The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#16

Post by Cult Icon » 31 Aug 2014, 19:47

So many army units however, created the context for the success of the counterstroke. This context was formed in the aftermath of 'Winter Storm' (Dec 1942). It was the unglamourous yet critical defense of the formations of AA Hollidt and AA Fretter-Pico and other army formations during two months of defensive fighting.... the SS were a small minority. The refitted SS came at the 'final act' so to speak, along with GD (motorized) which was pulled out of AGC and refitted.

The 'rivalry' between the SS and the Army is interesting and I have seen it that the SS had advantages due to its higher affiliation with nazism. Here is a bit I recently read (Dec 3rd 1943) about Generalmajor Bayerlein complaining about the SS stealing accolades from the Army:
The signaled the end of the initial fighting for Tscherkassy. The Daily Report of the Armed Forces High Command commented on the successful conclusion to the fighting. The 3. Panzer-Division was not mentioned. Generalmajor Bayerlein composed a sharp message to the corps in that regard and wrote

The fact that five 8.8-centimeter Flak and six guns of 2-centimeter caliber from the Flak-Division employed in sector were captured, that likewise the same fate befell elements of the armored artillery [battalion] of the Division “Wiking,” that the previously named division’s attack on Kirolowka was turned back despite the support of twenty-four assault guns and the village was latertaken under the leadership of the 3. Panzer-Division with the support of ten assault guns, the fact that all of the successes that were mentioned in the Armed Forces Daily Report in the area of combat operations around Tscherkassy were successes of the 3. Panzer-Division, especially the relief of the encircled elements of the 72. Infanterie-Division in Tscherkassy and the elimination of enemy groups of forces that had broken through. . . . The casualties that the 3.Panzer-Division sustained during the attack and the hard defensive fighting approached nearly 800 men. . . . Despite that, the division always attacked with success and defeated the Russian divisions. Those were achievements that cannot be attributed to the troop elements mentioned in the Armed Forces Daily Report.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#17

Post by dshaday » 01 Sep 2014, 11:01

Hi
Cult Icon wrote:So many army units however, created the context for the success of the counterstroke. This context was formed in the aftermath of 'Winter Storm' (Dec 1942). It was the unglamourous yet critical defense of the formations of AA Hollidt and AA Fretter-Pico and other army formations during two months of defensive fighting.... the SS were a small minority. The refitted SS came at the 'final act' so to speak, along with GD (motorized) which was pulled out of AGC and refitted.
The SS units were panzer divisions. Like all panzer divisions they got more of the public relations glory compared to regular infantry units. That in this case the panzer units were SS is more a function that they were available, and that the Army High command decided to use them for the crucial attack. They tipped the balance and deserve credit for that, particularly in the context that they are all on the same team.

No doubt the SS were also eager on a personal note to re-take the city they had once abandoned. I also suspect (but need to confirm) that this was the early/first example of the SS armoured units being used together in mass, with obvious success. So it was a big event for the SS at the time. Maybe this is why much is made of it and obscures the team effort in the campaign.
Cult Icon wrote: The 'rivalry' between the SS and the Army is interesting and I have seen it that the SS had advantages due to its higher affiliation with nazism.
I have also seen analysis where the Army gave preferential equipment allocation (armour) to Army units. Where the SS had to argue with the Army to get various resources.
Cult Icon wrote: Here is a bit I recently read (Dec 3rd 1943) about Generalmajor Bayerlein complaining about the SS stealing accolades from the Army:
The signaled the end of the initial fighting for Tscherkassy. The Daily Report of the Armed Forces High Command commented on the successful conclusion to the fighting. The 3. Panzer-Division was not mentioned. Generalmajor Bayerlein composed a sharp message to the corps in that regard and wrote

