Wehrmacht Artillery Weaknesses

[Rob - wssob2]

We touched on this in a couple of previous thread but I wanted to compile some addition information in a separate thread.

from World War II in Europe: An Encyclopedia edited by David T. Zabeck, the essay on artillery by Jonathan B. A. Bailey, p.819 :

“…Despite the technical quality and ground level tactical skill of German artillery, the fundamental weakness of German artillery relative to other arms and that of its opponents was never rectified. Panzer forces may have achieved dazzling successes in Russia in 1941; but even then the Germans found that artillery – most of it still horse-drawn – could not keep up. Once Soviet armor went onto the offensive, the Germans discovered to their horror that their antitank guns were generally ineffective, and they were forced to rely on field gins direct firing at short range to protect themselves. The Luftwaffe proved unable to provide reliable fire support in sustained operations, and there was no substantial body of mechanized medium and heavy artillery to take its place in what became a battle of attrition with the Soviets.

The Germans emphasized the role of artillery massed at divisional level and failed to provide the concentrations of artillery firepower at higher formations that the Soviets, by contrast, deemed decisive. By 1944, the Germans finally recognized the need for such a capability, but their efforts to create one failed in the face of Germany’s overall logistic deficiencies.

(further reading: Bailey’s Field Artillery and Firepower and German Artillery of World War II)

From the International Encyclopedia of Military History
edited by James C. Bradford, p. 120

"...Throughout World War II the German Army was handicapped continually by the weakness of its artillery…Right to the end of World War II, much of the artillery in the German infantry divisions was still horse-drawn.”

From On the German Art of War: Truppenführung by Bruce Condell, p.8

“…German artillery never developed to anywhere near its full potential. It remained a constant tactical weakness that cost the Germans dearly on the battlefield. The Panzer divisions of World War II had self-propelled guns, but as late as 1944 the infantry division remained woefully under-gunned, and the bulk of the artillery was horse-drawn. Relying heavily on the combination of tactical air power and tanks, the formula worked well enough for the Germans in Poland and France. It worked far less well in the vast expanses of Russia, where the Luftwaffe could not be overhead, everywhere, all the time. ..Back on the western front in 1944 and 1945, the Germans did not have the artillery to fall back on for fire support after the Allies achieved first air superiority, and then air supremacy.”

[Rob - wssob2]

By contrast, the Allied forces ranged far ahead of the Wehrmacht in terms of artillery innovation - think of the American POZIT fuses and battalion-level fire direction centers (FDCs) or the Red Army's unique mass artillery doctrine with its multiple artillery corps and 90 artillery divisions. (Sometimes quantity has a quality all its own)

Back in 2008, AHF member Kevin posted this interesting observation about British and especially Field Marshal Montgomery's artillery doctrine in the thread Re: Axis and allied artillery and mortar (http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &p=1233633)

Hi German overall tactics was flexible and mission oriented and her opponent Britain especially in the early stage of war and Russian adopted central control command system though after the war and modern British army adopted German flexible and mission oriented tactics. British junior officers was not told to do anything they want except under the approval of their superior and must follow boss's detailed guidance. Montgomery was the representative of this tactics. That was why Monty good at set piece battle and less effective in manoeuvre battle. He cared about casualties and also worried about German quick response and counteroffensive. British officers mind was not changed overnight and so he prefered to rigid control their operation. He concentrated all heavy artillery in non divisonal unit was the result of his tactics. He would assign medium and heavy artillery to divison if they need. But Monty mostly want to concentrate to destroy and neutralize German artillery and field fortication to enable him to route German without heavy casualties. That mean he want to use firepower (artillery and RAF) to win victory and not to depend on hand to hand fighting.

On the eve of Normandy invasion, in fact British divison had manpower shortage problem ( on the contrary, US had plenty of manpower). So he prefered to use firepower to make up for shortage of manpower and deployed most of its medium and heavy artillery to enable firepower concentration and also avoid the destruction of artillery asset if any divison was crushed by German counteroffensive which British encountered many times in North Africa. Russian also had some idea on that.Concentration in rear artillery forces rather than in front division to protect artillery assets but Russian was less effective in accurary and after all, they needed some hand to hand fighting but she had many men for that job. In 1944 British manpower problem made her no more spare infantry for that job since all of her men went to artillery, specical troop and RAF and Royal Navy.

Kevin's astute observation is echoed by John Buckley in his book Monty's Men, p.29

“…For Montgomery’s armies, backed by superiority in material resources, it made perfect sense to fight in this manner, and in 1944 the growing concern over manpower shortages further justified the methods and reinforced the reasoning behind their adoption.”

[stg 44]

As was brought up on another thread about artillery:

It is not strange, basically because that judgement is not correct, or at least exaggerated.

