Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
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steverodgers801
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Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
the long resistance in Normandy started the mess by requiring far more ammo then expected and then when the collapse happened there had not been time to stockpile supplies
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sandeepmukherjee196
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Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
"..Thus is so with Operation Market Garden which took place from Sept. 17-26, 1944. The goal of the operation was to bypass the German Siegfried line by crossing some major canals and rivers in Holland. The last bridge the Allies had to cross was over the Rhine in the Dutch city of Arnhem. Once over the Rhine, the Allied armies would sweep east into Germany, thereby knocking out the German industrial heart in the Ruhr district, which would end the war before Christmas..."
(Dan Fitzpatrick, Command Historian, U.S. European Command,Stuttgart, Germany)
https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newsp ... 40927.2.55
(Dan Fitzpatrick, Command Historian, U.S. European Command,Stuttgart, Germany)
https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newsp ... 40927.2.55
- https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19440927.2.55
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sandeepmukherjee196
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Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
Hi...MLW wrote:I see your point. However, I am not certain that Market Garden was a strategic defeat more than just an Allied operational failure. Also, did the result of Market Garden affect the US Third or Seventh Armies; or did it? If it just impacted the British Armies then, arguably, it was an operational defeat/failure/victory. To be strategic, the German success would have had to affect and change the course of the entire campaign on the Western Front.............................................sandeepmukherjee196 wrote:The autumn defensive successes of the Wehrmacht in the west, centred around the defeat of MG, was a strategic phenomenon. It neutralised the allied momentum of advance and wrested the initiative from the allies. The Wacht am Rhein was made possible because of the autumn victories emerging from the defeat of MG.MLW wrote:As I read this through this thread, it occurred to me that Germany had no strategic successes in 1944-45, or even 1943. Market Garden was not one. It was an Allied operational failure, not a German strategic success. I believe this because a strategic success is something that either takes, maintains, or retains the initiative at the strategic level. At no time did the Allies lose the military initiative from 1943 on wards - Kursk, Market Garden, the Ardennes offensive, or some of the Wehrmacht's operational and tactical defensive successes did not turn the tide of the war and wrest strategic initiative from the Allies.
What happened in Dec - Jan is a different story..nothing to do with this thread. Almost like the allegory of Rommel's strategic victory in North Africa in the spring - summer of '41..inspite of which the Axis was ultimately defeated in NA within one and a half years. That logic, upon suitable extension, would render all Axis strategic victories in WW II untenable .. since they finally lost anyways.
Market Garden led to the redeployment of the US First Army northwards and halted the Third Army. After MG, in October the US Ninth Army (XIX Corps) was moved to the boundary with 21st Army Group. This left the First Army with two corps around Aachen and one precariously stretched in the Ardennes for keeping contact with the Third Army. This facilitated the Wacht am Rhein.
Cheers
Sandeep
Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
Interesting. I am still not certain that the realignment of the Allied armies and the imposition of a delay in offensive operations constitutes a German strategic success. It seems to me, if there was to be a strategic success, it would have resulted from the Ardennes offensive, which perhaps only served, on the Allied side to delay offensive operations. and on the German side ended with the loss of important and significant forces. None of that appears to be a German strategic success.
Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
Hi Sandeep
I think you are spending too much time on Market-Garden. You should have a closer look at 12 Army Group operations that were taking place at the same rime and in particular what had changed between the issue of 12 Army Group Letter of Instruction Number Eight issued on 10 September 1944 and Letter of Instruction Number Nine issued on 25 September 1944.
The following is an extract from 12 Army Group Letter of Intentions Number Eight issued on 10 September 1944:
"Note: This Letter of Instructions confirms verbal orders of the Army Group Commander already issued but does not supplement them.
1.a. See current Intelligence Summary
b. 21 Army Group continues advance to the East to isolate and occupy the Ruhr. The capture of the Channel ports, the rocket bomb sites and the destruction of the enemy trapped along the coast will be completed.
