Allied tensions as reported in The New York Times
BRITISH PRESS IRE AGAINST U.S. RISES
The Economist Lays Rifts to ChurchiII’s Appeasiog of Both Roosevelt and Stalin
LONDON, Jan. 4--Most of the troubles besetting the Grand Alliance-both political and military- are attributed to Prime Minister Churchill’s acceptane of American ideas on how to fight a global war and Moscow’s dictates on post-war policies in Europe in an article to be published tomorrow by The London Economist.
It was that same authoritative weekly that last week published ian attack on American politicians Wand publicists for lecturing Britain on international morality.
The thesis of this week’s article, which must be taken as a sequel to last week’s, is that the time has come for Britain to take strong steps to disassociate herself from plans to dismember Germany and to serve notice on the United States that full-scale war against Japan must wait until Germany is beaten. The article even goes so far as to suggest that if the United States would not agree to a revision of the allocations of military strength, determined by Mr. Churchill
and President Roosevelt at Quebec in 1943 and 1944, when the British agreed to accept a greater share of the burden of the Pacific war, the British Government would "be justified in rediverting all the resources at its own disposal to the task of defeating Germany"
Military Situation a Factor
That the military direction of the war, as well as its political course, is in for review seems indicated. The News Chronicle’s columnist, A. J. Cummings, will say tomorrow that Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower is too busy with "administrative routine" to be able to spare much time for tactical or strategic planning and that Field Marshal Montgomery “is the ideal man" to plan a "riposte to von Rundstedt's gamble and should be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander." Subscribers to The Daily Mail will read tomorrow, on the other hand, that "nobody in this country has ever hinted that Eisenhower should go or should exercise divided authority." According to the picture presented by The Economist, which adroitly skirts around some inconvenient facts, Mr. Churchill was presented not as the tough, practical politician and defender of the empire that he is but as a "perpetual mediator and go-between," always yielding to Premier Joseph Stalin and Mr. Roosevelt rather than cause trouble by insisting on the protection of British interests.
The Economist was not the first British publication to find fault with American strategy and foreign policy, but before it published last week‘s angry protests against American twisting of the "lion’s tail," comment generally had been restrained and somewhat obscure.
But the influential weekly, which deals authoritatively with subjects of a more general nature than its name implies, has once again proved to be the bellwether of Fleet Street. One by one, a majority of British popular papers, both metropolitan and provincial, have taken up the thesis that the United States should put up or shut up.
Cartoon Typifies Criticism
The outpouring of criticism against the United States has not raised American stock in British eyes. The criticism is not abating but, on the contrary, it seems to be increasing and spreading down to , levels where the masses of people are affected.
Tonight's Evening Standard, owned by Lord Beaverbrook, published a cartoon by David Low which showed a shirt-sleeved American snoozing on a·couch among rumpled newspapers with headlines saying: ' "It must be Britain's fault." "It must be Russia’s fault," and "It must be China’s fault." The sleeper was labeled "American democracy." Guarding his slumbers was United States Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius Jr. holding behind him a volume entitled "The Facts of Life," and saying, "Ssh" . to Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyachcoslaff M. Molotoff, and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden entering the room with documents labeled "Dumbarton Oaks" and "Teheran."
Nor has criticism of American policy been confined to diplomatic indecisiveness. There has been an undercurrent of criticism of the Allied High Command headed by Gen. Eisenhower. When it was first suggested that Allied intelligence had fallen down somehow, a large part of the British press hastened to declare that if anyone was to be blamed in the recent German breakthrough he should be found "higher up," and there has been a tendency to suggest that if Field Marshall Sir Bernard L. Montgomery had been in supreme command it might not have happened at all.
Here The Economist enters the discussion again by leveling some of the fault for recent reverses on the American held front on General Eisenhowefs strategy since the Avranches break-through last August, but holding that the ultimate responsibility, while going higher still, rests on American shoulders for forcing Mr. Churchill to accept the idea that two wars could be fought at once, resulting in the denuding of the Western Front of reserves needed last autumn to exploit the German rout in France to the fullest degree.
Without mentioning the fact that before the British troops under Field Marshal Montgomery succeeded in opening Antwerp to Allied convoys the supply line to the troops at the German frontier was longer than the Burma Road, or that American troops were continuing to fight against disorganized Germens with captured gasoline, artillery and shells last fall, The Economist attributes the deadlock in the West to three main factors.
(1) That General Eisenhower’s strategy- "the strategy of the elephant leaning on an obstacle to crush it"erred in that he chose to wait until he had all his armies drawn up on a line against Germany instead of massing forces at one point and crashing through.
(2) That in the vacuum of official silence regarding the meaning of "unconditional surrender," unofficial spokesmen were permitted to broadcast plans for dismemberment of Germany, thus stiffening enemy resistance.
(3) That at the crucial moment when Germany could have been- overwhelmed, Allied military leaders were impotent to take advantage of the opportunity because the reserves they needed were just not there.
