Operation Konrad II question

[PK]

Why did HGr Süd cancel the second relief attempt of Budapest (Operation Konrad II) ?

Best Regards
PK

[Robdutch]

wasn,t it because the attack divisions couldn't move that fast in the Pillismountains. I believe the accent was swifted south to more favourable terrain. Hitler wanted that.

[Gertjan]

a good reference book on this subject is "Hungary 1944-1945: a forgotten tragedy" by Perry Pierik. (Also available in Dutch). I will check this book for some explanation

[Robdutch]

yes defenitly a good reference, that book gives a good account of the fighting for budapest and the konrad operations.

Rob,

[Aps]

Hello,

I'm not sure to understand what you mean by cancelled.

So far I know, Konrad II was merely a second try to fulfill Konrad I objectives. The III PzK was to reached IV SS PzK positions (At least, the positions the PzK was holding) and achieved encirclement of Soviet forces in the area Mor-Zamoja-Bicske before trying link-up with Budapest garrison. The offensive actually took place and was not cancelled, it simply failed.

But, maybe I'm missing an element as I don't have any book which focus on Hungarian 1945s' operations.

Best Regards,

Thomas

[Gertjan]

You are right. There was even a third stage of Konrad executed. The Perry Pierik book doesn't give a conclusive answer for it, other than that Hitler favoured the Fruhlingserwachen plans

[Abel Ravasz]

Hi;

@Aps:

Konrad 1: executed by the IV. SS PzK. The bulk of the corps (SSWK, SSTK, 711. ID, SS KG Ney) thrust forward from Komárom in the night of 1/1/45 to link up with the Budapest garrison. Meanwhile, 96. ID crossed the Danube and captured Esztergom. Eventually, the attack was halted 6/1 by Soviet reinforcements (18. TC, 7.MC, 2.GMC, 5.GCC).

Konrad 2: consisted of two operations; 7/1 the Gr Breith (I. KavK, III. PzK) started an attack on Soviet positions at Székesfehérvár (south of SS positions) to relieve pressure of the IV. SS PzK. Meanwhile, the SS corps regrouped its forces and renewed the offensive on Budapest. The vanguard, Gr Westland reached Pilisszentkereszt by 12/1, but the attack was called off by the OKW because of the high risk of encirclement.

Konrad 3: after a series of regroupments, the IV. SS and III. PzKs started attacking again 18/1, this time in the area of Székesfehérvár. The attack was quite successful, as Simontornya to the south, Dunapentele to the east and Vál to the north were captured, and the advance elements reached the Danube, mere 20 kms south of Budapest. The offensive reached its peak 25/1, but then, vast soviet forces assembled for a counterattack began operating against the attacking units, and the offensive was cancelled.

@Gertjan:

The Konrad offensives took place 1/45, while the Fruhlingserwachsen 3/45, so there was no conflict between the two. What you may be thinking about is the question of choosing the direction of the relief attacks. The Heeresgruppe preferred the Südlösung (op. Paula, from the area of Székesfehérvár), while the OKH opted for Nordlösung (op. Konrad).

Hope this clears things up,
Best,

Abel

[Aps]

Hello Abel,

Thank you for this summary.

Konrad 2: consisted of two operations; 7/1 the Gr Breith (I. KavK, III. PzK) started an attack on Soviet positions at Székesfehérvár (south of SS positions) to relieve pressure of the IV. SS PzK.

According to John Erickson, the goal of the III PzK was a area north of Bicske, via Zamoja. So far I can tell, this area was hold by the IV SS PzK. So it seem that one of the goal of the III PzK's attack was achieving if not an encirclement, at least the reduction of the bulge roughly located on the Szekesfehervar-Bicske this, in cooperation with the IV SS PzK. This make sense if we keep in mind that Hitler wanted Budapest to be recaptured and not it garrison to be relieved. In the first case, German forces were to "cover their back" before aiming at Budapest, this goes throught the destruction of the Soviet bulge. That is one of the point which bother me quite much in those Operations, were there counter-offensive designed to re-take ground lost in former Soviet operations with Budapest as the primary objective or simply rescue operations aimed to save what might be of the Budapest garrison?

What do you think?

Best Regards,

Thomas

[Abel Ravasz]

Hi,

That is one of the point which bother me quite much in those Operations, were there counter-offensive designed to re-take ground lost in former Soviet operations with Budapest as the primary objective or simply rescue operations aimed to save what might be of the Budapest garrison?

