Question on "Sledgehammer"

[gmichael]

I think I might have something to contribute to this discussion. For the past four and a half years I have been researching Operation Sledgehammer with some degree of intensity. I believe that in the course of my research, which includes significant forays into the British, American and German archives I have made some interesting discoveries.

The confusion about the purpose and objectives of Sledgehammer is natural because 1) operational code-names during the period in question were not used with the same precision as we find later on, and 2) the Sledgehammer plan went through a number of iterations. The Allies used Sledgehammer as a code name for a number of different plans that envisioned a cross-Channel invasion in the summer/fall of 1942 (possible landing sites included the Pas de Calais, Le Havre, Brittany and various parts of the Cotentin Peninsula), and then, when they definitively cancelled it in favor of Torch, it became the code-name for a deception operation (Bolero meant different things to different people as well). It is true that somewhere in the middle of the Sledgehammer story it was seen as a "sacrifice" operation, but that was not true when Mountbatten originally proposed it and it certainly was not true (from the American perspective, at least) when Marshall had it out hammer and tongs with the British in London in July of '42 (Andrew Roberts book Masters and Commanders probably has the best current account of the unfolding debate over Sledgehammer).

This past June I was fortunate enough to be able to give a presentation on many of my findings at the Overlord Echoes Conference, which was part of the 65th Anniversary of D-Day Commemoration at the National D-Day Memorial (I say fortunate because there were a lot of D-Day vets there in attendance). Due to the nature of the conference I wrote my Sledgehammer paper in the form of a comparison between Sledgehammer and Operation Overlord, which proved to be, I discovered, an especially fruitful way to approach the subject. While I did not attempt to do the impossible – to "prove" a historical what-if – I do endeavor, among other things, to make the best case that a cross-Channel invasion in the early fall of 1942 was far from the hopeless undertaking most historians have made it out to be, and indeed, had a more than reasonable chance for success, provided the Western Allies made a whole-hearted effort. I would add that, unlike those who have dismissed Sledgehammer as "suicidal," "quixotic," or a "fantasy," I have done the requisite research, archival and otherwise, and that includes researching the German side of the equation from their own documents. I also attempted to put into context the entire strategic situation in 1942 – something that I feel most other historians have done a poor job of. I addressed as well all of the major objections you will find in the historical literature: Dieppe, the strength of the Luftwaffe, the greenness of American troops, logistical limitations, the weather (I have the contemporaneous meteorological records from both sides of the Channel), and the lack of landing craft. With respect to the last item, I think I made some discoveries from the British archives, which are quite fascinating if not positively provocative.

I am new to the Axis History Forum, but in looking around I noticed that there were already some significant threads dealing with related topics – specifically "November 1942" and "Operation Roundup Cancelled". I haven’t attempted to read every message on these two subjects, but from what I did read I did find significant areas of agreement and disagreement with both the proponents and the skeptics on both sides of both threads. I could spend days I think replying to the various posts in those discussions, but most of it I could better address in the context of Sledgehammer. Having stated that, I would just add that the proponents for both Roundup and Quiberon Bay have identified real opportunities that the Western Allies could have taken advantage of (I'm glad, for instance, that someone else has noticed the Vichy angle, though from what I have seen, this did not get an analysis that takes the complicated political situation that prevailed there into account). The problem with the Roundup scenario, however, is that it is so difficult to gauge exactly what opposition the Anglo-Americans would have encountered when they landed in Northern France since we can only guess at developments between November 1942 and whenever Roundup actually would have taken place (the original goal was 1 April 1943), whereas the Quiberon Bay scenario was never an option the Allies considered at the time and it is highly doubtful it ever would have since it offered no significant advantage over Sledgehammer while suffering from several show-stopping disadvantages. My greatest fear, however, is that I have entered this discussion at a point when everyone who might otherwise be interested is thoroughly exhausted with the whole concept. I hope that is not the case, but either way I would just say that of all of the early Second Front concepts I have encountered I do believe that Sledgehammer had the best chance of both succeeding and making a major difference in the war in terms of a more favorable outcome for the western democracies.

If anyone is interested in reading my full Sledgehammer paper (which is just a rather hastily composed summary of my findings), you can download them using one of the following links (it runs about 115 pages): PDF MS Word DOC

(These are identical, though the PDF is smaller, if you are going to read it on your computer and like to jump back and forth between the footnotes and the text, then the Word DOC would be your best bet.)

