Rob-wssob2... I don't even know should I respond to this.. if it smells like a trap, it really is a trap... I agree... there has been excellent discussion.. I wrote that as a small unit action it was audacious and bold... why can't you just leave it at that.. you already expressed your 'unbiased' view... I believe I wrote enough to ascertain what it can be recognised for..a small unit action success.
I have come to the conclusion that it would be safer to write.. There was no significant Waffen-SS Military Success in World War 2.. non, what so ever... I would also have expected, considering you had a website on the Waffen-SS, that your response would be in detail of a more educated appraisal... to say it is not audacious then please give a comparison in the Warfare of WW2, by a small unit action that you would say is deemed audacious in your opinion. That way the reader has something to compare with. I would have also hoped that rather than dismiss everyone who does not agree with your view, that rather than give a personal opinion, you support your view substantially.
I respect your right to not agree, that is your opinion. Books and historians have written about this very topic and too many have read this exploit and regardless, it is well known and many in Belgrade would know this ... very few will read this post. One thing is for sure Klingenberg's exploits will be remembered for a long time. Long after this post is forgotten.
In fact Rob you wrote about Klingenberg on your original site, in which I have every page you published...
http://www.wssob.com/leaders.html
https://web.archive.org/web/20021220173 ... genbF.html
SS-Oberführer Fritz Klingenberg
Biography
1934: joined SSVT
Commanding Officer, motorcycle battalion, 2nd SS Division
1941: invasion of Yugoslavia, siezed Belgrade in daring bluff with only ten men; awarded Knight's Cross
1942: Staff officer, SS-Junkerschule Bad Tölz
1945: Commanding Officer, 17th SS Division
03/45 KIA
That would sound very bold and audacious, it would inspire many to research Klingenberg, to see how was it possible that so few captured the capital of Jugoslavia.
Thank you for publishing wssob.com in the first instance. It was a brilliant website.
Mark
Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
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Germanicus
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Re: Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
Please don't get me wrong. I'm in no way trying to downplay the role of the Waffen-SS, or any of it's individual exploits. I'm sure that there are plenty of examples of true bravery and whatnot. Unfortunately this is not one of them.
As an ex. soldier and NCO, I see nothing that is out of the ordinary in the acts of Klingenberg on 12 April 1941. As an amateur historian I value the historical accuracy we can draw from these easily available documents from various archives.
To understand the rapid collapse of the Royal Yugoslav Army you would have to study the country and what was going on there preceding the invasion and occurring at the same time as the invasion. The short version is that the army largely fell apart because of ethnic diversity, to put it mildly. While on some places the army just seized to exist without any fight at all, there were places where they did put up resistance as evidenced by the fact that the German army suffered losses in both men and equipment.
Some interesting questions arise when looking at this case. Seeing as there were not that many that participated in the entering of Belgrade, where might this detailed information have come from? Did Klingenbergs commanding officer just pull it out of his hat? Or is it more likely that Klingenberg was given the benefit of credibility as he and his soldiers told the story? Who else would have known to tell about it except Klingenberg, 9-10 of his men and Oberst Tousssaint?
So please someone explain to us all where the information for the proposal might have come from. I'm not being sarcastic, I'm being serious. This would be of utmost interest to know.
The claim that no one had received word of Klingenbergs action on the same day is also pure and simple bullshit. Again, take a look at the transcript of the message that Oberst Toussaint sent on 12 April 1941 at 21.00(!) hours to SS-Division "Reich"(!). It was signed by SS-Hstuf Weidinger as received. So how could they not have known on the very same day? Why would the division not inform its higher commands of this on the same day? Why would no one believe the message that they read, was there a common practice of many or every message being unclear or faulty?
Let us also take a closer look at the what the text in the award proposal says. At the time Klingenberg was the commander of the 2nd Company within the SS-motorcycle battalion (2./SS-Kradschüzten-Bataillon). He was not part of the reconnaissance battalion (SS-Aufklärungs-Abteiliung 2). One could argue that the motorcycle battalion was sort of a reconnaissance unit, but that was not its primary use. I'm not going to go into detail about why and how, as that would demand a closer look at the lack of motorised transportation in the German army in general.
Note here that is says specifically "einer kleinen Vorausabteilung das Kradsch.Btl.". That is not even his entire company, but just a small unit.
So if the division had met heavy resistance along the way, why send a small advance party to secure (not scout) a major objective if they were expected to meet more heavy resistance? Why not sent the entire company, or the entire battalion for that matter, to secure this so very important second objective of the entire campaign? I'm actually at a loss. Because the claim then would have to be made that the Germans outright lied in this document.
Furthermore this one line gives the basis of why exactly Klingenberg even was at Belgrade, long before any other German units were. And why did no other German higher commands send a small advance party to secure the bridge/s in to Belgrade?
If in doubt as to what his mission was, please read again the one line that explains exactly what his mission was. Again, no need to change or add. This is the official reason why.
Yes, the met many obstacles(!) and no actual resistance(!). Funny right? Not really, because everything points to there being no resistance what so ever. Even the unit that Klingenberg initially met gave up without actually shooting, as is stated. But who knows, maybe Klingenberg lied? Either case we have to accept this as the official version as there is nothing else to examine. Everything else, unless backed with actual documents, diaries or interviews, has to be taken as pure speculation. Speculation is fine, as along as you can find something that can confirm it and stand up to critical examination. Your word alone will never stand up to any examination.
There is no way to know for certain, but the text does indicate that the enemy unit that Klingenberg initially met was actually taken by surprise. Their immediate reaction to throw down their arms when fired upon heavily indicates this. Just speculating, but perhaps Klingenberg met them from an ambush position?
Indeed the award proposal says:
As Oberst Toussaint confirms in his document, that is the amount of prisoners taken up until 21.00 hours on 12 April 1941. But, I'm having some issue with clarifying if they were all military or if this includes the civilian authorities as well, such as police and city administration. If anyone has any information that will clarify this please share it here.
The text does say "Eine Pi.Kolonne und andere Einheiten..." which is one engineer column and other units. But what other units and how many soldiers? I get the impression that they are intentionally being vague on this in order to give the impression of it being more than it actually was. Considering that the bridges are blown, a Pi.Kolonne would not be strange to find in the city. But what other units might there have been if no resistance was planned?
The details in Klingenbergs award proposal focuses on the action of the entire day. The "bluff" is given as much space in the text as does all the other actions. No specific focus is given the "bluff". If the "bluff" was the focal point then they would have fleshed it out a lot more than one (1) line to explain that he secured the Military HQ with a few men and another one (1) line that the mayor was under the impression of stronger German force being there.
If two (2) lines are considered to mainly focus on the "bluff". Then the rest of the text is pure exaggeration of what Klingenberg did.
Ok, let's add one (1) more line to that. When Klingenberg sent only one Serbian soldier instead of a German soldier or one just to accompany the Serbian soldier. The one Serbian soldier must have added tremendously to the "bluff". Especially if he was stupid enough to not tell the mayor of the nature of him being there. I mean, it is an easily overlooked fact that 10-11 men captured him and his entire unit, right? And then trusting him enough to send him alone?
It is important to keep in mind that Klingenberg acted under orders up until he had secured the demolished bridge north of Belgrade. Very important.
So, Klingenberg met only obstacles along the way. Not one single enemy soldier. Not even a prepared trench or bunker out of sand bags. Nothing.
What Klingenberg then did surpassed his tactical initiative and also showed personal initiative as well. A very admirable trait for an officer in commanding position. But he would never have done what he did had he met any resistance along the way. To enter a city with 10-11 men just willy nilly is not any professional soldier would do, let alone a officer. It would have been a fatal decision if he had met any resistance along the way.
As it turned out Klingenberg did the right thing in probing the city. But then, why was he there in the first place? Why not any other German units?
Nobody is trying to dismiss what Klingenberg did. But why blow it out of proportion? His actions are not as glorious as the many writings about it would have us believe.
English is only my third language and German is only my sixth language. I don't have the time to sit and translate the entire text and make it an accurate translation. I do however understand what I am reading in German. Just as I understand what I am reading in English. There is no extraordinary act within this text, that tells us why Klingenberg received this high award. In fact, I would suggest that any officer in commanding position that would have been the first to enter Belgrade would have been given this award. I also do not believe it to be an accident that it was Klingenberg, a Waffen-SS officer. Just mere hours before the officers of the regular army reached Belgrade.
The Waffen-SS did nothing but take away the glory of the regular German army.
Sorry for the lengthy posts. Please, take a closer look at and examine the documents I shared. The actions of Klingenberg are explained to a relatively high degree in the very document that gave him the award for his actions. Why deny this and add or change facts? This document contains all the relevant information already. Or am I just failing to point that out properly due to the fact that English is only my third language?
Best regards
Blanusa
As an ex. soldier and NCO, I see nothing that is out of the ordinary in the acts of Klingenberg on 12 April 1941. As an amateur historian I value the historical accuracy we can draw from these easily available documents from various archives.
To understand the rapid collapse of the Royal Yugoslav Army you would have to study the country and what was going on there preceding the invasion and occurring at the same time as the invasion. The short version is that the army largely fell apart because of ethnic diversity, to put it mildly. While on some places the army just seized to exist without any fight at all, there were places where they did put up resistance as evidenced by the fact that the German army suffered losses in both men and equipment.
Some interesting questions arise when looking at this case. Seeing as there were not that many that participated in the entering of Belgrade, where might this detailed information have come from? Did Klingenbergs commanding officer just pull it out of his hat? Or is it more likely that Klingenberg was given the benefit of credibility as he and his soldiers told the story? Who else would have known to tell about it except Klingenberg, 9-10 of his men and Oberst Tousssaint?
So please someone explain to us all where the information for the proposal might have come from. I'm not being sarcastic, I'm being serious. This would be of utmost interest to know.
Based on what? Why in the world would the German high command not believe Oberst Toussaint, when everyone was aware of the fact that it would have occurred at latest by 14 April. At the very latest!! If you claim otherwise, then please provide some sort of source to back your claim. Your word alone is not enough to undermine the strategic awareness of several German commanders who were on the ground at the time. Klingenebrg, as evidenced by the award proposal, was not there without reason. Oberst Toussaint wrote that he gave Klingenberg new orders and considered the previous order to be old in light of the events unfolding. The previous order, that Oberst Toussaint chose to see as old, was that Klingenberg return to his unit as soon as possible. This is what Oberst Toussaint says in the document written on 12 April 1941 at 21.00 hours(!).At first, the German high command did not believe that the city had been taken. There was even word that Klingenberg would be shot for trying to fake such an exploit.
