The heroic resistance of the Hitler Youth at Pichelsdorf bridge, Berlin

[Art]

So would it instead be fair to say that, if the objective of the defenders of the Pichelsdorf Bridge (whoever they may have been and whether heroic or not) was to hold it open long enough to carry either a relief column or an escaping Berlin garrison, they appear to have succeeded?

I believe one have to see the bridge episode as a part of a greater scale actions in the Spandau-Heerstraße-Olympic stadium. The latter was of much significance and the German defenders here achieved certain results keeping the Havel bridges in Spandau and a corridor between these bridges and the central Berlin. It was an essential prerequisite for the attempted breakout of the Berlin garrison on 2 May. It was only partly successful though and the most part of the Berlin garrison had to capitulate anyway but that is already another story. The Pichelsdorf bridge was apparently only an episode in this general picture and a rather irrelevant one. Of course, if it had been lost the course of events won't be much different. Personally I see the actions between the Heerstraße and the Olympic stadium east of the Havel as a more curious episode and the positive result of this thread is that it draw attention to it.

[histan]

I have a couple of points to make before trying to reconcile the Russian and German evidence at the Frey bridge.

I think that the objectives of the HJ at the Frey and Stößensee bridges can be summarised as:

To ensure that the bridges are available to be crossed if an when a relief force arrives from the western side of the river and/or a breakout force arrives from the eastern side.

It was not their fault that a relief force was never going to arrive, nor was it their fault that the Russians blocked the approach to the bridge so that a break-out using this route was never attempted.

I also think that we are considering the wrong bridge. I think that the Charlottenbrücke is more interesting because that also had a HJ group deployed to defend it and was used by a a force attempting a breakout. I also agree that the actions between the Heerstraße and the Olympic stadium east of the Havel are worthy of investigation, after all the Russians do seem to mention having a hard time there.

Regards

John

[Michael Kenny]

The thread started out as a unsourced claim that certain soldiers in Berlin performed superhuman feats in the face of overwhelming odds. These type of claim for the Berlin defenders seem to be the norm. What I did right from the start was to try and pin down every source and trace it back to it's source. The majority of the 'sources' were passing descriptions/circular referencing where the only thing that seemed to be highlighted was the (always excellent) claimed performance of the boys. Little or nothing of substance was posted. I spent a frustrating dozen or so pages trying to get someone to posts the facts. It came rather late and we have moved far from the tone of the opening post.
My aim from the start was to run down the source of these vague claims about the Havel bridges. I kept at it and the result is where we are now. I will always question these type of claims. Above average performace requires above average proof. I have a thick skin and always stick to my point. The thread is now far removed from its opening premise and I like to think I had something to do with it.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Russian maps show that the Soviet 55th Guard Tank Brigade arrived at the Heerstraße adjacent to the Stößensee bridge on 26/27 April.
.....................
GregSingh points out that the commander of the Soviet 55th Guard Tank Brigade makes no mention of the Stößensee bridge. Although he points out hard time brigade was having with HJ near Olimpic Stadion.

This suggests that:
The bridge was not important to him - for example he had not been tasked with capturing it.
Any opposition posed by the HJ at the bridge was not worthy of note - consistent with the eyewitness account given above.

He is likely to have mentioned if his brigade had been tasked with capturing the bridge but had been beaten back by the HJ "holding the bridge against all the odds"

A bridge is not, and cannot be, militarily defended against a tank brigade, or even an infantry regiment, within 50 - 100 metres from the actual structure. For a bridge to be effectively and seriously defended against a serious force, the defence has to start some distance away with room to manoeuvre and make it count. Art has mentioned as much here.

The Pichelsdorf bridge was part of the overall action in the Heerstrasse - Reichssportsfeld area. The action included the Kaiserdamm area, as mentioned earlier in a post by Eligius. If a sizeable force of tanks finally reach a bridge defended by boys with infantry weapons...then the tanks would blast their way on to the bridge and beyond.

I am remembering the capture of the Wall bridge at Nijmegen by a joint force of the US 82nd airborne and British XXX Corps. Euling's Waffen SS KG resisted fiercely and hard on the streets and parks leading up to the bridge - approaches before the allies actually reached the structure. But once they reached the bridge they just blasted their way through. Mind you SS troopers resisted all the way even when the tanks were crossing, they clung on to the different parts of the structure and kept up their fire. But the tanks were through anyway. And here we are talking of battle seasoned Waffen SS veterans.