When rearmament started in 1936, soon the artillery branch looked back to artillery organisation and tactics in WW1 and redeveloped some concepts, like division of tasks between divisional and corps, or GHQ artillery.
Also, quicker creation of massed fire strikes was goven consideration. Everey division had to do an annual shooting at a shooting range, where fire control and massed fire strikes by the division were trained.

Beyond that, larger exercises involved training of larger fir strikes of more than one division. For instance, in 1938, a fire exercise was held at Grafenwöhr training range, which involved firing a so called "Hammer" - a two minutes duration fire strike by 288 guns (the artillery of 6 divisions) onto a single target area, which looked like the moon surface afterwards. The exercise was attended by the army commander in chief, the chief of the general staff, and by Hitler.

As I briefly described, fire control mechanisms were actually somewhat similar to those of the US artillery. Divisional fire strikes were a normal occurrence on the eastern front, and sopped countless Soviet attacks. Corps level fire strikes were less frquent, but were realized as well. If t the same volume of fire could not be realized by the Germans, the reasons were the following:

- At first, production targets were not met, production numbers of guns were very feeble, in particular those of the most modern guns (like the 21 cm howitzer).
- The first campaigns involved rapid advances and were quickly completed, before there was much opportunity to bring up strong artillery (at times it could be strong however, as at Warsaw or during the reduction of some Maginot line forts, or the inital attacks of "Case Red" in June 1940).
- the Barbarossa campaign at first involved rapid advances as well. In addition, part of the artillery had to be used against Soviet tanks in a direct fire role, because the German AT guns could not deal with them.
- During the retreats of winter of 1941/42, many guns were lost, which, due to still feeble production, could not be replaced. After that most units were considerably understrength. Ironiucally, this changed somewhat in 1944/45.
- Generally, sector widths were very large on the Eastern front, division sectors often exceeding 15-20 km, corps sectors 50-80 km. Normal gun densities were 2-4 guns per kilometer of front. Compare to Normandy, where British attacks were supported by up to 70 guns per kilometer of front.
- The infantry divisions outside the Eastern theater were established for occupation (basically garrison) duty and had to be equipped with booty guns.
- Those divisions, as well as the later created divisions could not be given adequate fire training and exercises (due to lack of ammunition, or in case of later divisions, simply lack of training time).
- While radio communication was widely practiced, the manpack radios of the forward observers were unreliable. They tended to fail in particular at the most critical situations (large enemy attacks, supprted by strong fire).
- From 1943 onwards, the Germans were regularly strongly outgunned and highly inferior in the air, in particularat the Allies' chosen points of main effort. These conditions reduce own artillery effectiveness for any army.
- Generally, standardization of methods were somewhat lacking. This may ultimately stem from the German view of warfare as a creative art, and the resulting tendency to avoid "cooking book recipes", but keep doctrine flexible and situational. Or the resulting tendency of many units to "work around" the manuals and introduce individual variations of the methods. For example, there are 6 or 7 different methods for target designation described in German artillery manuals. This tended to make inter-operability between different units difficult, and it depended, more than for other armies, on the personalities of the commanders (Arkos/Harkos and so on), to fine-tune the procedures and standardize them for their own sector.

The raw firing data isn't that difficult to pass. "Hello <Artillery units in support>> This is <Authorised OP> Gunfire Grid 123456. I am not sure where centralised calculations are an improvement on X battery command posts calculating the firing data for their battery. I find it hard to believe that the Germans had a gyro system capable of tracking their OPs which was not used to better effect in say, all weather aircraft.

Exactly, and the German army had figured that out and developed procedures for massing fire based on decentralized calculation of gun laying data at battery or at battalion level, similar to those of other armies. In addition, for larger fire strikes, forward observers or the supported infantry/tanks would request fire, then artillery regiment commanders or Arkos would in response order that fire, similar to the procedure in the US artillery. The computer was considered as a tool to speed up the process and make it more reliable.

The gyro system never got beyond planning stage.

[Gary Kennedy]

Just to note that the British Inf Div organisation never included an organic Medium RA Regt from pre-war (1938) onwards throughout the war years. I don't think Monty can be regarded as enforcing that decision. Likewise the emergence of the AGRA during 1943 pre-dated his appointment to 21AG, so again I don't think he signed off on that one either for Normandy.

[Art]

“…Despite the technical quality and ground level tactical skill of German artillery, the fundamental weakness of German artillery relative to other arms and that of its opponents was never rectified. Panzer forces may have achieved dazzling successes in Russia in 1941; but even then the Germans found that artillery – most of it still horse-drawn – could not keep up.

Curiously, the German infantry which was easily the important of all other arms relied on horses and own feet as the principal means of transport. So artillery wasn't inferior relative to other arms but rather on par with them.

but as late as 1944 the infantry division remained woefully under-gunned

The basic organization of the infantry division's artillery throughout most of the war included three light (105-mm) and one heavy (150-mm howitzers) artillery battalion - not really different from US infantry divisions.