2.a.Twelfth Army Group advances to the East to secure bridgeheads over the Rhine River from Mannheim to Koln both inclusive.
b. Boundaries [Not included]
3. a. First Army
(1) Continue the advance to the East, to secure crossings over the Rhine River in the vicinity of Koblenz, Bonn, and Koln
(2) Maintain contact with 21 Army Group and protect the left (north) flank.
b. Third Army
(1) Continue the advance to the East in zone and secure crossings of the Rhine River in the vicinity of Mannheim and Mainz. If sufficient forces become available to Third Army, it will also seize a bridgehead in the vicinity of Karlsruhe.
(2) Protect the south flank East of Orleans exclusive
c. Ninth Army. Reduce the Brittany peninsula and protect the south flank along the Loire River from its mouth to Orleans exclusive.
4. Armies will have equal priorities of supply except that the capture of Brest area will have first priority. Other administrative instructions, no change."
Note All this is in accordance with Eisenhower's statement of his intentions to the Combined Chiefs of Staff dated 9 September 1944.
Note also that the capture of Brest had priority in the allocation of supplies.
Third Army had already issued an Operational Directive to its Corps dated 5 September 1944 that stated:
"1. Third U S Army will -
a. Advance to the east with two Corps abreast; one Corps initially covering right (south) flank and later advancing to the east.
b. Seize bridgehead east of the MOSELLE RIVER.
c. Continue advance to the east to seize a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER from KOBLENZ (exclusive) to KARLSRUHE (inclusive).
2. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 7th Aral Div and supporting troops) will, without delay -
a Seize METZ, advance east of the MOSELLE RIVER within zone, continue advance rapidly to the northeast to seize MAINZ and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER within zone
b. Be prepared to continue advance to seize FRANKFURT, on Army order.
c Maintain contact with First U S Army on the left (north).
3. XII Corps (35th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and supporting troops) will, without delay
a. Seize NANCY and secure a bridgehead east of the MOSELLE RIVER within zone.
b. Protect south flank of Army until relieved by elements of XV Corps.
c. Be prepared to continue advance rapidly to the northeast, on Army order, to seize MANNHEIM and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER within zone.
4. XV Corps (79th Inf Div, 83rd Inf Div, 2d Fr Anal Div and supporting troops) will, without delay
a. Move Corps troops and 2d Fr Armd Div (upon release by First U S Ann/) to an area southeast of TROYES.
b. Protect the south flank of the Army from MDNTARGIS (exclusive) to the east, relieving elements of XII Corps.
c. Move 79th Inf Div (upon release by First U S Army) to a concentration area southeast of TROYES.
d. Direct the 83d Inf Div (upon release by VIII Corps) to move to an area selected by XV Corps.
e. Seize line of MOSELLE RIVER within zone. fo Be prepared to
1) Continue advance to the northeast to seize KARLSRUHE and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER within zone, or
(2) Move through bridge"heads secured by XII Corps or XX Corps.
{rest omitted]
Note both Eisenhower's and Bradley's intentions are consistent with this.
Unfortunately I do not have a copy of First Army Directives for this period - perhaps someone else has.
So we have a clear and consistent view of the intentions of 12 Army Group Intentions for September 1944 that clearly state that the intention was to cross the Rhine in a number of different places.
Regards
John
PS: The idea is to get the timeline correct and the intentions clear.
The intention was to achieve multiple crossings of the Rhine in September 1944. By the end of September it was clear that none of these crossings had been achieved.
The "pause" and supply crisis manifested itself in October 1944 and had multiple impacts on the US forces, resulting in some hard fought battles in October and November 1944.
The Germans were able to "hold the line" to a reasonable extent during these battles and at the same time assemble a theatre reserve that was used in the Ardennes offensive.
Market-Garden had almost no impact on American operations in October and November 1944.
I think you are spending too much time on Market-Garden. You should have a closer look at 12 Army Group operations that were taking place at the same rime and in particular what had changed between the issue of 12 Army Group Letter of Instruction Number Eight issued on 10 September 1944 and Letter of Instruction Number Nine issued on 25 September 1944.
