Seelöwe: British Defensive Measures - Tanks, Flak, Artillery

[Bronsky]

I suppose that now is a good time to complain on how mean you are

(after all, you're making me update my archived files, and revisit the difference between our sources regarding British tank production)

[RichTO90]

I suppose that now is a good time to complain on how mean you are

(after all, you're making me update my archived files, and revisit the difference between our sources regarding British tank production)

Well, part of the problem is that the War Office and Ministry of Supply figures don't quite jibe? At soc.history.war.world-war-ii Louis Capdeboscq and I had a slightly extended conversation regarding it, further down in the thread. The general conclusion was there was a 19 tank discrepancy between the two sets of figures through 1940, which we agreed was possibly accounted for by the inclusion of prototypes (which the British frequently constructed of mild steel) in one count and not the other.

[Tim Smith]

However, by late September 1940, three months later, the British were in a much better position.

Further note that they considered their position to be sufficiently safe as to allow the transfer of reinforcements (including tanks) to the Middle East in IIRC August.

Absolutely. They must have been pretty confident to do that.

[Walter_Warlimont]

However, by late September 1940, three months later, the British were in a much better position.

Further note that they considered their position to be sufficiently safe as to allow the transfer of reinforcements (including tanks) to the Middle East in IIRC August.

Absolutely. They must have been pretty confident to do that.

If they were so confident, then why did the Commander-In-Chief of Home Forces "Alanbrooke" throw a Hissy Fit over the decision when he knew that he would need them in the coming Invasion?

[Walter_Warlimont]

But in another forum, this was written (By Someone You All Know). This should answer to a smal degree the question of The StuG's.

At the same time as Lympne is assaulted by glider-borne forces the reinforced 55th and 21st infantry regiments of the 17th infantry division is landing on the beach only a few kilometres directly South of Lympne. With these regiments also came Tank Detatchment B (one batallion of U-tanks) and Sturmbatterie 666 (self-propelled). All barges in the forward line were armed with 7.5 cm. guns and 20 mm. AA cannons. The landings of the 17th and 35th infantry divisions were also supported by 9 aux. gunboats and the 3rd, 4th and 16th minesweeper flotillas, the 2nd and 3rd patrol boat flotillas and the 11th R-boat flotilla.

Preceeding the reinforced regiments of the 17th infantry division was the advance detachments (stormtroopers) consisting of 1,050 soldiers augmented by assault engineers, assault craft crews and ramp operators for the barges. The advance detachments were landing with assault crafts from 8 patrol boats, 8 minesweepers and 2 tugs. In addition 4 barges. The advance detachments brought with them two mountain guns, three light field guns, three PAK's, ten heavy mortars, eight heavy machine guns, two smoke launchers, two flamethrowing tanks and one tank command vehicle.

This complete force was to advance straigh North on a narrow front across the RMC and onto Lympne to join up with the airborne forces.

[johnbryan]

However, by late September 1940, three months later, the British were in a much better position.

Further note that they considered their position to be sufficiently safe as to allow the transfer of reinforcements (including tanks) to the Middle East in IIRC August.

Absolutely. They must have been pretty confident to do that.

If they were so confident, then why did the Commander-In-Chief of Home Forces "Alanbrooke" throw a Hissy Fit over the decision when he knew that he would need them in the coming Invasion?

You certainly have a short memory, don't you Walter? Alanbrooke's diary has been thoroughly disseminated on this thread and even he confesses himself that the diary was the only way to confess his misplaced fears. Therefore, the British Army was in fact "pretty confident to do that."

[RichTO90]

However, by late September 1940, three months later, the British were in a much better position.

Further note that they considered their position to be sufficiently safe as to allow the transfer of reinforcements (including tanks) to the Middle East in IIRC August.

Absolutely. They must have been pretty confident to do that.

If they were so confident, then why did the Commander-In-Chief of Home Forces "Alanbrooke" throw a Hissy Fit over the decision when he knew that he would need them in the coming Invasion?

Er, "pretty confident" and "so confident" are not one and the same. There is also "confident enough". And they all relate to "calculated risk".

In any case, Alan Brooke (he wasn't 'Alanbrooke' for a while yet) had just taken over from Ironside on 20 July and was busy re-vamping Ironsides strategy for defense, which had been based upon fixed defenses due to the immediate consequences of the losses at Dunkirk. Brooke on the other hand wanted to fight a mobile defense, based upon fixed defenses of the beaches with an immediate mobile reserve and a more powerful strategic reserve (sound familiar?). So his vision required tanks, antitank, and antiaircraft guns in fair numbers to fully implement to the level he felt secure with.

And generals rarely like anyone, especially politicians, to take their toys from them and give them to someone else. In this case Churchill overrode his objections.

[Tim Smith]

Yeah, most generals tend to only consider the needs of their own command (Rommel!) and couldn't care less about the needs of another general on a different continent.

Politicians and commanders-in-chief have to consider both.

