Wehrmacht Artillery Weaknesses

[Sheldrake]

How could they invest in artillery to that degree when they needed to spend so much on FLAK from 1941 on while they were expanding the division totals the whole time and needed to provide enough artillery (while losing a lot of that around Moscow in 1941-42, Stalingrad and Tunisia in 1943, and then throughout the entire 1943-45 period)? Germany just did not have enough resources and they kept losing equipment in major defeats. Had there been no strategic bombing offensive they'd have had twice the artillery guns per FLAK gun they didn't make, but that wasn't an option given the Allied efforts.

The Germans made their decision about the priority assigned to field artillery long before 1943. In 1939 the Germans had the best Panzer force in the world, but left most of their artillery reliant on horse draught. By contrast, the British motorised their field and medium artillery, but had a tank development programme that the official history entitled "The Great Tank scandal."

[Meyer]

In 1939 the Germans had the best Panzer force in the world, but left most of their artillery reliant on horse draught.

Do you think they made a mistake allotting their limited motorized resources?

[Meyer]

The decision not to motorize artillery regiments across the board was a mistake.

Where are the extra truck and fuel coming from?

The decision to adopt literally dozens of captured weapons types to augment their artillery stocks was a mistake - and so on.

Why? No weapons are better than captured ones?

[Sheldrake]

In 1939 the Germans had the best Panzer force in the world, but left most of their artillery reliant on horse draught.

Do you think they made a mistake allotting their limited motorized resources?

The Germans partially motorised the antitank company in each Infantry Regiment and anti tank abteilung in each infantry Division. It would have been more use to have motorised the field and medium artillery. This isn't original thinking by me, but a comment by a German commander after the end of Op Barbarossa. (Guderian)

[Art]

The British had a bit of a fetish about the Creeping Barrage, a comfort blanket since 1 July 1916. It was one of the few ways to guarantee the enemy's head would be kept down while the infantry closed with them. It is perhaps characteristic of the difference between the British and US approaches to battle. The British preferred a series of pulses of "colossal cracks" compared to the more sustained but dispersed US attacks.

One can notice from the comparison of divisional organizations that US and German infantry divisions had 36 organic light field howitzers while the British late-war division - twice as many 25-pdr guns with a lighter and less expensive projectile. Which was certainly better suitable for barrages.

[Rob - wssob2]

Why? No weapons are better than captured ones?

Captured weapons are great in the short term for tactical situations, but more problematic over time - it's difficult to find ammunition and spare parts for them.

Adrian Tooze in his 2006 book The Wages of Destruction mentions that by March 1944, the Wehrmacht had a total of 17,589 artillery guns, of which 47% were foreign, the majority French (p.385)

You can imagine the logistical nightmare a Corps supply officer would have, with one division having French artillery pieces, another Czech and German, and a third captured Soviet pieces - each with different calibers, spare parts, transportation requirements, etc.

He also comments “the Anglo-American invasion force of 1944 was the only military force in World War II to fully conform to the modern model of a motorized army.”.

[stg 44]

The Germans rebored captured artillery:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7.62_cm_Pak_36%28r%29
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canon_de_ ... II_service
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7.5_cm_Pak_97/38

[Art]

The weapon of artillery is the round and not the equipment that fires it. Comparing the number of barrels, tubes or even the theoretical tonnage of shells is misleading without consideration for ammunition supply. The real German weakness in field artillery was a lack of investment in capacity to supply field artillery with common ordnance, ammunition and the logistic services.

Considering ammunition let's compare production statistics for the start. USA stats:



versus German:
http://archive.is/qX4S
Taking the year 1944 as the point of maximal effort we have:
rounds for US 75-mm howitzers - 8100 thousands versus 5550 thousands for German 75-mm infantry and mountain guns
US 105-mm infantry how M3 - 3800 thousands/2300 thousands rounds for German 105-mm mountain and 150-mm infantry guns
US 105-mm light how M2 - 34000 thousands/38 000 thousands German 105-mm field howitzer
US 155-mm how - 6100 thousands/8300 thousands German 150-mm howitzer
US 155-mm 4,5'' gun - 300 thousands/2750 thousands German 105-mm guns
US 155-mm gun - 2400 thousands/1750 thousands German, French, Soviet guns 150-170mm
US 8'' howitzer - 630 thousands/460 thousands German 210-mm howitzers
US 8'' gun - 56 thousands/35 thousands German 210-mm guns
US 240-mm howitzer - 126 thousands/8 thousands rounds for German and Czech 240-mm guns and howtizers
Some captured weapons with German produced ammunition are discarded.
The general conclusion is that overall number of rounds produced was quite similar. However Germany was appreciably weaker in ammunition for heavy artillery. It should be also remembered that Germany fielded several ties more divisions thus having less artillery ammunition per divisions or less ammunition per infantry soldier. It would be also interesting to compare the ratio of rounds/gun.

[Sheldrake]

The weapon of artillery is the round and not the equipment that fires it. Comparing the number of barrels, tubes or even the theoretical tonnage of shells is misleading without consideration for ammunition supply. The real German weakness in field artillery was a lack of investment in capacity to supply field artillery with common ordnance, ammunition and the logistic services.

