Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45

[Harro]

In that newspaper clip we can read:

"...hundreds more Germans had been killed. Two hundred and sixty-seven German dead were counted on the railway bridge alone..."

But on road bridge - one SS officer...???

Well, the SS was about to blow the road bridge and no doubt had cleared it whereas the railroad bridge had been taken earlier that day with no attempt to blow it up.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

In that newspaper clip we can read:

"...hundreds more Germans had been killed. Two hundred and sixty-seven German dead were counted on the railway bridge alone..."

But on road bridge - one SS officer...???

Hi...

Actually all the fighting for the road bridge took place in the town and the bridge approaches. On the bridge -road per se, when the 5 Guards vehicles stormed across, there was very little fighting. However on the girders and elsewhere in the structure IIRC a lot of Germans were clinging and shooting. Most were taken POW.

Ciao
Sandeep

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Hi....

This is another interesting perspective on the issue of who can claim credit for the Waal bridge storming on 20th September.


(http://ww2today.com/20-september-1944-n ... s-the-waal)

"...The bridge was taken at both ends by XXX Corps. The 82nd were not even at the bridge when the tanks went across. They were at the far end of the village of Lent, about 1km away, which was just north of the bridge. The Germans had naturally put a road block at the end of the bridge which the tanks had to push out of the way to proceed. On leaving the bridge two tanks of the four were hit and one knocked out with men killed, injured and taken prisoner. One was got going again. The Germans were firing from the girders and land around the bridge. No 82nd were there to meet the tanks, only Germans. The 82nd first met the British tanks near the railway embankment and railway bridge at the far side of Lent. The 82nd men kissed the tank and its guns. The leading two tanks had already knocked out a German self-propelled gun and hit the church. The tank would go no further as German guns were ahead and they were to protect the bridge.

Only four tanks moved over the bridge. The rest of the tanks were fighting in Nijmegen town helping the 82nd who had not taken Nijmegen.  One tank added to the four. The tanks were tasked to secure the north end of the bridge in case of a counter-attack, not neglect their prime task and go on a suicidal night stroll into Dutch farmland. 

There wasn’t only Waffen SS in the way to Arnhem. Schwere Panzerkompanie Hummel with 14 Tiger I tanks had also crossed the Arnhem bridge at that time and took up defensive positions near Elst north of Lent. There is no way that 4 Sherman tanks would have got anywhere near Arnhem. The big point is they they were to protect the bridge and only the bridge.

The best book on this is Market Garden Then and Now. A Bridge Too Far is inaccurate on many points."


I would personally tend to find this version credible. Actually in the heat of battle .. of the type involved at the bridge and the immediate northern end, it would be very difficult for participants to register details about anything outside their immediate concerns. Later it's improbable that they would recollect with great accuracy certain details about who met whom at which point at which time.

However it is a fact that US paras did have conversations with the Guards tankers about a dash for Arnhem, at some point when the immediate area was clear of Germans. The pat story made out in the above narrative, about the utter helplessness of the Irish Guards at that point, is certainly not factual.

That evening the sun set at 1943 hrs in the Nijmegen area. Last light would be another hour from then ? The Guards tanks had over 2 hrs of natural visibility to try and reach the NiederRhein? US paras would certainly have been game for accompanying the tanks. Afterall that's what the paras had undertaken the near suicidal boat ride for!


Ciao
Sandeep

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Below are aerial photo of Nijmegen bridges and a map showing Waal river crossing.

As we can see crossing happened far west to railway bridge.
Do we know which German unit defended crossing, Fort and area north of railway bridge?
It can't be Euling's unit, as we know they were located south of the road bridge.

Nijmegen bridges.jpg

Waal crossing.jpg

Sources:
https://www.cpp.edu/~rosenkrantz/paratr ... lriver.htm
http://www.worcestershireregiment.com/b ... n_1944.php

Hi...