[Carl Schwamberger]

Michael... thanks for the link to your monograph. Read most of it this morning. I suspect there will be only one, or maybe two, persons posting here who will read it throughly enough for comprehension of the content. Or, consider your sources. Also, there is not likely to be more than two who can address this near the level you are trying to. You have probablly already identified them.

Your point about the stratigc objectives of this particular 'Cotientin' Sledgehammer plan (might it be called Version Madiline?) and the attritional nature of the subsequent ground/air campaign may be the most difficult for folks to grasp. The fixtiation on the scope of Overlord campaign has been evident in the other discussions of the Sledgehammer and Roundup plans & interfered mightly in any rational discussion.

There are a couple points where this plan, or your observations may be on weak ground. but I'll wait until reading the text again before commenting on those.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Michael,

many thanks for the post and link to the article. I am away for a couple of days so will be able to have a good read through it then; from your post it sounds most intriguing.

Regards
Tom

[Carl Schwamberger]

Looked at some specific details in Michael's Sledgehammer analysis. His general stratigic analysis of the German situation in late 1942 paralles my thoughts of the past couple years. He also makes the same observations as I have on the attitude of the Italian Facist leaders in late 1942. The book 'The Fall of Mussolini' Phillp Morgan, has some usefull comments on this, tho I'd suspect one would have to go to Italian sources to accquire solid information on this. Any one have any recomendations for English language books on italys politics in WWII?

The remarks about the French attitude are intiguing as well. The attitude of the French population in general & the various political/military leaders of Vichy are not broadly discussed in the English language. 'The Dark Years' Julian Jackson is one of the few I'v run across. Any others to recommend?

[phylo_roadking]

Relative to this - http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=160630 - I see Michael uses the term "flight" for a posse of landing craft

[phylo_roadking]

Admittedly, there is no evidence that even the advocates of SLEDGEHAMMER fully recognized either
its potential political or military benefits. There is every reason to believe, however, that British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill would have discerned the significant political leverage that a successful
SLEDGEHMAMMER might have made possible. Earlier that year, when the Allies had still hoped to turn
Vichy to the Allied cause, Churchill had spoken of offering them a choice between “blessings or curses”
depending on whether they accepted Allied overtures to join in the war against Germany. It is not clear
if Allied leaders ever attempted to follow up on Churchill’s proposed diplomatic gambit. The
miscalculation underlying any such approach to the Vichy French at this time was that not only were
they asking their French interlocutors to commit what was objectively treason, they were asking them to
commit treason in the context of a strategic situation that could seemingly only have brought disaster to
France. Whatever their hopes or prognostications regarding the long term outcome of the war, most
Vichy officials and military officers were not likely to take the existential risks in favor of actions that
seemed so obviously doomed to failure since German military power seemed so manifestly in the
ascendant. Moreover, the offer of “blessings or curses” only contains the potential to motivate to the
extent that the one making the offer has the demonstrated power to fulfill either promise. The successful
occupation of even a small part of Western Europe, combined with Germany’s already flagging
prospects in Egypt and on the Eastern Front, on the other hand, would represent powerful evidence that
the tide had truly turned against Nazi Germany. Under such circumstances, Vichy would be forced to
reexamine its options. Even lacking such a demonstration, one high Vichy official had informed his
American interlocutor: “If you come with two divisions, we will fire on you. If you come with twentyfive
divisions we will receive you with open arms.” In other words, only a manifestation of effective
Allied military power could change the attitude of the Vichy French. The policy of collaboration had
already patently failed to bring France any of the economic or political benefits its advocates had hoped
for at the beginning. Collaboration had always had as one of its premises the continuation of German
military hegemony into the foreseeable future. Even without a cross-Channel invasion, however, that
calculation was already beginning to look obsolete. There already were powerful forces inside of Vichy,
principally in the French military, moving towards bringing France back into the war on the side of the
Allies in conjunction with a future Allied invasion (which was not anticipated to take place until the
spring of 1943, however).
A similar political recalculation would surely have taken place as well in the centers of power in the
capitals of Germany’s formal Axis allies. Italy, above all, would find itself in a precarious position. The
same groups that would later turn on Mussolini in the fall of 1943 were already in late 1942 looking for
a way out of the war. With defeat at El Alamein (or at least seemingly interminable deadlock there) and
its even larger army smashed in Russia in mid-December, an Anglo-American military presence on the
continent may have not only demonstrated the waning of German power in general, but also provided
the opportunity for a volte-face without fear of German military intervention.

Michael, I'm not sure how strong the grounds for some of your statements here are; there are places there...

