Eisenhower strategic influence

[Rein]

Did Eisenhower had any strategic influecene has supreme commander?
Did he ordered a major operation?
Or was he just the spindoctor between al those egotripper generals and wasnt involved in any military business?

[Aber]

A very complicated question.

As the leader of a very large organisation most plans were made by his staff or subordinates, and in most cases he didn't even need to approve them. In general his management style was hands- off and he did not micro-manage the decisions of his subordinates.

Some very large decisions eg whether to launch D-day, were definitely his, and were always expected to be his.

The more interesting ones are those where he took the initiative in making unexpected decisions. Probably the most significant ones were giving Montgomery command of 2 US. armies during the Ardennes battle, and the decision not to attempt to take Berlin.

[Sheldrake]

Did Eisenhower had any strategic influence has supreme commander?
Did he ordered a major operation?
Or was he just the spin doctor between al those ego-tripper generals and wasnt involved in any military business?

I think you misunderstand the role of a theatre commander pursuing the policies of a coalition at war. There is no point in comparing him to an independent commander of a nation al force.

He was the servant of the Combined Joint Chiefs of staff - an Anglo-American committee of the political leaders of Britain and the USA and their military advisers. The emergent strategy was produced by committee. Eisenhower had the patronage of George marshall Rooseveldt's appointee

Neither he nor Marshall was ignorant about military strategy. He chopse to live on Gettysburg and had a passion for military history - which he shared with his patron - who lived in the Shenendoah valley. Both he and Marshall were inexperienced in commanding troops. Ike had not commanded anything above a battalion.

However, Eisenhower and Marshall were supreme politician soldiers who make it to the top of the US military - and in Ike's case to the white house. Comparing Ike to a spin doctor is not a cricism it is praise, but ndoes not go far enough to mcredit his political skill.

So what did ike do?

1. He led the Anglo American command team which won in Tunisia Sicily and NW Europe. He set the right tone to minimise friction between the national components - despite the presence of the likes of Mark Clark, Patton and Montgomery.

2. He banged the table to obtain the resources that his land force commander, Montgomery, said were needed to make Overlord work. The original plan was constrained by lack of assault shipping andf the planners were told to make the best plan they could with shipping for three divisions. Ike (not Monty) put the pressure on to get the additional shipping.

[Kingfish]

IIRC, it was Ike's decision to employ a sustained air campaign against the Italian defenses of Pantelleria during operation Corkscrew.

[Carl Schwamberger]

One example of Ikes stratigic influence was with the Anvil/Dragoon operations. Op Anvil had been originally proposed in 1943 by COSAC, to be executed in the spring of 1944 in support of the Sledgehammer=Overlord operations on the table. When appointed to command SHAEF Ike took a look at the Anvil Proposal and endorsed it. However executing Anvil before April was impractical due to the commitment to the Shingle operation in january 1944, and executing it after March interfered with the Overlord/Neptune operations in NW Europe. The Allied staffs were unable to solve the amphibious fleet conundrum. It could not support two large scale invasions just a couple months apart. Ike had to give up the idea of a Anvil operation in the spring. churchill was happy with this as he assumed all the Allied forces in the Mditerranean would remain there for use in the several operations he favored. It is at this point where Ikes ability to influence strategy kicked in. As soon as Op Anvil was canceled Ike had allied staff reworking that plan into one for post Overlord, renamed Op Dragoon. Like Op Anvil Dragoon proposed removing a entire Army groups worth of ground forces from the Mediterranean & sending it to France to attack Germany directly. Churchill was adamantly opposed to this and fought it to the bitter end. Despite the support of Alan-Brooke the Brit CIGS Churchill was unable to stop the US and French leaders from supporting Ikes desire for Op Dragoon. Churchil is said to have complained "We are Drsgooned into this operation". He also predictied failure, unacceptable casualties, ect...

