copied the Army. We have spent many years on other threads here and elsewhere trying to establish some unique military contribution by the Waffen-SS and come up with nothing substantive. It was, in everything military, little more than a clone of the Army that could only exist by drawing resources off the Army. And if the W-SS had no unique military contribution to make, and its actual contribution could only be bought at the expense of an Army that was already arguably the best in the world, what on earth was the military justification for creating the Waffen-SS as an independent arm of the Wehrmacht? There appears to be none, especially as the early performance of the W-SS in Poland was not particularly distinguished. All Germany's conquests were achieved without any indispensable Waffen-SS contribution.

No, a U-boat crew were not "a law unto themselves". Unlike the Waffen-SS, they were certainly isolated from immediate supervision for extended periods, but they were always subject to conventional military justice. By contrast, in early 1940 the Waffen-SS was withdrawn from conventional military justice. Why? Because it was the subject of a number of internal Army war crimes charges relating to its activities in Poland. In other words, the Waffen-SS got early political cover for its non-military vices and was literally "a law unto itself".

You may, indeed, "beg to differ on the issue of the caste ridden heer tradition being similar to the egalitarian waffen ss ethos", but you will find that neither was the Army (either as the Reichswehr or the Heer) anywhere near as class-ridden as you apparently believe, nor was the SS as egalitarian as you seem to believe. The recent thread on this subject is quite instructive on this. You should try to differentiate the political propaganda from the facts.

Confusingly you also give a major and contradictory endorsement for "the class-ridden Heer" when you write, "however the strategic wisdom of the prussian general staff tradition was superior where grand strategy and utilisation of resources were concerned... thats what produced the brilliant chain of victories." If you are looking for a last bastion of Junkerdom in the German Army, it would be this same general staff! The Waffen-SS had no equivalent and the likes of Sepp Dietrich had to be surrounded by such Army staff officers as they reached their highest ranks towards the end of the war.

You write, "in some ways the ss ethos produced its own unique qualities.....". And these were? (Let's stick to the military, as the downside of the Waffen-SS in terms of its non-military activities, is discussed elsewhere).

The senior Waffen-SS divisions usually fought well, but was it because they consisted of motivated regular or volunteer manpower, always motorized and latterly armoured, (all of which was acquired at the expense of the German Army) or was there some special "value-added" military quality of "Waffen-SSedness"? If so, what was it, because it appears to have escaped discovery so far.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Seaburn,

Nobody denies that usually the senior formations of the Waffen-SS fought well enough.

But the question arises in every case, was it because they usually consisted of motorized (latterly armoured) selectively recruited volunteer manpower, or because of some hitherto unquantified, but widely assumed, quality of "Waffen-SSedness"?

To put it another way, why do you wish to discuss the "Military successes" in terms of the Waffen-SS rather than in terms of motorization, or armour, etc., etc.?

dshaday gave a list of Waffen-SS successes above. How many of them could the W-SS have achieved without motorization?

Alternatively, could any of them not have been achieved by the equivalent Army formation?

In framing the question in purely W-SS terms in the first place, I would suggest you are making an unsubstantiated assumption about the unique military value-added nature of "Waffen-SSedness", as opposed to mechanization, selectively recruited volunteer manpower, etc., etc..

I would contend that the Waffen-SS is fascinating on a number of levels, but least so on the military level, largely because, as a military institution, it was almost completely unoriginal, unlike the Army, which pioneered the fast moving armoured warfare in which the Waffen-SS was never an indispensible component because it represented no easily establishable "value- added" to the Wehrmacht.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi dshaday,

I think you should cut Belgrade off your list. It was an undefended city with an active German 5th column when the first W-SS arrived. If the Yugoslavs had defended their capital, do you imagine a single company, however brilliant, would have sufficed to take it?

Also, the surrender of the Greek forces in Albania to a W-SS division was done by the Greeks deliberately to spite the Italians.

As a matter of interest, how many of the W-SS successes on your list do you think could not have been achieved by the equivalent Army formation or without mechanization or armour?

Cheers,

Sid.

[dshaday]

Hi Sid

I think you should cut Belgrade off your list. It was an undefended city with an active German 5th column when the first W-SS arrived. If the Yugoslavs had defended their capital, do you imagine a single company, however brilliant, would have sufficed to take it?

The Yugoslav Army was present in the city and manning sites. The point is that the SS officer was daring by using bluff to have the Jugoslavs troops lay down their arms. He and his men could easily have been overpowered. After a short fire-fight he convinced the Jugoslavs (particularly the Mayor) that resistance was useless and counter-productive. He apparently disarmed the Jugoslav soldiers and guarded their weapons. The Jugoslav army was indeed on the verge of collapse, and this would be the main reason for the bluff working.