The defence of the Havel bridge lifeline started on the Heerstrasse and was part of the RSF command of the HJ - VS.

Ciao
Sandeep

[sandeepmukherjee196]

I have a couple of points to make before trying to reconcile the Russian and German evidence at the Frey bridge.

I think that the objectives of the HJ at the Frey and Stößensee bridges can be summarised as:

To ensure that the bridges are available to be crossed if an when a relief force arrives from the western side of the river and/or a breakout force arrives from the eastern side.

It was not their fault that a relief force was never going to arrive, nor was it their fault that the Russians blocked the approach to the bridge so that a break-out using this route was never attempted.

Hi Histan...

The breakout didn't come that way due to other reasons. The high command didn't make up their collective minds till it was too late. When the breakout was actually executed, the Pichelsdorf bridge was gone. The Heerstrasse route was not traversable without armour. The Bunker - Chancellery people were on foot. There were women. They took their chances over the Spree.

The Tiergarten KG blasted their way through anyways past the Heerstrasse and RSS area and over the Havel...no Russian blocking of the route worked here. The casualties of this group came at the bridge and beyond.

Ciao
Sandeep

[sandeepmukherjee196]

The thread started out as a unsourced claim that certain soldiers in Berlin performed superhuman feats in the face of overwhelming odds. These type of claim for the Berlin defenders seem to be the norm. What I did right from the start was to try and pin down every source and trace it back to it's source. The majority of the 'sources' were passing descriptions/circular referencing where the only thing that seemed to be highlighted was the (always excellent) claimed performance of the boys. Little or nothing of substance was posted. I spent a frustrating dozen or so pages trying to get someone to posts the facts. It came rather late and we have moved far from the tone of the opening post.
My aim from the start was to run down the source of these vague claims about the Havel bridges. I kept at it and the result is where we are now. I will always question these type of claims. Above average performace requires above average proof. I have a thick skin and always stick to my point. The thread is now far removed from its opening premise and I like to think I had something to do with it.

Right from the first post on this thread, sources were quoted . And right from the first post humble requests were made for more elaborate material and references.

Yes we are today indeed far removed from the stage where it was point blank being denied that there ever was any effective HJ involvement at the Pichelsdorf bridge area or it was of any consequence whatsoever. The most interesting "far removal" ..if I may use that term..is the change of heart on Axmann as a source, as the thread progressed

[Art]

I think that the Charlottenbrücke is more interesting because that also had a HJ group deployed to defend it and was used by a a force attempting a breakout. I also agree that the actions between the Heerstraße and the Olympic stadium east of the Havel are worthy of investigation, after all the Russians do seem to mention having a hard time there.

Soviet popular account ("Posledniy Shturm") says the following:

26 April 3 Guards Tank Army with attached 61, 48 Guards and 20 Rifle Divisions advanced from Mariendorf-Zelendorf to the north having the greatest success on its left wing. Here the 7 Guards Tank attacking in the forest area along the Havel to the north advanced 9 km and reached Reichssportfeld and was only 2 km from the 2 Guards Tank Army of the 1 Belorussian Front. With the 7 GTC reaching the Havel River at Pichelsdorf isolation of the Berlin garrison from the groups at Potsdam and Wansee was completed.

27 April
3 Guards Tank Army with attached 61, 48 Guards and 20 Rifle Divisions continued to attack to the north and north-west.
..
7 Guards Tank Corps attacking to the north along the Havel River advanced 2,5 km and reached the Spree River by the end of the day and met troops from the 2 Guards Tank Army north of Ruhleben.
Units of the 3 GTA mopped up southern and south-western Berlin suburbs, penetrated the central regions of the city and reached a city defense perimeter on a broad front from Shoneberg to Westkreuz stations. Here they were stopped by many anti-tank obstacles and organized fire of numerous AT guns.