The following is an extract from 12 Army Group Letter of Intentions Number Eight issued on 10 September 1944:
"Note: This Letter of Instructions confirms verbal orders of the Army Group Commander already issued but does not supplement them.
1.a. See current Intelligence Summary
b. 21 Army Group continues advance to the East to isolate and occupy the Ruhr. The capture of the Channel ports, the rocket bomb sites and the destruction of the enemy trapped along the coast will be completed.
2.a.Twelfth Army Group advances to the East to secure bridgeheads over the Rhine River from Mannheim to Koln both inclusive.
b. Boundaries [Not included]
3. a. First Army
(1) Continue the advance to the East, to secure crossings over the Rhine River in the vicinity of Koblenz, Bonn, and Koln
(2) Maintain contact with 21 Army Group and protect the left (north) flank.
b. Third Army
(1) Continue the advance to the East in zone and secure crossings of the Rhine River in the vicinity of Mannheim and Mainz. If sufficient forces become available to Third Army, it will also seize a bridgehead in the vicinity of Karlsruhe.
(2) Protect the south flank East of Orleans exclusive
c. Ninth Army. Reduce the Brittany peninsula and protect the south flank along the Loire River from its mouth to Orleans exclusive.
4. Armies will have equal priorities of supply except that the capture of Brest area will have first priority. Other administrative instructions, no change."
Note All this is in accordance with Eisenhower's statement of his intentions to the Combined Chiefs of Staff dated 9 September 1944.
Note also that the capture of Brest had priority in the allocation of supplies.
Third Army had already issued an Operational Directive to its Corps dated 5 September 1944 that stated:
"1. Third U S Army will -
a. Advance to the east with two Corps abreast; one Corps initially covering right (south) flank and later advancing to the east.
b. Seize bridgehead east of the MOSELLE RIVER.
c. Continue advance to the east to seize a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER from KOBLENZ (exclusive) to KARLSRUHE (inclusive).
2. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 7th Aral Div and supporting troops) will, without delay -
a Seize METZ, advance east of the MOSELLE RIVER within zone, continue advance rapidly to the northeast to seize MAINZ and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER within zone
b. Be prepared to continue advance to seize FRANKFURT, on Army order.
c Maintain contact with First U S Army on the left (north).
3. XII Corps (35th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and supporting troops) will, without delay
a. Seize NANCY and secure a bridgehead east of the MOSELLE RIVER within zone.
b. Protect south flank of Army until relieved by elements of XV Corps.
c. Be prepared to continue advance rapidly to the northeast, on Army order, to seize MANNHEIM and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER within zone.
4. XV Corps (79th Inf Div, 83rd Inf Div, 2d Fr Anal Div and supporting troops) will, without delay
a. Move Corps troops and 2d Fr Armd Div (upon release by First U S Ann/) to an area southeast of TROYES.
b. Protect the south flank of the Army from MDNTARGIS (exclusive) to the east, relieving elements of XII Corps.
c. Move 79th Inf Div (upon release by First U S Army) to a concentration area southeast of TROYES.
d. Direct the 83d Inf Div (upon release by VIII Corps) to move to an area selected by XV Corps.
e. Seize line of MOSELLE RIVER within zone. fo Be prepared to
1) Continue advance to the northeast to seize KARLSRUHE and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER within zone, or
(2) Move through bridge"heads secured by XII Corps or XX Corps.
{rest omitted]
Note both Eisenhower's and Bradley's intentions are consistent with this.
Unfortunately I do not have a copy of First Army Directives for this period - perhaps someone else has.
So we have a clear and consistent view of the intentions of 12 Army Group Intentions for September 1944 that clearly state that the intention was to cross the Rhine in a number of different places.
Regards
John
PS: The idea is to get the timeline correct and the intentions clear.
The intention was to achieve multiple crossings of the Rhine in September 1944. By the end of September it was clear that none of these crossings had been achieved.
The "pause" and supply crisis manifested itself in October 1944 and had multiple impacts on the US forces, resulting in some hard fought battles in October and November 1944.
