German Tank Support For Infantry

[ChristopherPerrien]

A tank costs more, and demands a higher trained crew than a mobile gun. The infantry had their infantry howitzers as support, the StuG came along as a mean to bring their howizters closer and under fire.

As to Zaloga, he surely knows about the Stug v Tank differences . But he is writing of tanks in that book , much like Guderian wrote in his book, which brings me to something, about the cited quote,

A widely overlooked consequence of the small scale of German tank production was the inability of the Wehrmacht to provide adequate tank support to the infantry divisions.

This wording is very close to quoting/paraphrasing, Guderian and/or B.L. Hart, IIRC, I just can't remember where. Is there a footnote in that area?

[Pips]

But the assessment of Zaloga is also a bit misleading; actually, the German doctrine never contemplated the distribution of tanks among infantry to bolster its firepower. Germany never designed any "infantry tank" like all the other powers did: Matilda I &II in UK, R35 & H35 in France, T-26 in USSR, L3 in Italy.

I'm not sure that is correct.

Wasn't the concept behind the PzKpfw IV that it was an infantry support AFV? That was why it was equipped with the 75mm KwK37 L/24 gun, ideal for soft targets with it's very useful high explosive shell. That same gun was of little real benefit against other armoured tanks. The anti-tank role was the allocated to the PzKpfw III with it's far more effective 37mm gun.

It was only after the shock of encountering the T-34 and the KV-I that the PzKpfw III showed it's limitations in it' ability to be upgraded, and a urgent programme of updating the Pzkpfw IV to be armed with the KwK 40 L/43 brought about a complete change of roles.

So while the Germans per se didn't allocate tanks to the infantry in dedicated units, they did nevertheless utilise an infantry tank in the early years of the war.

[ChristopherPerrien]

Dunnigan is correct, StuGs were not tanks and couldn't operate as tanks.

They were worse than normal tanks with rotating turret and less flexible tactically, somewhat lower silhouette seems to be the only advantage . On the other hand I can't imagine any thing that a tank with similar gun and armor, Pz.IV for example, would do worse. There are no reasons to expect that a tank unit won't be able to perform the same tasks as assault gun units.

The lack of the turret, allowed the emplacing of more frontal armor to the hull. Since the "assault gun" was designed to bring up a heavy cannon to reduce strong-points that the infantry encountered and enduring heavy fire at short range while doing so. It was of concern for the assault gun to have heavier armor than a regular tank.

ASP's required little armor beyond small arms fire/ fragments(or added armor) facing in other directions, though skirts were added later due to infantry AT weapons , such as ATR's and ATM's , fired at the sides/flanks.

What is of note , even these assault guns were not assigned directly to German infantry units. They were organized in support "Sturm" battalions. So even if the Germans had had more tanks they still would not have parceled them out into infantry units.It was against their doctrine.

[ChristopherPerrien]

But the assessment of Zaloga is also a bit misleading; actually, the German doctrine never contemplated the distribution of tanks among infantry to bolster its firepower. Germany never designed any "infantry tank" like all the other powers did: Matilda I &II in UK, R35 & H35 in France, T-26 in USSR, L3 in Italy.

I'm not sure that is correct.

Wasn't the concept behind the PzKpfw IV that it was an infantry support AFV? That was why it was equipped with the 75mm KwK37 L/24 gun, ideal for soft targets with it's very useful high explosive shell. That same gun was of little real benefit against other armoured tanks. The anti-tank role was the allocated to the PzKpfw III with it's far more effective 37mm gun.

So while the Germans per se didn't allocate tanks to the infantry in dedicated units, they did nevertheless utilise an infantry tank in the early years of the war.

The short barrelled PzIV F1 was meant to give tank units an anti-infantry/anti-AT-gun/HE weapon to support other tanks, not to support infantry, so it really can't be called an "infantry tank".
Anti-infantry tank would be a more accurate name IMO

[MarkN]

So it sounds like Zaloga's 'analysis' is high disingenuous in terms of German infantry division armor if you're leaving out StuGs.

The Australian, British and New Zealand defenders of the Florina Gap on the 12 and 13th of April 1941 all tell of being attacked by pantsers. And yet, the LSSAH had not a single one to their name. But they had some StuG and some JagdPz which, I guess, can be easily confused.

Not sure how to take the , except to say it was common for Allied Infantry early in the war to call any gun/track vehicle a "tank".

Pantsers?

= common problem that is still widespread even today.
Pantsers = old habits and spellings die hard.

[Christian Ankerstjerne]

What is of note , even these assault guns were not assigned directly to German infantry units. They were organized in support "Sturm" battalions. So even if the Germans had had more tanks they still would not have parceled them out into infantry units.It was against their doctrine.

Late-war infantry divisions did receive assault guns, intended for anti-tank as well as infantry support.