The claim that no one had received word of Klingenbergs action on the same day is also pure and simple bullshit. Again, take a look at the transcript of the message that Oberst Toussaint sent on 12 April 1941 at 21.00(!) hours to SS-Division "Reich"(!). It was signed by SS-Hstuf Weidinger as received. So how could they not have known on the very same day? Why would the division not inform its higher commands of this on the same day? Why would no one believe the message that they read, was there a common practice of many or every message being unclear or faulty?
Let us also take a closer look at the what the text in the award proposal says. At the time Klingenberg was the commander of the 2nd Company within the SS-motorcycle battalion (2./SS-Kradschüzten-Bataillon). He was not part of the reconnaissance battalion (SS-Aufklärungs-Abteiliung 2). One could argue that the motorcycle battalion was sort of a reconnaissance unit, but that was not its primary use. I'm not going to go into detail about why and how, as that would demand a closer look at the lack of motorised transportation in the German army in general.
My translation: On 12 April 1941, SS-Hauptsturmführer Klingenberg as leader of a small advance party of the MC-battalion had the task to take the bridge over the Danube north of Belgrade.Am 12.4.41 hatte SS-Hauptsturmführer Klingenberg als Führer einer kleinen Vorausabteilung das Kradsch.Btl. den Auftrag, die Donaubrücke nordlich Belgrad in Handstreiche zu nehmen.
Note here that is says specifically "einer kleinen Vorausabteilung das Kradsch.Btl.". That is not even his entire company, but just a small unit.
So if the division had met heavy resistance along the way, why send a small advance party to secure (not scout) a major objective if they were expected to meet more heavy resistance? Why not sent the entire company, or the entire battalion for that matter, to secure this so very important second objective of the entire campaign? I'm actually at a loss. Because the claim then would have to be made that the Germans outright lied in this document.
Furthermore this one line gives the basis of why exactly Klingenberg even was at Belgrade, long before any other German units were. And why did no other German higher commands send a small advance party to secure the bridge/s in to Belgrade?
If in doubt as to what his mission was, please read again the one line that explains exactly what his mission was. Again, no need to change or add. This is the official reason why.
Yes, the met many obstacles(!) and no actual resistance(!). Funny right? Not really, because everything points to there being no resistance what so ever. Even the unit that Klingenberg initially met gave up without actually shooting, as is stated. But who knows, maybe Klingenberg lied? Either case we have to accept this as the official version as there is nothing else to examine. Everything else, unless backed with actual documents, diaries or interviews, has to be taken as pure speculation. Speculation is fine, as along as you can find something that can confirm it and stand up to critical examination. Your word alone will never stand up to any examination.
There is no way to know for certain, but the text does indicate that the enemy unit that Klingenberg initially met was actually taken by surprise. Their immediate reaction to throw down their arms when fired upon heavily indicates this. Just speculating, but perhaps Klingenberg met them from an ambush position?
Indeed the award proposal says:
My translation: About 1000 prisoners were taken.Es wurden etwa 1000 Gefangene gemacht.
As Oberst Toussaint confirms in his document, that is the amount of prisoners taken up until 21.00 hours on 12 April 1941. But, I'm having some issue with clarifying if they were all military or if this includes the civilian authorities as well, such as police and city administration. If anyone has any information that will clarify this please share it here.
The text does say "Eine Pi.Kolonne und andere Einheiten..." which is one engineer column and other units. But what other units and how many soldiers? I get the impression that they are intentionally being vague on this in order to give the impression of it being more than it actually was. Considering that the bridges are blown, a Pi.Kolonne would not be strange to find in the city. But what other units might there have been if no resistance was planned?
The details in Klingenbergs award proposal focuses on the action of the entire day. The "bluff" is given as much space in the text as does all the other actions. No specific focus is given the "bluff". If the "bluff" was the focal point then they would have fleshed it out a lot more than one (1) line to explain that he secured the Military HQ with a few men and another one (1) line that the mayor was under the impression of stronger German force being there.
If two (2) lines are considered to mainly focus on the "bluff". Then the rest of the text is pure exaggeration of what Klingenberg did.
Ok, let's add one (1) more line to that. When Klingenberg sent only one Serbian soldier instead of a German soldier or one just to accompany the Serbian soldier. The one Serbian soldier must have added tremendously to the "bluff". Especially if he was stupid enough to not tell the mayor of the nature of him being there. I mean, it is an easily overlooked fact that 10-11 men captured him and his entire unit, right? And then trusting him enough to send him alone?
It is important to keep in mind that Klingenberg acted under orders up until he had secured the demolished bridge north of Belgrade. Very important.
So, Klingenberg met only obstacles along the way. Not one single enemy soldier. Not even a prepared trench or bunker out of sand bags. Nothing.
What Klingenberg then did surpassed his tactical initiative and also showed personal initiative as well. A very admirable trait for an officer in commanding position. But he would never have done what he did had he met any resistance along the way. To enter a city with 10-11 men just willy nilly is not any professional soldier would do, let alone a officer. It would have been a fatal decision if he had met any resistance along the way.
As it turned out Klingenberg did the right thing in probing the city. But then, why was he there in the first place? Why not any other German units?
Nobody is trying to dismiss what Klingenberg did. But why blow it out of proportion? His actions are not as glorious as the many writings about it would have us believe.
English is only my third language and German is only my sixth language. I don't have the time to sit and translate the entire text and make it an accurate translation. I do however understand what I am reading in German. Just as I understand what I am reading in English. There is no extraordinary act within this text, that tells us why Klingenberg received this high award. In fact, I would suggest that any officer in commanding position that would have been the first to enter Belgrade would have been given this award. I also do not believe it to be an accident that it was Klingenberg, a Waffen-SS officer. Just mere hours before the officers of the regular army reached Belgrade.
The Waffen-SS did nothing but take away the glory of the regular German army.
Sorry for the lengthy posts. Please, take a closer look at and examine the documents I shared. The actions of Klingenberg are explained to a relatively high degree in the very document that gave him the award for his actions. Why deny this and add or change facts? This document contains all the relevant information already. Or am I just failing to point that out properly due to the fact that English is only my third language?
Best regards
Blanusa
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Germanicus
- Member
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- Joined: 04 Jun 2009, 14:26
- Location: Shell Cove NSW Australia
Re: Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
Dear nmy
The question I originally believed that was being asked is Waffen-SS Military Success. The original question wasn't true bravery. They are two different things. I am not denying anything, I am remaining true to the original question.. Military Success was the question, was it not?? No your English is fine, however to change course in the middle of the debate in order to seek out an alternative answer is the fault here. If the original question has changed then so be it. You stated nmy....In fact, I would suggest that any officer in commanding position that would have been the first to enter Belgrade would have been given this award.... I agree with that, however, there wasn't anyone else there.. however, you then go on to state ..The Waffen-SS did nothing but take away the glory of the regular German Army... There lies the problem, the fact that he belonged to the Waffen-SS!!... Klingenberg was able to by-pass any resistance, was able to drive through a hostile country and reach the premier city of that country and enter it without any defences would have appeared to be unusual and strange to anyone!!.. surely it wasn't that easy as though he was going for a Sunday drive!!... I fail to see why Klingenberg being an Waffen-SS officer is at fault for entering Belgrade and being recognised for what he did?? Yes any other unit could have done this, however they weren't and Klingenberg's unit did!! I thought we were still being factual...
The following is written by Professor Colin D. Heaton served in the U.S. Army and later the U.S. Marines as a scout sniper under Livingston's command. He was a guest historian on the History Channel program Dogfights: Secret Weapons and has authored several books of military history, including German Anti-Partisan Warfare in Europe 1939–1945; Occupation and Insurgency: A Selective Examination of The Hague and Geneva Conventions on the Eastern Front; Night Fighters: The Luftwaffe and RAF Air Combat over Europe, 1939–1945, coauthored with Anne-Marie Lewis; and The Me 262 Stormbird: From the Pilots Who Flew, Fought, and Survived It, coauthored with Anne-Marie Lewis. He has taught history and military history at American Military University. Now I am in the process of contacting him, in order to ascertain his sources for this report... Surely you have already pressed the link which has been written and have already read this. However that is fine. If not read this in its entirety and this may answer ..
Invasion of Yugoslavia: Waffen SS Captain Fritz Klingenberg and the Capture of Belgrade During World War II
http://www.historynet.com/invasion-of-y ... war-ii.htm
'When Germany's forces slammed into the Balkans during the early spring of 1941, they encountered not only armed resistance but also difficultterrain and horrendous weather. The Italian military's failure to make headway during the previous winter campaign in Greece, followed by the commitment of British forces to Greece's aid, threatened Germany's southern flank, compelling Adolf Hitler to intervene. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini had sent 500,000 soldiers into the Balkans, and had lost 63,000 in the first six months of his effort. High elevations and mountain passes covered with snow until April and even May hindered German supply convoys and placed a great strain on mechanized units. Reinforcements could not be deployed as readily as needed. Rivers and streams had to be crossed, wounded soldiers and prisoners needed to be evacuated, airfields had to be captured or constructed, and lines of communication needed to be established. Victory sometimes depended on a secured, viable supply line more than a superior military force.
The intense fighting for the Balkans was unlike any that the Wehrmacht had previously faced. This was its first encounter with guerrilla fighters, winter fighting and mountainous terrain. All the key objectives had to be taken quickly, and cities were the primary targets. The Germans expected Greece to capitulate, placing the capital of Athens and Greek ports in German hands. Greek bases for the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine would solidify German control over the northeastern Mediterranean and assist in supplying the Afrika Korps. Greece would also serve as a staging area for interdiction of British shipping and would position German arms just a little closer to the Suez Canal.
In Germany's path was Yugoslavia, which was largely pro-British — particularly the Serb and Gypsy contingents within the country. Fear that Yugoslavia's Prince Paul might sway toward the Fascist camp prompted the Yugoslavian ambassador in Washington to send an impassioned plea to Belgrade, begging the prince not to give in to Hitler. Britain's King George VI, along with Prime Minister Winston Churchill, sent messages to Prince Paul and Yugoslavian Prime Minister Dragisa Cvetovic. Churchill predicted that if Yugoslavia 'were to become an accomplice in the assassination of Greece, her ruin will be certain and irrevocable.'