The sense I got from my readings, was that this was enough to convince the locals/Army not to rise up and fight street by street as the Germans were “already here and in control”. That further bloodshed was useless.

This is why I believe it is a military success and should be kept.

Also, the surrender of the Greek forces in Albania to a W-SS division was done by the Greeks deliberately to spite the Italians.

The Greeks surrendered in the first place because they had not much option. It was a combat decision. I can well understand how they would not want to surrender to the Italians. I seem to remember that Sepp Dietrich took the surrender and gave them reasonable/good terms.

Interesting that the Greeks surrendered to the Waffen SS and not the German Army.

As a matter of interest, how many of the W-SS successes on your list do you think could not have been achieved by the equivalent Army formation or without mechanization or armour?

That’s a nice hypothetical question with loaded phrases. A fair reply would therefore be:

Well, if the equivalent Army unit was:
* Motorised/Armoured like the Waffen SS
* Aggressive and daring like the Waffen SS
* In the right place, like the Waffen SS
* Well led and dedicated, like the Waffen SS
Then surely they could have done all the things on my list.

Note that in the Belgrade example the Waffen SS entered on captured vehicles (no armour or motorcycles) after commandeering a boat, and used bluff (not usually taught in Army staff college scenarios?) to succeed.

Regards

Dennis

[dshaday]

Hi Seaburn

I have just noticed that point d/ in my list has a typo mistake. The Units involved in the Prokhorovka action that crippled the Soviet 5 Guards Tank Army are the 1st SS, 2nd SS and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions.

Regards

Dennis

Hi Seaburn

As per your original comment regarding examples of military successes of the Waffen SS you can have a look at the following brief notes for starters. Some have already been mentioned, but I have included them so as to keep things in one place/together;

a/ April 1941 advance elements of Das Reich (motorcycle company) in a daring move capture Belgrade, the capital of Yugoslavia. They took the city’s surrender, and with some reinforcements defended it against counterattacks. The main German Army forces arrived the next day. SS-Hauptsturmführer Fritz Klingenberg received the Knights Cross for this action.

b/ Operations in Greece. The Leistandarte successfully takes the two main passes defended by Greek and Commonwealth troops. The Klidi Pass and the Kleisoura Pass are key in the Greek First Army’s main line of resistance, and are now broken. After the pitched battle on the Metsovon Pass the Greek First Army surrenders to the Leistandarte (Sep Dietrich). The Leibstandarte vigorously pursues Commonwealth forces till their evacuation from Greece. The Leibstandarte occupied a position of honour in the victory parade through Athens.

c/ The Leibstandarte seized the first bridgehead over the Dnieper, broke through the Soviet defences at the Crimea at Perekop and stormed Taganrog and Rostov. The 5th SS Viking Division pursued the Russians to the Sea of Azov.
Das Reich captured Belgrade in 1941 and later broke through the Moscow defences and came within 50km of the Kremlin.

d/ In the battle of Kursk the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Panzer Divisions advanced the furthest and virtually crippled the Soviet 5 Guards tank Army around Prokhorovka.

e/ The 1st SS Panzer Corps was rushed to Kharkov in early 1943 to help stem the Soviet advance. They succeeded in doing so and, by the end of March, had actually retaken the city and helped stop the Soviet offensive. Hitler was so impressed that he declared the Corps to be 'worth twenty Italian divisions' (Hitler's Table Talk, 5 April 1942, pp 402-3, cited in Reitlinger, 1981, p 156).


In defence:
f/ When the Soviets cut off the Totenkopf and five army divisions at Demyansk in February 1942, Eicke's division led "the nucleus of a mixed force of surrounded army and waffen SS formations that hung onto the Valdai Hills, prevented a major Russian breakthrough, and stabilized the weakened right flank of Army Group North." Later spearheading the breakthrough to German lines. Charles W. Sydnor Jr., Soldiers of Destruction: The Death's Head Division, 1933-1945, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), page 211

g/ In December 1943, the Red Army broke through the German lines in the Ukraine and surrounded nearly 60,000 troops at Cherkassy. The 5th SS Viking provided critical mobile armoured defence of the pocket and led the breakout to the west into the German relief force.

On these occasions, at Demyansk and Cherkassy, the Waffen SS had helped to prevented another potential Stalingrad-type loss.

h/ In Normandy in 1944, remnants of nineteen German divisions were trapped in the Falaise Pocket. Waffen SS units were instrumental in keeping open a corridor until a significant number of the units had escaped.

i/ At Arnhem in 1944 SS units were instrumental in delaying the advance of British paratroopers to the bridge, and in later defeating the main body. They were instrumental in the general defence of the region, and thwarting the Allied offensive.