28 April
Commander of the 3 Guards Tank Army ordered on the evening of 27.04 to fully take the south-western part of Berlin by the end of 28 April and advance to Landwehrkanal.
...
7 Guards Tank Corps leaving the 56 Guards Tank Brigade commanded by colonel Slyusarenko at Ruhleben with rest of its units started an attack on Charlottenburg from the west and in the course of bitter fighting advanced over 700 meters. As a result of the corps' actions the corridoer between the German groups at Westend and Halensee was now only 500 meters wide.
Regrouping of the 7 GTC weakened its positions at Ruhleben. That was exploited by German forces encircled at Westend. They were reinforced at the expense of units retreating from Charlotenburg and the group encircled at Stresow. Here by 28 April there were more than 20 thousands men with tanks and assault guns. Attacking from east end west the enemy pushed the troops of the 56 Brigade to the line Heerstraße station - Pichelsberg and gained a free passage to the east side of the Havel River, the west side being occupied by the 129 Rifle Corps.

Then nothing interesting about this area.

Long story short: the left wing of the 3 Guards Tank Army advanced with relative easy in the forest area along the Havel and closed a ring around the central Berlin meeting elements of the 2 Guards Tank Army near the Olympic stadium (that also meant that the area of the Havel bridges was effectively encircled. Their command paid surprisingly little attention to maintaining the encirclement and directed the main forces of the army to the city center. The weak screen force that remained at the Ruhleben - Stadium was unable to control such a large area and was forced to retreat behind the Heerstraße. That meant that the connection between the Havel River and the Berlin center was reestablished again. That was a key event making a breakout attempt several days later possible. Apparently the Soviet command was not particularly worried since there was still a screening force along the Havel front and they seemed to be more concerned with assault on central Berlin.
The interesting detail in that account is that it describes the German counterattack near the Stadium mentioned earlier in this thread.

[histan]

Thank you Sandeep.

You have changed my mind. I stand by my definition of success but you have persuaded me that the HJ failed at the Frey and Stößensee bridges because they were not available when the break out forces needed them.

Regards

John

[GregSingh]

Thanks Art for providing this account.

The weak screen force that remained at the Ruhleben - Stadium was unable to control such a large area and was forced to retreat behind the Heerstraße. That meant that the connection between the Havel River and the Berlin center was reestablished again. That was a key event making a breakout attempt several days later possible. Apparently the Soviet command was not particularly worried since there was still a screening force along the Havel front and they seemed to be more concerned with assault on central Berlin.

I was looking into strenght of 55 GTB.
Dmitry Shein book '3rd Guards Tank Army in the battle for Berlin' has many tables.
It seems that even before Russian forces got to Berlin from the Oder river, tanks strength was already down 10-20%.
According to organisational data for a tank brigade it has 65 T-34/85 tanks organised in three battalions.

So is it fare to say that after three day of fighting in Ruhleben and Stadium areas one battalion probably had no more than 10-12 tanks?
It does not look like significant force capable of further offensive actions.
One of the reasons perhaps, not much happened in the area from 29th of April to 2nd of May.

[GregSingh]

eligius wrote:

Heerstrasse is the name of the road both to the west and east of the bridges. This is clearly shown on maps from 1939 and 1945.

I don't really want to argue about every little detail. My point was that Dragunskij in his memoirs often points to Heerstrasse as suburb (there was also a rail station and a street). But maps I saw have street name there as 'An der Heerstraße'.

Heerstrasse 1939

Both bridges

[Germanicus]

Dear All

It is though we are now fighting the battle on 'paper' as a more detailed series of events have developed. We have introduced names and participants to the scenario. This is far better than what is usually portrayed in books, because we are focusing on one particular event. The books focus on all aspects of the Battle for Berlin.

I do agree that Michael Kenny including Sandeep, have pushed the envelope open and contributions from all parties in this thread, has allowed us to ascertain what took place. Yes we have moved further along and a clearer picture is developing. Yet with the introduction of more Russian units into the equation, lets not drop the ball now. Lets discover more, so we can find the historical logical conclusion to what occurred. The Reichsportsfeld, Charlotten Bridge is all part of this scenario, as the Hj were scattered throughout the defences. The Heerstrasse is an important aspect as well, in some books it does not just focus on the Bridges itself, yet they also speak of the Havel defence line. Just a thought. So if you look deeper this needs to be taken into account.

Most respectfully

Mark

[histan]

I agree with Mark and plead guilty to suggesting that it might be interesting to look at other fighting. I intend to get back to examining the sources that relate to the Frey bridge - where I think it might just be possible to reach some tentative conclusions.