On March 20, Prince Paul formally announced that his country would join the Axis Tripartite Pact. Meeting with Arthur Bliss Lane, the American ambassador, Paul stated that, if he did not join the Axis, he could not count on Croat support in the invasion that was sure to come.
On March 24, 1941, Prime Minister Cvetovic and Foreign Minister Cincar-Markovic left for Vienna to sign the pact, departing in secret for fear of public reprisals. They signed the agreement on the 25th, then returned home. In Belgrade, they learned of a coup that had been initiated on the evening of the 26th. Military officers and anti-fascist troops seized air bases, aircraft and government buildings, toppling the weak Yugoslav government overnight. The revolutionary forces seized radio and telephone exchanges, the ministry of war building, police headquarters and the main post office. Cvetovic was arrested. Prince Paul was captured in Zagreb, where he was traveling by train, and was forced to abdicate, leaving the young King Peter as a puppet monarch.
The new government announced that it would remain faithful to the Tripartite Pact after realizing that Britain and the United States, although supportive, were in no position to assist them against a German attack. Hitler was not appeased, however. On the very day the coup took place in Yugoslavia, he ordered his high command to plan a full-scale invasion of the country. On April 6, 1941, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop gave orders for the attack on Yugoslavia to roll forward.
Bulgaria was already allied to and occupied by the Germans, and many divisions passed through that country on their way to invade the countries to the south. In order for the Germans to secure their left flank and the supply routes necessary for further conquest, Yugoslavia had to be subjugated quickly. The 1st SS Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler and 2nd SS Das Reich divisions, along with mountain troops and additional armored and infantry units, were to thrust through Serbia. Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital, was the most important objective, and to weaken the city the German high command planned a two-week bombardment followed by massive artillery and armored attacks. The Germans intended to employ five infantry divisions to occupy the city after its capture. Events proved, however, that even the best laid battle plans are sometimes pre-empted — and sometimes under most unusual circumstances.
Belgrade did suffer through several days of artillery attacks and three days of aerial bombardment, which served to soften up the Yugoslav capital. But the city was taken on April 12, 1941 — much earlier than the high command had anticipated — by a handful of troops low on ammunition and high on morale, led by a man who was not afraid to seize an opportunity when he saw it.
The highly unorthodox assault was a product of the military judgment, audacious courage and sheer luck of Waffen SS Captain Fritz Klingenberg. A 26-year-old graduate of the Bad Tölz officers academy, Klingenberg had gained a reputation as a headstrong, somewhat abrasive character. During the French campaign the previous year, his former company commander had said of him, 'Klingenberg is intelligent yet headstrong, loyal yet not above correcting his superiors, brilliant under pressure, yet arrogant to the point of insubordination.' Evaluations like that labeled Klingenberg more as a maverick than a competent military officer.
Klingenberg was not a hearty drinker or talker and never boasted of his accomplishments. When later asked by students at Bad Tölz how he had captured the capital of a country, he simply said, 'I was not too preoccupied at the time, and found something to do.'
Klingenberg had served his entire career in the elite 2nd Waffen SS Panzer Division Das Reich, and the invasion of France had been his baptism of fire. He was awarded the Iron Cross Second Class for heroism during that action. His platoon was pinned down by effective machine-gun fire when a Panzerkampfwagen Mark II light tank that had been supporting them struck a mine. The crew was trapped in the burning vehicle and raked by machine-gun fire. While his men rescued the tankers, Klingenberg raced across 100 meters of open ground, taking out the three-man French position with grenades. He did not receive so much as a scratch.
Klingenberg's direction of artillery during a battle was unique and impressive. Once, during the French campaign, he even called deadly 88mm fire down on his own position to rout an enemy counterattack. That action allowed the entire German column to press forward, taking advantage of confusion among the French. During another engagement, he called Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers down on his position to stop the enemy from retreating, which resulted in the capture of 55 prisoners. For that action, the acting battalion commander, Lt. Col. Hannes Eckhold, awarded the upstart captain the Iron Cross First Class. Klingenberg's evaluations continued to reflect obstinacy mixed with courage and creativity. Because he always emerged unscathed from his many flirtations with death and court-martial, his men began to call him the 'Magician.'Klingenberg also gained a reputation as a first-class scrounger. Whatever his men needed — ammunition, food, water, etc. — he managed to furnish. Klingenberg even held a school for scroungers, teaching men to steal essentials for survival. Soon after arriving in Yugoslavia, he was promoted to captain and given command of a motorcycle reconnaissance unit, which was responsible for gathering intelligence quickly and maintaining communications with rear units. His men held the division record for complaints and theft reports. In fact, they were called 'Klingenberg's criminals.' But the Magician had taught them well — no allegations against his men were ever proved.
On one occasion, Klingenberg's unit was to be inspected by the division for vehicle serviceability, and to pass, he had to produce an additional dozen serviceable motorcycles. He found himself about six short, so he sent his men out on a foraging mission; by hook or by crook, they managed to collect the required equipment. The only problem was that they ended up with six machines too many, freshly painted to hide their previous ownership. Klingenberg's commanding officer turned a blind eye to the discrepancy. He did, however, inform Klingenberg that he was not willing to hang for the activities of his subordinate, and asked the captain to please be more careful.
Klingenberg's next mission in Yugoslavia was to reconnoiter ahead of the main armored unit, scouting for enemy activity and marking roads or obstacles on maps. Those intelligence-gathering missions were crucial for a successful German thrust into the region.
Although Belgrade was marked for capture, the bulk of Das Reich was tied up fighting rear-guard actions and trying to push through Yugoslavia's narrow mountain passes. Meanwhile, the rest of the German army was so far behind that they were not even using the same maps. Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to bomb Belgrade prior to the final drive into the capital. From August 6 to 10, more than 500 bombing sorties were flown against Belgrade, inflicting more than 17,500 fatalities. Most of the government officials fled, and the Yugoslav army began to collapse.
On April 11, Klingenberg's instructions were to reconnoiter and establish checkpoints, secure any bridges and roads encountered, then hold for reinforcements. Heavy rains and melting snow had washed away nearly all soft surfaces, and bridges had been destroyed by retreating Yugoslav forces. The main avenues of approach to Belgrade were no longer viable routes, and the tanks would be hard pressed to continue without massive engineering support to clear those areas. After several hours of observing the stricken city from across the Danube River, Klingenberg believed that Belgrade was his for the taking, due to the confusion caused by the bombardments — provided his unit arrived in time. He had only 24 hours to submit a report to his command, and a decision had to be made quickly.
Klingenberg saw a chance to probe more deeply into the city's environs when one of his men found an abandoned motorboat tied to a tree along the banks of the swollen Danube. Taking only one sergeant and five privates, he negotiated the treacherous river. The trip was extremely dangerous, the currents raging from the runoff of melting snow in the mountains and from torrential rains. The boat was overloaded, as well. Reaching the far side of the Danube, Klingenberg sent two men back to ferry more troops over before sunset. On the return trip, however the boat struck a submerged obstacle and sank. Klingenberg's 'navy' ceased to exist, leaving the captain and six of his men stranded. They were totally isolated, with limited supplies and ammunition.
The squad advanced along the road and encountered a few British-made vehicles manned by Yugoslav soldiers. They captured two trucks and a bus, along with some 20 enemy soldiers. One of the men on the bus was an inebriated German tourist who had been trapped in Belgrade since the invasion started. The tourist, who spoke Croatian, had been apprehended as a spy by the Yugoslav soldiers and was being taken to be executed. He was still drunk and unaware of his impending fate. When he sobered up, he thought that he was still among his group of partygoers until he was informed of the situation. Klingenberg used him as an interpreter, in which capacity the grateful German was most helpful.
The SS men continued on, using their prisoners and a few captured uniforms to get past several enemy checkpoints. They made good progress the first day without any of the enemy checkpoint guards becoming suspicious. The Germans added the Yugoslav guards to the increasing number of prisoners they were collecting along the way. The population of Belgrade, after several days of bombing, was anticipating a long siege rather than an attack, and the lax security that Klingenberg encountered played directly into his hands.
Upon entering the outskirts of the city, the Germans became involved in a two-hour running firefight. They finally drove their captured vehicles into the city with many wounded prisoners aboard, including the hapless tourist. Miraculously, none of the SS men were wounded in the fight. They ended up in the city center, all alone and surrounded by a wide-eyed, bewildered population. The only SS casualty in Belgrade thus far was a private who had fallen and sprained his wrist.The Germans were amazed to find that no one attacked them in the city. The civilians went about their daily business as if nothing had happened. Klingenberg ordered Sergeant Hans Hossfelder to raise the German colors, replacing the Yugoslavian national flag with the German ensign shortly after 5 p.m. on April 12. Under Klingenberg's orders, his men began to strut about the city on patrol, giving the inhabitants the unmistakable impression that they were in charge.
The mayor of Belgrade came up to the Germans, complete with his entourage of city officials and in proper ceremonial dress. After asking what was going on, he inquired about the terms of surrender. Klingenberg told the mayor that his was the point team of several SS tank divisions, and if he did not check in with his unit by radio with the information requested, the Luftwaffe would continue their attempts to level the city. He also said that the air attacks would be followed by an artillery barrage and armored and infantry attacks that would spare no one.
The other Germans looked at their leader as if he was mad. Their radio was damaged and could not transmit, only receive; their unit was a considerable distance away; and they were out of ammunition and food. Sergeant Hossfelder later told his captain that he was in the wrong business, adding that the Propaganda Ministry could surely find a use for him.
The mayor fell for the ruse, and after an hour-long conversation with Klingenberg, he began the necessary arrangements for the surrender of the city. Then, as if on cue, a group of German aircraft flew over the city on a reconnaissance mission, and Klingenberg took advantage of the moment. He looked up, pointing to the sky, and reminded the mayor that the clock was ticking. Klingenberg gave his word that if all instructions were followed, no further harm would befall the city or its inhabitants. The city officials seemed relieved to hear that.
The soldiers and city militia agreed to lay down their arms in exchange for the Germans' ceasing additional attacks. The Yugoslav army stacked its arms in the city square, and Klingenberg had all of the men register with the mayor. Klingenberg then ordered the prisoners to quarter themselves in four of the largest hotels and posted a German guard to each building. The handful of Germans had just captured more than 1,300 troops and a city with a population of over 200,000 without firing a single shot. The city had suffered considerable damage, but not enough to prevent the locals from continuing with life and business as usual. Yugaslav soldiers outside the city, unaware of what had happened to their capital, drove into Belgrade only to be ordered by their superiors to lay down their arms, abandon their vehicles and march to the hotels. All the Yugoslavians complied without hesitation.