Well, I must say that ironically enough, none of the two. There was no real chance of retaking the area lost west of the Danube; and Hitler never wanted to evacuate the garrison troops. What he wanted to do is reinforce them with fresh forces to make them fight for an even longer time. As far as Hitler's beliefs were from reality, he thought that Budapest might be held for an 'indefinitely' long time, thus halting the Soviet advances in the area.

According to John Erickson, the goal of the III PzK was a area north of Bicske, via Zamoja. So far I can tell, this area was hold by the IV SS PzK. So it seem that one of the goal of the III PzK's attack was achieving if not an encirclement, at least the reduction of the bulge roughly located on the Szekesfehervar-Bicske this, in cooperation with the IV SS PzK. This make sense if we keep in mind that Hitler wanted Budapest to be recaptured and not it garrison to be relieved.

Well, I think that Bicske was the direction of the attack, and not the goal - there wasn't any serious chance to break through the lines of the 68th, 31st and 20th Rifle, 5th Cavalry, 7th and 1st Guards Mechanized Corps; the aim was to kepp these units busy defending the area south of the main thrust.

Let me give you a narrative of the German attack. This is from a work of Norbert Számvéber, "Erőd a Duna mentén", accessible via internet, unfortunately only in Hungarian so the translation is mine.

On 7th of January, the Korpsgruppe Breith started attacking from the area northwest of Székesfehérvár in the direction of Csákvár to cut the supply lines of the Soviet units fighting in front of the stuck IV. SS Panzerkorps and thus enable them advancing further on Budapest. The I. Kavallerie Korps formed main axis, consisting of the 4. Kavallerie Brigade, the 1. and 23. Panzer Divisions and the Panzergruppe of the 3. Panzer Division. Because of this action, and the counterattacks of the 7. Mechanized Corps, positioned behind the 20. Guards Rifle Corps, and the 1. Guard Mechanized Corps, another armoured battle – the second – took place near Székesfehérvár. In very heavy fighting, the Germans gained only a small area, but held off a considerable Soviet force and handled out serious losses to them.

On 9th January, the I. Kavallerie Korps resumed the attack. This was the first day of operation “Konrad 2” (1). The German armour and cavalry knocked out 74 Soviet tanks alone in the battle near Zámoly. The town itself was captured on the 11th.

In the night of 8th January, the IV. SS Panzerkorps shifted the weight of its attack to the left flank. The strengthened regimental group of 10. SS Panzergrenadier Regiment Westland was assembled in the area south of Esztergom to get ready for an attack to the southeast through the positions of 711. Infanterie Division, in the direction of Szentendre and Pomáz.

The Heeresgruppe Süd prepared a bold, but risky operation from the area east of Esztergom, captured by the 96. Infanterie Division. To help the very bad supply situation in Budapest, they wanted to get a convoy carrzing 200 tons of supplies into the city. First Oberst Philipp’s Kampfgruppe (2) had to break through the Soviet lines and reach Budapest via the riverside road. The convoy was to follow this group. The operation was undertaken on the 10th. On the 11th, the attack reached an area 3 kilometers northwest of Pilismarót, but any further advance was impossible because of gunfire from the other side of the river. The 711. Infanterie Division was also involved in heavy fighting in the woods, and gained only very little advances in the direction of Budapest. The regimental group Westland, commited to the offensive to higher the speed of the advance, had problems with movement because of the weather conditions.

On 11th January, the regimental group Westland, together with parts of the 1. (ung.) Sturmjäger Regiment der SS, reached Pilisszentkereszt and captured it on the next day. However, by that time, Hitler didn’t trust in the success of the attack any more, and a decision to stop the attack in this area and transfer the IV. SS Panzerkorps to the area of Székesfehérvár was made, practically getting ready for the Südlösung. Gille [CO, IV. SS PzK] tried everything he could to maintain the attack, but he had to let the transportation of the SS Panzer Divisions begin. Even though the SS troops were already just some 21 kms away from the city, and couldn’t understand why the attack was stopped, in reality they were strong enough only to make a contact with the garrison, but not to maintain it. The 5. Guards Cavalry Corps, assembled 15 kms northwest of Budapest, could easily have encircled them.

(1) The vast majority of the reference matterial counts the start of the attack of the I. Kavallerie Korps as the beginning of Konrad 2. However, on the 7th and 8th, the attack only supported the IV. SS Panzerkorps’ tries to resume advance, while the direction of attack was shifted on the 9th.