Even lacking such a demonstration, one high Vichy official had informed his
American interlocutor: “If you come with two divisions, we will fire on you. If you come with twentyfive
divisions we will receive you with open arms.” In other words, only a manifestation of effective
Allied military power could change the attitude of the Vichy French.

....where you're not making the necessary (vital?) distinction between Vichy colonial armies/commanders/political generals....and METROPOLITAN Vichy ones

The successful occupation of even a small part of Western Europe, combined with Germany’s already flagging
prospects in Egypt and on the Eastern Front, on the other hand, would represent powerful evidence that
the tide had truly turned against Nazi Germany. Under such circumstances, Vichy would be forced to
reexamine its options.

After all - don't forget that historical events showed HOW rapidly the Germans did move to occupy Metropolitan Vichy with the minumum of forces already available in Occupied France etc. Now...imagine HOW fast that could and would be achieved with much heavier German forces moved from East to West It's ok to theorize a volte-face on the part of Metropolitan Vichy - but something else to try and imagine that Vichy's minimal and minimally-equiped Metropoilitan "armed" forces could have resisted a German ocupation...and I would read Vichy's covert attempts to gather transport, develop armoured vehicles etc. not ONLY as an intent to take control of their own destiny again - but realistically it ALSO has to indicate their own self-awareness of their military weaknesses

It's one thing for COLONIAL Vichy military commanders to talk changing-sides with the Americans....they had the military wherewithall to BE a considerable thorn in the side of the Axis in Africa - but the real catastrophic affects of SLEDGEHAMMER in mainland France would have been that Germany not JUST moving to occupy the militarily FAR-weaker Metropolitan Vichy as they did historically ....but to actively suppress a potential threat to their rear. And THAT would have been a FAR more painful experience and reward for a mainland Vichy contemplating such a move...

In other words - in the event of SLEDGEHAMMER the Germans would have had to not just occupy Metropolitan Vichy - but INVADE it. A LOT more good Frenchmen are going to die that way...and I believe the metropolitan Vichy government realised the difference in scale, hence their continuing "cooperation" with the Germans through the last years of the war after 1942...

The policy of collaboration had already patently failed to bring France any of the economic or political benefits its advocates had hoped for at the beginning.

...even though arguably they'd lost everything that in real terms they'd tried to preserve in the Armistice of 1940 The Armistice wasn't just a supposed springboard potential for growth under German hegemony - but more importantly in June 1940 it was a relatively successful attempt to preserve SOMETHING from the ruin. After the late '42 Occupation very nearly ALL of that had gone, as well as any supposed, trumpeted potential for growth - yet Vichy STILL didn't change sides

If all THAT wasn't enough to shift Petain/Laval historically - I don't personally think SLEDGEHAMMER would be enough either...EPSPECIALLY once it became obvious that the Allies were settling down to develop their enclave rather than pushing on into the continent! ....but the other side of the equation/problem is - the GERMANS would have to prepare for a "worst-case"... hence an "invasion" rather than an "occupation".

And given that the Allies aren't in a position to assist Metropolitan Vichy in any concrete way - Vichy is in big trouble one way or another in the event of SLEDGEHAMMER.

[Carl Schwamberger]

A second read of Michaels essay brought back to mind the several other debates of Sledgehamer, Round UP, & other proposed amphibious operations of this era. A number of political, and military considerations are touched on particularly the military logisitics in all these .Some numbers are given for a few specific aspects, but across the board the collective still lacks depth. To discuss the thesis in depth a lot more hard numbers are needed beyond the several excellent contributions of folk.

1. Logistics.
1a. Cross beach transfer. What were the proven daily discharge of the landing craft types? Numbers from any 1942 test or exercises & statistics from ops Watchtower, Torch, & Huskey would be very usefull. Thats for both combat & service units and weight of supplies. Particularly important would be numbers of tanks sent across the beach per day & how absent the LST?

1b. Condition of ports captured, how long it took to repair damage and resources available to do so? Again the examples from Torch and Husky would be the most pertinant. Watchtower captured no ports, a corps was supplied across a open beach for 6+ months so it is irrelevant to this specific question.

1c. Numbers for the various claims for sea transport available. That is both general cargo/mnpower tranport and landing craft. A varety of numbers have been presented seperatly by many authors. Lining all these up in a single comparitive document with supporting data would be usefull for sorting that out and identifying the most likley models & quantities available.

1d. Quantites of material on hand, and production figures for the Fall of 1942, & early 1943 for tha matter. That is the ammount of artillery ammunition available, aircraft, tanks, trucks, ect.. and where the depositories were. Monthly or quarterly production figures are necessary as well. This is important for both sides.