All the best

Dennis

[dshaday]

Hi Ponury

In 1939. SS did not flashed. Same defeat, with the exception of the murderers of Einsatzkomando.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Jaworów

After the battle the regiment was disbanded SS "Germania". Poles lowered them nice whips.

The Polish army did very well, and inflicted major casualties on Regiment Germania.

The Germania regiment was not disbanded. It was re-built and used in the SS-VT division. Later the regiment was transferred to help form the new Wiking Division.

Regards

Dennis

[Cult Icon]

I see that the german armored divisions perform best in the context of maneuver, advances, and of the offensive. Defensively they are needed but the cost of raising them is partially wasted as it does not exploit their potential.

The Waffen SS Panzer divisions had 6 battalions of infantry instead of 4, which is a major difference. There was also a stug battalion (hq battery, 3x batteries). There was sometimes differences in artillery as well. The only Heer division similarly equipped was the GD. On equipment and manpower alone, they and the GD are supposed to outperform the regular panzer divisions.

I really don't see much physical differences between the army and the W-SS panzer outside of bureaucratic reallocation, officer cadres/leadership nature, divisional size, and additional administrative overhead needed for the new formations. The SS tended to get volunteers into 1943, and then use substandard, impressed manpower like volksdeusche later on. The German panzer divisions recruited from regional areas. The GD was volunteer, creamed manpower from the rest of the army, and then got their men from all across germany.

The SS were not the spearhead of the armed forces in 1941, they were supporting forces. 1942- Only wiking played an important and ultimately unsuccessful role of the spearhead of resource-starved AGA in the caucasus with other divisions like the 3rd and 23rd PzD.

In 1943 the counteroffensive at Kharkov....The GD played an important role there as well, gaining many tactical victories along with other divisions. It should be noted that the SS were out of the fight for a great many months while they were refitting into PzG divisions. GD was engaging in heavy fighting in Rzhev against operation Mars with 9th Army and other panzer divisions were similarly engaged mostly in the center in the south. They were often not pulled out of the eastern front for a real long rebuilding in germany or france, but rather refitted in the field or pulled into the rear rest area for periods of time.

The advances of 48th Panzer korps vs. II SS Panzer korps at Kursk are moot to me...they all failed in it's really a matter of degree. Spaeter's GD, V2 has a detailed account of the crisis after crisis experienced by the GD, which was the spearhead of 48th Panzer korps. Afterward, it is mostly defense and counterattack, which doesn't really differentiate units, allow them to participate in major operational victories, or give them really major tactical victories. The prisoner counts collapse after 1942.

[histan]

Dennis

You wrote:
"It is quite true and correct to say that Wehrmacht troops were often involved in operations with the Waffen SS . That is why I was careful in my description of the military successes I attributed to the Waffen SS."

It is more correct to say that the Waffen SS operations were almost always conducted as part of an Army operation. This is true of both Demjansk and the Cherkassy, which were Army operations in which the Waffen SS played a role.

Demjansk - around 90,000 troops from six or seven divisions were isolated in a the Demjansk pocket. One of these divisions was an SS division, the rest were army. Command within the pocket was exercised by II Armee Korps.
Quoting from FMS Study C-034:
"During the winter, the deep snow protected the encircled German troops around Demjansk from annihilation. Even the Russian infantry was unable to mount an attack through those snows. Russian ski troops got nowhere. The encircled German forces were supplied by the Luftwaffe. This means of supply, however, proved inadequate, and with the hardening of the snow and the onset of the thaws, the situation was bound to become serious for the encircled troops. Thus, starting late in February, German forces were assembled west of Staraya Russa in order to relieve the encircled forces at Demjansk."
Korps Gruppe Seydlitz (5 and 8 le divisions) broke through the Russian lines to start the process of establishing a land route to the pocket. It was also decided that once Korps Gruppe Seydlitz was close enough to the pocket troops inside the pocket would attack and join up with the relieving force.
According to Army Group North by Werner Haupt:
"(Geneneralleutnant) Zorn was flown into into the Demjansk pocket in order to take over the corps group, which was to attack from the west. For this mission , ....., he had available the SS 'Totenkopf' division and the II Army Corps Assault Regiment. The Assault Regiment was composed of a battalion each from the 12th, 30th, 290th ID, the 5th SS Motorcycle Battalion and five battalions of the 32nd ID."

Demjansk was not just a Waffen SS success but was due to the performance of the Army, Luftwaffe, and Waffen SS plus a significant contribution from the weather.

I could write a similar short essay on Cherkassy.

Please note, I am not saying that the Waffen SS did not perform well in these operations but that success was achieved because of an equally good performance by army units as well.

I think that good examples of Waffen SS successes can be found in the book Viking Panzers by Ewald Klapdor. He makes use of Army records to show how the Viking Division successfully cooperated with the army and achieved many of the objectives set for it by Korps and Army headquarters.

Regards

John