Wehrmacht Artillery Weaknesses

[Ypenburg]

In 1939 the Germans had the best Panzer force in the world

I'd like to see some prove for this statement. Even during Fall Gelb 2/3 of the German Panzers were PzKpfw I (523) and PzKpfw II (955). Their armour being resp. 13 mm and 14,5 mm, armed resp. with 2 x 7.62 MG and 20 mm gun. With the PzKpfw I originally being a training-vehicle, and in regard to the over 2000 Frensch tanks with armour from 40 mm (200+) - 45 mm (1670) - 55 mm (300) and 60 mm (274) and a 37 mm gun, one might wonder what "best Panzer force" you're thinking of.

[Sheldrake]

In 1939 the Germans had the best Panzer force in the world

I'd like to see some prove for this statement. Even during Fall Gelb 2/3 of the German Panzers were PzKpfw I (523) and PzKpfw II (955). Their armour being resp. 13 mm and 14,5 mm, armed resp. with 2 x 7.62 MG and 20 mm gun. With the PzKpfw I originally being a training-vehicle, and in regard to the over 2000 Frensch tanks with armour from 40 mm (200+) - 45 mm (1670) - 55 mm (300) and 60 mm (274) and a 37 mm gun, one might wonder what "best Panzer force" you're thinking of.

Well. Even though tank for tank the German tanks were unimpressive, they still had had the best Panzer Force.

Combat power can be considered as the sum of the physical, cognitive and moral components.

Lets take the physical side first. The Germans had lots of reliable if under armed and under armoured light tanks. The tanks were supported by more motorised artillery, engineers, reconnaissance troops infantry, anti tank, AA artillery and logistic support than in British French or Red army mechanised formations. Overall German Panzer formations had more and a better balance of military equipment operated by well trained soldiers, who were trained to make the best use of panzer troops.

Which takes us to the cognitive component. The German panzer force operated to an effective and consistent tactical and operational doctrine that combined the tanks with other mobile forces. Oh and their commanders were jolly good at training to an overall doctrine which emphasised initiative. They had practical recent experience of conducting large scale armoured operations Austria and Poland) and knew about the problems of repair and recovery. The French were stuck in 1918 while the British had a doctrinal mess. The Red Army had a theoretical doctrine but could not train their troops to use it (and had shot the generals who developed the doctrine.)

The morale component pitted competent well motivated German troops against the men of the Phoney war. Hitler promised a short successful war to overturn the sleights Germans had suffered in the past decades. The Allied troops motivations were less certain. The British armoured troops were regular troops with the strengths and limitations of their tribal system. The French were some of the best, but from a country riven by political splits. The soviets were probably motivated by the desire to avoid the Gulag or a 7.62mm solution.

These things are a matter of judgement and you might assess these things differently. While I would be happy to debate these qualitative factors, this thread is about German artillery weakness. My point was that the Germans invested in a panzer force and negelected their artillery, while the French invested in the artillery they thought they needed to refight 1918.

[Urmel]

the restructuring of the army away from infantry and towards other arms after 1940- by 43' there were more artillerymen than infantrymen in the British Army.

eg.

On its own this doesn't tell us anything. What were the numbers in the other armies? FWIW, I somehow doubt that the Germans fielded considerably more than 16% infantry in their post mid-1942 divisions. I maybe wrong of course.

[Sheldrake]

the restructuring of the army away from infantry and towards other arms after 1940- by 43' there were more artillerymen than infantrymen in the British Army.

eg.

On its own this doesn't tell us anything. What were the numbers in the other armies? FWIW, I somehow doubt that the Germans fielded considerably more than 16% infantry in their post mid-1942 divisions. I maybe wrong of course.

In general terms the Germans were much leaner than the British and US.
If you take the 1944 Division

1944 Infantry Division three Regiment structure

9,843 soldiers of which some 5,400 were in the three Infantry regiments,(C.58%) 2,150 in the artillery regiment and anti tank battalion (C.22%) 510 engineers (C 5%) and 389 in the Div HQ and Signals (C.4%) and 1182 in the divisional services (c.11%)

This was a very lean formation which maximised the number of combat troops

The British figures are for 2nd Army as a whole rather than a single division. This includes a substantial proportion of the British non divisional armour (armoured Brigades) and artillery (Corps AA and Anti tank, AGRA and AA Brigades) The Germans had far fewer non divisional troops (there is a discussion in Zetterling). The biggest difference is in the proportion of services is the largest figure - the tail rather than teeth. But artillery is only as good as its ammunition supply and the "services" will include the RASC columns which multiplied the effectiveness of the RA. Perhaps it was the emphasis on combat troops at the expense of logistics which was the biggest weakness of the German artiller?