2. Order of Battle
From the varios discussions of this it is clear the details of the OB for both sides exists, down to battalion level. While some facts of composition will not be settled. The first question is the identification and location of German units in the West. Since this question of Sledge hammer extends to the Stratigic level & hence covers six plus months the possibility of reinforcement from other parts of Europe is part of it. Ditto for the Allies. Exactly what was located where, and its readiness for combat. In the case of both sides a examination of how ‘Raadiness’ was judged is important, as well as how preperations could be accelerated or delayed.

3. Effectivenss of the Air Forces.
Beyond the questions of OB and combat readiness there is the very tough question of combat effectivenss in 1942/1943. I’ve seen dozens (perhaps hundreds) of claims & discussions of this subject over the past fourty years. The framentary nature of most seldom proves much. A comprehensie study probablly wont ‘prove’ anything either, but it would provide a higher degree of usefull guidance

[Carl Schwamberger]

Giumarra’s essay or monograph is not a easy read. Keeping his sources entirely in the Bibliography/endotes makes it slow going, anoying in fact for me. I’m aware of the reasons behind this, but find te practice a obstruction rather than a help in getting though the arguments in the text. In length he probablly exceeds Grigg’s chapters (1943 The Victory That Never Was) discussing the details of executing the ‘Roundup’ plan in 1943. Mpstof Grigg’s book discusses the decision making & politcs the led to cancelation of Roundup.

Giumarra presents a wide set of conclusions from his nanlysis of the Sledgehammer plan & its implications for the development of a battle on the continent. While I have not had time to cross check any facts buried in the text or bibliography from my menory here are a few observations.

On the British Sledgehammer or Maidline plan (& not Giumarras discussion), to me the weakest point seems to be the timely capture of Cherbourg. If that port can be secured within a week, and made at least partially operational then the plan has a sound basis for establshing the Cotintin bridgehead and the subsequent attritional battle. Without it the sustainment of the initial two corps minimum (and the RAF bases) to hold the pennensula is clearly more difficult. A analysis of the maps Giumarra provides and the other information concerning the Maidaline option and the German resources suggests the invasion force is under a very tight schedule.

The air side of the Sledgehammer concept appears sound. That is the German Air Force was in no position in 1942 to engage in a sustained battle of attrition with the Allied airforces. Any tactical sucesses would be fleeting victories, leaving the GAF weaker each time, lose or win.

US Combat Readiness
Giumarra’s arguments are solid here. This is perhaps one of the lamest aspects of discssions of the capability of US combat forces. In general it shows many people remarking on this as underread on the details of the battles of 1942-43 in the Mediterainian. There is also frequently a bit of twisted logic in judging the viability of a combat operation in terms of the US Army when the intial months of the operation would be dominated by British combat units, and in the idea that the the US Army in general needed to “seasoned” in combat before being committed to combat. Giumarra makes several important points concerning the capability of the Allied artillery, and in general the solid capability of the US/Comonwealth ground forces in the defense from the Fall of 1942. Similarly the misconceptions of the experince of the US combat forces used for operations Neptune and Overlord are addressed.

German Strength
The summary of the defenses of France and its coast appear sound in terms of the numbers provided. Conclusions about the actual combat power Giumarra allows the total German force might be debated over detail. While the records I’ve seen cited for the condition of the German combat units in France agree in a general way with Giumarra the ability of the Wehrmacht to improvise adaquate solutions was no less than the Yanks & cannot be discounted. On a larger scale his take on ground combat formations available is in line with other sources. Tho the question about the state of mobilization of other manpower/combat formations could be addressed.

His summary of the German Air Force is in general agrreement with the take from other historians of this subject. Alfred Price provides similar information on the gross and actual operational strength of the GAF. The remarks about the strength of the GAF in 1942 vs 1944 are in line with other historians.

The remarks about the fuel supply for the German forces in France need further investigation. While I had seen similar remarks about artillery ammunition, or horses (critically short), and other items this fuel deficiency of the combat forces in France is a new one to me.

From Page 64 the logistics plan for Overlord (actually Neptune) is addressed, to make a case for the logistics support of 1942 as being adaquate. The observation of the breakdown of the logisitcs plan for Op. Neptune is on firm ground. It is refered to in US Army historical literature cncenring Neptune/Overlord logistics, and remarked on briefly by miscl other historians.

