The Saar Offensive??

[Markus Becker]

This is one for David Lehmann:

Let´s say the French mean bussinessand launch an actual offensive: Wikipedia speaks of 40+ divisions, with 78 artillery and 40 tank regiments. According to W.L. Shirer on Sept. 7th France already had 80+ division mobilized, so how many and what quality of troops could the French have used in the assault on the Saar/Pfalz region and who would they have run into?

On th web I found info of ten german 1st and 2nd wave divisions, plus so-called border regiments.

[tigre]

Hello Markus ; just to start take a look here in this very Forum

viewtopic.php?f=54&t=81054

Hope it may helps you. Cheers. Raúl M .

[Markus Becker]

So that would be four 1st. wave, two 2nd. wave and one "border" division on the german side, if I intrepret the OOB correctly vs. 41(!!) French division? All already mobilized? And how many were A and B division?


A few questions about the Germans According to this:

http://niehorster.orbat.com/011_germany ... _army.html

1. Army had the IX, XII and Saarpfalz Border Guard Command, but no XXX and XXIV corps. A total of ten divisions.

[tigre]

Hello Markus ; you've right about the XXX. AK, it was brought under 1. AOK from October 1939 onwards with regards to Saarpfalz Border Guard Command it was called that way till 17 Sep 1939 since then General Kommando XXIV. AK. As for the French attackers were the following :

- under IIIème Armée (3rd Army) command :

--- Corps d'Armée Colonial (Colonial Army Corps) :
----- 12ème Division d'Infanterie Motorisée (DIM : 12th Motorized Infantry Division. (A I guess)
----- 3ème Division d'Infanterie Nord-Africaine (DINA : 3rd North African Infantry Division). (A I guess)

--- 1er Corps d'Armée (1st Army Corps) :
----- 2ème Division d'Infanterie Nord-Africaine (DINA : 2nd North African Infantry Division). (A I guess)
----- 42ème Division d'Infanterie. (B I guess)

- under IVème Armée command :

--- 9ème Corps d'Armée :
----- 6ème Division d'Infanterie Coloniale (DIC : 6th Colonial Infantry Division). (A I guess)
----- 4ème Division d'Infanterie Nord-Africaine (DINA). (A I guess)

--- 20ème Corps d'Armée :
----- 11ème Division d'Infanterie. (A I guess)
----- 21ème Division d'Infanterie. (A I guess)
----- 9ème Division d'Infanterie Motorisée (DIM : 9th Motorized Infantry Division. (A I guess)
----- 23ème Division d'Infanterie. (A I guess)

--- 5ème Corps d'Armée :
----- 15ème Division d'Infanterie Motorisée. (A I guess)
----- 3ème Division d'Infanterie Coloniale. (A I guess)

Source : "Blitzkrieg à l'Ouest", Jean-Paul Pallud, Heimdal, Bayeux, 2000. Posted by Loïc here
http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic ... 45&t=15791

Cheers. Raúl M .

[Markus Becker]

Thanks, that confirms the presence of nine "good" german divisions(1st and 2nd wave) and the ratio of A to B divisions(11:1) on the French side is also interesting, but I´m more interested in the quality and stae of readyness of all 40+ french divisions, not just the units that actually participated in what was more or less a "fake" offensive.

[tigre]

OK, good luck then Markus . Regards. Raúl M .

[Bronsky]

Let´s say the French mean bussinessand launch an actual offensive: Wikipedia speaks of 40+ divisions, with 78 artillery and 40 tank regiments.

Actually, most of the divisions were still mobilizing, a business which involved regular units shedding about a third of their personnel to form reserve units. The tank regiments, appart from those in the DLM's, were reserve units as well.

According to W.L. Shirer on Sept. 7th France already had 80+ division mobilized

No, they had some 94 division equivalents that were mobilizing. The figure includes troops overseas and the fortress troops, including those manning the Alps sector against Italy. It would take a fairly generous accounting to give the French 80 full divisions even in May 1940, let alone in the first week of mobilization!

so how many and what quality of troops could the French have used in the assault on the Saar/Pfalz region and who would they have run into?

French assets depend a lot on what scenario you want for them.

1. If Gamelin has a sudden adrenaline shot and he decides to launch an all-out attack, then all he has to work with is the historical OOB, posted by Tiger. Add maybe a corps' worth of troops that were deployed in the Belgian sector, and rushed reinforcements of heavy tanks to help with the breakthrough, but that's it.

2. Assuming Gamelin has had a change of heart about his mission a few months earlier, then I suppose he could have got more troops ready. Add maybe a half-dozen divisions by shifting all the regulars from the Alps and Belgium to the planned attack sector, also the tank battalions are available a bit sooner and include the heavy stuff. No more than that short of altering the mobilization plan, which Gamelin couldn't do easily.