[Urmel]

First, the numbers are clearly not comparable if one are divisional, and the other contain the corps/army slice.

Secondly, even at divisional level they are not comparable, because the German regiments contain hundreds of artillery men in the AT and cannon/heavy mortar companies at regimental level that didn't exist in the Commonwealth brigades but were held at divisional level there.

[Art]

In general terms the Germans were much leaner than the British and US.

US infantry division according to the TO&Es published in 1943 had 14 250 men of them 2200 in the divisional artillery. That was less than 1/6. For comparison personnel strength of the German infantry division from the same year:

Actually the proportion of artillery component was even somewhat larger. As already said organizations of divisional artillery in German and US armies were largely similar save for difference in transport. British Army was quite specific since anti-tank and anti-aircraft units were counted as belonging to artillery branch.

[Carl Schwamberger]

First, the numbers are clearly not comparable if one are divisional, and the other contain the corps/army slice.

Secondly, even at divisional level they are not comparable, because the German regiments contain hundreds of artillery men in the AT and cannon/heavy mortar companies at regimental level that didn't exist in the Commonwealth brigades but were held at divisional level there.

A important consideration here. The US infantry division had 36 105mm & 12 155mm caliber howitzers for a total of 48 cannon. However the Infantry regiments also had six cannon of 75mm or 105mm caliber. those were commonly connected to the division artillery & operated in coordination with them. Thus adding to the total indirect fire weight of the division. It was the same for the 13th or the cannon company in the German inf regiment.

Moving upwards to the corps level the US Army had between 50% & 150% more cannon per division HQ in the corps groups than the German.

[Gary Kennedy]

Re the figures for infantry strengths that Urmel and Sheldrake have picked up on, and I of course kicked up about originally.

I spent about a week searching off and on for a comparative figure for the US Army, which I think was the closest to the British in terms of mechanisation. I could not find a figure for the number of personnel in the infantry arm as a percentage of the total number of US Army personnel. Likewise a not split for US forces in the ETO on the same basis.

In terms of how many infantry there were in each type of Division and how many Divs there were in theatre, and how many personnel were in theatre all told, you can pull some figures together for the US. I had a play around but couldn't come up with anything definitive. What I would say re the high percentage of RA personnel in 2nd Army, is that RA provided all Divisional and non-Div Field, Medium, Heavy and Super Heavy Regts, all Survey, all Div and non-Div Anti-tank and AA, both Light and Heavy, and Searchlight Btys/Regts. Given it was anticipated that the Luftwaffe would put up more of an offensive display than it actually did in terms of the Normandy beachhead, and given prior experience, not allowing for a strong AA arm would seem imprudent.

Gary

[Sheldrake]

Agreed, it is difficult to compare on a like for like basis. Some of this is organisational hair splitting. Anti tank guns or mortars can be considered as either infantry artillery or some separate branch entirely.

One big difference between the Germans and western allies is the amount of non divisional artillery. Most German artillery was within divisions but around half of the Britsh and US field artillery was extra to the divisional artillery.

The second is the amount of service support. The high tail to teeth ratio in the Western Allied armies is usually seen as a Bad Thing. But in the context of delivering high concentrations of artillery it may be that the tail is as important as the teeth. We have seen statistics which demonstrate that there was no shortage of artillery ammunition produced by German industry. But this was certainly not reaching the 7th Army in Normandy in 1944! The Germans did not have enough tail to support their armies.

[Urmel]

But what is more astonishing in this regard then is that even with the very high ratio of teeth to tail, the German infantry division of the post-1942 reorg was considered to be weak in terms of its ability to put boots into frontline trenches.

Looking at the graph by Art above, and substracting 320 men from the Grenadier regiments each for AT and Cannon coys (based on the strength of the divisional AT coy net of Hiwis), you end up with a total consisting of 6,115 (net of Hiwis) consisting of:
3x1,356 (Grenadier regiments) as mainline infantry and:

1x594 (Fusilier)
1x897 (replacement battalion)
1x556 (engineers)
or 2,047 net of Hiwis as reserve infantry in case the proverbial hit the fan.

That gives you a ratio of 6,115/13,463 or 45%. The divisional artillery by comparison accounts for 19%, and a further 3.6% for the regimental cannon companies (in both cases excluding AT).