From Page 93. Giumaras remarks on the artificial harbors would have been better left out. His thesis that these were not essential to amphibious land is correct in the abstract. In actual practice it is a gross distortion of how the beaches were crossed after the intial assualt. In simplistic terms the ‘Mulberry’ harbors were not entirely of new technology which had never been used before. They were a complex almagation of techniques, some new & little tried, some dating back to Roman tmes or earlier, and many techniques or equipments having been used before by the Allied amphibious forces. The literature on the subject of cross beach logistics is thin and mostly technical. A adaquate analysis of the role of the two Normandy harbors would require a text rivaling Giumarras. Skipping over all that, the two items that were important to the Normandy beach harbors were the Pheonix & Gooseberry breakwaters, and the “Mulberry” floating docks. Neither was unique or revolutionry in concept. The floating dock had been in use before the war, & in the case of the British a working prototype tested as early as Febuary 1942. The unique aspect of the these items at Normandy was the scale or size deployed and the accompanying complexity.

Amphibious Ships/Boats
From approx page 98 a series of remarks are made concerning the Alied count of the amphibious craft available. The statements leave the reader wondering if the either the British leaders were mendacious or the overall Allied officers responsible were entirely incompetent. Leaving that aside my take on the actual numbers presented & comparisons with other actual operations executed is that a long and detailed study is necessary to answer the question of what could actually be done. I’ve seen several attempts in writing, such as Dunn, or Grigg, or efforts on these discussion boards, all of which fall far short of proving much one way or the other. From my long ago training in amphibious warfare I strongly suspect that a close look at the twin factors of assualt lift and cross beach discharge rate for the three task forces of Op. Torch, Op Huskey, Op Watchtower, & the several other amphibious ops, in the Pacific is just as important to this question as a accurate count of gross numbers of ships & boats. Despite the pages devoted tot is question Giumarra is notconvincing either. perhaps carefully sifitng through his sources might suggest the truth, but thats way more time than I’d like to spend this month.

Overall the weaknesses of the German command, and the stratigic position/resources of late 1942 seem to be correctly grasped.


On the British Sledgehammer plan, to me the weakest point seems to be the timely capture of Cherbourg. If that port can be secured within a week, and made at least partially operational then the plan has a sound basis for establshing the Cotintin bridgehead and the subsequent attritional battle. Without it the sustainment of the initial two corps minimum (and the RAF bases) to hold the pennensula is clearly more difficult. A analysis of the maps Giumarra provides and the other information concerning the Maidaline option and the German resources suggests the invasion force is under a very tight schedule.

[phylo_roadking]

The remarks about the fuel supply for the German forces in France need further investigation. While I had seen similar remarks about artillery ammunition, or horses (critically short), and other items this fuel deficiency of the combat forces in France is a new one to me

Carl, I can offer anecdotal evidence of that. You know the famous pic of a pair of beutepanzer Char Bs sitting on a harbour in the Channel Islands? I've a cousin manages the Thorntons' branch (a UK specialist chocolatier) on Jersey, and her landlord Eric is a local historian (recently appeared in an edition of Antiques Roadshow on the BBC with WWII militaria from the occupation)....

Apparently they were driven to there very soon after they arrived on the island....and didn't move again for several years! There just wasn't the fuel to move them again

(Char Bs were notoriously thirsty, this led to one of the French' major armour defeats in the May 1940 campaign IIRC, the Char Bs went into battle without a chance for their bowsers to catch up and refuel them after they'd nearly run dry motoring into position for their attack; during the batle they DID run dry - and the Germans simply manouvered round them and shot up their weak point, the hull side-mounted oil cooler - from Montefiore)

[gmichael]

I apologize for the tardiness of my reply. I am very appreciative to anyone who has taken the time to read my rather long treatment of Sledgehammer. Despite its length I should point out that as I composed it I was conscious that (with a few exceptions) the arguments that I was committing to paper represented a small summary of the evidence I would like to present. Nowhere is that more true than with respect to how I dealt with the Vichy question. It really requires on its own 20-30 pages or more, but I will try to at least answer some of the points that Carl has brought up.