In the end Ike got his way, Op Dragoon was executed in August, and a dozen US/French ground divisions, two army HQ groups, and over 1000 operational aircraft departed the Mediterranean theatre.

Earlier Ike made the final decisions of which of a dozen proposed operations would be executed vs Italy & elsewhere in the Med in 1943. As the Sicillian campaign played out he started cutting Alexander out of the loop and made the final calls on where in Italy the invasions would occur and their sequence. He also showed a increasing resistance to Marshalls suggestions and those of Brooke & the others from mid to late 1943.

After the Normandy battles and capture of Paris it was predominately his concept of 'broad front' vs Germany which the Allied armies followed. He briefly tested Montys proposal for a single thrust across the lower Rhine in the Netherlands, but his heart was no in it, & the broad front strategy was never actually set aside.

His directives that diverted a portion of the spring 1944 heavy bomber sorties from targets in Germany to targets in France, to support Op Overlord might be considered stratigic influence. That looks to me to be above the purely operational level.

[OpanaPointer]

As I understand it COSSAC was responsible for grand strategy. SHAEF was created to allow planning for the invasion to go ahead while waiting for a Supreme Commander to be chosen. COSSAC issued Ike's orders, "You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with other Allied forces, conduct military operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces." (That's from memory, may be off a bit.)

So, COSSAC, theoretically, dealt with the heads of states, and issued orders based on what the HsoSs wanted, and Ike directed SHAEF to make plans so as to execute those orders.

I'm sure somebody will correct all that.

[RichTO90]

As I understand it COSSAC was responsible for grand strategy. SHAEF was created to allow planning for the invasion to go ahead while waiting for a Supreme Commander to be chosen. COSSAC issued Ike's orders, "You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with other Allied forces, conduct military operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces." (That's from memory, may be off a bit.)

So, COSSAC, theoretically, dealt with the heads of states, and issued orders based on what the HsoSs wanted, and Ike directed SHAEF to make plans so as to execute those orders.

I'm sure somebody will correct all that.

Okay...

COSSAC was Chief Of Staff Supreme Allied Commander and was originally formed as COSSAC-D where "D" equals "Designate". COSSAC-D was formed in 1943 months before Eisenhower became the "Designate" and its sole purpose was to lay the groundwork for OVERLORD. Given that it was always a staff organization, COSSAC never had any purview on grand strategy or command authority. That was vested in SCAEF, Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces, i.e., Eisenhower. COSSAC was eventually rolled into SHAEF, as part of that Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces.

COSSAC never dealt with heads of state, never issued orders, or anything of the sort. They were a temporary planning staff, pure and simple.

[OpanaPointer]

So, just a bunch of Bigots?

[OpanaPointer]

I may have been thinking of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ETO/Ove ... S-Dir.html

[RichTO90]

So, just a bunch of Bigots?

No, but they were BIGOTED.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Sheldrake,

2. He banged the table to obtain the resources that his land force commander, Montgomery, said were needed to make Overlord work. The original plan was constrained by lack of assault shipping andf the planners were told to make the best plan they could with shipping for three divisions. Ike (not Monty) put the pressure on to get the additional shipping.

The problem with the COSSAC plan being restricted to just three divisions has a bit of a strange footnote, as it seems that the COSSAC planners argued that if any more assault landing craft could be "found" for OVERLORD it should be used for follow-up divisions (rather than landing ships) rather than extending the front to be attacked.

As for who put most pressure into gaining those extra craft, I couldn't say - but Monty certainly put the case strongly, and influenced Eisenhower to accept that OVERLORD and ANVIL could not occur simultaneously.

Eisenhower's desire for ANVIL is an interesting case where his perspective was much broader than Montgomery's - he argued strongly that the invasion of southern France was important as it would allow the French forces that the Americans had developed in North Africa to take part in the invasion of North West Europe without having to ship them back to the UK. Which was a very good point

Cheers

Tom

[steverodgers801]

Three divisions were all that were available for use at that time so that is what was planned for. It is just dramatics by Monty that he got the number to be increased. Much of what Monty took credit for was done by the original planners, it was just expanded.