3. If you want to imagine truly aggressive French policy and give the country a few years, then the French can change their whole mobilization plan, effectively ditching the B reserve units (i.e. a third of their army) in exchange for having the rest ready sooner. In such a case, maybe 20 divisions initially and double that number after a couple of weeks. Of course, if the planned German offensive takes place that autumn, France is in serious trouble with that setup as the B reserve units will take months to organize.

The Germans had a total of 42 divisions, including the OKH reserve units in the western sector and that were historically assigned to the West. This was discussed in another thread.

Of these, ten are 1st wave units i.e. just as good as the French, another 10 or so are good enough for static defense, given how the Saar provides good defensive terrain and there are prepared defenses around. The rest won't be much good, but then neither will French reserve units in the attack anyway.

[takata_1940]

Hi,

Thanks, that confirms the presence of nine "good" german divisions(1st and 2nd wave) and the ratio of A to B divisions(11:1) on the French side is also interesting, but I´m more interested in the quality and stae of readyness of all 40+ french divisions, not just the units that actually participated in what was more or less a "fake" offensive.

From the divisions cited above at IIIe and IVe Armées, neither are A or B divisions, they are all Active divisions of the "couverture"; this Active Metropolitan Army consisted of 33 divisions and 2 Spahis brigades:

- Motorized Infantry Divisions: 1e, 3e, 5e, 9e, 12e, 15e, 25e DIM
- Infantry Divisions: 10e, 11e, 13e, 14e, 19e, 21e, 23e, 36e, 42e, 43e DI
- Mountain Infantry Divisions: 27e, 29e, 31e DI
- North-African Infantry Divisions: 1e, 2e, 3e, 4e DINA
- Colonial Infantry Divisions: 1e, 2e, 3e, 4e DIC
- Cavalry Divisions: 1e, 2e, 3e DC
- Light Mechanized Divisions: 1e, 2e DLM
- Spahis Brigades: 1e, 2e BS

Affected to the VIe Armée (Alps), were 6 divisions and 1 Spahis brigades:
- 23e, 27e, 29e, 31e DI, 1e DINA, 2e DIC and 1e BS
All others units were covering the North-East from Switzerland to Belgium.

The mobilizing divisions consisted of 39 réserve infantry divisions:
- Infantry Divisions (série A): 2e, 4e, 6e, 7e, 16e, 18e, 20e, 22e, 24e, 26e, 32e, 35e, 41e, 45e, 47e DI
- Mountain Infantry Divisions (Série A): 28e, 30e DI
- North-African Infantry Divisions (Série A): 5e DINA
- Colonial Infantry Divisions (Série A): 5e, 6e, 7e DIC
- Infantry Divisions (Série B): 51e, 52e, 53e, 54e, 55e, 56e, 57e, 58e, 60e, 61e, 62e, 63e, 66e, 67e, 70e, 71e DI
- Mountain Infantry Divisions (Série B): 64e, 65e DI

S~
Olivier

[Edited: The mobilizing army consisted of only 39 divisions instead of 40 as the 6e DINA (corrected) was added later to the list in november 1939]

[takata_1940]

This should make the whole process a bit more understandable:

- Scheduled mobilisation plan (France, North Africa & Levant):
Mobilisation Day (M) is 2 September at 00.00 Hrs

1) M+7: 41 divisions ("couverture")
.36 DI
.3 DC
.2 DLM

2) M+12: 63 divisions
.58 DI
.3 DC
.2 DLM

3) M+17: 83 divisions
.78 DI
.3 DC
.2 DLM

4) M+22: 86 divisions
.81 DI
.3 DC
.2 DLM


- Situation planned @ M+22 (24 September)

a) North-East and Jura: 56 divisions
. 23 DI Active (17 DI, 3 DINA, 3 DIC)
. 19 DI Série A (15 DI, 1 DINA, 3 DIC)
. 9 DI Série B
. 2 DLM
. 3 DC
. 1 BS

b) South-East: 9 divisions
. 5 DI Active (3 DI Mtn, 1 DINA, 1 DIC)
. 2 DI Série A Mtn
. 2 DI Série B Mtn
. 1 BS

c) Interior : 7 divisions
. 7 DI Série B

d) North-Africa : 14 divisions
. 10 DI (81e, 82e, 83e, 84e, 85e, 86e, 87e, 88e DIA*, 1e & 3e DM*)
. 4 DI "Protection" (181e, 182e, 183e DIA, 2e DM)
. 5 Cavalry Brigades
*DIA = Division d'Infanterie d'Afrique (mountain type)
*DM = Division d'Infanterie Marocaine (mountain type)

e) Levant (Syria-Lebanon): 2 mixed Brigades

Total: 86 Divisions + 9 Brigades
(+ 15 Fortress equ. divisions)

S~
Olivier

[tigre]

Thanks Olivier . Cheers. Raúl M .