The Germans were able to "hold the line" to a reasonable extent during these battles and at the same time assemble a theatre reserve that was used in the Ardennes offensive.
Market-Garden had almost no impact on American operations in October and November 1944.
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sandeepmukherjee196
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Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
Hi John..
My POV is that the US reversals at Metz and the Huertgen forests have lesser strategic implications for the Germans. On the operational level it was creditable for the Germans in holding the front against superior forces.
However Bradley's forces didn't ever look like they were gonna bounce the Rhine that time. Their advantage over their opponents wasn't as great as that of 21st Army Group. Btw after a hard fight the Americans did capture Metz and Huertgen both....for whatever the symbolism was worth. They didn't really make any meaningful impact in their sectors...that's true. But was it really feasible at any stage?
The MG part on the other hand COULD have succeeded inspite of :
Terrain
SS units
Bad weather over England
And such like....
And I am saying this, keeping in mind the failure of 1st AB north of the Rhine. I think this is where Model's brilliance lies. Model directed the battles in the 12th Army Group areas like an HG commander should. Not hands on but in a directive, administrative capacity. However against MG he went hands on since he spotted this area as the biggest vulnerability of the Reich in the west.
Hitler too spotted MG as the main threat and went all out in supporting the German forces in Holland. He immediately released the entire frontline strength of the LW fighter force around 300 to HGB when MG started.
People blame the slow advance of the Garden forces. They blame everyone down from O'Connor to Thomas to Joe Vandeleur. But why were the Garden forces delayed at every step? From D1 at Valkenswaard till the very end at Elst.
In terms of operational savvy the Germans at Metz and the Huertgen forests too did well. But it was much more difficult for the Germans in Holland. Thats what makes it special.
Cheers
Sandeep
My POV is that the US reversals at Metz and the Huertgen forests have lesser strategic implications for the Germans. On the operational level it was creditable for the Germans in holding the front against superior forces.
However Bradley's forces didn't ever look like they were gonna bounce the Rhine that time. Their advantage over their opponents wasn't as great as that of 21st Army Group. Btw after a hard fight the Americans did capture Metz and Huertgen both....for whatever the symbolism was worth. They didn't really make any meaningful impact in their sectors...that's true. But was it really feasible at any stage?
The MG part on the other hand COULD have succeeded inspite of :
Terrain
SS units
Bad weather over England
And such like....
And I am saying this, keeping in mind the failure of 1st AB north of the Rhine. I think this is where Model's brilliance lies. Model directed the battles in the 12th Army Group areas like an HG commander should. Not hands on but in a directive, administrative capacity. However against MG he went hands on since he spotted this area as the biggest vulnerability of the Reich in the west.
Hitler too spotted MG as the main threat and went all out in supporting the German forces in Holland. He immediately released the entire frontline strength of the LW fighter force around 300 to HGB when MG started.
People blame the slow advance of the Garden forces. They blame everyone down from O'Connor to Thomas to Joe Vandeleur. But why were the Garden forces delayed at every step? From D1 at Valkenswaard till the very end at Elst.
In terms of operational savvy the Germans at Metz and the Huertgen forests too did well. But it was much more difficult for the Germans in Holland. Thats what makes it special.
Cheers
Sandeep
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John Hilly
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Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
histan wrote: 2d Fr Anal Div
An interesting unit, indeed!
With best, J-P
"Die Blechtrommel trommelt noch!"
Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
Hi J-P
Serves me right for not checking a cut and paste from a pdf.
Although if one has to make a mistake it's best to make a good one.
Regards
John
Serves me right for not checking a cut and paste from a pdf.
Although if one has to make a mistake it's best to make a good one.
Regards
John
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Michael Kenny
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Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
Best stick to the French 2e DB!
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sandeepmukherjee196
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Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
The quality of German troops facing the Americans in the Huertgen Forest sector was a bit iffy. Decimated formations, merged units, personnel from an assortment of splintered formations thrown together.