[RichTO90]

But in another forum, this was written (By Someone You All Know). This should answer to a smal degree the question of The StuG's.

That's fine, there were a total of five batteries IIRC available, so 30 of them. But the rest is not quite correct.

At the same time as Lympne is assaulted by glider-borne forces the reinforced 55th and 21st infantry regiments of the 17th infantry division is landing on the beach only a few kilometres directly South of Lympne.

Not quite. Lympne airfield, which is about 3.7 kilometers inland was the target of one battalion drawn from KG Heidrich (the newly formed - in July FJR 3 of three battalions), which in turn was part of KG Bräuer. But they were to land an hour after 17. Infanterie-Division was to hit the beaches. But Bräuer was to land south of Postling, 3.5 to 4 kilometers to the NE of Lympne.

The glider assault was to be Meindl's Luftlande-Sturm-Regiment, his Stab and I. Batallion was to land noth of Hythe and secure the crossing of the Military Canal there and west of town and advance to Saltwood, leaving them over four kilometers to the east of the airfield. His II. Batallion was to land even further to the ENE at Paddlesworth, over 9 kilometers from the airfield.

BTW, the assault beaches are more than a "few" kilometers from the airfield, it is actually just over 3.7 kilometers away.

With these regiments also came Tank Detatchment B (one batallion of U-tanks) and Sturmbatterie 666 (self-propelled).

Er, no, the Tauchpanzer-Abteilung B was to be launched so as to theoretically land with the infantry, they were submerisible tanks.

All barges in the forward line were armed with 7.5 cm. guns and 20 mm. AA cannons.

No, they were not actually. Schenk clearly shows in his schematic that the Normalgrüppe consisted of a command boat, 8-12 Sturmboot, and six tugs towing a non-motorized and a motorized Prähme, each tow accompanied by two wooden assault boats or motor boats. There is no indication that any of the barges were armed with 7.5cm pieces, which would be difficult for those equipped with ramps anyway. They may have had a 2cm Flak gun, since the divisional battery was to go in with them, so perhaps 12, spread between three groups, so roughly every other tow would have one?

The landings of the 17th and 35th infantry divisions were also supported by 9 aux. gunboats and the 3rd, 4th and 16th minesweeper flotillas, the 2nd and 3rd patrol boat flotillas and the 11th R-boat flotilla.

Preceeding the reinforced regiments of the 17th infantry division was the advance detachments (stormtroopers) consisting of 1,050 soldiers augmented by assault engineers, assault craft crews and ramp operators for the barges. The advance detachments were landing with assault crafts from 8 patrol boats, 8 minesweepers and 2 tugs. In addition 4 barges. The advance detachments brought with them two mountain guns, three light field guns, three PAK's, ten heavy mortars, eight heavy machine guns, two smoke launchers, two flamethrowing tanks and one tank command vehicle.

Poor leandros is misreading Schenk's diagram again. It is a total of 6-8 M-Boot (minesweepers) or VP-Boot (patrol boats), not both. The two tugs were of course towing the 4 barges (2 each, both motorized, with one of each armed with a 7.5cm infantry gun, the other was likely the carrier for the three tanks and Pak). There seems to be a degree of double-counting since the 7.5cm in the armed barges and the "mountain guns are very likely one and the same, while the three "field guns" don't appear in any list I've seen? I suspect they are 15cm heavy infantry guns? Although I don't exclude the idea that they are the same as the armament of the "9 aux. gunboats"?

Of course the 10 "heavy" mortars at this time were 8cm, while the "smoke launchers" were 10cm chemical mortars, the first equipment of the Nebeltruppen and although called "Nebelwerfer" were not in fact the multiple rocket launchers.

This complete force was to advance straigh North on a narrow front across the RMC and onto Lympne to join up with the airborne forces.

Yep, just like 3rd British Division was to advance straight to Caen on D-Day.

[Andreas]

I have merged a thread discussing tanks into this one to keep the discussion concentrated and cleaned this one up a bit.

All the best

Andreas

[Gooner1]

Problem is a gun emplacement isn't a small target; the British had this disturbing habit of surrounding them at that period in the war by all sorts of ancillary housing, the destruction of any of which would cause problems - crew quarters, searchlight emplacements, battery obsevation post, fire command post etc. Together with an amout of above-ground immediate-use ammo stowage. And the guns themselves were accentuated by the big concrete glacis downslope!!! Not overly small - but in the case of the glacis they may as well have painted a target on the battery or a big arrow saying "Gun Here"....

Yeah, try and give the British some credit. Battery Observation Posts would be protected by reinforced concrete and brick, when possible a back-up BOP would be provided, comms. cables would be buried and magazines placed below ground ASAP.
Operational Instruction No.5 of the 5th Somerset Light Infantry (of 135 Brigade 45th Division defending the coast between Dymchurch and Dungeness) of 2nd June 1940 stated "In all cases where artillery is sited in static positions the guns will be dug in and provided with head cover."

http://www.brixhambattery.org/battery_history.html
for a good website on a Emergency Coastal Battery.