The fact that five 8.8-centimeter Flak and six guns of 2-centimeter caliber from the Flak-Division employed in sector were captured, that likewise the same fate befell elements of the armored artillery [battalion] of the Division “Wiking,” that the previously named division’s attack on Kirolowka was turned back despite the support of twenty-four assault guns and the village was latertaken under the leadership of the 3. Panzer-Division with the support of ten assault guns, the fact that all of the successes that were mentioned in the Armed Forces Daily Report in the area of combat operations around Tscherkassy were successes of the 3. Panzer-Division, especially the relief of the encircled elements of the 72. Infanterie-Division in Tscherkassy and the elimination of enemy groups of forces that had broken through. . . . The casualties that the 3.Panzer-Division sustained during the attack and the hard defensive fighting approached nearly 800 men. . . . Despite that, the division always attacked with success and defeated the Russian divisions. Those were achievements that cannot be attributed to the troop elements mentioned in the Armed Forces Daily Report.
I find this part of the post a little confusing. Maybe due to it being a partial quote.

Firstly you mention the date Dec 3, 1943. What is that referring to?
The Battle of the Korsun–Cherkasy Pocket took place from 24 January to 16 February 1944. Bayerlein left 3rd Panzer Division on 4 January 1944.

The text quoted from Bayerlein’s letter does not mention credit for any actions by 3rd Panzer Div being stolen by the SS. It says that the Daily Report of the Armed Forces High Command got the reporting wrong. Now this daily report is generated by the Army propaganda department? It may not be a case of SS vs Army rivalry as such, but a mis-identification of a unit’s achievements. (Do you have a copy of the report so we can see what it actually says? Is he referring to LSSAH?).

Regards

Dennis


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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#18

Post by dshaday » 01 Sep 2014, 12:43

Hi
Cult Icon wrote:Cherkassy mostly involved the regular army. Only 5th SS and 1SSLAH were involved.
Also involved inside the pocket was the 5 SS Infantry Brigade (attached to SS Wiking), with Leon Degrel.
Now Wiking was the only panzer division inside the pocket at Cherkassy. It was crucial to the defence of the pocket. Of all the German divisions in the pocket, SS Wiking "did more than any other to ensure the continued survival of Gruppe Stemmermann ..." Nash, Hell's Gate, p.369. It provided the mobile reserve to repair incursions made by the Russians to the pocket defences.

The 1SSLAH was the only SS division in the relief force. It was only one amongst 9 armoured units involved.

Cult Icon wrote: As for Kharkov- their greatest 'victory', the SS Panzer units outside of 2nd SS were late comers and really were there just for the counterstroke. The context for the counterstroke was established by Army units, which already damaged, substantially, the soviet forces like the 3rd Tank Army (Gallop/Star). There really isn't such thing as a 'ss battle' IMO.
The units that re-took Kharkov were SS (1st, 2nd and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions). So that is probably why it is considered an SS battle. The counterstroke as a whole used quite a few Army units of course.

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Dennis

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#19

Post by Cult Icon » 01 Sep 2014, 19:35

A interesting bit from 'Combat History of the 23rd Panzer division" writes that the 23rd Panzer suffered from a delayed refitting in 1943 (6th place IIRC) due to the weapons being preferentially allocated to the newer SS formations."

It looks to me that the SS was initially on the back foot when they were just infantry regiments. Later on, they were pushed to the top of the list- the SS Panzer units in Kharkov came into the field in Feb. being well armed and large with good equipment. By the summer of 43' they were in the top ranks of units to be refitted alongside favored army panzer units. The other German panzer units (like the 23rd, etc.) suffered. By the winter of 43' they were considerably better equipped than the army panzer units, particularly in the allocation of the new panthers.

The bottom quote is from 'Armored Bears: history the 3rd Panzer" volume 2 and about the fighting in the same area that predates the Korsun pocket. He is referring to SS Wiking and complaining that 3rd Panzer's (his division) achievements were not recognized.

SS Wiking and their subordinated units was the most important division inside the Korsun pocket, yes.

Good point. As for Kharkov, the boundary lines for the battle would have to be established. If kharkov is just the counterstroke, it would be primarily a SS battle. But I believe if we are trying to subjectively measure performance of these SS units, then the entire context must be taken in so I have never considered the true meaning of Kharkov as being just the counterstroke. Likewise, I have difficulty thinking of the meaning of Operation citadel as being just Kursk, and not also the massive Orel and Kharkov counteroffensives.

