Italian Eritrean askari organisation 1936?

[Happy Wanderer]

Gentleman,

I'm hoping someone can help.

I am trying to find the platoon organisation of the Italian Eritrean askari organisation 1936. Does anyone know what it is?

Specifically, I'm trying to identify the breakdown of squads and whether LMGs were issued and used in an askari platoon.

Any info regarding this question would be greatly appreciated.

Kind regards

Happy Wanderer

[Eugen Pinak]

Don't know about Eritrean troopl, but Libian troops had 1 LMG in each squad.

[Happy Wanderer]

Thanks Eugen,

From the limited info I can tell there appears to be less LMGs in the Eritrean platoons than I first thought. Probably only one, maybe two at most. If I could find some confirmation that would be great but that's about what I can tell thus far.

Happy W

[jwsleser]

HW

Nothing I have found indicates that the A.O.I. colonial infantry squad was different from a metropolitan infantry squad. I have checked L'esercito italiano tra la 1 e la 2 guerra mondiale, La campagna 1935-1936 in Africa orientale vol I, and La campagna Italo-Etiopica (1935-1936).

This doesn’t mean I am correct. I would be very interested to read the references that you have found. Can you provide cites?

There is one book I will try to check on Monday. It is not in my personal collection (I wish it was) but it is in CARL. I will look to see if it addresses squad/platoon organization.

What is happening during this time period (1933-1937) is that the RE was changing the squad organization. At issue was the number and method of employment of the Breda 30s.

The pre-1933 platoon organization is:

Plotone fucilieri:
-Comandante di plotone
-One porta ordini o segnalatore (Orderly/runner)
-Three squadra fucilieri each with – Comandante di squadra, Graduato (vice capo squadra), 12 fucilieri.
-One squadra mitragliatrice leggera with – comandante di squadra, 2 capo mitragliatrice leggera (gun commanders), 2 porta armi (gunners w/ Breda 30), 10 porta munizioni (ammo bearers, 5 per gun).

(Il nuovo manuale del caporale)– dated 1931, pages 404-447]

This organization placed the mitragliatrice leggera under the control of the comandante di plotone. It didn't provide enough weapons to give each squadra a LMG.

In 1933 the RE recognized that two LMGs for three squads wasn’t working. They experimented with three LMGs and whether to maintain the squadra mitragliatrice leggera or to integrate the LMGs into the squadra fucilieri. ( L'esercito italiano tra la 1 e la 2 guerra mondiale page 95)

The organization adopted in 1935 was:

Plotone fucilieri:
-Comandante di plotone
-Three squadra fucilieri each with – Comandante di squadra, Graduato (vice capo squadra), 8 fucilieri, 1 capo mitragliatrice leggera (gun commanders), 1 porta armi (gunner w/ Breda 30), 3 porta munizioni (ammo bearers)

(Manuale per il Graduato – 1935, pages 367-378 and 380-394)

This change placed the LMGs under the comandante di squadra. In 1938 the number of Breda 30s would be increased to two per squadra.

La campagna 1935-1936 in Africa orientale vol I allegato 27 states that the compagnia fanteria (infantry companies) had 9 mitragliatrice leggera. With 3 plotoni, each with three squadre, that would be one LMG per squad. This indicates that the 1935 organization was used in A.O.I.

I wil see if there is any other information. There are several books I have wanted to obtain that likely addresses this issue, but I have yet to purchase them.

I hope this helps.

Pista! Jeff

[Happy Wanderer]

Hi Jeff,

I hope you are well.

The info for the Askaris having reduced numbers of LMGs is based a bit more on a complete lack of anecdotal evidence to support their inclusion. Whilst it seems fair to say the Askaris had the same organisational structure as the Italians their lack of LMG weapons in any photos, of which there are many, is telling. The Askaris also had much older weapons as a general rule, though not always, and thus were kind of at the end of the equipment ‘food chain’.

So its been bit of a mystery to put together whether the Askaris did in fact have the same equipment allocation of a Breda in the same way as an Italian regular infantry platoon structure.