Klingenberg and his men made themselves comfortable in the city's finest hotel, making fake radio transmissions to reinforce the charade. They stockpiled bottles of wine and weapons, and two of the men disappeared with a couple of local women. Meanwhile, Klingenberg consolidated his position, knowing that things could still go wrong. If the main force did not arrive soon, the game was up. He had his men recruit locals to help procure every map, police record and tax record in the city.
The chief of police was ordered to provide a list of all criminals in the city, stating their crimes, age and other pertinent information. Women with nursing skills were to report for duty immediately, and all doctors were called in as well. Every liter of gasoline was accounted for, and oil, medical supplies and other necessities were placed in special holding facilities. The hospital was to be neutral ground, and all health care was to be maintained as a gesture of good will. Klingenberg even ordered the schools to remain open and placed no restrictions on daily business. He did, however, place an 8 p.m. curfew on the city; only citizens with a pass signed by him could legally venture outside their homes after that time.
The next day, April 13, more of Klingenberg's men who had remained on the opposite side of the river followed their leader into the city. Seeing the German flag, they believed that the main force had somehow bypassed them. They were amazed to find the 'lost' men in command of the primary objective, with the locals not hostile but actually accommodating. Hossfelder told the new arrivals what had transpired and warned them to play along. They flexed their military muscle by commandeering every vehicle they could find.
Finally, on the night of April 13, the forward elements of Das Reich entered the city expecting a heavy fight. They had disregarded radio transmissions they had received telling of the city's surrender, believing it was an enemy hoax, possibly an attempt to lure German units into an ambush. Rumor had it that Klingenberg and his men had been captured, tortured and forced to release the codes required for proper radio communications. The XLV Corps commander was so furious at not having received his intelligence summary that he had threatened to have Klingenberg court-martialed if he were found alive as a prisoner. The first place he inquired for Klingenberg was at a brothel, figuring that he would find the renegade captain there. The corps commander's fury soon subsided when he learned why his junior company commander had been negligent in his duties.
The rest of Das Reich and supplemental army Panzergrenadierunits entered Belgrade in force the following day, and instead of fighting their way into the city, they were greeted with wine and cheese. The Yugoslav prisoners were conscripted to reinforce the German defense in case of partisan attacks. Sadly, when the mayor realized that he had been duped, he shot himself.
On April 17, Josip Broz, better known as Tito, the trade unionist and leader of the 'illegal' Communist Party, acknowledged defeat in Yugoslavia and surrendered the country in name only. He fled into the mountains with his partisans, where, supported by the British, he waged a four-year guerrilla campaign against his country's invaders. He would later become president of a Communist Yugoslavia, which nevertheless rejected association with the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact.Klingenberg persuaded the garrison commander to relinquish his maps and divulge the location of his minefields and gun emplacements, as well as the nearby anti-aircraft emplacements and adjacent auxiliary airstrip. Markers were placed that could be clearly seen from the air, and German transports were able to land, bringing food, ammunition and war correspondents. Klingenberg even had some of the prisoners repair the damaged runways and confiscated several obsolete aircraft.
German Intelligence had projected before Belgrade surrendered that Yugoslav army casualties would number approximately 10,000 to 15,000 wounded and 2,000 dead after massive Luftwaffe and artillery bombardment and a subsequent fight to enter the city. Civilian casualties were predicted to be 10 times those figures. Klingenberg was concerned for the welfare of his men, yet he was also worried about the fate of the civilians. He did not see the need for further bloodshed in the city, and his men were actually treated well by the civilians, who knew that they could have suffered a much worse fate.At first, the German high command did not believe that the city had been taken. There was even word that Klingenberg would be shot for trying to fake such an exploit. Two days of radio transmissions were needed to convince Berlin that all was well. Lieutenant General Paul Hausser was ordered to inspect for himself.
When Klingenberg reported to his superiors to explain why he had not followed orders, he was drunk, unshaven and smelled of perfume. After several minutes, Klingenberg said, 'What was I to do, give the city back?' His indiscretions were overlooked, and the German battle plan, now obsolete, was stamped 'completed.' The drive into Greece was now ahead of schedule. The cost of the entire Yugoslavian campaign to Germany was 558 wounded and 151 killed, with less than a dozen aircraft lost. More than 340,000 Yugoslavs were captured. The exact number killed will never be known.
The Germans left 10 of their infantry divisions, two SS units and one auxiliary SS unit, the 13th Waffen SS Handschar (or Scimitar) Division, as a garrison force of occupation in Yugoslavia. This unit was made up of Yugoslavs, primarily Bosnian Muslims, and they performed a counterpartisan role. The occupation of Yugoslavia consumed manpower and claimed resources badly needed for the future Eastern Front. More Germans died while assigned to garrison duty in Yugoslavia than had been wounded during the fighting to conquer it.
Every man assigned to Klingenberg during the Belgrade operation received decorations for valor and promotions. Hossfelder was given a commission as a second lieutenant and attended the SS officers school at Bad Tölz, where he later became an instructor. Today he lives in Munich as a retired school teacher.
For his daring exploit, Klingenberg was awarded the Knight's Cross, and he became a favorite of the SS inner circle. The 'Old Man,' as he came to be known, was periodically sent to Bad Tölz as an instructor on tactics and battlefield initiative. On March 15, 1944, he became the only Bad Tölz graduate to assume command of the school.
When Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, commenced, Das Reich was hurled into the fray. Klingenberg later distinguished himself at Kharkov, Minsk and Kursk, earning many honorable mentions in the dispatches of General Heinz Guderian. He was eventually awarded the Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross, presented in 1943. He became a personal favorite of Paul Hausser, commander of the II SS Panzer Corps until the Kursk-Orel operation.
Klingenberg was promoted to the rank of colonel on December 21, 1944. As Germany's situation deteriorated on all fronts, he was ordered to take command of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division 'Götz von Berlichingen' on January 12, 1945, assuming the post nine days later. Attached to General Max Simon's XIII SS Corps, the 17th was defending the West Wall southeast of Saarbrcken against Maj. Gen. Wade H. Haislip's XV Corps of the U.S. Seventh Army.
The XIII SS Corps had its back to the Rhine, stubbornly defending the area between Neustadt and Landau. When resistance finally collapsed on March 22, Klingenberg was among the casualties — he had died leading his division in its last-ditch effort to stem the American tide.
Klingenberg's actions in Belgrade fit in with the mystique surrounding the Waffen SS. Despite the atrocities correctly attributed to SS units and individuals, such acts of chivalry and valor as Klingenberg demonstrated were not uncommon among the real professionals. Klingenberg could have followed the book and contributed to the total destruction of the ancient city and population of Belgrade had the Yugoslavians offered further resistance. History is the better for his act of bravery and humanity.'
This article was written by Colin D. Heaton and originally appeared in the January 1998 issue of World War II.
The question I originally believed that was being asked is Waffen-SS Military Success. The original question wasn't true bravery. They are two different things. I am not denying anything, I am remaining true to the original question.. Military Success was the question, was it not?? No your English is fine, however to change course in the middle of the debate in order to seek out an alternative answer is the fault here. If the original question has changed then so be it. You stated nmy....In fact, I would suggest that any officer in commanding position that would have been the first to enter Belgrade would have been given this award.... I agree with that, however, there wasn't anyone else there.. however, you then go on to state ..The Waffen-SS did nothing but take away the glory of the regular German Army... There lies the problem, the fact that he belonged to the Waffen-SS!!... Klingenberg was able to by-pass any resistance, was able to drive through a hostile country and reach the premier city of that country and enter it without any defences would have appeared to be unusual and strange to anyone!!.. surely it wasn't that easy as though he was going for a Sunday drive!!... I fail to see why Klingenberg being an Waffen-SS officer is at fault for entering Belgrade and being recognised for what he did?? Yes any other unit could have done this, however they weren't and Klingenberg's unit did!! I thought we were still being factual...
The following is written by Professor Colin D. Heaton served in the U.S. Army and later the U.S. Marines as a scout sniper under Livingston's command. He was a guest historian on the History Channel program Dogfights: Secret Weapons and has authored several books of military history, including German Anti-Partisan Warfare in Europe 1939–1945; Occupation and Insurgency: A Selective Examination of The Hague and Geneva Conventions on the Eastern Front; Night Fighters: The Luftwaffe and RAF Air Combat over Europe, 1939–1945, coauthored with Anne-Marie Lewis; and The Me 262 Stormbird: From the Pilots Who Flew, Fought, and Survived It, coauthored with Anne-Marie Lewis. He has taught history and military history at American Military University. Now I am in the process of contacting him, in order to ascertain his sources for this report... Surely you have already pressed the link which has been written and have already read this. However that is fine. If not read this in its entirety and this may answer ..
Invasion of Yugoslavia: Waffen SS Captain Fritz Klingenberg and the Capture of Belgrade During World War II
http://www.historynet.com/invasion-of-y ... war-ii.htm
'When Germany's forces slammed into the Balkans during the early spring of 1941, they encountered not only armed resistance but also difficultterrain and horrendous weather. The Italian military's failure to make headway during the previous winter campaign in Greece, followed by the commitment of British forces to Greece's aid, threatened Germany's southern flank, compelling Adolf Hitler to intervene. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini had sent 500,000 soldiers into the Balkans, and had lost 63,000 in the first six months of his effort. High elevations and mountain passes covered with snow until April and even May hindered German supply convoys and placed a great strain on mechanized units. Reinforcements could not be deployed as readily as needed. Rivers and streams had to be crossed, wounded soldiers and prisoners needed to be evacuated, airfields had to be captured or constructed, and lines of communication needed to be established. Victory sometimes depended on a secured, viable supply line more than a superior military force.
The intense fighting for the Balkans was unlike any that the Wehrmacht had previously faced. This was its first encounter with guerrilla fighters, winter fighting and mountainous terrain. All the key objectives had to be taken quickly, and cities were the primary targets. The Germans expected Greece to capitulate, placing the capital of Athens and Greek ports in German hands. Greek bases for the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine would solidify German control over the northeastern Mediterranean and assist in supplying the Afrika Korps. Greece would also serve as a staging area for interdiction of British shipping and would position German arms just a little closer to the Suez Canal.