[Peter K]

so how many and what quality of troops could the French have used in the assault

OKH report from 20.09.1939 says that:

"(...) French infantry demonstrate only limited willingness for offensive actions, they occupy their attack positions carelessly and [sometimes] fall into the fire of their own artillery; on the other hand they skilfully use terrain and camouflage themselves; they shoot poorly. (...)"

I added "sometimes".

[Carl Schwamberger]

Counting 'divisions' is a start for assesing relative strength. Several other parts include:

Corps & army artillery groups. I've been unable to locate much in the way of medium or heavy artillery outside that in the German infantry division in the West in September. A close look at what the Germans & French had deployed & could have deployed may change the relative combat power between the two.

Ditto for other combat & service support. Actual & potential strength at the corps/army level needs to be determined.

Air strength. In this scenario one should assume the French AF is deployed to support the offensive. How fast & in what strength could the GAF be redeployed to counter the French attack?

[Peter K]

Corps & army artillery groups. I've been unable to locate much in the way of medium or heavy artillery outside that in the German infantry division in the West in September. A close look at what the Germans & French had deployed & could have deployed may change the relative combat power between the two.

When it comes to non-divisional artillery:

Out of 84 motorized non-divisional heavy artillery battalions, 60 fought in Poland and 24 were in the West.

Each of these 24 battalions in the West was equipped with 8 x 15cm howitzer and 4 x 10,5cm Kanone, except for one which was equipped with 2 x 15cm Kanone and 3 x 21cm mortar (it had only 2 batteries).

This makes a total of 281 heavy guns in non-divisional heavy artillery battalions (mot.) in the West. Apart from this there were also several horse drawn (4) and stationary (2) non-divisional heavy artillery battalions in the West:

I./s.Grenz-Art.Regt.-105
I./s.Grenz-Art.Regt.-106
I./s.Grenz-Art.Regt.-108
I./s.Grenz-Art.Regt.-109

Each of them with 8 x 15cm howitzer and 4 x 10,5cm Kanone.

Art.Abt.-215 (bo.) - 2 x 30,5cm, 4 x 17cm
Art.Abt.-216 (bo.) - 2 x 24cm, 4 x 17cm

In total 341 heavy guns in these non-divisional units (including 7 of calibres 21, 24 and 30,5cm).

However, hard to say if all of them could provide support against the French offensive. Most of them were in 5. Army and in 1. Army, but some were also in 7. Army and in reserves of Army Group "C".

Those 60 which were fighting in Poland had more guns of heavier calibres as 51 of them were equipped with 8 x 15cm howitzer and 4 x 10,5cm Kanone each, while the remaining 9 (plus two independent batteries) had in total 14 x 15cm Kanone, 8 x 10,5cm K18, 36 x 21cm mortar, 6 x 24cm howitzer and 10 x 30,5cm howitzer M. 16.

In total 686 heavy guns in these battalions in Poland, including 52 of calibres 21, 24 and 30,5cm.

Also out of 6 motorized non-divisional light artillery battalions, 2 fought in Poland and 4 were in the West. Each of them was most probably equipped with 12 howitzers calibre 10,5cm.

In Poland also 2 non-divisional Nebel-Abteilungen fought:

1. Nebel-Abt. - was part of XVI. Armee-Korps(mot.)
2. Nebel-Abt. - was part of XIX. Armee-Korps(mot.)

I don't know if any Nebel-Abteilungen were in the West.

Apart from that Germans had some heavy and super-heavy railway guns, some of which fought in Poland.

During the Polish campaign they used some (out of 4 produced) 15 cm Kanone (E), as well as some 28cm Krupp K5 (E)* and also some (out of 6 produced) 24 cm Theodor Bruno Kanone (E) railway guns.

24 cm Theodors took part in combats in the Polish Coastline, shelling the area around Gdynia.

Question is if any of those heavy and super-heavy railway guns were left in the West? For sure there were some 24cm Theodors in 7. Army - at least on 31.08.1939 - but it is possible that later they were moved to Poland.

*In total 8 were produced until the invasion of France, I don't know how many were until 01.09.1939.

==================================

So all in all Germans could count on around 400 non-divisional heavy & medium artillery pieces in the West.

Air strength. In this scenario one should assume the French AF is deployed to support the offensive. How fast & in what strength could the GAF be redeployed to counter the French attack?

Germans have 100 percent of their dive bombers & assault aircrafts as well as destroyers (heavy fighters) involved in Poland. No of them was left in the West. Considerable majority of German bombers are also in Poland.