[ChristopherPerrien]

Pantsers?

= common problem that is still widespread even today.
Pantsers = old habits and spellings die hard.

I was thinking some kind of mechanized underpants gnome.

[Dunnigan]

But the assessment of Zaloga is also a bit misleading; actually, the German doctrine never contemplated the distribution of tanks among infantry to bolster its firepower. Germany never designed any "infantry tank" like all the other powers did: Matilda I &II in UK, R35 & H35 in France, T-26 in USSR, L3 in Italy.

I'm not sure that is correct.

Wasn't the concept behind the PzKpfw IV that it was an infantry support AFV? That was why it was equipped with the 75mm KwK37 L/24 gun, ideal for soft targets with it's very useful high explosive shell. That same gun was of little real benefit against other armoured tanks. The anti-tank role was the allocated to the PzKpfw III with it's far more effective 37mm gun.

So while the Germans per se didn't allocate tanks to the infantry in dedicated units, they did nevertheless utilise an infantry tank in the early years of the war.

The short barrelled PzIV F1 was meant to give tank units an anti-infantry/anti-AT-gun/HE weapon to support other tanks, not to support infantry, so it really can't be called an "infantry tank".
Anti-infantry tank would be a more accurate name IMO

Correct. If you look at the allocation of the Pz IV kurz, they were located in the medium tank companies of the battalion, not in independent units that could easily support infantry. Early-war Panzer Divisions (that of 1939-1940) really had the Panzer Brigades/Regiments really operated separately from the Motorized elements. Even through to the Soviet invasion, the Pz IV kurz (and to the Pz III N's supporting Tiger I's) weren't used to support infantry but to keep the soft targets off the back of the Pz lang's.

It was really the StuG III with the same 75mm L/24 that was to support infantry and eventually upgraded to L/43 adn L/48 for more anti-tank capability.

[ML59]

Prior to the war the German Army had 2 tank brigades whose primary mission was support of infantry:
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... rig4-R.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... zBrig6.htm
Yet they were used to form new armored divisions in 1939.

That is un-influential: the official doctrine adopted before WW2 and never changed afterwards was to concentrate all tanks in fully independent armored units. However, there were exceptions: several independent companies, battalions and even regiments equipped with beute or obsolete tanks (or a mixture of tanks plus miscellaneous armored vehicles) were organized for occupation and anti-partisan duties all over occupied Europe, especially in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Northern Italy. Some of them were not Heer units but, instead, Polizei.

T-26 wasn't designed in the USSR You don't need special type tanks for separate tank units. US Army was doing fine with the same Shermans in separate armored battalions as in their armored divisions, Soviet Union with T-34 etc. The idea of a dedicated "infantry tank" was all but dead by the end of the war, the fact that the types you mentioned were designed in 1930s illustrates it quite eloquently.

Again, the fact that the T-26 design was not original soviet but a (license) copy of the British Vickers 6 tons means nothing; the point is that RKKA at that time adopted a doctrine similar to the British or French ones, buying large quantities of light infantry tanks (the T-26) for the direct support of infantry units, and large quantities of "fast" or, in English word, cruiser tanks like the BT family for exploitation of success and independent operations.

[ML59]

The lack of the turret, allowed the emplacing of more frontal armor to the hull. Since the "assault gun" was designed to bring up a heavy cannon to reduce strong-points that the infantry encountered and enduring heavy fire at short range while doing so. It was of concern for the assault gun to have heavier armor than a regular tank.

ASP's required little armor beyond small arms fire/ fragments(or added armor) facing in other directions, though skirts were added later due to infantry AT weapons , such as ATR's and ATM's , fired at the sides/flanks.

What is of note , even these assault guns were not assigned directly to German infantry units. They were organized in support "Sturm" battalions. So even if the Germans had had more tanks they still would not have parceled them out into infantry units.It was against their doctrine.

a further proof that StuG were not intended to be substitute of tanks is the fact that they were assigned to and operated by ARTILLERY personnel, not panzer men. This changed a bit vey late in the war when some armored units received StuG or JagdPz for lack of anything better.

[Art]

However, in no case it could fully replace a turreted tank, it had too many tactical limitations.

Sure. What I was saying is that a turreted tank could replace StuG and perform a similar task of infantry support.

[Sheldrake]

There is a big overlap between tanks and SP Guns and the roles of tank/ armoured corps, anti tank and close support / assault artillery.

During WW2 vehicles were developed for the above roles, many of which could be used interchangeably. The Germans used StuG and Panzer Jaeger and equipped tank battlaions woith STuG when they needed to.

The US had 75mm, 76mm and 105mm M4 Sherman M10 TD and M7 105mm SP Artillery. British M10 AT units in Normandy asked for improvements to the M10 (which they liked) They wanted all 17 pdr , overhead protection, and a co-ax machine gun, best met by issuing Sherman firefly tanks.