Just to say a little bit more about activities at the Stößensee bridge. On the basis of the evidence, maps and Russian histories quoted above, the Russians advanced from the South through the Grunewald forrest. They reached Reichssportfeld on 26 April and had control of the eastern bank of the Stößensee bridge by 27 April. Note to Sandeep - this was a South to North advance so the Reichssportfeld forces were not contributing to the defence of the Eastern bank of the Stößensee bridge. We know that at least 20 HJ deployed at this eastern side of the bridge dispersed when the contact battle at the East bank of the bridge started.

On 24 April Krukenberg found the Stößensee bridge barricaded but not defended. On 27 April the Russians arrived and took control of its Eastern end.

Regards

John

PS Thanks to Michael for reminding us that just finding another secondary source that repeats the mistake of a single initial source doesn't make it any truer.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Thank you Sandeep.

You have changed my mind. I stand by my definition of success but you have persuaded me that the HJ failed at the Frey and Stößensee bridges because they were not available when the break out forces needed them.

Regards

John

Oh Histan ! But what made you change your mind? I had only indicated that the Pichelsdorf bridge was destroyed on the evening of 1st May and hence the HJ left that specific location .. since there was nothing to defend. The later breakout happened to the North on 2nd May. I am reposting below the relevant map-sketch pl:

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Just to say a little bit more about activities at the Stößensee bridge. On the basis of the evidence, maps and Russian histories quoted above, the Russians advanced from the South through the Grunewald forrest. They reached Reichssportfeld on 26 April and had control of the eastern bank of the Stößensee bridge by 27 April. Note to Sandeep - this was a South to North advance so the Reichssportfeld forces were not contributing to the defence of the Eastern bank of the Stößensee bridge. We know that at least 20 HJ deployed at this eastern side of the bridge dispersed when the contact battle at the East bank of the bridge started.

On 24 April Krukenberg found the Stößensee bridge barricaded but not defended. On 27 April the Russians arrived and took control of its Eastern end.

Regards

John

HI Histan..

How and where did the Russians cross over from the west of Havel to the east and reach the RSF on 26th? If they controlled all the bridges, they lost all the bridges too real quick! Earlier maps and Russian troop dispositions posted on this thread by Art ( and perhaps GregSingh too?) indicated infantry formations on the east of Havel in the bridge area. They indicated Russian advance from the east too. In fact M Kenny had taken strong exception to my mentioning Russian tanks in this sector :

dogged action of 550 youngsters, in holding open a lifeline to the besieged fortress of Berlin, against 2 Soviet regiments, backed by tanks, for a number of days, was heroic or not !

What 2 Soviet Regiments was it?
What Soviet Tank Regiments was it?
Where can I find the information that confirms it was 2 Regiments and that tanks were involved?

Did you not take note earlier when it was pointed out that the Soviets were over the river (that is on both banks) and advancing down from the north and up from the south?

The information is given in this thread, please read the posts from Art and Greg Singh.. the Russian formations have been identified and named.

I have read the posts you mention. It seems that you have not. I ask you again. Where can I find any evidences of Soviet tank units attacking these 'heroic' boys.

So the HJ boys, with infantry weapons and IAT s, outfought Russian tanks and infantry on the east side and reoccupied the bridges? And then kept the route open? Further claims to 'heroism' perhaps ?!

Ciao
Sandeep

[histan]

Sandeep

Look at the maps. The Russians were already on both sides of the river! I repeat the Russians on the East side of the river advanced through the Grunevald forest to the Stößensee bridge. They didn't need the bridge at all for their operations and had no need to cross it. The troops on the Eastern side of the river were under a different commander from those on the Western side of the river with the river forming the boundary between the two Fronts. Re-read Art's posts to understand Russian operations on the East bank.

Some of us are trying to carry out a piece of historical analysis. We gather facts and attempt to make sense of them. On the basis of the factual evidence I repeat:

On 24 April Krukenberg found the Stößensee bridge barricaded but not defended. On 27 April the Russians arrived and took control of its Eastern end.
The Russian maps show them still there on 29 and 30 April.

The key bits of evidence for this statement are provided by German sources - accounts by people who were there at the bridge on the dates quoted.

If you disagree then please provide factual evidence to support your case.

Regards

John