KG Rheinhold (Hauptstrmfr Leo Hermann Reinhold) held the north bank, upto the Lent area. KG Henke (Oberst Fritz Henke), having pulled back from the South end, defended the northern approaches to the rail bridge and the area around, and including, Fort Hof Van Holland. In Lent, the Landersschützen Kampfgruppe Hartung had been deployed too immediately after Operation MG had commenced on 17th. But I am not certain if this KG was active during the bridge storming operations.


Ciao
Sandeep

[GregSingh]

Sandeep, Harro, thanks for your responses.

I understand railroad bridge was taken from both ends by 82nd paratroopers (they crosses Waal river on boats and arrived north of the bridge).
But I doubt the same can be said about road bridge. After fighting in the town tanks from British XXX corps seemed just to cross the bridge and arrived north of it. There were neither US paratroopers there, nor British infantry, so it couldn't have be taken from both ends.

[Gary Kennedy]

There's an account here of the activities of H Company, 504th PIR, including the assault crossing. It was penned by the Coy CO in the late 1940s.

http://www.benning.army.mil/library/con ... %20CPT.pdf

D+3, page 24/25 of the document, is where the assault crossing and operation to take the opposite bank are detailed.

Gary

Edit - another account here, re ops of 3rd Platoon, E Coy, 508th PIR

http://www.benning.army.mil/library/con ... %20CPT.pdf

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Sandeep, Harro, thanks for your responses.

I understand railroad bridge was taken from both ends by 82nd paratroopers (they crosses Waal river on boats and arrived north of the bridge).
But I doubt the same can be said about road bridge. After fighting in the town tanks from British XXX corps seemed just to cross the bridge and arrived north of it. There were neither US paratroopers there, nor British infantry, so it couldn't have be taken from both ends.

Hi Greg you are right largely. I have posted an account above, of the goings on at the North end of the road bridge if you notice. That corroborates what you say . The 5 tanks of the Irish Guards rushed the bridge from the south end. They met the 504 some way off from the north end near Lent.

Ciao
Sandeep

[sandeepmukherjee196]

http://www.artehistoria.com/v2/obras/16843.htm

Kampfgruppe Von Tettau near Oosterbeek, outside Arnhem. This KG, formed out of a grab bag of disparate elements including Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine units. This rag tag formation gave a nightmarish ordeal to the British 1 Airborne. They drove a decisive nail into the ultimate coffin of operation MG when they overran the re supply zones of 1AB.

Given below is the OOB of this KG:

Commander : Generalleutnant Hans Von Tettau

SS Schule Arnheim, Standartenfuehrer Lippert
Strength: 3000

SS Polizei Schule
Strength: 600

SS Training and Replacement Bataillon 4, Sturmfuehrer Labahn

SS Wach Bataillon 3
Commander : Standrtnfuhr Paul Anton Helle

SS Bataillon Eberwein
Strength: 600

Schiffsturm Abteilung 10 (KM): Kapitan Lieutnant Zaubzer
Strength: 600 men

Schiffsturm Abteilung 6/14 (KM)
Strength: 600 men

Fliegerhorst Bataillon 2 (LW)
Strength: 600

Fliegerhorst Bataillon 3 (LW)
Strength: 600

Artillerie Regiment 184
Strength: 450 men

Regiment 42 Sicherheit


This list may not be exhaustive since units were put under this KG as the battle progressed.

Ciao
Sandeep

[sandeepmukherjee196]

http://forum.panzer-archiv.de/viewtopic.php?p=60141&sid=97e149dc16f32b54bcc404e5cc892d63