First of all, though you do well to bring up the distinction between colonial and Metropolitan officials, I do not think it would have represented a crucial difference in this case. You are correct also that Laval and Pétain did not go over to the Allied side even after D-Day. The easy retort would be that by then they were entirely under the control of the Germans, but that would give the false impression that following Sledgehammer they might have willingly come over to the Allies. In fact, I state myself in my paper that neither was liable to do so. Laval was too pro-German and Pétain was too pro-Pétain for this to be a realistic possibility. There were, however, others in positions of authority who, I feel confident, would have reacted differently. The quote you refer to (“If you come with two divisions, we will fire on you. If you come with twenty-five divisions we will receive you with open arms”) was originally uttered by Adm. Darlan, who, though no longer head of government, was in the fall of 1942 still the head of all of Vichy’s armed forces and the legal successor to Pétain as well as one of his closest confidants. Darlan is a very controversial figure, but in my opinion there is a great deal of evidence that he would have been more than willing to throw in with the Allies once the conditions I allude to in my paper became a reality (Germany appearing vulnerable militarily and an opportunity for France to play a positive role in its defeat). There were certainly other important figures in Vichy (Giraud, members of the French General Staff as well as, apparently, Weygand) who were definitely eager to resume the war against Germany when the time was right. I don’t see Laval as being a significant obstacle in such a situation, but Pétain may very well have been. On the other hand, an octogenarian head of government who was already showing signs of senility is subject to either manipulation or a de facto coup in ways that are almost too obvious to enumerate. Indeed, Darlan and his colleagues in North Africa were only too ready to dispense with their oath of loyalty to Pétain at the first convenient opportunity (as soon as it could be plausibly be held that Pétain no longer spoke of his own free will following the German occupation of the Free Zone).

There is a lot more I could say along those lines, but the important thing is that no matter what the possibility that the French could throw in with the Allies following an invasion of the occupied zone would represent a great difficulty for the Germans. While the Anglo-Americans held out in Normandy it is highly improbable that the Germans would have attempted an invasion of Vichy since they would not have adequate resources to both counter the Allied invasion and launch one of their own to the south. Of course, they could have brought forces back from the Eastern Front or waited until they had driven the Allies in the north back into the sea, but there were other complications that would have made this difficult as well. First, since the French in Tunisia were effectively in the rear of Rommel’s critical lines of supply, they could not afford to invade the Free Zone without first securing Tunisia. But how would they do that? They did not have the pretext that the Torch landings gave them in November of 1942 since there were no foreign troops in French North Africa to counter. An amphibious operation would have taken some time to mount and in any case it is not clear Germany and Italy had the resources at that time for such an undertaking.

But what if despite the difficulties, the Germans decided to occupy Metropolitan France and Tunisia and managed to do so? The natural result would have been for the French fleet to flee to Oran where the French officers would almost surely have come to the same conclusion they did after Torch (by now, presumably, the Germans would have suffered defeat at El Alamein and the Red Army would have surrounded Stalingrad) except that now the Allies would have been invited in (and could avoid the difficulties and buildup bottlenecks associated with an amphibious assault since they would have had immediate access to local ports) with the French fleet added in to boot.

What if the Germans had try to preempt or counter the Allies by striking west from Tunisia? Even in the case of Torch (i.e., without an invasion of NW Europe and before the Stalingrad crisis and with the full cooperation of the local French authorities), the German buildup in Tunisia was relatively slow. Moving west, moreover, was both a logistical and military challenge. The difficult mountainous terrain and overall poor communications in eastern Algeria proved a real problem for the Allies when all they had to do was drive their trucks through friendly territory, but the Germans would have to contend with French colonial forces fighting on their home grounds in terrain that strongly favored the defender (remember, Juin, the commander in Algeria would later demonstrate the prowess of French colonial troops in mountainous terrain in Italy). I am only talking about delaying actions here – long enough for sufficient Anglo-American forces to arrive to check the Germans definitively – but place the German advance anywhere you want between the Tunisian/Algerian border and French Morocco and the disadvantage goes to the Germans again. Following the retreat from Libya, Rommel’s position in Tunisia was only (temporarily) tenable in the face of the advancing British due to the fact that he could join up with the other considerable forces there. With these other forces well to the west, they could not support each other so the British would have that much easier a task to drive Rommel back and take the vital Tunisian ports. Of course, the Germans would likely have countered this by bringing their western force back into Tunisia to link up with Rommel, but then the front lines would have been almost exactly the same as in the first several months following the Torch landings! In other words, even in the wake of a “failed” Sledgehammer (there is no possibility in my mind that the Germans would have mounted a major effort in French North Africa if they had not first defeated the Normandy invasion), the Allies would have lost very little and the Germans would have gained even less – and this represents almost the worst possible scenario for the Allies.

Even a minimally successful Sledgehammer, on the other hand, held the prospect for an eventual defection to the Allies of all or some significant portion of Vichy (I am virtually certain this would not take place for weeks or even months after the launching of Sledgehammer – but from October 1942 on all signs were pointing more and more to German defeat). Even if this meant just French North Africa it would mean that the Allies could have opened up the Med. to shipping without having to invade and probably months sooner as well (the Allies started sending convoys through immediately after the fall of Tunis – they did not have to wait until the occupation of Sicily).