In Germany's path was Yugoslavia, which was largely pro-British — particularly the Serb and Gypsy contingents within the country. Fear that Yugoslavia's Prince Paul might sway toward the Fascist camp prompted the Yugoslavian ambassador in Washington to send an impassioned plea to Belgrade, begging the prince not to give in to Hitler. Britain's King George VI, along with Prime Minister Winston Churchill, sent messages to Prince Paul and Yugoslavian Prime Minister Dragisa Cvetovic. Churchill predicted that if Yugoslavia 'were to become an accomplice in the assassination of Greece, her ruin will be certain and irrevocable.'
On March 20, Prince Paul formally announced that his country would join the Axis Tripartite Pact. Meeting with Arthur Bliss Lane, the American ambassador, Paul stated that, if he did not join the Axis, he could not count on Croat support in the invasion that was sure to come.
On March 24, 1941, Prime Minister Cvetovic and Foreign Minister Cincar-Markovic left for Vienna to sign the pact, departing in secret for fear of public reprisals. They signed the agreement on the 25th, then returned home. In Belgrade, they learned of a coup that had been initiated on the evening of the 26th. Military officers and anti-fascist troops seized air bases, aircraft and government buildings, toppling the weak Yugoslav government overnight. The revolutionary forces seized radio and telephone exchanges, the ministry of war building, police headquarters and the main post office. Cvetovic was arrested. Prince Paul was captured in Zagreb, where he was traveling by train, and was forced to abdicate, leaving the young King Peter as a puppet monarch.
The new government announced that it would remain faithful to the Tripartite Pact after realizing that Britain and the United States, although supportive, were in no position to assist them against a German attack. Hitler was not appeased, however. On the very day the coup took place in Yugoslavia, he ordered his high command to plan a full-scale invasion of the country. On April 6, 1941, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop gave orders for the attack on Yugoslavia to roll forward.
Bulgaria was already allied to and occupied by the Germans, and many divisions passed through that country on their way to invade the countries to the south. In order for the Germans to secure their left flank and the supply routes necessary for further conquest, Yugoslavia had to be subjugated quickly. The 1st SS Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler and 2nd SS Das Reich divisions, along with mountain troops and additional armored and infantry units, were to thrust through Serbia. Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital, was the most important objective, and to weaken the city the German high command planned a two-week bombardment followed by massive artillery and armored attacks. The Germans intended to employ five infantry divisions to occupy the city after its capture. Events proved, however, that even the best laid battle plans are sometimes pre-empted — and sometimes under most unusual circumstances.
Belgrade did suffer through several days of artillery attacks and three days of aerial bombardment, which served to soften up the Yugoslav capital. But the city was taken on April 12, 1941 — much earlier than the high command had anticipated — by a handful of troops low on ammunition and high on morale, led by a man who was not afraid to seize an opportunity when he saw it.
The highly unorthodox assault was a product of the military judgment, audacious courage and sheer luck of Waffen SS Captain Fritz Klingenberg. A 26-year-old graduate of the Bad Tölz officers academy, Klingenberg had gained a reputation as a headstrong, somewhat abrasive character. During the French campaign the previous year, his former company commander had said of him, 'Klingenberg is intelligent yet headstrong, loyal yet not above correcting his superiors, brilliant under pressure, yet arrogant to the point of insubordination.' Evaluations like that labeled Klingenberg more as a maverick than a competent military officer.
Klingenberg was not a hearty drinker or talker and never boasted of his accomplishments. When later asked by students at Bad Tölz how he had captured the capital of a country, he simply said, 'I was not too preoccupied at the time, and found something to do.'
Klingenberg had served his entire career in the elite 2nd Waffen SS Panzer Division Das Reich, and the invasion of France had been his baptism of fire. He was awarded the Iron Cross Second Class for heroism during that action. His platoon was pinned down by effective machine-gun fire when a Panzerkampfwagen Mark II light tank that had been supporting them struck a mine. The crew was trapped in the burning vehicle and raked by machine-gun fire. While his men rescued the tankers, Klingenberg raced across 100 meters of open ground, taking out the three-man French position with grenades. He did not receive so much as a scratch.
Klingenberg's direction of artillery during a battle was unique and impressive. Once, during the French campaign, he even called deadly 88mm fire down on his own position to rout an enemy counterattack. That action allowed the entire German column to press forward, taking advantage of confusion among the French. During another engagement, he called Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers down on his position to stop the enemy from retreating, which resulted in the capture of 55 prisoners. For that action, the acting battalion commander, Lt. Col. Hannes Eckhold, awarded the upstart captain the Iron Cross First Class. Klingenberg's evaluations continued to reflect obstinacy mixed with courage and creativity. Because he always emerged unscathed from his many flirtations with death and court-martial, his men began to call him the 'Magician.'Klingenberg also gained a reputation as a first-class scrounger. Whatever his men needed — ammunition, food, water, etc. — he managed to furnish. Klingenberg even held a school for scroungers, teaching men to steal essentials for survival. Soon after arriving in Yugoslavia, he was promoted to captain and given command of a motorcycle reconnaissance unit, which was responsible for gathering intelligence quickly and maintaining communications with rear units. His men held the division record for complaints and theft reports. In fact, they were called 'Klingenberg's criminals.' But the Magician had taught them well — no allegations against his men were ever proved.
On one occasion, Klingenberg's unit was to be inspected by the division for vehicle serviceability, and to pass, he had to produce an additional dozen serviceable motorcycles. He found himself about six short, so he sent his men out on a foraging mission; by hook or by crook, they managed to collect the required equipment. The only problem was that they ended up with six machines too many, freshly painted to hide their previous ownership. Klingenberg's commanding officer turned a blind eye to the discrepancy. He did, however, inform Klingenberg that he was not willing to hang for the activities of his subordinate, and asked the captain to please be more careful.
Klingenberg's next mission in Yugoslavia was to reconnoiter ahead of the main armored unit, scouting for enemy activity and marking roads or obstacles on maps. Those intelligence-gathering missions were crucial for a successful German thrust into the region.
Although Belgrade was marked for capture, the bulk of Das Reich was tied up fighting rear-guard actions and trying to push through Yugoslavia's narrow mountain passes. Meanwhile, the rest of the German army was so far behind that they were not even using the same maps. Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to bomb Belgrade prior to the final drive into the capital. From August 6 to 10, more than 500 bombing sorties were flown against Belgrade, inflicting more than 17,500 fatalities. Most of the government officials fled, and the Yugoslav army began to collapse.
On April 11, Klingenberg's instructions were to reconnoiter and establish checkpoints, secure any bridges and roads encountered, then hold for reinforcements. Heavy rains and melting snow had washed away nearly all soft surfaces, and bridges had been destroyed by retreating Yugoslav forces. The main avenues of approach to Belgrade were no longer viable routes, and the tanks would be hard pressed to continue without massive engineering support to clear those areas. After several hours of observing the stricken city from across the Danube River, Klingenberg believed that Belgrade was his for the taking, due to the confusion caused by the bombardments — provided his unit arrived in time. He had only 24 hours to submit a report to his command, and a decision had to be made quickly.
Klingenberg saw a chance to probe more deeply into the city's environs when one of his men found an abandoned motorboat tied to a tree along the banks of the swollen Danube. Taking only one sergeant and five privates, he negotiated the treacherous river. The trip was extremely dangerous, the currents raging from the runoff of melting snow in the mountains and from torrential rains. The boat was overloaded, as well. Reaching the far side of the Danube, Klingenberg sent two men back to ferry more troops over before sunset. On the return trip, however the boat struck a submerged obstacle and sank. Klingenberg's 'navy' ceased to exist, leaving the captain and six of his men stranded. They were totally isolated, with limited supplies and ammunition.
The squad advanced along the road and encountered a few British-made vehicles manned by Yugoslav soldiers. They captured two trucks and a bus, along with some 20 enemy soldiers. One of the men on the bus was an inebriated German tourist who had been trapped in Belgrade since the invasion started. The tourist, who spoke Croatian, had been apprehended as a spy by the Yugoslav soldiers and was being taken to be executed. He was still drunk and unaware of his impending fate. When he sobered up, he thought that he was still among his group of partygoers until he was informed of the situation. Klingenberg used him as an interpreter, in which capacity the grateful German was most helpful.
The SS men continued on, using their prisoners and a few captured uniforms to get past several enemy checkpoints. They made good progress the first day without any of the enemy checkpoint guards becoming suspicious. The Germans added the Yugoslav guards to the increasing number of prisoners they were collecting along the way. The population of Belgrade, after several days of bombing, was anticipating a long siege rather than an attack, and the lax security that Klingenberg encountered played directly into his hands.
Upon entering the outskirts of the city, the Germans became involved in a two-hour running firefight. They finally drove their captured vehicles into the city with many wounded prisoners aboard, including the hapless tourist. Miraculously, none of the SS men were wounded in the fight. They ended up in the city center, all alone and surrounded by a wide-eyed, bewildered population. The only SS casualty in Belgrade thus far was a private who had fallen and sprained his wrist.The Germans were amazed to find that no one attacked them in the city. The civilians went about their daily business as if nothing had happened. Klingenberg ordered Sergeant Hans Hossfelder to raise the German colors, replacing the Yugoslavian national flag with the German ensign shortly after 5 p.m. on April 12. Under Klingenberg's orders, his men began to strut about the city on patrol, giving the inhabitants the unmistakable impression that they were in charge.
The mayor of Belgrade came up to the Germans, complete with his entourage of city officials and in proper ceremonial dress. After asking what was going on, he inquired about the terms of surrender. Klingenberg told the mayor that his was the point team of several SS tank divisions, and if he did not check in with his unit by radio with the information requested, the Luftwaffe would continue their attempts to level the city. He also said that the air attacks would be followed by an artillery barrage and armored and infantry attacks that would spare no one.
The other Germans looked at their leader as if he was mad. Their radio was damaged and could not transmit, only receive; their unit was a considerable distance away; and they were out of ammunition and food. Sergeant Hossfelder later told his captain that he was in the wrong business, adding that the Propaganda Ministry could surely find a use for him.
The mayor fell for the ruse, and after an hour-long conversation with Klingenberg, he began the necessary arrangements for the surrender of the city. Then, as if on cue, a group of German aircraft flew over the city on a reconnaissance mission, and Klingenberg took advantage of the moment. He looked up, pointing to the sky, and reminded the mayor that the clock was ticking. Klingenberg gave his word that if all instructions were followed, no further harm would befall the city or its inhabitants. The city officials seemed relieved to hear that.
