Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

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Sheldrake
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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#16

Post by Sheldrake » 08 Jan 2015, 21:11

Brevity wrote:These conversation are fantastic :)

The criticism of towed a-tk guns was common among wehrmacht, after they found that 75 mm guns were too big and too heavy to be an effective weapon.
The 21 AG ORG study of Tank Destroyers in the Ardennes provided a quantitative endorsement of this analysis, also reflected in the casualties suffered by British and Canadian towed anti tank guns. Towed TD units could kill, but not move once engaged. SP TDs could redeploy when under fire.

I like the references to Drum fire. A calling card of the Royal Regiment ;)

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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#17

Post by valentine III » 09 Jan 2015, 20:40

Just a few thoughts.

In most of Normandy, tanks ans assault guns were forced to advance along very predictable lines: ussually roads or wide paths, so your enemy could position its anti-tank assets to cover these avenues of approach and fire at you at short range.

Every time the germans tried to advance in the bocage they found the same problems than the allies: their tanks were confined to the roads-paths. The lines of sight were short and the firefights were fought at relatively short ranges, so short than in fact the "long gun-good armour" combination so common in late german tanks were defeated by allied defences.
Examples: Panzer Lehr at the Vire-taute canal, British defence of the Rauray Spur, Mortain counterattack...etc

Only in some areas like the south of Caen permited broad advances and long lines of sight, and of course then the long range firepower-armour advantge of Panthers and Tigers could prevail.

Of course, if you add to the ecuation the allied advantage in Air support, artillery support, replacement tanks and weapons, etc....


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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#18

Post by krichter33 » 10 Jan 2015, 20:29

EF tank tactics definitely didn't seem to work in the West. Though not Normandy, an example would be the Panzer Brigades that fought in the West, like the 106, 112, ext... Though the troops were green, they had excellent EF veteran commanders, who were highly successful, yet when they tried their EF tactics in the West they were decimated. Yet, interestingly the Panzer Brigades that fought only in the East, like the 101, and 102, were much more successful. Furthermore the Panzer Brigade's guidelines specifically mentioned that they were to be used in mobile defense, counterattacking enemy penetrations, yet they were more often than not employed in direct attacks, in the East and the West. However, in the West they were wiped out, and in the East they were relatively successful...

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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#19

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 10 Jan 2015, 21:21

US and British tanks had radio, as did the Germans.

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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#20

Post by rossmcpharter » 12 Jan 2015, 21:54

http://forum.axishistory.com/download/f ... ?id=339818

I think the translators missed something, in fact Kurt Meyer is referring to the Jagdpanzer IV, which was in the panzerjaeger battalion of 12.ss-panzer-division, rather than towed anti-tank guns. The Jagdpanzer IV had a very low profile, and lacked a cupola compared to the contemporary StuG IIIG.

Great thread Seaburn, and very interesting discussion :thumbsup:

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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#21

Post by rossmcpharter » 12 Jan 2015, 21:57

I don't think the Germans could cope with the responsive comms of the Western Allied support, artillery especially, which the Soviets lacked. Even Baeke came unstuck in the West.

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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#22

Post by Cult Icon » 15 Jan 2015, 06:47

rossmcpharter wrote:I don't think the Germans could cope with the responsive comms of the Western Allied support, artillery especially, which the Soviets lacked. Even Baeke came unstuck in the West.
Where did you read of this? I have seen West Front authors claim this more than once but without having researched it, I consider it a claim by west front historians who aren't eastern-front specialists. (not saying that it is right or wrong, but with something like this it begs to question)

Bake's tactics, according to History of 23rd Pz., Hell's Gates, and Korsun Pocket (zetterling) was to recon, raid, to move fast and within the decision cycle of the enemy force.

Heavy Panzer Regiment Bake was in effect, a nimble specialized combined-arms shock troop (recon, armor, engineers, infantry, SP artillery) used to primarily to seek and destroy enemy armor and anti-tank gun belts. It had only one battalion of Jagers so it wasn't there to hold territory. PR-Bake was a spearhead unit, designed to enhance the efforts of other divisions.