[Sheldrake]

But what is more astonishing in this regard then is that even with the very high ratio of teeth to tail, the German infantry division of the post-1942 reorg was considered to be weak in terms of its ability to put boots into frontline trenches.

Looking at the graph by Art above, and substracting 320 men from the Grenadier regiments each for AT and Cannon coys (based on the strength of the divisional AT coy net of Hiwis), you end up with a total consisting of 6,115 (net of Hiwis) consisting of:
3x1,356 (Grenadier regiments) as mainline infantry and:

1x594 (Fusilier)
1x897 (replacement battalion)
1x556 (engineers)
or 2,047 net of Hiwis as reserve infantry in case the proverbial hit the fan.

That gives you a ratio of 6,115/13,463 or 45%. The divisional artillery by comparison accounts for 19%, and a further 3.6% for the regimental cannon companies (in both cases excluding AT).

I think that figure just represents the reality of WW2 combat after allowing for the impact of 1940 style armour. The 1943 "Infantry Division" was oriented towards fire power based on artillery, mortars, machine guns and anti tank weapons. It was part of a pattern over the C20th which started with Infantry divisions of 15,000 -20,000 men of whom 9,000-12,000 were riflemen and a battalion was "1000 fighting Englishmen, the colonel and the band" (and a two machine guns pulled on carts)

The figures for British and US units are even worse. An infantry division would have 81 (US) or 108 (British) rifle platoons in nine infantry battalions. At full strength a British should have had 40 men in each platoon * giving a a total of 4320 men expected to engage at close quarters with an enemy. Add in 10% for company HQs and the cutting edge of a British infantry division was around 5,000 men. The US figures are not much different. These were the men who took 80% of the casualties.

*but usually went into the attack with around 24, according to one British observer in Sicily.

[Gary Kennedy]

There is a slightly more detailed breakdown given in Jean Bouchery's 'The British Soldier, Volume 2' from Histoire and Collections, but Heavens forbid, the figures are worse!

RA 18%
Infantry (incl Airborne) 14%
RE 13%
RAC 6%
RCS 5%

RASC 15%
Pioneer Corps 10%
REME 5%
RAMC 4%
Other services (RAOC, RAPC, CMP, RAEC, ACC, Intel Corps, etc) 10%

It says the figures are for 21AG (so Br/Cdns combined) for Aug44, and based on 660,000 men. It doesn't mention if these figures are extrapolated from WEs (so unit entitlements) or actual strength returns by arm of service.

Based on 660,000 men that makes 92,400 in the infantry arm, with 118,800 RA, 85,800 RE, 39,600 RAC and 33,000 RCS in the combat arms, total 369,600, and a further 290,400 in the services.

The closest figures I could find for the US come from The Organization of Ground Troops for Combat, with figures for Dec43 and Mar45.

Inf, Cav and Fd Arty (includes Armd and TD) - 1,860,068 (24.9%) * book says 1,960,068, but that doesn't fit in with the %
Coast Arty (includes AAA) - 590,939 (7.9%)
Total Ground Arms - 2,451,007 (32.8%)

Engrs - 561,066 (7.5%)
Sigs - 309,641 (4.1%)
Balance - 1,864,369 (24.9%) * includes Chemical, which should include the Chemical Mortar Bns, which were definitely combat (Med, Ord, Tpt, QM, MP, etc)

Army Air Corps - 1,810,900 (24.2%)
Balance, Air - 485,451 (6.5)

Total - 7,482,434

Subtracting the Army Air Forces should give -

Inf, Cav, Fd Arty, Armd, TD - 1,860,068 (35.9%)
Coast Arty, AAA - 590,939 (11.4%)
Engrs - 561,066 (10.8%)
Sigs - 309,641 (6.0%)
Balance - 1,864,369 (35.9%)

Total, Ground - 5,186,083

The book states that there were no separate reports for Armd, TD and AAA troops, so no split can be given by arm of service, so there's no way I can see to compare the two mechanised armies of the day to get an idea of whether the British were somehow 'infantry poor' in terms of the split between the multiple arms of service required for a modern army.