Generalleutnant Hans Von Tettau

Am 16. März 1944 wurde seine Funktion in Leiter des Führungs- und Ausbildungsstab in die Niederlanden ernannt. Anfang November 1944 wurde er dann zum Kommandeur der Division z.b.V. 604 ernannt. Ebenfalls Anfang November 1944 wurde seine Einreichung zur Verleihung vom Eichenlaub abgelehnt. Mitte Januar 1945 wurde er mit der Führung einer Korpsgruppe Tettau in Hinterpommern betraut. Dort wurde er mit einer Kampfgruppe bei Kolberg eingeschlossen und konnte sich mit Teilen wieder freikämpfen. Am 16. März 1945 zum General der Infanterie ernannt, wurde er am gleichen Tag wieder in die Führerreserve versetzt. Am 5. April 1945 wurde er für seine Führungsleistung mit dem Eichenlaub zum Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes ausgezeichnet. Bei der Kapitulation der Deutschen Wehrmacht wurde er dann durch die Besatzungstruppen gefangen genommen. Aus der Gefangenschaft wurde er dann Mitte 1947 wieder entlassen.
Ritterkreuz (3. September 1942) Eichenlaub (5. April 1945).

It's rather surprising that he was passed up for the Oak Leaves in November 44 !

[histan]

Hi Sandeep

Perhaps not given this assessment by Lippert
" Co-operation with von Tettau's staff was a catastrophe. It was according to my information thrown together , and was non-functional, at least during the first few days. It was unable to produce weapons, ammunition, support weapons, radio communications, rations, transport, military police, doctors, medics, ambulances and many other things besides. How far Generalleutnant von Tettau was responsible is not for me to judge. Units were required to in all respects to provide for themselves. The NCO school, normally based in barracks, was not at all equipped to conduct such tasks, and this was also the case for all units subsequently attached. rations had to be purloined from the Dutch population, and luckily the soldiers were able to get near to some dropped food supply containers from the British"

Quoted in "it Never Snows in September: The German View of Market-Garden" by Robert Kershaw.

This book is indispensable reading for anyone interested in Operation Market-Garden.

In its annexes it has detailed ORBATS for Kampgruppe von Tettau for the periods 17-18 September, 19-20 September, and 20-26 September. It discusses the successes and failures of this formation and its component Kampfgruppe.

It also shows the units at Nijmegen on 17 September and the build up of units over the next few days, along with a decent account of the German defence of Nijmegen.

The books origins were to aid the Camberley Staff College battlefield tour of Arnhem and the author was lucky enough to be able to interview many veterans, including Karl-Heinz Euling and Heinz Harmel

Regards

John

PS Lippert's quote is a good example of the comment attributed to Field Marshall Lord Wavell - When amateurs get together they discuss tactics, when professionals get together they discuss logistics"

PPS Peter Carrington's tanks were from the Grenadier Guards, the Irish Guards provided the infantry.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Hi John...

I did slip up about the Guards. Silly of me.

I was referring to the impact and outcome where Von Tettau's KG is concerned. I don't think it is anybody's contention that this KG was even a half way decent military formation. It was a desperate assembly of anyone capable of varying arms from whatever uniformed units available in the vicinity.

My contention is that such an unlikely rag tag array could achieve such effective and remarkable results against a so called elite para division!

The overrunning of the re-supply zones sealed the fate of the 1st AB. Other German generals have been decorated for similar achievements of their troops. In this case Von Tettau was explicitly NOT given the Eichenlaub in spite of being recommended for the same in November. Maybe the SS role in Arnhem overshadowed all else.

Thanks again .

Ciao
Sandeep

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Hi...


Some more key information about Operation Market garden and the German response :

In 1944, during Operation Market Garden, a British airborne division consisted of
12,416 officers and men. They were armed with:
•2942 pistols and revolvers
•7171 rifles
•6504 Sten guns
•966 Bren guns
•46 Vickers machine guns
•474 2-inch mortars
•56 3-inch mortars
•5 4.2-inch mortars
•392 PIATs
•38 flamethrowers
•23 20mm cannon
•27 75mm Pack Howitzers
•84 6-pounder anti-tank guns, and
•16 17-pounder anti-tank guns

( ref: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/s ... garden.pdf)



Other Allied losses, Apart from Airborne forces :