I know that from Glantz's "From don to the dneiper" that the Soviets also see the boundary lines as different from the German centric version. "Beyond Stalingrad: Manstein's operations of AG don" see the counterstroke as the final act of a series of intentional operational decisions by AG don to culminate into a strategic result.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#20

Post by j keenan » 01 Sep 2014, 22:07

Cult Icon wrote:A interesting bit from 'Combat History of the 23rd Panzer division" writes that the 23rd Panzer suffered from a delayed refitting in 1943 (6th place IIRC) due to the weapons being preferentially allocated to the newer SS formations."

It looks to me that the SS was initially on the back foot when they were just infantry regiments. Later on, they were pushed to the top of the list- the SS Panzer units in Kharkov came into the field in Feb. being well armed and large with good equipment. By the summer of 43' they were in the top ranks of units to be refitted alongside favored army panzer units. The other German panzer units (like the 23rd, etc.) suffered. By the winter of 43' they were considerably better equipped than the army panzer units, particularly in the allocation of the new panthers.
In what way did the 23rd suffer ?
Between the 12-21.8.43 the II/Pz.Rgt.23 received 96 Pz.V but due to the situation at the front they were deployed away from the parent unit, rejoining it in 9.43.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#21

Post by Cult Icon » 01 Sep 2014, 22:57

page 303: combat history of the 23rd Panzer division
The II./PR23, the former II./PR201 was equipped with the newly introduced Panzer V "Panther" from 20 March to 28 August 1943. As a result of an overburdening of the tank courses at Erlangen, and the preferential issuance of equipment to the Waffen-SS, the conversion to the new equipment was delayed.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#22

Post by j keenan » 02 Sep 2014, 01:19

Cult Icon wrote:page 303: combat history of the 23rd Panzer division
The II./PR23, the former II./PR201 was equipped with the newly introduced Panzer V "Panther" from 20 March to 28 August 1943. As a result of an overburdening of the tank courses at Erlangen, and the preferential issuance of equipment to the Waffen-SS, the conversion to the new equipment was delayed.
Which is wrong,there were 5 army units and 2 SS converting to Pz.V at the same time.But there were only enough tanks for Pz.Abt.51 receiving 96 Pz.V in june.Then II/Pz.Rgt.23 receiving theres at the same time as another army unit and the 2 SS, Totenkopf not receiving theres till the summer of the following year.So they weren't delayed by the SS but the manufacturers who did not deliver the numbers promised.First delivers proved to be unreliable and broke down resulting in there crews having to blow them up.With the units who first received them having to be refitted with the better later tank.So the SS hardly got preferential treatment ?

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#23

Post by Christian Ankerstjerne » 02 Sep 2014, 18:05

At least in terms of armor, I have not been able to find any evidence of wide-spread preferential treatment of the Waffen-SS. In fact, quite to the contrary, when I compared armor allocation and strength in 1944 and 1945, I would either a fairly even distribution, or preferential distribution to the Heer. I'm working on a complete armor allocation record, which will take some time, but so far I haven't found anything to contradict my above study.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#24

Post by Cult Icon » 03 Sep 2014, 03:38

I read your article, and while it is nicely formatted, your use of statistics and the depth of your data do not produce the definitive answers that your article implies. It is, however, a meaningful way to speculate about this issue given the materials that you have used. It would also help if you attached your spreadsheet to the article as it would make things easier to verify.

As far as armor goes, the independent units like Tiger battalions, Jagdpanzers, and Panzer Brigades (often equipped with a battalion of Panthers) would clearly skew the results toward the Army. There's no debate here.

However, in terms of Panzer divisions? That was what the author, an officer that worked on the staff of the 23rd PzD was referring to. SS divisions were larger and had more infantry. I believe the impression that 'The SS had preference' comes from division, not independent AFV unit oob's in mid-late 43-45. They were being designated the assault spearheads (eg. Normandy, 6th SS Panzer Army in the Ardennes, the SS units participating in the counterstrokes of late 43/early 1944, and IIRC operation spring awakening ) and AS were generally better equipped. So the SS were shoulder to shoulder with the favored units of the Army like GD, 1st Panzer, 2nd..etc...and placed above the 'backwater' panzer divisions with a higher unit number.

