Guys,
Panzer Brigade 150 had 5 Panthers modified to look like American M10s--NOT 12.
They also had 5 StuG IIIs and 2 Shermans.
Best regards,
Ron Klages
About "disguised German" during Battle of Bulge...
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Ron Klages
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Bulge
This operation didn’t only create some confusion in the American lines, it also confused the Germans. My father was with the I.SS Panzer Division LAH 2.Werfer Batterie. They had to stop to let them pass. These special troops used American vehicles and smoked American cigarettes which were noticed by the Germans. They had no prior knowledge about that operation.
Rader
Rader
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|Handschar|
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Yes, there is a thread on that here: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=60655|Handschar| wrote:Did the allies ever disguise themselves as Germans?
/Marcus
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PanzerKing
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Only 2 of the crew survived that scene actually.deadly88mm wrote:Yes i fullly understand and ment no offense. I was actually suprised that 'Battle of the Bulge' had that represented in it, because i have seen several horable war movies from that same time period. Also the sherman's turret geting blown of and no one died was rather funny to me.
Operation Griffin
From an earlier post. Information source: "Otto Skortzeny and the Laws of War", The Journal of Military History, Volume 55. No. 2 James Weingartner and posted before at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... highlight=
As a summary of the earlier posts, Skortzeny himself confirmed the following information after the war.
****
Skorzeny's impact on the outcome of the German offensive was virtually nil except in post-war lore.
The German Plan
Skorzeny's assignment was to capture intact at least two bridges over the Meuse between Liege and Namur. Deception was to be the key element in Operation Greif (Griffin). Skorzeny's multiservice force of army, navy, air force, and Waffen-SS soldiers was to operate in the guise of American combat units. Only a tiny fraction of Skorzeny's main force, 150th Panzer Brigade of approximately three thousand men possessed anything near English competency. In addition, captured U.S. equipment was in short supply. As were German tanks and equipment. Skorzeny later estimated that 98 percent of 150th Panzer Brigade was equipped only with German small arms. Operating in part independently of 150th Panzer Brigade was a commando unit of approximately 150 men. It was here that the element of deception was most concentrated, as all personnel possessed some knowledge of the English language and many were outfitted with American uniforms and jeeps. Some of these commandos were to operate as demolition teams of five or six men each and destroy U.S. supply dumps and bridges, which were not of use to German forces, and to remove demolition charges from bridges to be used by them. Others were to be employed in reconnaissance units of three to four men each, reconnoitering on both banks of the Meuse and causing such confusion among the enemy as opportunity would allow.
The Results
So what did they really accomplish? 150th Panzer Brigade was employed, almost exclusively, in orthodox infantry operations in the Malmedy area of eastern Belgium between 21 and 29 December. Due in part to Skorzeny's lack of artillery, his own inexperience as a field commander and the diverse and uneven training of his brigade, an ineffective 150th Panzer suffered heavy casualties and Malmedy remained in American hands.
As for the commandoes, only a handful totaling forty-four men were injected behind American lines. Results were modest. A few munitions dumps were identified east of the Meuse and one small facility was reported destroyed. A gasoline cache was discovered and its location reported to the fuel-starved First SS Panzer Corps. One of Skorzeny's commando teams claimed to have misdirected an entire U.S. infantry regiment which remained lost for several days thereafter, a circumstance partially confirmed by U.S. sources. That’s about it.
The greatest of Greif's effects on Allied forces was an unexpected. The wholly false Allied conclusion that Skorzeny's primary objective was to abduct or assassinate Eisenhower resulted in the Allied supreme commander's virtual imprisonment by his own troops.
The rest is mythos.
Matti
As a summary of the earlier posts, Skortzeny himself confirmed the following information after the war.
****
Skorzeny's impact on the outcome of the German offensive was virtually nil except in post-war lore.
The German Plan
Skorzeny's assignment was to capture intact at least two bridges over the Meuse between Liege and Namur. Deception was to be the key element in Operation Greif (Griffin). Skorzeny's multiservice force of army, navy, air force, and Waffen-SS soldiers was to operate in the guise of American combat units. Only a tiny fraction of Skorzeny's main force, 150th Panzer Brigade of approximately three thousand men possessed anything near English competency. In addition, captured U.S. equipment was in short supply. As were German tanks and equipment. Skorzeny later estimated that 98 percent of 150th Panzer Brigade was equipped only with German small arms. Operating in part independently of 150th Panzer Brigade was a commando unit of approximately 150 men. It was here that the element of deception was most concentrated, as all personnel possessed some knowledge of the English language and many were outfitted with American uniforms and jeeps. Some of these commandos were to operate as demolition teams of five or six men each and destroy U.S. supply dumps and bridges, which were not of use to German forces, and to remove demolition charges from bridges to be used by them. Others were to be employed in reconnaissance units of three to four men each, reconnoitering on both banks of the Meuse and causing such confusion among the enemy as opportunity would allow.
The Results
So what did they really accomplish? 150th Panzer Brigade was employed, almost exclusively, in orthodox infantry operations in the Malmedy area of eastern Belgium between 21 and 29 December. Due in part to Skorzeny's lack of artillery, his own inexperience as a field commander and the diverse and uneven training of his brigade, an ineffective 150th Panzer suffered heavy casualties and Malmedy remained in American hands.
As for the commandoes, only a handful totaling forty-four men were injected behind American lines. Results were modest. A few munitions dumps were identified east of the Meuse and one small facility was reported destroyed. A gasoline cache was discovered and its location reported to the fuel-starved First SS Panzer Corps. One of Skorzeny's commando teams claimed to have misdirected an entire U.S. infantry regiment which remained lost for several days thereafter, a circumstance partially confirmed by U.S. sources. That’s about it.
The greatest of Greif's effects on Allied forces was an unexpected. The wholly false Allied conclusion that Skorzeny's primary objective was to abduct or assassinate Eisenhower resulted in the Allied supreme commander's virtual imprisonment by his own troops.
The rest is mythos.
Matti
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Panzerfaust XxX
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