I'm afraid it'll be a bit before I have time for a more extensive reply to your other "points", but this is almost too easy...
Lightbob wrote:Rich I mentioned on an earlier submission that the British took most of the early fighting in Normandy because the Germans thought the British to be the greatest threat..
I’m surprised you had to ask for a reference with your knowledge of the battle and its geography. You realise of course that Caen is only approximately 160 miles to Paris or 50 miles to the River Seine and then another 300 miles approx to the West wall at Aachen’
Does anyone notice the logical fallacy? Apparently, "geographic knowledge" is "proof" that the "British took most of the early fighting in Normandy"? Nevermind of course that no "proof" has been offered of what constitutes most of the fighting. I would rather of thought that casualties suffered and inflicted might have been a better measure of the scale of the fighting than the location of Caen was?
Ah! But I have not finished.
Why am I unsurprised?
According to Antony Beevor’s ‘D-Day’ page 184;
“Both Rundstedt and Rommel regarded the Second Army as the chief threat. This was partly because they considered the British more experienced soldiers (they later admitted to underestimating the Americans), but also because a south-easterly breakthrough towards Falaise opened the possibility of an Allied dash for Paris. Such a disaster, if it came about, would cut off all German forces in Normandy and Brittany. Even Hitler agreed with this analysis, if only because of the symbolic value of Paris. His obsessive desire to hold on to foreign capitals was described as `a peevish imperialism' by the intelligence chief at Montgomery's 21st Army Group headquarters. Geyr was the only one who disagreed with the OKW's determination `to block the enemy direct route to Paris.”
You do realize of course that Beevor is not a "source" in this case? A "source" would be his reference for where he found these putative opinions by Rundstedt, Rommel, Hitler, and Geyr expressed...
Note the further logical fallacy that, although apparently the Germans did not know where the landings were to be, they did know that the greatest threat there would be the British?
BTW, Geyr was also one of the ones who was obsessively concerned with the possibility of a massive Allied airborne assault that would seize Paris, cutting off the German armies in France that way.
Sorry, all I have time for now...is that enough "abuse" for you today?
Cheers!