The Germans emphasized the role of artillery massed at divisional level and failed to provide the concentrations of artillery firepower at higher formations

An that is true. German non-divisional artillery was surprisingly weak.

[stg 44]

An that is true. German non-divisional artillery was surprisingly weak.

Wasn't that a factor of how much they had to invest in FLAK from 1940 on? They couldn't afford to build up a huge artillery park because those resources went into massive FLAK construction. Also with corps artillery didn't they end up parceling it out in the end and it just became a hindrance because of fast moving warfare doctrine? When things then bogged down they couldn't then afford to make up for the deficit.

[Art]

Also with corps artillery didn't they end up parceling it out in the end and it just became a hindrance because of fast moving warfare doctrine?

German army mostly didn't have a permanent corps artillery but rather a pool of GHQ units that could be attached to corps or divisions. That pool relative to the number of division wasn't a large one.
Yes, in general production of artillery guns doesn't seem to be up to demands. Hence an assortment of various captured guns which made a large part of artillery strength in the West/Italy/Balkans.

[Cult Icon]

Some criticism that I have encountered:

The British doctrine sounds good in theory and sells well in public relations campaigns, but practice did not truly conform- it was an expensive/slow way to fight and it negated rapid maneuver victories off-hand. Also, the use of airpower and artillery was not entirely efficient in destroying defending forces. Circa June 1944 they were still early on the learning curve which effected how well they could coordinate their firepower.

Second, the fighter-bombers, while decisively effective at pre-emption (stopping the forming of counterstrikes, counteroffensives, and fragmenting enemy forces, forcing them to fight in small groups) did not have the shock effect and precision of massed dive bombers. Four engined bombers had a tendency to miss their targets due to dispersion factors.

The so-called infantry shortage had more to do with their intentional composition of their armies, with a thin layer of infantry and a huge rear echelon. So the british model automatically allocated themselves a weak infantry arm.

Back in 2008, AHF member Kevin posted this interesting observation about British and especially Field Marshal Montgomery's artillery doctrine in the thread Re: Axis and allied artillery and mortar (http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &p=1233633)

[Rob - wssob2]

Curiously, the German infantry which was easily the important of all other arms relied on horses and own feet as the principal means of transport. So artillery wasn't inferior relative to other arms but rather on par with them.

However, the Wehrmacht did make an effort to upgrade the infantry into motorized infantry and panzer grenadiers. The artillery arm lagged by comparison.

Hence an assortment of various captured guns which made a large part of artillery strength in the West/Italy/Balkans.

Spot on. It must have been a nightmare from a training and logistical perspective.

[stg 44]

Curiously, the German infantry which was easily the important of all other arms relied on horses and own feet as the principal means of transport. So artillery wasn't inferior relative to other arms but rather on par with them.

However, the Wehrmacht did make an effort to upgrade the infantry into motorized infantry and panzer grenadiers. The artillery arm lagged by comparison.

Hence an assortment of various captured guns which made a large part of artillery strength in the West/Italy/Balkans.

Spot on. It must have been a nightmare from a training and logistical perspective.

Ironically the Germans had more trucks than the Soviets did right up through Bagration. Only the US and UK were able to afford to fully motorize because they had far fewer divisions than the Germans or Soviets. If Germany had 50 divisions like Britain they could have fully motorized with their truck stocks. Probably the same with a US-sized army. The Soviets and Germans just had to have horse drawn artillery with the infantry because of how massive their armies were.

[Gary Kennedy]

"The so-called infantry shortage had more to do with their intentional composition of their armies, with a thin layer of infantry and a huge rear echelon. So the british model automatically allocated themselves a weak infantry arm."

I'm sorry, what does that mean exactly?

[Rob - wssob2]

"The so-called infantry shortage had more to do with their intentional composition of their armies, with a thin layer of infantry and a huge rear echelon. So the british model automatically allocated themselves a weak infantry arm."

It seems to imply that the British Army had more soldiers "in the rear with the gear" than the armies of other belligerents. I have no idea if that is true or not.

[Gary Kennedy]

I get the gist but am at a loss as to what the presumption is founded upon, and how the British Army was unique in having a 'thin layer of infantry' and a 'so called infantry shortage'. Perhaps we're also louder snorers?

[Cult Icon]

the restructuring of the army away from infantry and towards other arms after 1940- by 43' there were more artillerymen than infantrymen in the British Army.

eg.

[Art]

However, the Wehrmacht did make an effort to upgrade the infantry into motorized infantry and panzer grenadiers. The artillery arm lagged by comparison.

In armored and motorized divisions artillery and heavy weapons were motorized as well. Proportion of motorized divisional artillery corresponded to the proportion of mobile divisions in ground forces. However, one can notice, that while in British and American armies by the end of the war artillery in armored divisions fully consisted of armored self-propelled vehicles, the German Army failed to do the same thing with their armored arm, only a part of guns were self-propelled.