[rcocean]

Ike had plenty of strategic INFLUENCE. During the Jan 1942-August 1942 time period he was more less Marshall's right hand man in the Pentagon. He represented Marshall in several meetings with Churchill and the British regarding Sledgehammer.

And he was more or less in charge of the Italian surrender and was responsible for the Darlan deal.

He convinced the higher ups that Overlord needed more divisions and landing craft and held firm for Anvil. Once he took over in France, he decided against a narrow thrust into Germany, approved Market Garden, and gave the attack into Germany priority over taking the approaches to Antwerp. In October 1944 he approved Bradley's November offensive and after the Battle of the Bulge, gave priority to the attack on Montgomery's front - despite the wishes of Bradley and Patton. He also came up with the idea of clearing all the Germans from the West bank of the Rhine before making a major thrust into Germany. Of course, the Remagen Bridge made hash of that strategy. Finally, he decided not to take Berlin but to send the US Armies southward. He also made the decision to support the Zuckerman transportation plan and not Spaatz's Oil Plan in April-May 1944.

Plenty of decisions by Ike although many had to be reviewed by the Allied Chief of Staffs.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Steverodgers801,

Three divisions were all that were available for use at that time so that is what was planned for. It is just dramatics by Monty that he got the number to be increased. Much of what Monty took credit for was done by the original planners, it was just expanded.

Of course, when Montgomery arrived in London in early January 1944 to meet the two other C-in-C's (Ramsay and Leigh-Mallory), he also only had assault lift for three divisions, the difference being that, although as Eisenhower wrote on 15 Jan 44: "The desirability of strengthening OVERLORD is universally accepted", only Montgomery had the prestige at that time to stand up and say to his superiors: "provided we can get what I recommend [and for this to happen ANVIL will have to be "reduced to a threat"] then I consider OVERLORD has every chance of being a quick success...time is very short. will you hurl yourself into the contest and get us what we want." [Montgomery signal to Eisenhower, 10 Jan 44]

Thankfully, when Eisenhower got to sit down with Montgomery, after arriving in London later in January, and went through his recommendations in detail, he saw the point (and perhaps realised that Montgomery was in fact saying "back me, or sack me"!), and realised that he would have to insist that ANVIL be postponed to ensure OVERLORD was fully resourced. From that point onwards, Eisenhower took over the reins of getting the resources, leaving Montgomery to concentrate on the land battle. An ideal example of the way it should be done!

Incidentally, there were much greater changes between the COSSAC plan and the OVERLORD plan that merely expanding it as you suggest. I suggest you read Montgomery's diary notes for 3 January as they clearly articulate Montgomery's reservations as expressed (regularly!) during January 1944. Incidentally, the evolution of the final OVERLORD Plan is much more convoluted than Montgomery allows, Ramsay's diary shows how there were several stages (as he put's it in his diary entry for 8 Jan: "This was not unexpected [Montgomery's request to go from a 4 div assault to a 5 div assault] as I felt certain that (as in Egypt) he would not reach a decision on a final plan without several false starts."). I'm not sure why the sequence of negotiations between 21 Army Group and the air and naval staffs hasn't really been brought out in the historiography of D-Day - Montgomery probably didn't want to discuss the fact that it was all so "messy" and the fact that it all took place in the absence of Eisenhower is clearly not welcome to those who want to pretend that he was deeply involved in the details.

As Ramsay put it in his diary entry of 4 Jan: "Bedell Smith left for N. Africa. He told me that Ike Eisenhower was going to U.S. & would not be here till 20th which was iniquitous. This is the very time he should have been here, to settle the plan & to negotiate for it with Chiefs of Staff."

Regards

Tom

[steverodgers801]

Please, every one knew that the assault was going to be increased once adequate troops and ships arrived.