Considering ammunition let's compare production statistics for the start. USA stats:



versus German:
http://archive.is/qX4S
Taking the year 1944 as the point of maximal effort we have:
rounds for US 75-mm howitzers - 8100 thousands versus 5550 thousands for German 75-mm infantry and mountain guns
US 105-mm infantry how M3 - 3800 thousands/2300 thousands rounds for German 105-mm mountain and 150-mm infantry guns
US 105-mm light how M2 - 34000 thousands/38 000 thousands German 105-mm field howitzer
US 155-mm how - 6100 thousands/8300 thousands German 150-mm howitzer
US 155-mm 4,5'' gun - 300 thousands/2750 thousands German 105-mm guns
US 155-mm gun - 2400 thousands/1750 thousands German, French, Soviet guns 150-170mm
US 8'' howitzer - 630 thousands/460 thousands German 210-mm howitzers
US 8'' gun - 56 thousands/35 thousands German 210-mm guns
US 240-mm howitzer - 126 thousands/8 thousands rounds for German and Czech 240-mm guns and howtizers
Some captured weapons with German produced ammunition are discarded.
The general conclusion is that overall number of rounds produced was quite similar. However Germany was appreciably weaker in ammunition for heavy artillery. It should be also remembered that Germany fielded several ties more divisions thus having less artillery ammunition per divisions or less ammunition per infantry soldier. It would be also interesting to compare the ratio of rounds/gun.

These figures compare the Germans with just one of their enemies. To get a fair picture, the production figures for the UK and USSR need to be added. The production for 1944 does not tell the whole story either. Speer boosted factory production, but not all that was built could be transported to the battlefield. The Germans gave little priority to producing trucks and were over reliant on railways.

The Germans complained about the lack of artillery ammunition in Normandy - compounded by the variety of ordnance. If there had been parity in artillery in Normandy the allies might have lost!

[Art]

rounds for US 75-mm howitzers - 8100 thousands versus 5550 thousands for German 75-mm infantry and mountain guns
US 105-mm infantry how M3 - 3800 thousands/2300 thousands rounds for German 105-mm mountain and 150-mm infantry guns

Correction: 12 204 thousands rounds for German 75-mm infantry and mountain guns, 2985 thousand rounds for German 105-mm mountain and 150-mm infantry guns. Numbers are closer to American ones.

[Art]

These figures compare the Germans with just one of their enemies.

Oh, one thing at a time. Right now we are talking about two economies and two armies, of which the American is obviously stronger. Yet from production figures it appears that Germany invested a larger part of her resources into artillery and ammunition production.

The production for 1944 does not tell the whole story either.

I'm comparing capacity of ammunition industry, for which maximal production seems to be an adequate measure. One can calculate total production in 1940-45, from the sources given above. We have in thousands:

US 75-mm How – 26 791
German 75-mm IG – 29 468.7
Sov. 76-mm gun mod. 27 – 2 520.4
German 75-mm mountain gun – 3 438.1

US 105-mm M3 how – 7 950
German 105-mm mountain – 1 160.4
German 150-mm infantry gun – 6 235.9

US 105-mm howitzer M2 – 85 484
German 105-mm field howitzer – 103 682.9

US 155-mm howitzer – 15 491
German 150-mm howitzer – 28 073

US 4,5” gun – 1 969
German 105-mm gun – 7 002,4

US 155-mm gun – 7 168
German 150-mm K16 – 30.5
German 150-mm K18 – 320
German 150-mm K39 – 236.3
150-mm gun Mrs – 24.3
Soviet 152-mm gun-howitzer – 759.5
French 155-mm gun – 1350.2
German 170-mm gun – 573

US 8” howitzer – 2 531
German 210-mm howitzer – 1 711.4

US 8” gun – 187
German 210-mm K38 – 24.2
German 210-mm K39/40/41 – 60.6

US 240-mm howitzer – 409
240-mm How 39/40 – 23
240-mm K3 – 12.6
240-mm Czech gun- 9.6
Actually German production ended in May 1945 for obvious reasons, so the result is skewed in favor of Unites States. The conclusion is the same as above: Germany is notably weaker in heavy artillery ammo, while maintaining a favorable balance in other types.

but not all that was built could be transported to the battlefield. The Germans gave little priority to producing trucks and were over reliant on railways

Again one think at a time. We'll proceed to ammo consumption, I hope.

[stg 44]

Wouldn't German stats also be heavily skewed due to ammo production for FLAK?

[Sheldrake]

This is interesting, and not what I had expected.
Other analysis suggest that the Germans were being out produced by the USA even in 1944.
https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/econ ... tprint.pdf

So if the Germans were producing all this ammunition why were their armies constantly complaining about a shortage of artillery ammunition? (A state of affairs corroborated by allied reports which claim a mastery over German artillery in counter bombardment and the trend for the Germans to rely on mortars?)

If the Germans were producing roughly the same amount of warlike munitions in the form of artillery ammunition, what made up the vast surplus of the US munitions production over the Germans? Was it all Deuce and a half trucks, C47 transports and B24 bombers?

[Art]

If the Germans were producing rouhgly the same amount of warlike munitons in the form of artillery ammunition, what made up the vast surplus of the US munitions production over the Germans?

Aircraft, ships, motor vehicles? From what I remember the source from which I posted US production tables has procurement price in $ for different groups of materiel.

[Sheldrake]

In 1944 the US built about ten times more trucks than the Germans.

UK production of 25 pdr ammunition is given here.
http://www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php? ... &Itemid=58
Peak UK production was in 1942, just over 15,000,000 rounds of HE.