The soldiers and city militia agreed to lay down their arms in exchange for the Germans' ceasing additional attacks. The Yugoslav army stacked its arms in the city square, and Klingenberg had all of the men register with the mayor. Klingenberg then ordered the prisoners to quarter themselves in four of the largest hotels and posted a German guard to each building. The handful of Germans had just captured more than 1,300 troops and a city with a population of over 200,000 without firing a single shot. The city had suffered considerable damage, but not enough to prevent the locals from continuing with life and business as usual. Yugaslav soldiers outside the city, unaware of what had happened to their capital, drove into Belgrade only to be ordered by their superiors to lay down their arms, abandon their vehicles and march to the hotels. All the Yugoslavians complied without hesitation.
Klingenberg and his men made themselves comfortable in the city's finest hotel, making fake radio transmissions to reinforce the charade. They stockpiled bottles of wine and weapons, and two of the men disappeared with a couple of local women. Meanwhile, Klingenberg consolidated his position, knowing that things could still go wrong. If the main force did not arrive soon, the game was up. He had his men recruit locals to help procure every map, police record and tax record in the city.
The chief of police was ordered to provide a list of all criminals in the city, stating their crimes, age and other pertinent information. Women with nursing skills were to report for duty immediately, and all doctors were called in as well. Every liter of gasoline was accounted for, and oil, medical supplies and other necessities were placed in special holding facilities. The hospital was to be neutral ground, and all health care was to be maintained as a gesture of good will. Klingenberg even ordered the schools to remain open and placed no restrictions on daily business. He did, however, place an 8 p.m. curfew on the city; only citizens with a pass signed by him could legally venture outside their homes after that time.
The next day, April 13, more of Klingenberg's men who had remained on the opposite side of the river followed their leader into the city. Seeing the German flag, they believed that the main force had somehow bypassed them. They were amazed to find the 'lost' men in command of the primary objective, with the locals not hostile but actually accommodating. Hossfelder told the new arrivals what had transpired and warned them to play along. They flexed their military muscle by commandeering every vehicle they could find.
Finally, on the night of April 13, the forward elements of Das Reich entered the city expecting a heavy fight. They had disregarded radio transmissions they had received telling of the city's surrender, believing it was an enemy hoax, possibly an attempt to lure German units into an ambush. Rumor had it that Klingenberg and his men had been captured, tortured and forced to release the codes required for proper radio communications. The XLV Corps commander was so furious at not having received his intelligence summary that he had threatened to have Klingenberg court-martialed if he were found alive as a prisoner. The first place he inquired for Klingenberg was at a brothel, figuring that he would find the renegade captain there. The corps commander's fury soon subsided when he learned why his junior company commander had been negligent in his duties.
The rest of Das Reich and supplemental army Panzergrenadierunits entered Belgrade in force the following day, and instead of fighting their way into the city, they were greeted with wine and cheese. The Yugoslav prisoners were conscripted to reinforce the German defense in case of partisan attacks. Sadly, when the mayor realized that he had been duped, he shot himself.
On April 17, Josip Broz, better known as Tito, the trade unionist and leader of the 'illegal' Communist Party, acknowledged defeat in Yugoslavia and surrendered the country in name only. He fled into the mountains with his partisans, where, supported by the British, he waged a four-year guerrilla campaign against his country's invaders. He would later become president of a Communist Yugoslavia, which nevertheless rejected association with the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact.Klingenberg persuaded the garrison commander to relinquish his maps and divulge the location of his minefields and gun emplacements, as well as the nearby anti-aircraft emplacements and adjacent auxiliary airstrip. Markers were placed that could be clearly seen from the air, and German transports were able to land, bringing food, ammunition and war correspondents. Klingenberg even had some of the prisoners repair the damaged runways and confiscated several obsolete aircraft.
German Intelligence had projected before Belgrade surrendered that Yugoslav army casualties would number approximately 10,000 to 15,000 wounded and 2,000 dead after massive Luftwaffe and artillery bombardment and a subsequent fight to enter the city. Civilian casualties were predicted to be 10 times those figures. Klingenberg was concerned for the welfare of his men, yet he was also worried about the fate of the civilians. He did not see the need for further bloodshed in the city, and his men were actually treated well by the civilians, who knew that they could have suffered a much worse fate.At first, the German high command did not believe that the city had been taken. There was even word that Klingenberg would be shot for trying to fake such an exploit. Two days of radio transmissions were needed to convince Berlin that all was well. Lieutenant General Paul Hausser was ordered to inspect for himself.
When Klingenberg reported to his superiors to explain why he had not followed orders, he was drunk, unshaven and smelled of perfume. After several minutes, Klingenberg said, 'What was I to do, give the city back?' His indiscretions were overlooked, and the German battle plan, now obsolete, was stamped 'completed.' The drive into Greece was now ahead of schedule. The cost of the entire Yugoslavian campaign to Germany was 558 wounded and 151 killed, with less than a dozen aircraft lost. More than 340,000 Yugoslavs were captured. The exact number killed will never be known.
The Germans left 10 of their infantry divisions, two SS units and one auxiliary SS unit, the 13th Waffen SS Handschar (or Scimitar) Division, as a garrison force of occupation in Yugoslavia. This unit was made up of Yugoslavs, primarily Bosnian Muslims, and they performed a counterpartisan role. The occupation of Yugoslavia consumed manpower and claimed resources badly needed for the future Eastern Front. More Germans died while assigned to garrison duty in Yugoslavia than had been wounded during the fighting to conquer it.
Every man assigned to Klingenberg during the Belgrade operation received decorations for valor and promotions. Hossfelder was given a commission as a second lieutenant and attended the SS officers school at Bad Tölz, where he later became an instructor. Today he lives in Munich as a retired school teacher.
For his daring exploit, Klingenberg was awarded the Knight's Cross, and he became a favorite of the SS inner circle. The 'Old Man,' as he came to be known, was periodically sent to Bad Tölz as an instructor on tactics and battlefield initiative. On March 15, 1944, he became the only Bad Tölz graduate to assume command of the school.
When Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, commenced, Das Reich was hurled into the fray. Klingenberg later distinguished himself at Kharkov, Minsk and Kursk, earning many honorable mentions in the dispatches of General Heinz Guderian. He was eventually awarded the Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross, presented in 1943. He became a personal favorite of Paul Hausser, commander of the II SS Panzer Corps until the Kursk-Orel operation.
Klingenberg was promoted to the rank of colonel on December 21, 1944. As Germany's situation deteriorated on all fronts, he was ordered to take command of the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division 'Götz von Berlichingen' on January 12, 1945, assuming the post nine days later. Attached to General Max Simon's XIII SS Corps, the 17th was defending the West Wall southeast of Saarbrcken against Maj. Gen. Wade H. Haislip's XV Corps of the U.S. Seventh Army.
The XIII SS Corps had its back to the Rhine, stubbornly defending the area between Neustadt and Landau. When resistance finally collapsed on March 22, Klingenberg was among the casualties — he had died leading his division in its last-ditch effort to stem the American tide.
Klingenberg's actions in Belgrade fit in with the mystique surrounding the Waffen SS. Despite the atrocities correctly attributed to SS units and individuals, such acts of chivalry and valor as Klingenberg demonstrated were not uncommon among the real professionals. Klingenberg could have followed the book and contributed to the total destruction of the ancient city and population of Belgrade had the Yugoslavians offered further resistance. History is the better for his act of bravery and humanity.'
This article was written by Colin D. Heaton and originally appeared in the January 1998 issue of World War II.
Re: Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
Hello,
Alright then, let's pay absolutely no attention to what the German contemporary documents say and take everything that Professor Colin D. Heaton writes as fact. You are free to do as you please.
Please see Post Number: #34.
And no, just no and nothing but no. Belgrade was not a Waffen-SS military success. Is this a direct enough answer?
Looking at the original question I would draw the conclusion that this particular "Waffen-SS Military success - Belgrade 1941" in this case is based solely on the bravery of one Waffen-SS officer. If this is not the case and we are talking about the means to this particular end, then most definitively this is not a Waffen-SS military success. No either way.
But you don't have to agree with what I am writing and you can cherry pick everything I wrote and on top of that claim that Professor Colin D. Heaton is the ultimate authority on this subject. I personally see nothing in Professor Colin D. Heaton's article about Belgrade that comes even close to what the German contemporary documents say. He greatly exaggerates the actions of Klingenberg. In my opinion even professors can be at fault.
Please see Post Number: #34.
The Waffen-SS played a very small role in the grand scheme of the campaign. In fact, in the grand scheme of the campaign the Waffen-SS just swooped in and stole the glory away from the regular German army. And let me clarify that I am only speaking about Yugoslavia in general and Belgrade in particular.
It was not a random act that the unit Klingenberg commanded met no resistance. Nor is the lack of resistance the result of Klingenbergs actions or the result of the actions of the Waffen-SS. Instead it was a situation that had developed and which the SS-division then exploited. What Klingenberg did was of no tactical or strategic value either, because the main forces were already closing in on Belgrade.
Best regards
Blanusa
Alright then, let's pay absolutely no attention to what the German contemporary documents say and take everything that Professor Colin D. Heaton writes as fact. You are free to do as you please.
Please see Post Number: #34.
And no, just no and nothing but no. Belgrade was not a Waffen-SS military success. Is this a direct enough answer?
Looking at the original question I would draw the conclusion that this particular "Waffen-SS Military success - Belgrade 1941" in this case is based solely on the bravery of one Waffen-SS officer. If this is not the case and we are talking about the means to this particular end, then most definitively this is not a Waffen-SS military success. No either way.
But you don't have to agree with what I am writing and you can cherry pick everything I wrote and on top of that claim that Professor Colin D. Heaton is the ultimate authority on this subject. I personally see nothing in Professor Colin D. Heaton's article about Belgrade that comes even close to what the German contemporary documents say. He greatly exaggerates the actions of Klingenberg. In my opinion even professors can be at fault.
Please see Post Number: #34.
The Waffen-SS played a very small role in the grand scheme of the campaign. In fact, in the grand scheme of the campaign the Waffen-SS just swooped in and stole the glory away from the regular German army. And let me clarify that I am only speaking about Yugoslavia in general and Belgrade in particular.