So he was not a consolidator: The consolidation of the terrain taken was done by 1.Pz, or other units it worked with. PR-Bake would destroy the tanks and AT guns, and then move on to other targets.

As far as I know, the failure of the Panzer Brigades in the West was similar to a core failure of the Panzer Brigade 10 (Panthers)(also built around veterans) in the East- faulty organization, lack of training & integration of the unit of the whole and doctrinal role. The differences in armor and AT guns usage (west vs. east) is noted.

So to West front specialists: What was needed to Panzer raid?

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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#23

Post by krichter33 » 15 Jan 2015, 07:37

I agree with Cult Icon's post. Most of the problems with the Panzer Brigades was organizational in nature, as well as lack of training time. Also, the East Front veterans aggressive tactics didn't have the same effect in the West than in the East. But I feel the main reason was their lack of time to properly recon, as well as lack of support for the missions they were wrongly assigned, that went against the Panzer Brigade's own doctrine. To me the Panzer Brigades were a waste of resources that should have been used to reinforce existing Panzer divisions. However, if they were to be created, as Hitler had ordered, they should only have been used in the East, not the West. Because the type of missions they were supposed to be assigned, that is counterattacking distinct enemy penetrations and destroying them, and not launching attacks inside enemy lines without support, as they did in the West, was more conducive in the East. Also the few Brigades that did operate in the East, such as Pz Brg 101 to 104, actually performed well, even at times when they were assigned non doctrinal attack missions....

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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#24

Post by Sheldrake » 15 Jan 2015, 09:57

Cult Icon wrote: So to West front specialists: What was needed to Panzer raid?
Time, space and surprise.

Where the Germans could achieve these they did indeed carry out Panzer Raids.

The 1940 Blitzkreig was led by a big Panzer raid all the way across the allied lines of communications. There are plenty of examples from 1941-43 North Africa, which offered plenty of space for manouvre, the intensity of operations was constrained by logistics and allied intelligence was patchy. Rommel's victories are a series of panzer raids combined with systematic all arms action against allied defences.

In mainland Europe 1943-45 these conditions did not often apply. The Western Allies generally did not fight open manouvre warfare, but set piece battles which played to their strengths. Infantry were much better equipped with anti tank weapons and the massed use of armour could not simply blast a hole in the line. The Germans failed in every attempt to eliminate allied beachheads with Panzer raids. From Sicily to Normandy the story was the same. The intensity of operations in Europe was far higher than in North Africa and the Armour was often reduced to holding the line and its strenght eroded through attrition.

The battles in Lorraine in September 1944 appeared to offer one opportunity to masnouvre against the flank of the over extended allied troops after Normandy. It failed because the Germans were out fought at the point where they met the 4th US Armoured Division, who were better led and trained. There wasn't that much wrong with the structure of the Panzer Brigades. It wasntl that different from the kind of battlegroup that might be the main fighting element of a Panzer division. The problem was that these were new organisations which had not trained together.

The Germans did mount Panzer raids on two other occasions. One of these is , of course the Battle of the Bulge. The second is the raid mounted in October by the 9thPz and 15thPG divisions against the 7th US Armoured Division in the Peel marshes in the Netherlands. The raid was beaten back, but not without some embarrassing moments which cost the commander of the 7th US Armoured Division his job. The 7th AD was thinly spread and eye witness accounts and AARs provide a picture of a slack approach to security and a lack of curiosity about what the Germans were up to.

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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#25

Post by Rob - wssob2 » 16 Jan 2015, 07:42

Great thread. This would make an interesting article in Armor Magazine.

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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#26

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Jan 2015, 23:02

I read this post and overall, I don't really agree with the arguments at all. Difference circumstances demanded different force structure and tactics. The ground forces holding the Normandy bridgehead were not peculiar.

The main difference is that every allied division was a basically a mobile and armored-equipped unit, which required them to be attacked accordly. They had to be treated as if they were a mech. corps or a tank corps dug-in. The 'Panzer raids' were best against static soviet units without armor or unsupported armor, like a tank brigade.
Sheldrake wrote:
Time, space and surprise.