Nearly one hundred percent of German Ju-52 transport aircrafts are also involved against Poland.

On the other hand, a very considerable portion of Bf-109 fighters is left in the West.

So GAF wanted to counter Allied air attacks rather than conduct own attacks against Allied ground targets.

[Carl Schwamberger]

That is usefull information. What in your opinion are the best acessable sources for the German OB?

My take is the 15cm cannon are what would count in countering a French offensive, tho my thinking is colored by experience at fire planning in the late 20th Century, vs 1940. The same considerations may or may not apply. A closely related & equally important question concerns the artillery ammunitions supply on both sides. There are arguments the Germans lacked a usefull reserve, in terms of on hand stocks & production that could be quickly delivered. How valid those are I am still unsure of.

As with the French one would have to sort out which of the artillery units were combat ready & which had not completed mobilization.

The lack of German bomber aircraft in the west favors the French. I'll leave the combat efficiency of the French bomber force for others to discuss. While I have little doubt the ten first rate German divisions could have stood up to air attack of several days the ability of the recently mobilized & just mobilized formations is questionable. Would they have stood up to a sustained & concentrated airstrikes any better than Polish, Belgian, Yugoslavian, or Soviet reservists called up just weeks or days earlier?

Yet another question is mine warfare. The Germans seem to have placed considerable numbers of mines in depth. Assuming a reasonablly prepared French offensive, how efficient would the French pioneers in the divisions & in the corps engineer units be at clearing the necessary routes?

[Bronsky]

My take is the 15cm cannon are what would count in countering a French offensive, tho my thinking is colored by experience at fire planning in the late 20th Century, vs 1940.

Hi Carl, it seems to me 105mm would pack enough punch. Note that the bulk of the French artillery would be of the 75mm variety anyway.

A closely related & equally important question concerns the artillery ammunitions supply on both sides.

Both sides had enough ammunition to last them until the Saar battle was decided, one way or another. Both would face serious shortages of artillery shells after 2-3 months.

The lack of German bomber aircraft in the west favors the French.

The "lack" of German bomber was only relative, like the US artillery ammunition "shortage" of late 1944. Even with the bulk of its bomber force committed in Poland, the Luftwaffe still had 395 bombers in the West. The French had 276 bombers in total, and the British could contribute with the 10 squadrons of Battles that flew to prepared air strips in the first few days of the war. Of course, those RAF squadrons would only be good for maybe 1-2 sorties each before the lack of spares and ammunition would ground them until their ground echelons joined up (which took several weeks).

So the Germans had as many bombers as the British and the French together, their planes were more modern in average (particularly when compared with the French antiques) and they had far better doctrine and serviceability. In terms of bomber sorties, the Luftwaffe would likely outdo the Allies, though not of course on the same scale as the historical 1940 campaign.

The Luftwaffe had 288 Bf 109Es and 277 Bf 109Ds for a total of 588 fighers.
The French had 216 Morane-Saulnier 406 and 94 Curtiss H-75s, or 310 Bf 109D equivalents, plus 58 Potez 631s (night fighters - a sort of Bf 110 except weaker, could be marginally useful against unescorted bombers), 56 old (Dewoitine 510s) and 43 very old (Nieuport-Delage 622/629, Spad 510...) fighters, for a total of 467.
The RAF was committed to sending 4 squadrons of Hurricanes, but their main job was protecting the Channel ports and they couldn't be used over the Saar initially, and it would take weeks before they could be kept supplied and in range of the Saar anyway.

I'll leave the combat efficiency of the French bomber force for others to discuss.

One word: pathetic. Old level bombers, mostly, some considered fit for night bombing only (not that any of them had proper night aiming equipment, mind you).

While I have little doubt the ten first rate German divisions could have stood up to air attack of several days the ability of the recently mobilized & just mobilized formations is questionable. Would they have stood up to a sustained & concentrated airstrikes any better than Polish, Belgian, Yugoslavian, or Soviet reservists called up just weeks or days earlier?

Not to worry, even if the German fighter force had gone on strike, I doubt the French air force could have "stood up to air attacks of several days" anyway

Yet another question is mine warfare. The Germans seem to have placed considerable numbers of mines in depth. Assuming a reasonablly prepared French offensive, how efficient would the French pioneers in the divisions & in the corps engineer units be at clearing the necessary routes?

The extent to which the Germans were using mines came as a shock to the French - and the British - because mines hadn't been all that effective in WWI, especially against tanks. Now they were. The French had developped some prototype mine-clearing tanks, but the bulk of the work took place in the light of their September 1939 experience. Their army wasn't particularly good at mine-clearing, then.