rossmcpharter wrote:I don't think the Germans could cope with the responsive comms of the Western Allied support, artillery especially, which the Soviets lacked. Even Baeke came unstuck in the West.
Where did you read of this? I have seen West Front authors claim this more than once but without having researched it, I consider it a claim by west front historians who aren't eastern-front specialists. (not saying that it is right or wrong, but with something like this it begs to question)
Bake's tactics, according to History of 23rd Pz., Hell's Gates, and Korsun Pocket (zetterling) was to recon, raid, to move fast and within the decision cycle of the enemy force.
Heavy Panzer Regiment Bake was in effect, a nimble specialized combined-arms shock troop (recon, armor, engineers, infantry, SP artillery) used to primarily to seek and destroy enemy armor and anti-tank gun belts. It had only one battalion of Jagers so it wasn't there to hold territory. PR-Bake was a spearhead unit, designed to enhance the efforts of other divisions.
So he was not a consolidator: The consolidation of the terrain taken was done by 1.Pz, or other units it worked with. PR-Bake would destroy the tanks and AT guns, and then move on to other targets.
As far as I know, the failure of the Panzer Brigades in the West was similar to a core failure of the Panzer Brigade 10 (Panthers)(also built around veterans) in the East- faulty organization, lack of training & integration of the unit of the whole and doctrinal role. The differences in armor and AT guns usage (west vs. east) is noted.
So to West front specialists: What was needed to Panzer raid?