It was not a random act that the unit Klingenberg commanded met no resistance. Nor is the lack of resistance the result of Klingenbergs actions or the result of the actions of the Waffen-SS. Instead it was a situation that had developed and which the SS-division then exploited. What Klingenberg did was of no tactical or strategic value either, because the main forces were already closing in on Belgrade.
Best regards
Blanusa
Re: Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
I cannot believe there are FIVE pages in this topic. Belgrade was heavily attacked and damaged from both air and ground by the German Army, and Klingenberg and his scared (the report used the term "tense") men were ordered to cross the river, expecting the enemy fire any moment - as the official German report for the territory of Serbia admits (published in Belgrade 1941). They did waltz into the city, but they didn't expect to waltz in. They were also not ordered to do so by the SS div. cdr. / OKW, it was one impatient man's idea. Klingenberg's own bluff at the final stage of the German Army's assault was his own success. But Belgrade was attacked, destroyed and conquered by the German Army (Air & Ground Forces) and it is naturally Army's success. It was all already known, written down back then by the people who did it, and also not disputed by the enemy. Five pages, come on...
Cheers,
Ivan
PS
In a team sport, let's say football, at a world cup - the decisive goal is of course attributed to the player, but the victory is attributed to the national team and the country, not the player nor his club. Sounds familiar? Five pages.
Cheers,
Ivan
PS
In a team sport, let's say football, at a world cup - the decisive goal is of course attributed to the player, but the victory is attributed to the national team and the country, not the player nor his club. Sounds familiar? Five pages.
Last edited by Ivan Ž. on 12 Nov 2014, 02:16, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
Hello Ivan,
With all due respect to you as Forum Staff, but there can never be enough discussion on any subject. Especially as long as the participants feel the need for it.
Nothing is as simple as it is being presented. I appreciate that people understand things differently. Hey, we are a diverse species in more then one way. I don't expect everyone to know the difference between tactics and strategies. Neither do I expect everyone to always think in both small and big picture. This is why we discuss and this is why there can be no set limit to a discussion. If need be, then this discussion should go on for another five pages.
Now, I'm curious as to which official report published in Belgrade 1941 you are referring. It seems to contain some very interesting details not mentioned in the documents I posted.
Best regards
Blanusa
With all due respect to you as Forum Staff, but there can never be enough discussion on any subject. Especially as long as the participants feel the need for it.
Nothing is as simple as it is being presented. I appreciate that people understand things differently. Hey, we are a diverse species in more then one way. I don't expect everyone to know the difference between tactics and strategies. Neither do I expect everyone to always think in both small and big picture. This is why we discuss and this is why there can be no set limit to a discussion. If need be, then this discussion should go on for another five pages.
Now, I'm curious as to which official report published in Belgrade 1941 you are referring. It seems to contain some very interesting details not mentioned in the documents I posted.
Best regards
Blanusa
Re: Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
There is a difference between a strict, neutral historical discussion (exchange of documents) and a chit-chat, wasting valuable informations by losing them in a sea of private and thus off-topic exchanges of historically irrelevant personal opinions, political attitudes hidden behind a historical research - most of them already covered in several threads in this forum section, dealing with pro- and con- Waffen-SS topics. And the eventual "conclusion" of this "new" debate was already known and available to public since 1941.
The report was published in Serbian language (for the occupied population) in a pocketbook called "Munjeviti rat u Jugoslaviji i Grčkoj" (Blitzkrieg in Yugoslavia and Greece) and it was written by KB Arndt, who was present at the time (Jugoistok, Belgrade, 1941). The report was named "Devet Nemaca osvaja Beograd" (Nine Germans conquer Belgrade).
Cheers,
Ivan
The report was published in Serbian language (for the occupied population) in a pocketbook called "Munjeviti rat u Jugoslaviji i Grčkoj" (Blitzkrieg in Yugoslavia and Greece) and it was written by KB Arndt, who was present at the time (Jugoistok, Belgrade, 1941). The report was named "Devet Nemaca osvaja Beograd" (Nine Germans conquer Belgrade).
Cheers,
Ivan
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Germanicus
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Re: Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
I am not disputing the historical fact.. that is absolutely clear... you asked for the source I gave it to you..then you became upset. Nmy you then frivolously write 'Alright then, let's pay absolutely no attention to what the German contemporary documents say and take everything that Professor Colin D. Heaton writes as fact. You are free to do as you please'. I mean I could have written the same in relation to you. No where did I state that Colin D Heaton was the ultimate authority... you are starting to become emotional. However as you stated you are an amateur historian [aren't most on Axis History Forum amateur historians] and Professor Heaton is a professional historian then isn't it more prudent to gain some reference from an expert. I don't believe he wrote what he did out of thin air. Professr Heaton wrote about a particular episode and gave insight into crucial aspects about Klingenberg. It explained the situation surrounding the event, it spoke of Klingenberg and what type of soldier he was. Contemporary documents do not spell this out. Most importantly nmy the question was about Belgrade.. not about Jugoslavia as a whole.. I will accept What Klingenberg did was of no tactical or strategic value either.. however one should not refute the psychological impact this would have had on the Jugoslav Army and its long term reason to fight on. I will not cherry pick every word you write others seem to be doing that all the way through this subject matter. Yet your opinion and assumptions are just that, opinions and assumptions.. I am not stating that what Klingenberg did as being out of all proportions yet others who have written extensively about this very matter believe it was outstanding. I mean walking into a foreign capital city and then taking its surrender by less than a dozen men seems impressive, no matter who. I can't remember reading any where that so few have done so. As for the focus on "bluff", it was Robwssob2 that wrote that in his original website.
However i will focus on something you wrote nmy
But he would never have done what he did had he met any resistance along the way. [Of cause not however that is hypothetical] To enter a city with 10-11 men just willy nilly is not any professional soldier would do, let alone a officer. [That makes no sense as you are saying in one breath prior to that...What Klingenberg then did surpassed his tactical initiative and also showed personal initiative as well. A very admirable trait for an officer in commanding position.' However you criticise him when he does this very fact] It would have been a fatal decision if he had met any resistance along the way. [Of cause it would have been, yet that didn't occur so he pushed on and succeeded] As it turned out Klingenberg did the right thing in probing the city. [He did probe the city he didn't go about his business willy nilly, he made sure that everything was safe prior to doing so] But then, why was he there in the first place? [On April 11, Klingenberg's instructions were to reconnoiter and establish checkpoints, secure any bridges and roads encountered, then hold for reinforcements.] Why not any other German units? [Belgrade was marked for capture, the bulk of Das Reich was tied up fighting rear-guard actions and trying to push through Yugoslavia's narrow mountain passes. Meanwhile, the rest of the German army was so far behind that they were not even using the same maps.]
I accept that you don't believe it was anything outstanding. You have presented your case yet don't come down on anyone that does not agree.. Fine, I know where you stand.. however respect the right of those who see it otherwise. You have come out swinging, you are swearing, you are upset and that is your right to do so, however accept there are those who don't agree with you. Nothing wrong with that nmy or is there??
I believe every person who presents a view on this Forum should be encouraged to do so and trying to discourage people will eventually see the demise of this very worth while media.
Mark
However i will focus on something you wrote nmy
But he would never have done what he did had he met any resistance along the way. [Of cause not however that is hypothetical] To enter a city with 10-11 men just willy nilly is not any professional soldier would do, let alone a officer. [That makes no sense as you are saying in one breath prior to that...What Klingenberg then did surpassed his tactical initiative and also showed personal initiative as well. A very admirable trait for an officer in commanding position.' However you criticise him when he does this very fact] It would have been a fatal decision if he had met any resistance along the way. [Of cause it would have been, yet that didn't occur so he pushed on and succeeded] As it turned out Klingenberg did the right thing in probing the city. [He did probe the city he didn't go about his business willy nilly, he made sure that everything was safe prior to doing so] But then, why was he there in the first place? [On April 11, Klingenberg's instructions were to reconnoiter and establish checkpoints, secure any bridges and roads encountered, then hold for reinforcements.] Why not any other German units? [Belgrade was marked for capture, the bulk of Das Reich was tied up fighting rear-guard actions and trying to push through Yugoslavia's narrow mountain passes. Meanwhile, the rest of the German army was so far behind that they were not even using the same maps.]
I accept that you don't believe it was anything outstanding. You have presented your case yet don't come down on anyone that does not agree.. Fine, I know where you stand.. however respect the right of those who see it otherwise. You have come out swinging, you are swearing, you are upset and that is your right to do so, however accept there are those who don't agree with you. Nothing wrong with that nmy or is there??
I believe every person who presents a view on this Forum should be encouraged to do so and trying to discourage people will eventually see the demise of this very worth while media.
Mark
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Germanicus
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Re: Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
Dear Ivan [Forum staff]
I appreciate your input thank you and it is great to see you have contributed positively to the subject. I will endeavour to find [The report was published in Serbian language (for the occupied population) in a pocketbook called "Munjeviti rat u Jugoslaviji i Grčkoj" (Blitzkrieg in Yugoslavia and Greece) and it was written by KB Arndt, who was present at the time (Jugoistok, Belgrade, 1941). The report was named "Devet Nemaca osvaja Beograd" (Nine Germans conquer Belgrade).] I gather Blanusa will be able to review this and add more knowledge to a subject that he doesn't know everything about.
Your contribution is helpful and appreciated.
Most respectfully
Mark
I appreciate your input thank you and it is great to see you have contributed positively to the subject. I will endeavour to find [The report was published in Serbian language (for the occupied population) in a pocketbook called "Munjeviti rat u Jugoslaviji i Grčkoj" (Blitzkrieg in Yugoslavia and Greece) and it was written by KB Arndt, who was present at the time (Jugoistok, Belgrade, 1941). The report was named "Devet Nemaca osvaja Beograd" (Nine Germans conquer Belgrade).] I gather Blanusa will be able to review this and add more knowledge to a subject that he doesn't know everything about.
Your contribution is helpful and appreciated.
Most respectfully
Mark
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Rob - wssob2
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Re: Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
Although sympathetic to Ivan's incredulity that such a small incident could merit such a long thread, I for one think this discussion is great. - and I'd like to thank everyone - regardless of their interpretation of the event in question - for participating. I've found this thread to definitely be above average WRT citations and sourced debate.
Sid wrote:
Dennis wrote:
Sid wrote:
That's why its important to get at the details behind the headlines, so to speak.It is rather more how his unresisted mopping up activity, admirably conducted though it apparently was, has grown in the telling over the years into a combat epic worthy of an unquestioned thread title such as "Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941" in which the real agent of victory - the German Army - gets no credit at all.