There was more to the unit than the equipment. The procedures and training played a part. Artillerymen and tank corps thought differently.

[Meyer]

A really stupid statement from Zaloga, he should know better. Different armies had different ways, and a greater german tank production wouldn't necessarily result in the formation of independent panzer-regiments.
But this "concentrating its tanks entirely in the panzer divisions" is dead wrong. Both the Heer and the W-SS fielded independent Panzer battalions, also for the Blau operation a number of motorized formations were given a Panzer battalion each, and for Kursk Panzer-Regiment 39 was attached to the GD Pz-grenadier division.
Not to mention the independent Panzer brigades, although these were combined arms formations.

Besides, usually in the German doctrine the Panzer divisions were the ones conducting the breakthrough, and also the exploitation of it, while in the Red Army they used different "echelons" for each task.

Did the US Army used independent tank regiments attached to IDs? AFAIK they used battalions.

Edit: just checked, and the Red Army tank regiments had even less tanks than a Pz-Abt., plus some infantry. So, that makes Zaloga's point even weaker.

[Michate]

There is a big overlap between tanks and SP Guns and the roles of tank/ armoured corps, anti tank and close support / assault artillery.

Indeed. Zaloga is technically correct as far as his statement concerns tanks (in the narrow sense of the word, i.e. turreted). Taken in a more general sense, his statement is however misleading, as it implies the absence of any armored, direct fire close support for German infantry.

This, as has been pointed out, was a role assigned to the assault guns.

In addition, it should be mentioned, that tanks often were (ab)used, normally by temporarily subordinating a company or battalion sized tank battle group to an infantry division or corps. Something the tankers hated and repeatedly pointed out resulted in little success and high losses. The infantry was not trained in cooperation with tanks, and vice versa, the tanks were not trained in close cooperation with infantry.

There was more to the unit than the equipment. The procedures and training played a part. Artillerymen and tank corps thought differently.

Good point. For the Germans, it seems that assault guns and tanks used different fire or ranging procedure.

To find the correct range and get their fire on target, assault guns used the bracketing procedure originating from their mother branch, the artillery (direct fire not withstanding).
Tanks, it seems, used a more direct procedure, based on the individual correction of each shot (miss).

In autumn 1943, some experts suggested that the assault gun ranging procesure was quicker or otherwise superior and that the tanks should adopt it.
That caused some "paper war" that can be traced from the records of Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen, but it seems the tank branch ultimately rejected the suggestion.

In addition, it seems assault guns had by default superior optics.

[MarkN]

I sense a few posters are letting formation names and dry top level orbat lists (gliederung) lead their arguments rather an understanding of the actual employment of their armour by the Wehrmacht. The Wehrmacht was most pro-active in combined arms operations at the very lowest of levels and the utilisation of infantry and tanks together in small packets was quite normal.

Remember that, by 1941, a pantser division was predominantly an infantry-heavy formation: 1 pantser regiment alongside 2 infantry regiments. A pantser corps was even more lopsided when you added a motorised infantry division to a pair of pantser divisions. And so on. The Wehrmacht doctrine was certainly not single-arm orientated. I suggest other posters are failing to recognise the 'separation' of panster divisions from purely infantry divisions was not about separating tank from boots, but separating high-mobility from horse and cart!!!

And, at a lower level, the combinations were just as evident. Here are just a few examples from April 1941. They come from two separate commands in different theatre, so hardly a single commander centric solution.

1) Streich placed a leichte Pz.Kp (with mtl.zug included) under commander MGBtl.8 for the attack on Agadebia. Combined with other attachments, this became Vorausabteilung PONATH.
2) Rommel then divvied up 5.leichte Div into 3 separate columns. One via Benghazi, er Regima etc was lead by Aufkl.Abt.3 and included a leichte Pz.Kp (with mtl.zug included) of I.Abt/Pz.Regt.5 under command. A second via Antelat and Msus lead by Pz.Regt.5 consisting of II/Pz.Regt.5 and MGBtl.2. And thirdly, under command 5.leichte Div, the remainder of the division including the remaining leichte Pz.Kp (with mtl.zug included) of I.Abt/Pz.Regt.5 and MGBtl.8. In effect the pantsers were neither concentrated nor deployed separate from the infantry; the division was task organised as the commander(s) saw fit.

3) For the attack on Yugoslavia, and after passing through the Kleidi Pass, Vorausabtailung BOROWEITZ (Pz.Div 9.) was created as a combined arms kampfgruppe including 1.Kp/Pz.Regt.33 (Pz.II/III/IV) as well as other elements from within the division.
4) Pz.Div 5. attached elements of Pz.Regt.31 to the infantry of the division.

And so on and on....

So, to take away, don't suppose that a 'panzer' division is a formation of only pantsers operating independent of infantry. It wasn't.