If you can have a dig in CARL to confirm this then that would be great.

The platoon structure is pretty much the same as what we have deduced from our own investigations that have been used to put together these details on my Abyssinian Crisis blog.

https://abyssiniancrisis.wordpress.com/ ... coloniali/


So, any further details you can find would be much appreciated.

Regards

Rolf (HW)

[jwsleser]

Rolf

I spent a little time over at CARL this morning. While I can't say 100% definitive, I am comfortable stating the following:

-Regular colonial units were organized and equipped per the metropolitan units.
-Irregular units were only equipped with rifles and lacked machineguns.

I look at over 20 books, but I was mainly checking the two official observer reports:

Report of Military Observer with Italian Armies in East Africa MAJ Norman Fiske Military Intelligence Division, War Department 1936 (9 reports)
Diary and Reports of the U.S. Naval Observer of Italian Operations in East Africa MAJ Pedro de Valle Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Intelligence 1937.

Neither gets into specifics of the company/platoon structure in toto. However both offer enough evidence to allow me to make the conclusion above.

Both observers stress that the Italians focused on providing large numbers of automatic weapons to compensate for the smaller divisional structure
employed in Ethiopia

The organization of the Italian forces in East Africa is specifically designed for this particular campaign and is characterized by flexibility, lightness, and a high proportion of automatic fire (underlines in the original) Fiske Report 1 page 9

In fact, many (if not all, it is unclear how much was accomplished) of the 3rd battalions in the regiments were converted to machine gun battalions. This might have been a wartime transition as Fiske is not clear on the process

The organization of the infantry division represents an evolution in Africa as a result of colonial experience. The first divisions sent to Africa were originally organized very much as is the division in Italy. Report 1 Page 13)

Only del Valle gives a detailed break of a few of the Italian units. On page 208-212 he discusses and provides tables for the column advancing against Harrar on April 10 1936. In the table on page 210, both the Arabo-Somali and the Eritrean battalions list 27 Light MGs (the correct number for 3 LMGs per platoon).

Fiske Report 1 page 13 states that the LMGs in the regular (Italian) divisions were organized into squads

Each rifle platoon has a light machine gun squad Breda, Cal 6.5mm., air cooled

Picture 300 in Report 5 (below) indicates that the LMGs in the colonial companies might be grouped into a single element under company control.
However this is more speculation than fact and the picture might only represent a march formation.

It is possible that a detail reading of these reports might gleam a little more data. What is certain is that Breda 30s were issued to colonial units
and that that the few bits of information I have discover leans towards three in a platoon. What is new is the possibility that these were organized
as separate squads (the 1933 platoon organization) rather than one per squad (the 1935 organization).

One of the reports mentioned the squad consisted of 16 men (I believe it was del Valle). For some reason I didn't capture that in my notes. I will need to go back and check again.

Pista! Jeff

[jwsleser]

Rolf

I was doing a more detail scan of the reports and found this passage. As close to a smoking gun as I will likely find.

Operations began simultaneously with those in Eritrea October 3, 1935. General Graziani had at his disposal at this time the "Peloritana" Division and the native garrisons which had been increased to 12 battalions of regular native troops (Arabo-Somali) and the equivalent of 12 battalions of native bands. The native bands were well trained and completely organized into battalions - the chief distinction between the bands and the regular battalions being that the latter included light machine guns in the rifle platoon and were permanently in service while the former had no light machine guns and were enlisted only for the emergency. (my bold) Fiske Report 2 page 52.

So the presence of light machine guns is specifically stated and they are in the platoons (so disregard my previous comment above about the guns at company).

There are several more photos that might contain Breda 30s, but I will need to get my magnifying glass to check.

As you are working on wargaming rules/information, I thought the following might be of interest.