On pre-existing coastal battery sites or where an unlimited traverse would be required armoured shields for the gun crews would be available, such as the Ladder Hill battery on St. Helena here



and that would be a small target even for Stuka Rudel.

[Gooner1]

A quick note on the naval beach mines.

As of 1st October 1940 74,088 had been received into Eastern Command of which 46,093 had been laid.

Spread evenly along the 276 miles of coast suitable for a landing would equal a mine about every 10 yards still far from the official requirement of a mine every 18-20 feet.

The beach mines known as 'Mushrooms' were "circular, about 20 inches in diameter by 9 inches deep with a movable lid over a steel bowspring with central firing needle.The mine, packed with 25 lbs of high explosive (amatol topped with baratol) was fired by the bowspring needle piercing a percussion cap in the 4 ounce gelignite primer and thence the main charge." and proved lethal taking some 151 lives in the clearing of them including the GOC 47th Division.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/ww2peopleswar/stor ... 8864.shtml

[johnbryan]

Problem is a gun emplacement isn't a small target; the British had this disturbing habit of surrounding them at that period in the war by all sorts of ancillary housing, the destruction of any of which would cause problems - crew quarters, searchlight emplacements, battery obsevation post, fire command post etc. Together with an amout of above-ground immediate-use ammo stowage. And the guns themselves were accentuated by the big concrete glacis downslope!!! Not overly small - but in the case of the glacis they may as well have painted a target on the battery or a big arrow saying "Gun Here"....

Yeah, try and give the British some credit. Battery Observation Posts would be protected by reinforced concrete and brick, when possible a back-up BOP would be provided, comms. cables would be buried and magazines placed below ground ASAP.
Operational Instruction No.5 of the 5th Somerset Light Infantry (of 135 Brigade 45th Division defending the coast between Dymchurch and Dungeness) of 2nd June 1940 stated "In all cases where artillery is sited in static positions the guns will be dug in and provided with head cover."

http://www.brixhambattery.org/battery_history.html
for a good website on a Emergency Coastal Battery.

On pre-existing coastal battery sites or where an unlimited traverse would be required armoured shields for the gun crews would be available, such as the Ladder Hill battery on St. Helena here



and that would be a small target even for Stuka Rudel.

What are those? Six or eight inch guns?

[Walter_Warlimont]

Problem is a gun emplacement isn't a small target; the British had this disturbing habit of surrounding them at that period in the war by all sorts of ancillary housing, the destruction of any of which would cause problems - crew quarters, searchlight emplacements, battery obsevation post, fire command post etc. Together with an amout of above-ground immediate-use ammo stowage. And the guns themselves were accentuated by the big concrete glacis downslope!!! Not overly small - but in the case of the glacis they may as well have painted a target on the battery or a big arrow saying "Gun Here"....

Yeah, try and give the British some credit. Battery Observation Posts would be protected by reinforced concrete and brick, when possible a back-up BOP would be provided, comms. cables would be buried and magazines placed below ground ASAP.
Operational Instruction No.5 of the 5th Somerset Light Infantry (of 135 Brigade 45th Division defending the coast between Dymchurch and Dungeness) of 2nd June 1940 stated "In all cases where artillery is sited in static positions the guns will be dug in and provided with head cover."

http://www.brixhambattery.org/battery_history.html
for a good website on a Emergency Coastal Battery.

On pre-existing coastal battery sites or where an unlimited traverse would be required armoured shields for the gun crews would be available, such as the Ladder Hill battery on St. Helena here



and that would be a small target even for Stuka Rudel.

What are those? Six or eight inch guns?

They wouldn't have 8" Inch Guns on Coastal Batteries.

6" Inchers Normally & sometimes 9.2" Inchers, but no way those are the latter.

[RichTO90]

Problem is a gun emplacement isn't a small target; the British had this disturbing habit of surrounding them at that period in the war by all sorts of ancillary housing, the destruction of any of which would cause problems - crew quarters, searchlight emplacements, battery obsevation post, fire command post etc. Together with an amout of above-ground immediate-use ammo stowage. And the guns themselves were accentuated by the big concrete glacis downslope!!! Not overly small - but in the case of the glacis they may as well have painted a target on the battery or a big arrow saying "Gun Here"....

Yeah, try and give the British some credit.

I decided at the time not to bother with asking the screamingly obvious question of phylo as to exactly where things like "crew quarters, searchlight emplacements, battery obsevation post[s], fire command post[s], were supposed to be placed other than "surrounding" such a battery? Or where else they were supposed to go?

Of course I'm also a bit curious as to where this "above-ground immediate-use ammo stowage" was that was so common? It certainly wasn't in any of the existing batteries that were reactivated and I rather think that one of the first priorities in establishing an emergency battery was digging in the ammunition bunker and protecting the ready use ammo, especially since that was standard practice in the field artillery?