Morale was uncertain and esprit de corps non existent in many units. Strong artillery and the ideal terrain conditions for defence came to the Germans' aid. Given below are the diary excerpts of a typical semi trained German landser captured outside Grosshau:
22 November 44--While standing my post I am thinking about my brother who died 3 years ago. I am wet through and through and wish the only possible thing, either get slightly wounded or become a PW. The latter would be the much more appreciated solution.
23 November 44--While the shells explode in front of my foxhole I am writing this . . . The Corporal is missing since last night and we think he is a PW. We all envy him. . . .
( "Passchendaele with tree bursts", an analysis of cohesion, morale, and operational effectiveness of U.S. and German organizations in the Hürtgen Forest, Fall 1944. Robert S Rush. Dissertation paper).
Morale was uncertain and esprit de corps non existent in many units. Strong artillery and the ideal terrain conditions for defence came to the Germans' aid. Given below are the diary excerpts of a typical semi trained German landser captured outside Grosshau:
22 November 44--While standing my post I am thinking about my brother who died 3 years ago. I am wet through and through and wish the only possible thing, either get slightly wounded or become a PW. The latter would be the much more appreciated solution.
23 November 44--While the shells explode in front of my foxhole I am writing this . . . The Corporal is missing since last night and we think he is a PW. We all envy him. . . .
( "Passchendaele with tree bursts", an analysis of cohesion, morale, and operational effectiveness of U.S. and German organizations in the Hürtgen Forest, Fall 1944. Robert S Rush. Dissertation paper).
Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
They are constantly fighting rear guard actionsJohn Hilly wrote:histan wrote: 2d Fr Anal Div
An interesting unit, indeed!
With best, J-P
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb
~Babylonian Proverb
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sandeepmukherjee196
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Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
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sandeepmukherjee196
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Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
OOB Metz garrison, and formations in the flanking sectors, early November 44 : Approx 14,000 officers and men. Tooth : Tail - 10,000 : 4000.
462 Volks Grenadier Division, at it gallantly since September : Approx 7,000 officers and men.
1215 Regiment (Oberst Stoessel) : north, Maizières-lès-Metz and connected with the 19th VG Division at the Moselle. 1010 Security Regiment (Oberst Anton) : bridgehead perimeter to the west, Norroy-Amanvillers.
Left : 1217 Regiment (OberstLt Richter) till Ars-sur-Moselle, on the west bank of the Moselle River.
22 Fortress Regiment : Moselle river, holding the line bordering Gotz von Berlichingen (17th SS) till the east bank.
Misc. fortress units : equivalent of three battalions and one MG battalion, distributed in the forts and in the main perimeter in Metz.
Artillery : 761 AR, 1311 Fortress Artillery Battalion, unknown Flak strength.
Sector Reserves : Beginning of November, 1216 regiment, 462 VG Division; 6, 462 Fuesilier Battalions; the aufklarungs battalion of Gotz von Berlichingen.
462 Volks Grenadier Division, at it gallantly since September : Approx 7,000 officers and men.
1215 Regiment (Oberst Stoessel) : north, Maizières-lès-Metz and connected with the 19th VG Division at the Moselle. 1010 Security Regiment (Oberst Anton) : bridgehead perimeter to the west, Norroy-Amanvillers.
Left : 1217 Regiment (OberstLt Richter) till Ars-sur-Moselle, on the west bank of the Moselle River.
22 Fortress Regiment : Moselle river, holding the line bordering Gotz von Berlichingen (17th SS) till the east bank.
Misc. fortress units : equivalent of three battalions and one MG battalion, distributed in the forts and in the main perimeter in Metz.
Artillery : 761 AR, 1311 Fortress Artillery Battalion, unknown Flak strength.
Sector Reserves : Beginning of November, 1216 regiment, 462 VG Division; 6, 462 Fuesilier Battalions; the aufklarungs battalion of Gotz von Berlichingen.
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Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
Sandeep,
Thanks for posting this:
In addition, to say that "the last bridge the Allies had to cross was over the Rhine in the Dutch city of Arnhem" is also incorrect, as part of the MG plan was to secure bridgeheads over the river Ijssel east of Arnhem - did Dan Fitzpatrick not realise that there are rivers in Germany?