There is a lot more I could say on each of these points, but this is already, I fear, a long post. I will attempt to address some of the other points that Carl brings up more directly related to the prospects for Sledgehammer (logistics, landing craft, Luftwaffe, etc.) soon.

Again, thank you for taking the time to read and comment on my paper.

[phylo_roadking]

Hi. I can sum up my answer to that in just one phrase - that's what I meant above about SLEDGEHAMMER being more likely to trigger a prejudicial action by the Germans to pre-empt any defections etc.. They reacted to TORCH/El Alamein by entering Metropolitan Vichy....and eventually carrying out a scratch-organised coup in Tunis...so how much MORE violenty will they react to an intrusion on the Continent in FRENCH territory? They HAVE to react to a potential military threat in their rear...

[gmichael]

They HAVE to react to a potential military threat in their rear...

But having to react and being able to react (effectively, at least) are two different things. There are simply not enough German troops to go around and they were much more likely to use what they had to eliminate the present danger in Normandy than they would be to counter a mere potential (your emphasis) threat somewhere else. Also, the evidence is that in the event of a Normandy invasion the potential threat they were most concerned about was to their U-Boat bases in Brittany (see p. 35 of my paper).

After all - don't forget that historical events showed HOW rapidly the Germans did move to occupy Metropolitan Vichy with the minimum of forces already available in Occupied France etc. Now...imagine HOW fast that could and would be achieved with much heavier German forces moved from East to West

How is it going to be faster if they have to wait for “much heavier German forces moved from East to West”? It took weeks for a single division to move between France and the Eastern Front. And, again, where were they going to find the spare forces of any consequence on the Eastern Front that already was stretched to the breaking point (as subsequent events would demonstrate)?

In any event, forcing the Germans to move substantial forces from the Eastern Front would already make Sledgehammer a major political success, even if the Germans were able to defeat the invasion of Normandy, occupy the Free Zone and take over Tunisia. The whole idea was to help the Soviet Union in their desperate struggle with Germany. Yes, we know now that they were able to turn the tables on the Germans at Stalingrad without a cross-Channel invasion, but in the wake of Sledgehammer no one could have been sure the Soviets could have held out without such assistance and the western Allies would have undoubtedly played up their “contribution” to that victory.

What then if the Germans had decided, for instance, to give up on the Caucasus oilfields and thus free up troops to send west to counter Sledgehammer and/or invade Vichy and/or shore up their Stalingrad position? Result: political victory for the Anglo-Americans (“we saved the oilfields”). Weakening the northern or central portions of the front would have the same result since both were hard-pressed to resist Soviet counterattacks as it was. And if the Soviets had been able to mount a full-scale Operation Saturn and succeed in cutting amputating the entire southern wing of the German position in the East, then it is essentially game over and Sledgehammer becomes a success of enormous proportions no matter what happened in the West. Moving “heavy” units from East to West would have made that a real possibility.

Is it absolutely impossible that the Germans could have accomplished what would have amounted to drawing an inside straight and come out ahead in the wake of a failed Sledgehammer? I’m not saying that, because it is possible, but I feel highly unlikely. The more likely outcome is a far greater setback for them in both military and political terms than what actually occurred in late 1943/early 1943 with the Western Allies likely reaping greater military and political dividends.

I want to add as well that it is not entirely clear that the German invasion of the Free Zone was an automatic response to Torch. There is every indication that their first thought was to aid the French in turning back the invasion of North Africa and it was only after it became clear that some top Vichy figures there were doing more talking with than fighting against the Anglo-American invaders that the Germans decided to move on Metropolitan Vichy. It is hard to see a parallel situation arising in the wake of Sledgehammer. I would grant that they would become worried about a potential threat in the manner you describe, but that would not give them the resources to counter it. It really becomes in my view more like an insoluble dilemma for them.

[Carl Schwamberger]

They HAVE to react to a potential military threat in their rear...

But having to react and being able to react (effectively, at least) are two different things. There are simply not enough German troops to go around and they were much more likely to use what they had to eliminate the present danger in Normandy than they would be to counter a mere potential (your emphasis) threat somewhere else. Also, the evidence is that in the event of a Normandy invasion the potential threat they were most concerned about was to their U-Boat bases in Brittany (see p. 35 of my paper).