Killed in action or died of wounds Captured or missing
RAF 368 79
Royal Army Service Corps 79 44
IX Troop Carrier Command 27 6
XXX Corps 25 200
Total 499 329



Allied Airborne Units :


Killed in action or died of wounds Captured or missing Safely withdrawn Total

1st Airborne 1,174 5,903 1,892 8,969
Glider Pilot Regiment 219 511 532 1,262
Polish Brigade 92 111 1,486 1,689
Total 1,485 6,525 3,910 11,920


Feldmarschall Model had indicated 3300 German casualties for the entire MG area, fighting the Market and garden Forces. However a II SS Korps signal on 27th September mentioned 3300 casualties in the North of the NiederRhein area alone. With time, more German casualties must have surfaced.

[Harro]

In 1944, during Operation Market Garden, a British airborne division consisted of
12,416 officers and men. They were armed with:
•2942 pistols and revolvers
•7171 rifles
•6504 Sten guns
•966 Bren guns
•46 Vickers machine guns
•474 2-inch mortars
•56 3-inch mortars
•5 4.2-inch mortars
•392 PIATs
•38 flamethrowers
•23 20mm cannon
•27 75mm Pack Howitzers
•84 6-pounder anti-tank guns, and
•16 17-pounder anti-tank guns

Given the considerable amount of equipment that was destroyed in the air or during the landings I'd say you need to know what got on the ground intact and was actually battle ready.

[Orwell1984]

In 1944, during Operation Market Garden, a British airborne division consisted of
12,416 officers and men. They were armed with:
•2942 pistols and revolvers
•7171 rifles
•6504 Sten guns
•966 Bren guns
•46 Vickers machine guns
•474 2-inch mortars
•56 3-inch mortars
•5 4.2-inch mortars
•392 PIATs
•38 flamethrowers
•23 20mm cannon
•27 75mm Pack Howitzers
•84 6-pounder anti-tank guns, and
•16 17-pounder anti-tank guns

Given the considerable amount of equipment that was destroyed in the air or during the landings I'd say you need to know what got on the ground intact and was actually battle ready.

Indeed .
Let's just consider the anti-tank guns for now.
Some other sites to consult are:
http://arnhemjim.blogspot.ca/2012/10/th ... ns-at.html
which notes:

In summary 1st AB Division had a total of 32 of the 6 Pdr AT Guns and 16 of the 17 Pdr AT Guns.

This is the number prior to any losses due to landing. The article linked to details those losses. The 17 pdrs were hit particularly hard.

http://www.pegasusarchive.org is also an indispensible site for looking at the British side of things.

Details of the actions of 1st Air Landing Anti-tank Battery
http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/war_1atbty.htm

A report written by a surviving officer from the 2nd Oban Airlanding Anti Tank Battery
http://www.royalartilleryunitsnetherlan ... -batt.html

notes:

Altogether four 6 pr and two 17pr guns of those supporting 4 Para Bde and three 6 pr guns from E Troop arrived in Div Troops area.

So as Harro correctly points out, a listing of the 'ideal' paper establishment of a British Airborne division tells us little about what was actually involved in combat during Market Garden.

[Gary Kennedy]

That listing of weapons isn't actually correct for 1st Abn Div. It's based on 6th Abn Div, less it tanks, and then for 1945, hence the 4.2-in mortars that were definitely not available to 1st Abn Div in Sep44. The original appears in Joslen and includes an error for the total of 3-in mortars which has been carried over ever since it seems (can anyone spot it?). Likewise the figures include weapons held by First Reinforcements.

1st Abn Div actually had 20x 6-prs with the two A/L Atk Btys, each of which formed extra gun Tps for the op, and each Bty also had eight 17-prs not included in the Bty WE. Each of the three A/L Bns also included eight 6-prs, so the 'book strength' of the Div was 56x 6-prs and 16x 17-prs. Each A/L Lt Bty had eight 75-mm pack how, plus one spare. Not all these pieces made it in if I recall and I think some 6-prs were brought with later lifts.

Gary