We are storming Castle Waffen in a quest for historical accuracy!Equally fascinating is the ferocious, room-by-room resistance put up today by some when any part of the Waffen-SS myth is challenged.
To be fair, the OKW communiqué and Hausser's KC recommendation certainly sowed the seeds for the tale.This thread is, in microcosm, almost a textbook example of how Waffen-SS activities often become inflated far beyond any justification.
Dennis wrote:
Yes - Himmler and the Waffen-SS definitely did recognize the importance of proving their military prowess, especially in these early 1939-41 campaigns.There appears to have been a rivalry between the SS and Army with the SS wanting to prove themselves.
I think everyone would agree to points 1, 3 and 4 - it seems that point #2 remains controversial.Was it a successful military operation - yes.
Was the ruse trivial and of no consequence – no.
Was it a war changing epic – no (and no one has claimed it to be).
Did Klingenberg’s actions typify the spirit and image higher SS Commanders expected of the Waffen SS – yes.
Yes it was a long complicated war, and as a consequence the particulars of the 1941 invasion of Yugoslavia have been obscured - which is why this thread is so great.Later events in WW2 have certainly dwarfed the significance and importance of Klingenberg’s action. By the standards of early 1941 the situation is kinder to Klingenberg. This is probably the main reason for historian not making a deeper study of the event.
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Germanicus
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Re: Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
Dear rob-wssob2
I believe that it is unfair to highlight certain aspects based on certain comments which you are allied to; by quoting:
'Equally fascinating is the ferocious, room-by-room resistance put up today by some when any part of the Waffen-SS myth is challenged.'
Is this really the reason for posting this subject in the first instance. In fact I would say that it is equally correct in saying that it is equally fascinating the ferocious, room-by-room attack put up by some when any mention of the Waffen-SS is presented. Is this forum suppose to be about historical accuracy and not agendas.
You maybe storming Castle Waffen, however I believe others were writing with an a historical viewpoint. A view based on your words.
Sad, very sad.
I believe that it is unfair to highlight certain aspects based on certain comments which you are allied to; by quoting:
'Equally fascinating is the ferocious, room-by-room resistance put up today by some when any part of the Waffen-SS myth is challenged.'
Is this really the reason for posting this subject in the first instance. In fact I would say that it is equally correct in saying that it is equally fascinating the ferocious, room-by-room attack put up by some when any mention of the Waffen-SS is presented. Is this forum suppose to be about historical accuracy and not agendas.
You maybe storming Castle Waffen, however I believe others were writing with an a historical viewpoint. A view based on your words.
Sad, very sad.
Re: Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
With all due respect to the fellow forum members, I'm sure everyone here has made some valuable contribution, but, as I already wrote, the pro-/con-Waffen-SS topic, which this one had turned into as well, has been already covered in AHF several times. I started following this topic with interest and then it only gave me a new headache (without too many new informations on the actual subject). Some time later, someone else said this to me privately: "Hey, are you following the Belgrade-topic? I did at first, but then it was really too much..."
Anyhow, I will see if I'll have the time to translate the report I mentioned (note: it was printed right after the pompous report on the advancing regular army, so the reader did NOT have an impression that the Waffen-SS in particular had any truly significant role in the battle for the capital; the report by the SS-KB was much more humble). Perhaps Trifković could do it as well, if he reads this and has time.
Ivan
Note:
Anyhow, I will see if I'll have the time to translate the report I mentioned (note: it was printed right after the pompous report on the advancing regular army, so the reader did NOT have an impression that the Waffen-SS in particular had any truly significant role in the battle for the capital; the report by the SS-KB was much more humble). Perhaps Trifković could do it as well, if he reads this and has time.
Ivan
Note:
The person who wrote this nonsenseGermanicus wrote:Professor Heaton is a professional historian then isn't it more prudent to gain some reference from an expert.
is neither a professional historian nor an expert. Tito was an anonymous at the time, and remained one for quite some time afterwards as well. I have no idea (well I do have some idea) why he was mentioned in the text in the first place. But this is off-topic, same as it was in Heaton's text.Heaton wrote:On April 17, Josip Broz, better known as Tito, the trade unionist and leader of the 'illegal' Communist Party, acknowledged defeat in Yugoslavia and surrendered the country in name only. He fled into the mountains with his partisans [...]
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Germanicus
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Re: Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
Dear Ivan..
If you google this very point, there is much on this topic to support this very view. I was always lead to believe that Tito remained anonymous until the Invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22 1941, not due to the Invasion or collapse of Yugoslavia. Google... [Josip Broz, better known as Tito, the trade unionist and leader of the 'illegal' Communist Party].. I agree that this paragraph is at odds in the context of the story... What you state however has left the door open to why it was put in, by stating (well I do have some idea), however, I have read greater nonsense posted already. In fact many before me highlighted this link to this web page.
All I did was cut and paste what they were referring to, so as to give the reader easy access to this, as well as quoting the source to something I posted when asked to do so by someone who was supposed to have read the story in the first instance. Heaton is a professional historian and has had books published. I have already stated that I am not touting him as an expert on the subject, however I do understand why you would have an affinity towards Tito. That is understandable, however Historical fact, sometimes offends, as not all of it is nice..
However considering the above, It is slightly offensive to be highlighted as such. Disappointing to say the least considering what some have posted.
Respectfully
Mark
If you google this very point, there is much on this topic to support this very view. I was always lead to believe that Tito remained anonymous until the Invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22 1941, not due to the Invasion or collapse of Yugoslavia. Google... [Josip Broz, better known as Tito, the trade unionist and leader of the 'illegal' Communist Party].. I agree that this paragraph is at odds in the context of the story... What you state however has left the door open to why it was put in, by stating (well I do have some idea), however, I have read greater nonsense posted already. In fact many before me highlighted this link to this web page.
All I did was cut and paste what they were referring to, so as to give the reader easy access to this, as well as quoting the source to something I posted when asked to do so by someone who was supposed to have read the story in the first instance. Heaton is a professional historian and has had books published. I have already stated that I am not touting him as an expert on the subject, however I do understand why you would have an affinity towards Tito. That is understandable, however Historical fact, sometimes offends, as not all of it is nice..
However considering the above, It is slightly offensive to be highlighted as such. Disappointing to say the least considering what some have posted.
Respectfully
Mark
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: Waffen-SS Military Success - Belgrade 1941
Hi Germanicus,
You write, "yet to dismiss what Klingenberg achieved is not fair to history".
I agree entirely. That is why I have not done so. I have said that what he did required "nerve, drive and initiative on his part".
However, the fact seems to remain that he faced absolutely no resistance (at least according to his Ritterkreuz commendation) and the reason why he faced no resistance had nothing to do with him or, indeed, his entire corps. They were all engaged in unopposed mopping up because German Army operations elsewhere had obliged the Yugoslav Army not to contend the city.
I would suggest not only that "to dismiss what Klingenberg achieved is not fair to history", but to exaggerate the significance of his actions and fail to give credit where it is due is also not fair to history, or indeed, to Klingenberg and those German Army troops who were engaged in the actual fighting that gave him his opportunity.
Cheers,
Sid.
You write, "yet to dismiss what Klingenberg achieved is not fair to history".
I agree entirely. That is why I have not done so. I have said that what he did required "nerve, drive and initiative on his part".
However, the fact seems to remain that he faced absolutely no resistance (at least according to his Ritterkreuz commendation) and the reason why he faced no resistance had nothing to do with him or, indeed, his entire corps. They were all engaged in unopposed mopping up because German Army operations elsewhere had obliged the Yugoslav Army not to contend the city.
I would suggest not only that "to dismiss what Klingenberg achieved is not fair to history", but to exaggerate the significance of his actions and fail to give credit where it is due is also not fair to history, or indeed, to Klingenberg and those German Army troops who were engaged in the actual fighting that gave him his opportunity.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: An oft ignored Yugoslav success.
Hi Dennis,
You write, "Klingenberg was tasked with scouting and securing the bridges because he was the commander of the motorcycle reconnaissance company. That is his normal job. This does not imply that he was tasked this because no resistance was expected. His objective was the bridge(s). Klingenberg found the bridges destroyed. He left men at the bridge to establish a bridgehead, thus completing his task."
Not quite. If Klingenberg's mission was to secure a bridge, then he failed. His crossing of the river was a commendable substitute piece of initiative by himself. Establishing a bridgehead did not "complete his task" which was to secure the means by which following troops could cross via a bridge. No identifiable blame attaches to Klingenberg for not reaching the bridges in time and he was not the only part of his corps not to do so.
Klingenberg did not just "find the bridges destroyed". Somebody destroyed them. Throughout this thread no recognition is being given to the Yugoslavs for a successful pre-emptive withdrawal of foot-, horse- and bullock-bound troops from the Banat ahead of a larger number of motorized German troops and for successfully demolishing all the Danube bridges ahead of them. That is why the Germans suffered almost no casualties in the their unopposed advance on Belgrade from the north. Again, no particular blame attaches to the Das Reich Division as a whole, because it crossed the border very late in the campaign.
Cheers,
Sid.
You write, "Klingenberg was tasked with scouting and securing the bridges because he was the commander of the motorcycle reconnaissance company. That is his normal job. This does not imply that he was tasked this because no resistance was expected. His objective was the bridge(s). Klingenberg found the bridges destroyed. He left men at the bridge to establish a bridgehead, thus completing his task."
Not quite. If Klingenberg's mission was to secure a bridge, then he failed. His crossing of the river was a commendable substitute piece of initiative by himself. Establishing a bridgehead did not "complete his task" which was to secure the means by which following troops could cross via a bridge. No identifiable blame attaches to Klingenberg for not reaching the bridges in time and he was not the only part of his corps not to do so.
Klingenberg did not just "find the bridges destroyed". Somebody destroyed them. Throughout this thread no recognition is being given to the Yugoslavs for a successful pre-emptive withdrawal of foot-, horse- and bullock-bound troops from the Banat ahead of a larger number of motorized German troops and for successfully demolishing all the Danube bridges ahead of them. That is why the Germans suffered almost no casualties in the their unopposed advance on Belgrade from the north. Again, no particular blame attaches to the Das Reich Division as a whole, because it crossed the border very late in the campaign.
Cheers,
Sid.
Last edited by Sid Guttridge on 12 Nov 2014, 13:28, edited 1 time in total.