The light fast tanks, so widely heralded in the first months of the Abyssinian campaign, proved to be valueless in the Somaliland fighting. The
high brush was an obstacle that could not be overcome. The tanks could not operate independently in advance of the foot troops. The Abyssinians soon found out about their limitations and would set fire to the brush and thus overcome the personnel by smoke. The lack of visibility from the tanks made it impossible to maintain direction, formation or contact. They could be employed only as accompanying tanks in support of the infantry and since the hostile position was seldom accurately located the infantry usually had to protect the tanks and derived very little support from them. Fiske Report 5 page 226

There is more in other reports on the shortcoming of the tanks.

Then there is...

Much to the surprise of the Italians, the Somali natives turned out to be better soldiers than the Eritreans. Heretofore the Italians had not a very high regard for the soldierly qualities of the Somalis and they always tried to maintain a large proportion of Arabs in the Arabo-Somali battalions to stiffen them up. In the heavy fighting in the OGADEN they handled themselves admirably, whereas among the Eritrean troops both in the north and in the south there were many occasions upon which the preformed very badly indeed. Fiske Report 5 page 226

And.

The Abyssinian troops showed a surprising disregard and indifference to machine gun and rifle fire. They charged repeatedly in the face of heavy fire from automatic small arms and suffered appalling losses. On the other hand they were deathly afraid of hand grenades and artillery. Although the losses occasioned by these latter weapons were not nearly as great as those caused by the automatic small arms their use proved of much greater morale value. Fiske Report 7 page 278

Pista! Jeff

[Happy Wanderer]

HI Jeff,

Thanks for that (as expected) excellent reply. Thanks.

It seems like the Observer reports might have a few more details in there than the copy I have. You make a number of good points to indicate that the standard 3 squad, two-team Italian organisation could apply to the Askari forces.

On balance it seems fair to say that a case can be made both ways given the shear size of forces involved, weapon and training to go with the whole job. You’ve kind off cemented in my mind this possibility of both types of organisation being possible…nice work.

Thanks Again.

Cheers

Rolf

[jwsleser]

Rolf

Thanks!

RE:

It seems like the Observer reports might have a few more details in there than the copy I have. You make a number of good points to indicate that the standard 3 squad, two-team Italian organisation could apply to the Askari forces.

Interesting. Can you provide cites for the reports you are using? I am always looking for new resources.

RE: Those with and without fucile mitragliatori.

Using the OB and tables found in La campagna Italio-Ethopica pages 129-134, I would state that the numbered colonial battalions (e.g. XVIII btg. indig.) were issued f.m. Colonial bands (e.g. banda della Dancalia Settentrionale) used the earlier squada organization without f.m.

The numbers of mitragliatrici e fucili mitragtiatore in the corps/units given on pages 229 and 132 support this understanding. I Corpo d'armata had a
total of 1,128 of these weapons. The Corpo d'armata indigeni had 1,535 weapons.

There was a significant build-up of forces by Italy for the invasion which might explain the level of equipment for the colonial forces. What would be
interesting to determine is whether the RCTC units had f.m. prior to the decision to invade Ethiopia. Regardless of the answer to the latter, I feel
it is clear that f.m. were issued/used by the RCTC based on my breakout above.

Below is another picture of the use of f.m. by colonial forces (del Valle page 99). I can't tell if a Breda 30 is in the picture under the tree, but
Lt Col del Valle would know a f.m. if he saw one. I can see a Breda 30 magazine charger in the foreground, a style only used by that weapon.

RE: The statement of a 16 man squadra is in del Valle, page 207 fn 3. It is a footnote to a diagram of the divisione Tevere found on that page.

Correction to an earlier post. Del Valle was a Marine Lt. Col. at this time, not a Maj.

Pista! Jeff

Edit: I posted a better scan of the picture.

[Happy Wanderer]

Hi Jeff,

The observer's reports are the one's publicly available from CARL...and De valle's book 'Roman Eagles' which is not detailed in this regard.

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/comp ... 670/rec/56

"the OB and tables found in La campagna Italio-Ethopica "

That source was one I was hoping you'd been able to source. I suspect only an Italian source will have these details and beyond the Observer reports there's very little in English. So it appears the numbered battalions were more than likely to have the fucili mitragtiatore...barring any specific description of them being allocated and organised that way then joining the dots might be the best that can be hoped for.

