Hi
Cult Icon wrote:So many army units however, created the context for the success of the counterstroke. This context was formed in the aftermath of 'Winter Storm' (Dec 1942). It was the unglamourous yet critical defense of the formations of AA Hollidt and AA Fretter-Pico and other army formations during two months of defensive fighting.... the SS were a small minority. The refitted SS came at the 'final act' so to speak, along with GD (motorized) which was pulled out of AGC and refitted.
The SS units were panzer divisions. Like all panzer divisions they got more of the public relations glory compared to regular infantry units. That in this case the panzer units were SS is more a function that they were available, and that the Army High command decided to use them for the crucial attack. They tipped the balance and deserve credit for that, particularly in the context that they are all on the same team.
No doubt the SS were also eager on a personal note to re-take the city they had once abandoned. I also suspect (but need to confirm) that this was the early/first example of the SS armoured units being used together in mass, with obvious success. So it was a big event for the SS at the time. Maybe this is why much is made of it and obscures the team effort in the campaign.
Cult Icon wrote: The 'rivalry' between the SS and the Army is interesting and I have seen it that the SS had advantages due to its higher affiliation with nazism.
I have also seen analysis where the Army gave preferential equipment allocation (armour) to Army units. Where the SS had to argue with the Army to get various resources.
Cult Icon wrote: Here is a bit I recently read (Dec 3rd 1943) about Generalmajor Bayerlein complaining about the SS stealing accolades from the Army:
The signaled the end of the initial fighting for Tscherkassy. The Daily Report of the Armed Forces High Command commented on the successful conclusion to the fighting. The 3. Panzer-Division was not mentioned. Generalmajor Bayerlein composed a sharp message to the corps in that regard and wrote
The fact that five 8.8-centimeter Flak and six guns of 2-centimeter caliber from the Flak-Division employed in sector were captured, that likewise the same fate befell elements of the armored artillery [battalion] of the Division “Wiking,” that the previously named division’s attack on Kirolowka was turned back despite the support of twenty-four assault guns and the village was latertaken under the leadership of the 3. Panzer-Division with the support of ten assault guns, the fact that all of the successes that were mentioned in the Armed Forces Daily Report in the area of combat operations around Tscherkassy were successes of the 3. Panzer-Division, especially the relief of the encircled elements of the 72. Infanterie-Division in Tscherkassy and the elimination of enemy groups of forces that had broken through. . . . The casualties that the 3.Panzer-Division sustained during the attack and the hard defensive fighting approached nearly 800 men. . . . Despite that, the division always attacked with success and defeated the Russian divisions. Those were achievements that cannot be attributed to the troop elements mentioned in the Armed Forces Daily Report.
I find this part of the post a little confusing. Maybe due to it being a partial quote.
Firstly you mention the date Dec 3, 1943. What is that referring to?
The Battle of the Korsun–Cherkasy Pocket took place from 24 January to 16 February 1944. Bayerlein left 3rd Panzer Division on 4 January 1944.
The text quoted from Bayerlein’s letter does not mention credit for any actions by 3rd Panzer Div being stolen by the SS. It says that the Daily Report of the Armed Forces High Command got the reporting wrong. Now this daily report is generated by the Army propaganda department? It may not be a case of SS vs Army rivalry as such, but a mis-identification of a unit’s achievements. (Do you have a copy of the report so we can see what it actually says? Is he referring to LSSAH?).
Regards
Dennis