Where the Germans could achieve these they did indeed carry out Panzer Raids.
snip.
The Soviets spent until Nov. 1942 without any combat effective combined arms armored division. The early models were imbalanced. During this period, soviet armor was similar to the "Panzer Brigades" and they fared badly against combined arms panzer divisions groups (2-4) which were not dissimilar to 4AD's combat commands.

I think the main problem was lack of forces for the Germans, both in quantity and quality.

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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#27

Post by delete013 » 25 Nov 2019, 19:39

Cult Icon wrote:
26 Jan 2015, 23:02
The main difference is that every allied division was a basically a mobile and armored-equipped unit, which required them to be attacked accordly. They had to be treated as if they were a mech. corps or a tank corps dug-in. The 'Panzer raids' were best against static soviet units without armor or unsupported armor, like a tank brigade.
Sheldrake wrote:
Time, space and surprise.

Where the Germans could achieve these they did indeed carry out Panzer Raids.
snip.
I think the main problem was lack of forces for the Germans, both in quantity and quality.
I don't think you evaluated Sheldrake's comment properly. He is referring to the axoms German set for their armoured warfare. One was not given and another was countered.

Compare it further to the manner in which Germans were employing maneuver warfare in 1940 in France and in the east in 1941. A major disadvantage for Germans that was being felt increasingly with the war's progress, was the lack of motorised transport for artillery or anything that could replace its function. When German KG made an infiltration between the opponent's ranks it did its job. What was missing at that point was means of suppression of opponent's artillery and anti-tank assets. In 1940, this was achieved by givent artillery or air force. In the east it was not as urgent because there was enough space for flanking units to avoid Soviet artillery and pak fronts. This space was simply not available in the west and German units had little time before they were placed under well supplied artillery fire or air attacks. Every fortified position, that would need a short artillery barrage or a single air attack to be taken, now had to be overcome in less than an hour with tanks and infantry only. No suppression and no space to maneuvre is what reaches the limits of any experienced German unit.

Now think what US response to such situations was? Sit tight for encircled units, call support and bring reinforcements frim the rear. Units in path loaded their equipment and rushed behind the first road block. I don't think this would work under full German combined arms complement.

In 1944 half of German doctrine wasn't possible to be implemented in the field. Attacks wouldn't be started if Germans weren't compelled to do it. Maybe you noticed in your extensive reading, German field commanders constantly complaining over impossible conditions for the given orders. The amount of choices given by effective employment of combined arms shrunk below the point under which Germans themselves believed that effective fighting was possible. A poignant remark made by Rommel that an army with no means against an air supported opponent is like savages fighting against a modern opponent.
Last edited by delete013 on 25 Nov 2019, 21:44, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#28

Post by delete013 » 25 Nov 2019, 21:42

Another thought on Bäke. I see him often judged without first clearing the obvious differences between east and west and other variables like different unit composition and aforementioned different possibilities of geography and given assets. The conclusion that his tactics worked in the east and failed in the west seem a little too convenient to me. This would imply that Soviet fighting capabilities were bad? That Germans had trouble adapting to different circumstances? If that is correct then there should be some notable tactical solutions of the British and Americans that I don't know of?

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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#29

Post by delete013 » 26 Nov 2019, 11:33

Cult Icon wrote:
26 Jan 2015, 23:02
The 'Panzer raids' were best against static soviet units without armor or unsupported armor
If I understood correctly were 'panzer raids' used in defense of Soviet breakthroughs too as part of 'fire brigades'. This meant tanks and mounted infantry that lacked artillery support when they outran their batteries. Is also what the panzer brigades were organised for. I have trouble with the idea that they had faulty organisation. Balck stated that precisely with such small units of tanks and infantry he managed to fight best against soviet pincers. A precondition for it was perhaps the open terrain to utilise firepower and protection and the knowledge of the enemy's location.

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Re: Tank tactics on the EF and how they failed in Normandy

#30

Post by Sam Wren » 27 Nov 2019, 02:44

When I copied this and other WO 208 files, I copied the original German transcriptions too (mostly) because the translations are not very accurate in many cases.

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