As you probablly already know this point has been made several times in related discussion. There are a portion of readers who are not going to accept this without a detailed OB for the Germans being presented. Unwilling to accept the German army was spread that thin they wont believe superior forces not available be massed everywhere needed on a moments notice. Unfortunatly I've only a partial OB at hand here so cant help with this.

[gmichael]

Well, what about starting with a map?

Map - OB West Early Fall 1942

OBWestEarlyFall1942Sm.JPG (44.58 KiB) Viewed 1472 times

Download full size map (3.2 MB)

Note that although the map is clearly marked 30 September 1942 (30.9.42), I know for a fact that the movements of parts of the 1st and 2nd SS Divisions (LSAH and DR) to Normandy as depicted did not take place until October 5 (and that was the movement I discuss in my paper which a British double agent caused by passing false intel to the Germans). I can only assume that an unknown hand updated the map without updating the date. Other than that discrepancy, this is pretty much the same picture you will see during this period. You will see 10th Pz. near Amiens - basically the only mobile reserve in all of NE France - would you move it all the way to the south of France in the face of an invasion to Normandy and leave nothing between the thin coastal defenses and the Reich? There was also 6th Pz. and 7th Pz. Divisions near Brittany where the Germans expected the real Allied blow to fall even in the event of a landing in Normandy (again, refer to my paper). Would Hitler risk sending these to occupy Vichy and deprive his U-Boat bases of their best defenses? We can feel safe in conjecturing that 1st (based SW of Paris) and 2nd SS (based east of Rennes) would be among the first to respond to Sledgehammer based upon the successful British deception operation of 5 October. The 337th Division located in NE Brittany was already converted to a regular (but relatively low-quality) field division, so it was likely to go to Normandy in the wake of a landing there. It's hard to see that those 3 divisions could drive the invaders back into the sea. It's not inconceivable, of course, but show me where/when else it was done (note that "almost" is not the same thing). The rest of the 300 and 700 numbered divisions are static and (apart from their low standard of weaponry and personnel) do not have the transport to do anything but remain Bodenständig. That leaves the 106th (just opposite the straights of Dover and obviously not going anywhere until another division takes its place), the 17th (in Brittany, also not likely to move for the same reasons I mention above) and the 15th Division near Bordeaux. There is really nothing of significance between what is in France and the Eastern Front (at least 2 weeks away by rail), but even in the East there are no reserves to speak of. The Germans did not after all allow hundreds of miles of vulnerable frontage there to be guarded by Italians, Hungarians and Rumanians because they had a favorable opinion of their Allies' fighting abilities. If they had had German troops to man those areas (or even to back them up) they would have done so, but no such forces existed.

Again, is it not impossible that the Germans could have held in Normandy and successfully taken over the Free Zone to the south. I am convinced, however, this would occur only after they have first tried (and probably failed) to dislodge the Anglo-American invaders. This in itself could only encourage and embolden those elements within the Vichy regime that were favorable to reentering the war against Germany. If Weygand could urge the Vichy cabinet following Torch (which involved Americans and Brits killing French soldiers, sinking French ships and shooting down French airplanes) to fight the Germans cross the demarcation line even though there was no hope of accomplishing anything but salvaging something of French honor, what about when the Anglo-Americans were spilling their blood to liberate French from the hated boche? Moreover, it doesn't take a military genius to know that even a holding action in the south could help secure success in the north. And what of the political consequences either way? Churchill and/or Roosevelt were certain to make clear that a failure to resist the Germans under the circumstances meant the loss of all of the French Empire whereas full-blooded resistance meant a seat at the peace table on the side of the presumptive victors. Vichy was trying as hard as it could not to take sides in the war (at least as far as becoming a belligerent was concerned), but Sledgehammer would have quickly made neutrality impossible. Yes, Laval was hopeless and almost surely Pétain as well, but there were plenty of others (Giraud, Weygand, de Lattre, Darlan and many others) who were not. Even if the Germans risked invading Vichy, you would only be setting up the scenario I describe in an earlier post where the French fleet flees to North Africa where in due time the French forces there would almost surely go over to the Allies.

Whoops! Another "short" post turning into a long one! I do run on, don't I?


At the risk of causing page ref. confusion, I have revised my paper to address the above stated concerns regarding my use of endnotes: Sledgehammer paper (D-Day 1942 - D-Day 1944) with footnotes instead of endnotes (PDF)

[gmichael]

I forgot to mention that the map above is from the NARA Record Group Number 242 (box 20) collection, which are photographic transparencies of captured German situation maps which have been returned to Germany.