On p16 of the US Observer report says "Native troops are armed with arms and ammunition captured from the Austrians in 1918." It also states that a corps (5 bns ie 20 coys plus 5MG coys) has 1,615 machine guns. That seems like alot of MGs most of which must have been LMGs. This works out to 1 MG per 6.5 men (Italians and Natives combined), take out butchers, bakers, candlestick makers, gun crews, mule drivers, supply & QM staff and it’s lower. If we take out the gunners alone it’s something like 1 MG per 3 men....numbers don't seem to add up?

I'm not at home at present so will check del Valle p207 when I can.

So, from this we have determined that perhaps the Observer MG numbers were a bit 'suspect' and thus maybe not quite right ..not sure on your thoughts here.

...the plot thickens!

Cheers

Rolf

[jwsleser]

Rolf

Okay, now getting an idea of what you have available.

RE: US Observers (i.e. Fiske). I am using the hard copy that was scanned to make the .pdf copy you are using. So you should be able to check the cites from Fiske I have provided.

On p16 of the US Observer report says "Native troops are armed with arms and ammunition captured from the Austrians in 1918.

Check. This is one of the challenges of using observer reports. I have found that cross checking against other sources sometimes clarifies the information. At the time Fiske wrote this, I am not sure whether he had seen regular colonial units or irregular colonial units as I previously discussed. I an not sure whether the RCTC was issued Carcano or other rifles. I feel it is clear that the band were issued captured rifles.

It also states that a corps (5 bns ie 20 coys plus 5MG coys) has 1,615 machine guns.

I didn't quickly find that quote. Rather than searching Fiske, do you have a page number? My assumption at this time is the use of the word 'corps'. Is it the body of troops (the colonial corps) or is it the military organization (the I corpo d'armata)? I suspect the latter as 1,500+ MGs better fits a 35,000 to 50,00 man military unit than 5 bns. I need to see the context to get a better idea.

I'm not at home at present so will check del Valle p207 when I can.

My del Valle cite is from his official reports, not his book.

Pista! Jeff

[Happy Wanderer]

HI Jeff,

Wish I had De Valle's book...that is one to get!!..at least I know someone who has it That book is not in PDF form or published is it?

Fiske's report is on page 19 under Preparations - it follows his description of the Native organisation on page 16 describing the Native organization. It shows two infantry 'Groups' (Regiments) per Division each of three battalions, each with 4 companies. . Here is the text.

[jwsleser]

Rolf

I see it. I believe this is an error. The numbers don't add up.

Here are the charts for the Italian forces in Oct 1935 (Eritrea and Somali) from the Italian official (La campagna Italio-Ethopica) pages 129 and 132.

As you can see, the forces in Eritrea are significantly greater than 5 battalions.

Pista! Jeff

[Happy Wanderer]

True, there certainly were more than 5 bns present.

I think the information might be misleading in that the total number of RCTC troops present and the details of weapons and equipment as described by Fiske has a certain disconnect. Thanks for those scans - very useful.

Thanks again Jeff, nice work...

Rolf

[jwsleser]

Yes there are some disconnects in what Fiske provides. Noted issues.

Native Divisions. Commander is listed as Dal Mazzo (generale brigata Lorenzo 'Renzo' Dalmazzo) who actually commanded the II brig. Mista indigeni. 1 Divisione Indigeni was commanded by generale divisione Salvatore Di Pietro. Dalmazzo did command the 2 Divisione Indigeni in April 1936.

The troop info on 19 appears correct, the MG total is very suspect. This data is dated 1 Jan 1935. Note in the paragraphs below that Fiske discusses the influx of troops and materials between Jan-Oct 1935. As he wasn't present at that time, this info came from the Italians and it might reflect a admin mix-up/language issue.

I have attached four pages from del Valle for you.

Pista! Jeff