The offensive operations, however, are not the whole story of course. Collating all the equipment allocations and the bureaucratic process during the last three years of the war would take much more work and collection.
Christian Ankerstjerne wrote:At least in terms of armor, I have not been able to find any evidence of wide-spread preferential treatment of the Waffen-SS. In fact, quite to the contrary, when I compared armor allocation and strength in 1944 and 1945, I would either a fairly even distribution, or preferential distribution to the Heer. I'm working on a complete armor allocation record, which will take some time, but so far I haven't found anything to contradict my above study.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#25

Post by Christian Ankerstjerne » 03 Sep 2014, 11:33

Thank you for your feedback. As mentioned, I hope to add more material in the future. Still, from the information I have seen so far, I have not seen any systematic preferential treatment of the Waffen-SS. I'll try to remember to keep you updated when I add to the article.

It seems reasonable that first-line units of the Waffen-SS received better equipment than the second-line Heer units. This is not an indication of preferential treatment. A more apt comparison would be between first-line units of both the Waffen-SS and first-line units of the Heer, as well as between second-line ditto. From the description of the author's phrasing, I would argue that author is biased, the reasons for which could be many.

While my knowledge of 9. and 10. SS-Panzer-Division is limited, my initial thoughts are that these divisions would form a much better ground for comparison with the 23. Panzer-Division than 1., 2., 3., and 5. SS-Panzer-Division. The situation is of course also situational, so a comparison between two units must be under the same circumstances, rather than, e.g., one unit that has just been re-fitted, and another one that has been in combat for several months.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#26

Post by j keenan » 03 Sep 2014, 13:57

Cult Icon wrote:I read your article, and while it is nicely formatted, your use of statistics and the depth of your data do not produce the definitive answers that your article implies. It is, however, a meaningful way to speculate about this issue given the materials that you have used. It would also help if you attached your spreadsheet to the article as it would make things easier to verify.

As far as armor goes, the independent units like Tiger battalions, Jagdpanzers, and Panzer Brigades (often equipped with a battalion of Panthers) would clearly skew the results toward the Army. There's no debate here.

However, in terms of Panzer divisions? That was what the author, an officer that worked on the staff of the 23rd PzD was referring to. SS divisions were larger and had more infantry. I believe the impression that 'The SS had preference' comes from division, not independent AFV unit oob's in mid-late 43-45. They were being designated the assault spearheads (eg. Normandy, 6th SS Panzer Army in the Ardennes, the SS units participating in the counterstrokes of late 43/early 1944, and IIRC operation spring awakening ) and AS were generally better equipped. So the SS were shoulder to shoulder with the favored units of the Army like GD, 1st Panzer, 2nd..etc...and placed above the 'backwater' panzer divisions with a higher unit number.

The offensive operations, however, are not the whole story of course. Collating all the equipment allocations and the bureaucratic process during the last three years of the war would take much more work and collection.
Christian Ankerstjerne wrote:At least in terms of armor, I have not been able to find any evidence of wide-spread preferential treatment of the Waffen-SS. In fact, quite to the contrary, when I compared armor allocation and strength in 1944 and 1945, I would either a fairly even distribution, or preferential distribution to the Heer. I'm working on a complete armor allocation record, which will take some time, but so far I haven't found anything to contradict my above study.
How was the 23 Pz.Div. a back water Division ? Where are your figures for the favoured Divs ?

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#27

Post by Sid Guttridge » 04 Sep 2014, 11:20

Hi Cult Icon,

In writing, "interesting bit from 'Combat History of the 23rd Panzer division" writes that the 23rd Panzer suffered from a delayed refitting in 1943 (6th place IIRC) due to the weapons being preferentially allocated to the newer SS formations.", you lift the lid on an even larger issue.