In terms of Divisional structures, there was no inbuilt weakness for a British or Commonwealth Div in its infantry component. Based on the June 1944 WEs the split by arm of service for an Inf Div was;

Div HQ, Prov, Post - 366 (1.99%)
Div Sigs, Recce, MG Bn - 2262 (12.30%)
Inf Bdes - 7896 (42.95%)
RA - 3814 (20.74%)
RE - 949 (5.16%)
RASC - 1288 (7.00%)
RAMC - 957 (5.20%)
RAOC/REME - 849 (4.61%)

108 Rifles Platoons (actually 37 all ranks at full strength) accounted for 3996 men, or 21.74% of the total authorised strength of the Infantry Division (18,381 based on the governing WEs).

The split for the US Infantry Division (based on the Jul43 model) was;

Div HQ + Special Tps - 412 (2.89%)
Sigs - 226 (1.59%)
Inf Regts - 9354 (65.63%)
Arty - 2160 (15.15%)
Cav - 155 (1.09%)
Engr - 647 (4.54%)
Med - 959 (6.73%)
Ord - 147 (1.03%)
QM - 193 (1.35%)

81 Rifle Pls (total 41 at full strength) accounted for 3321 men, or 23.30% of the 14,253 authorised strength of the Division.

Hard to get much from a straight comparison, as the US Div lacked organic Atk and AA units and had fairly modest lift capability in terms of trucks.

And for the opposition the May44 Type 44 German Div had;

Div HQ + att - 245 (2.06%)
Gren Regts + Fus Bn- 6669 (56.15%)
Arty Regt - 2013 (16.95%)
Atk Bn - 513 (4.32%)
Pio Bn - 620 (5.22%)
Sig Bn - 379 (3.19%)
Supply - 677 (5.70%)
Maint - 137 (1.15%)
Med - 469 (3.95%)
Vet - 156 (1.31%)

63 Rifle Pls (30 at full strength, if excluding the stretcher bearer and two drivers for horse drawn vehicles) account for 1890 men, or just 15.91% of a Div on 11,878 (which excludes the Field Replacement Bn of 925 men and goes with just one of the five official variations of Atk Bn).

The German Inf Regt of May40 should have come in at 3161 all ranks, and by May44 was down to 1987, so effectively a third down (in line with losing the third Bn).

Gary

[Urmel]

Thanks Gary. Always good to lay nonsense like the original post on page 1 to rest with some numbers.

[Sheldrake]

Thanks Gary. Always good to lay nonsense like the original post on page 1 to rest with some numbers.

Hmm I am not sure you can conclude that this comparison of breakdown of divisional establishments, diligent though Gary has been proves anything more than 15% of the manpower of a German infantry division were artillerymen!

It does not address the difference in artillery fire-power say between a British infantry divisions seventy two 25 Pdr guns and German artillery Regiment's thirty six, albeit of greater calibre (if equipped with the established weapons). Nor the imbalance between the relatively lavish non divisional artillery, including medium and heavy guns. Nor the differences in C3I of which the British Artillery are particularly proud, which underpinned the firepower based doctrine which ground down German defences from El Alemein onwards.

In order to challenge the premise of the original post, someone needs to provide some evidence that shows that there was no weakness in the German artillery arm, that it won the counter bombardment duels with its foes. That attacks on the Reich were broken up by the merciless drum fire of the German artillery.

Unfortunately this runs counter to the evidence from 1) the results of the engagements. and 2) the contemporary reports which, certainly in the Mediterranean and North west European theatres were of allied artillery predominance and relative impotence of the German artillery. If there was no weakness in the German artillery organisation and the Germans had lots of ammunition, why wasn't the Normandy invasion, and the assaults on the westwall by the handfuls of allied infantrymen crushed under a Passcehdaele style counter bombardment?

This has been an interesting thread which has brought together data showing that the Germans were not neglecting artillery ammunition production and had proportionate artillery support within their divisional oganisation. So what is the missing piece? Or have we misinterpreted history?

[Meyer]

It does not address the difference in artillery fire-power say between a British infantry divisions seventy two 25 Pdr guns and German artillery Regiment's thirty six, albeit of greater calibre (if equipped with the established weapons)

You are forgetting the twelve 15cm howitzers, and also they were supporting only two infantry regimets (against three "brigades" of the British div.). Also the Germans relied more, relatively speaking, and direct fire support weapons (infantry guns-Stugs), and considering, as you say, the bigger calibre I don't think those numbers support your premise.

Unfortunately this runs counter to the evidence from 1) the results of the engagements

About the result of the engagements (I guess from mid-war on, the early ones do not count?) I think most of them were of the result of a considerable imbalance between the forces, and not the consequence of a lower priority of the artillery arm among the Heer branches.