Reserve Situation Analyzed The most obvious reason for insufficient reserves on the Western Front, The Economist says, "can be found in the two conferences at Quebec, and adds: "In 1943 President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill decided to put greater emphasis on the war with Japan and in 1944 a decision appears to have been taken to wage the two wars with equal energy."
This "diversion" to the Far East, The Economist asserts, "may well have made the difference this autumn between complete victory and the long-drawn-out fighting which seems to threaten now" although the magazine does not allege that any British ground forces that might have been used in the West have been transferred to the Pacific, nor does it explain how British naval. units, now reported in Far Eastern waters, could have changed the balance of force in Belgium, Luxembourg or the Netherlands. Nor is it alleged that there was any lack of air support in the West.
Some other British publications have remarked that British troops engaged in the Greek civil war could be used more advantageously fighting Germans in Crete and elsewhere.
Opposes Reich Dismemberment
Turning to the political aspects of the war, The Economist holds that the policy of dismembering Germany had not been reached as a result of "sober examination," ,but was a "by-product" of the Russo-Polish dispute. Once the proposal was made to compensate Poland for her loss of her eastern territory with German territory to the Oder line, the magazine says, it was inevitable that France should return to demands for the Rhineland, rejected in 1919. ' According to The Economist. the British Government, if it had been ’"left to itself" never would have been caught short of reserves in the west nor permitted the threat of the destruction of the Reich to stiffen German resistance. The trouble was, according to the magazine, that Mr. Churchill saw Britain's role as that of the "honest broker" and yielded at one time to Washington and another time to Moscow to appease her two bigger Allies.
Having suggested that the remedy for the military mistakes of Quebec would lie in Britain's insistance upon disposing of her forces where they will do most to contribute to Germany’s early defeat, The Economist says that the resolution of the political problem is not so easy to find because the Prime Minister seems to have "committed himself to the senseless policy of dismemberment" which, the magazine says, was evolved in Moscow and enunciated in Paris.
Ask Policy Declaration
Yet it is an open secret, the article says, "that such a policy runs counter to the most expert thought and advice of the Foreign Office" and has no chance of commanding the support of the British people after wartime passions have cooled.
This being so, The Economist article says "there is a strong case for a public declaration from the British Government stating that it does not intend to pursue or support a policy that permanently deprives the German people of the possibility of leading a normal political and economic existence." Such a firm pronouncement by the British Government on the military and political aspects of the Grand Alliance, The Economist says, would undermine Dr. Joseph Goebbels’ propaganda and the hope for a negotiated peace through a schism among the Allies and "end the anomalous situation" whereby the policy of the alliance is worked is out in Moscow and Paris with the is British "feebly or apologetically", confirming decisions in which they have had no part.
ALLIES REPORTED REVISING COMMAND
London Press Says changes are Immenent-No official Confirmation Available
-Reports that a reorganization of the Allies’ command on the western front was imminent were prominently displayed today by the London press. One military commentator declared that an official statement covering some aspects of the re-grouping of the Allies commands and armies was expected shortly. The reports, the publication of‘which coincided with a definite improvement of the Allies position on the western front, were without any official confirmation.
The London Evening News delclared that "important changes in lthe organization of the Allied Supreme Command on the western front are imminent". It listed the present commanders without speculating what the changes might be.
The Evening Standard reported that "the big regroup is on." It quoted a Reuter military correspondent as saying that "the second phase of Marshal Karl von Rundstedt’s offensive has reached the poker stage"
The report of changes in the command appeared on the front page of The Star under the head- line: "Allied Command: Statement Soon." The London press also carried reports from Washington that an American Major General had been recalled from France and demoted, but not because of the German countenoffensive. Despite the setback suffered by the Allies in Belgium, there appeared to be no disposition here to question Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s ability to control the situation. The Supreme Commander retains the prestige that he won in North Africa, Italy and the smashing success of the Normandy invasion.
G. Ward Price, Sunday Dispatch war correspondent just returned from the western front, declared that the setback "should bring about changes which, before it occurred, were already known to be necessary by those on the inside of Allied stategy. Eisenhower is genuinely popular with all his subordinate commanders, but his responsibilities are too depressed and widespread for him to direct operations of seven Armies his orders with the necessary de- tailed knowledge of the situation of each." Mr. Price recalled that during the Normandy campaign, when things went Well, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery had been strategic Commander in Chief in the field, exercising powers conferred upon him by General Eisenhower, whose headquarters were then in England. Since September, when General Eisenhower went to France, Marshal Montgomery "has been but one of the army group commanders imder Eisenhower" Mr. Price said.
Those inside, Mr. Price added, have been disturbed by the Allied armies’ dispersing their strength instead of concentrating it. He said that one authority had told him: "If Montgomery’s advance into Nijmegen had been backed by ten United States divisions, we should have been in the Ruhr by now."
The Sunday Chronicle also published an article declaring that "Eisenhower’s burden should be eased. The old combination of Eisenhower [Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G.] Alexander and Montgomery had a non-stop run of success, Brig. J. G. Smyth said in a prominantly displayed article "might it not be repeated?" or must Alexander really stand by to quell riots in Greece