In 1943 the Waffen-SS expanded by about the same number of panzer battalions the Army lost. For the Wehrmacht, there was no "value added" in this expansion of the Waffen-SS because it was done at the direct expense of the Army. To add insult to injury, the first W-SS tankers were trained at Army schools, because the Waffen-SS then had none of its own.

The Waffen-SS added nothing to the overall Wehrmacht order of battle that was not subtracted from other arms of the Wehrmacht. Indeed, it was even slower than the Army in recruiting "non-Germanic" Europeans.

In short, the Waffen-SS represented no "value added" and there was no military justification for the creation of the Waffen-SS as an independent arm of the Wehermacht. The motivation for the creation and expansion of the Waffen-SS was entirely political.

Cheers,

Sid

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#28

Post by Sid Guttridge » 04 Sep 2014, 11:45

Hi Cult Icon,

I have found the following from an old post made by me on the Feldgrau site over a decade ago:

".....one of my lost earlier posts last week did contain a chronology of developments in 1943. What follows is my calculation of the month by month rise and fall in the number of establishment tank battalions in Army and SS panzer and panzer grenadier divisions.

.................Waffen-SS........................Army
1943...........(rise/fall/cumulative)..........(rise/fall/cumulative)
January........(-/-/-)............................(-/-4/-4)
February.......(+2/-/+2)........................(+8/-9/-5)
March..........(-/-/+2)..........................(+1/-1/-5)
April............(-/-/+2)..........................(-/-/-5)
May.............(-/-/+2)..........................(-/-6/-11)
June............(-/-/+2)..........................(+1/-1/-11)
July.............(+2/-/+4)........................(+2/-/-9)
August......... (+2/-+6).........................(-/-/-9)
September.....(-/-/+6)..........................(-/-2/-11)
October........(+3/-/+9).........................(-/-/11)
November......(+1/-/+10).......................(-/-/11)
December......(-/-/+10).........................(+2/-/-9)

The year end comparison shows that number of new SS armoured battalions (+10) on establishment is almost the same as the number lost from the Army establishment (-9)."

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#29

Post by Christian Ankerstjerne » 04 Sep 2014, 12:06

Sid Guttridge wrote:In short, the Waffen-SS represented no "value added" and there was no military justification for the creation of the Waffen-SS as an independent arm of the Wehermacht. The motivation for the creation and expansion of the Waffen-SS was entirely political.
But that is still not an argument for the Waffen-SS receiving preferential treatment in terms of equipment allocation. Obviously the Waffen-SS units created had to be equipped, but they didn't receive better or more equipment than the Heer.

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Re: The Military Successes of the Waffen-SS

#30

Post by j keenan » 04 Sep 2014, 16:52

Sid Guttridge wrote:Hi Cult Icon,

I have found the following from an old post made by me on the Feldgrau site over a decade ago:

".....one of my lost earlier posts last week did contain a chronology of developments in 1943. What follows is my calculation of the month by month rise and fall in the number of establishment tank battalions in Army and SS panzer and panzer grenadier divisions.

.................Waffen-SS........................Army
1943...........(rise/fall/cumulative)..........(rise/fall/cumulative)
January........(-/-/-)............................(-/-4/-4)
February.......(+2/-/+2)........................(+8/-9/-5)
March..........(-/-/+2)..........................(+1/-1/-5)
April............(-/-/+2)..........................(-/-/-5)
May.............(-/-/+2)..........................(-/-6/-11)
June............(-/-/+2)..........................(+1/-1/-11)
July.............(+2/-/+4)........................(+2/-/-9)
August......... (+2/-+6).........................(-/-/-9)
September.....(-/-/+6)..........................(-/-2/-11)
October........(+3/-/+9).........................(-/-/11)
November......(+1/-/+10).......................(-/-/11)
December......(-/-/+10).........................(+2/-/-9)

The year end comparison shows that number of new SS armoured battalions (+10) on establishment is almost the same as the number lost from the Army establishment (-9)."

Cheers,

Sid.
It would be nice if you named these units

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