(2) The Kampfgruppe, commanded by the CO of 1. Panzer Regiment, consisted of two Panzergrenadier-Marchkompanien of the Feldherrnhalle Panzer Division, armed with MP-44 and Panzerfausts, the 284/II. Grenadier Battalion, 6 SPWs, 5 Pz and StuG, and 3 PzSpWs. The armor was from the two SS Panzer Divisions.

Sorry for the mistakes in my translation.
Best,

Abel

[Aps]

Thank you very much for this translation! I understand far better the way the operation was planned and carried on.

Here is the quote from Erickson, not much anyway:

While Soviet troops struggled to roll back this first German attempt to break through to the garrisons in Budapest, a second attack unrolled from the salient south of Mor, mounted in this area by III Panzer Corps and aimed at Zamoja; this second force was to link up with German troops fighting north of Bicske.

John Erickson,The Road to Berlin p.440

Maybe this have to be link with the following extract of your text:

On 7th of January, the Korpsgruppe Breith started attacking from the area northwest of Székesfehérvár in the direction of Csákvár to cut the supply lines of the Soviet units fighting in front of the stuck IV. SS Panzerkorps and thus enable them advancing further on Budapest. The I. Kavallerie Korps formed main axis, consisting of the 4. Kavallerie Brigade, the 1. and 23. Panzer Divisions and the Panzergruppe of the 3. Panzer Division.

In both quote you have the idea of acting behind the opposing forces at a large scale (Cuting throught the Soviet lines to reach the IV SS for Erickson and breaking throught the Soviet units to cut the supply lines of the forces facing the right flank of the IV SS for Számvéber, if I have clearly understood). So, it seems that the german plan was, in theory, a little more than a kind of diversionary attack and was supposed to come as a strong threat for the Soviet units in the area. In fact, If I have now understand that one of Konrad II goal was to hold Soviet units in the III PzK area, I would like to know if it's correct to speak about an encirclement attempt as the (tactical) objective of the III PzKorps, at least for the action of the 7th.

By the way is Zamoja and Zámoly the same town?

Best Regards,

Thomas

[Abel Ravasz]

Hi,

I would like to know if it's correct to speak about an encirclement attempt as the (tactical) objective of the III PzKorps, at least for the action of the 7th.

Well, I would say the encirclement woud be very tough for the Germans. One of the main problems of the Axis on the Hungarian front was the lack of infantry. Thus, even though many encirclements were made during the fall of 44, in most of the cases they failed to destroy the encircled forces. If you take into consideration that none of the divisions of Korpsgr. Breith was a 'real' infantry unit, I would say that they lacked any adequate infantry support to destroy any pocketted enemy forces. Thus, an encirclement would have been very risky for themselves, as they might have found large enemy forces operating in their back. So, I would say, that an encirclement was not a tactical objective for the unit.

In my view, the best outcome of the southern thrust of Konrad II would have been the Soviets evacuating the 'bulge' between Bicske and Zámoly, thus securing the right flank of the IV. SS PzK, and leaving the III. PzK free for further action.

By the way is Zamoja and Zámoly the same town?

The two are the same - Zámoly is the Hungarian name of the town, Zamoja is most likely in German, but I'm not sure.

Best,

Abel

[Mark V.]

The objective of Konrad II was to re-establish contact with the beleaguered Budapest garrison, which was in a desperate need of supplies. But the whole operation was under a very tight schedule. Before it even began new plans were devised (by OKH and Hitler) for a much larger operation Konrad III (to destroy Russian forces on the western bank Danube and to reestablish contact with Budapest) to start as soon as possible. Thus the units involved in Konrad II had only till 11 January time to produce results. The operation began in the evening hours of 10th and was finally cancelled in the early hours of 12th (in other words one day). The German forces (711.ID and Westland group) faced little oposition and made good progress in a mountainous terrain (if needed further units would also become available to reinforce the advance) but there just wasn't enough time. Numerous pleas by commanders on the ground for more time (from Gille, Balck and Wöhler) turned to deaf ears in Berlin. The decision was already made to proceed with the more ambitious plan.

cheers

[Aps]

Thank you, Abel, for your precise answer.

Best Regards,

Aps

[Argiris Asfaltidis]

The idea at the time was that Budapest was to be sucrified. There were some similarities detween Stalingrad and Budapest,but the overall situation was completelly different.
In January 1945 what was really important,from a strategic point of view,was Vienna and the rescue of the armies that could be cut off in the Balcans.
So,thats why the efforts and the means were limited durring Operations Konrad 1,2 and 3. And thats why the strategic goal of those operations was never really Budapest.
After all if one tries to reallize the bigger picture, it wasnt what much the wrong decision.