By the way, you said that:
Similarly, Third Army was halted at the end of August (well before MG) and then, after the 2 September conference was granted equality of logistic support with First Army - MG absolutely did not "halt" Patton.
In addition, to say that First US Army's tactical position in September 1944 "facilitated" Wacht am Rhein is bizarre logic - why not blame the COSSAC plan to land in Normandy?
BTW I'm not sure I have seen poor O'Connor blamed for the slow advance of the Garden forces - do you mean Horrocks?
Did you look at the CMH website - The Siegfried Line Campaign is essential reading IMHO.
Regards
Tom
Thanks for posting this:
But as we have seen, Market Garden was purely the first phase and there was no worked out "plan" for the "Allied armies [to] sweep east into Germany, thereby knocking out the German industrial heart in the Ruhr district, which would end the war before Christmas..."."..Thus is so with Operation Market Garden which took place from Sept. 17-26, 1944. The goal of the operation was to bypass the German Siegfried line by crossing some major canals and rivers in Holland. The last bridge the Allies had to cross was over the Rhine in the Dutch city of Arnhem. Once over the Rhine, the Allied armies would sweep east into Germany, thereby knocking out the German industrial heart in the Ruhr district, which would end the war before Christmas..."
(Dan Fitzpatrick, Command Historian, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany)
In addition, to say that "the last bridge the Allies had to cross was over the Rhine in the Dutch city of Arnhem" is also incorrect, as part of the MG plan was to secure bridgeheads over the river Ijssel east of Arnhem - did Dan Fitzpatrick not realise that there are rivers in Germany?
By the way, you said that:
This is also at best only partly correct...the redeployment of First US Army northwards came before MG in late August and, arguably, was a major contributing factor in the gap in the German front which British 2nd Army exploited successfully to capture Brussels and Antwerp - after the 2 September conference at Bradley's HQ First US Army actually turned eastwards directly towards the Rhine and its front expanded in an attempt to close the gap between itself and Third US Army. Only after the 22 Sep conference, at which point Eisenhower seems to have grasped that he was not going to achieve success [i.e. Rhine bridgeheads] on all his army fronts, was First US Armies front extended under the influence of MG's comparative success.Market Garden led to the redeployment of the US First Army northwards and halted the Third Army.
Similarly, Third Army was halted at the end of August (well before MG) and then, after the 2 September conference was granted equality of logistic support with First Army - MG absolutely did not "halt" Patton.
In addition, to say that First US Army's tactical position in September 1944 "facilitated" Wacht am Rhein is bizarre logic - why not blame the COSSAC plan to land in Normandy?
BTW I'm not sure I have seen poor O'Connor blamed for the slow advance of the Garden forces - do you mean Horrocks?
Did you look at the CMH website - The Siegfried Line Campaign is essential reading IMHO.
Regards
Tom
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sandeepmukherjee196
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Re: Late War German Strategic Successes in 1944-45
Tom from Cornwall wrote:Sandeep,
....................
In addition, to say that First US Army's tactical position in September 1944 "facilitated" Wacht am Rhein is bizarre logic - why not blame the COSSAC plan to land in Normandy?
BTW I'm not sure I have seen poor O'Connor blamed for the slow advance of the Garden forces - do you mean Horrocks?
...............
Regards
Tom
Hi Tom.....
Too sleepy now...it's pushing 1 in the morning around here
So would have to respond later at length. But 2 quick points now.The failure of MG and the mess in Holland caused Bradley's lot to stretch and thin out in the Ardennes area, which was considered to be a safe zone. Operations elsewhere hadn't gone well too. The momentum and initiative had petered out. That's what made Wacht am Rhein possible to try.
Monty was kinda sore at O'Connors. If you refer to the situation map posted by John somewhere back in the thread, you would realise why. His corps was like kinda drag on the flank of XXX corps. That part usually gets lost in the glamour and glitz of the Waal - Rhein area.
More later.
Cheers
Sandeep