1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been better?

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Aber
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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#76

Post by Aber » 09 Nov 2013, 10:31

Even the Devon or Cornwall hedgerows at their worst are trivial in comparison to the Bocage hedges
Really?

I understand the distinction about UK training areas, but the western side of the UK has similar issues with small fields, hedges and lanes (or did until farmers started removing the hedges, and using flail trimmers)

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arjones
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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#77

Post by arjones » 09 Nov 2013, 13:42

The top two are to the north just outside Cherbourg


Tom from Cornwall
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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#78

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 09 Nov 2013, 15:11

I also seem to recall a discussion about the very close country in the far east of Kent being useful for "bocage" like training.

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Tom

RichTO90
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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#79

Post by RichTO90 » 09 Nov 2013, 15:43

Tom from Cornwall wrote:I also seem to recall a discussion about the very close country in the far east of Kent being useful for "bocage" like training.

Regards

Tom
I still fail to see where the prescience should have existed informing the Allied generals well enough in advance of the fact that it was expedient for troops they were having a difficult enough time simply getting to and housing in England after extensive unit, divisional, and corps training needed additional training, but only on a particular but otherwise random bit of terrain type? Especially when the accepted assessment was the Germans would not fight for the otherwise random bit of similar terrain in Normandy? Doing so would require a staggering capability for predicting the exact course of events that would make Nostradamus envious. In comparison, the thinking behind creating the Desert Training Area, which ultimately trained dozens of divisions in conditions actually encountered by only about five (and for only about five months) seems completely rational.

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#80

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 09 Nov 2013, 16:35

Rich,
Doing so would require a staggering capability for predicting the exact course of events that would make Nostradamus envious.
:lol: :lol:

Very true - and not even Montgomery would claim he had that capability! Although his RAF colleagues seem to think him remiss for not having had it... :roll:

Perhaps the importance of the Bocage has been "over-rated"... :roll: Sorry!!

Regards

Tom

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EKB
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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#81

Post by EKB » 10 Nov 2013, 01:15

In 1940, a substantial number of British troops passed right through the French bocage during Operation Ariel. Some of the combat units had been landed at Cherbourg in the first place. Did the combat photographers get any of this on record?

It would seem that the lessons learned about the geography were not institutionalized by today's standards, but there was definitely a base of knowledge for the terrain conditions in Normandy.

Granted that the topography had changed somewhat in 1944 due to extensive flooding by the Germans, but surely there must have been some analysis by SHAEF, 21st Army Group, or some other HQ to collect information, opinions, and photos from those in the know. Perhaps tactical bulletins or memorandums were produced but not widely read or distributed before the invasion.
Last edited by EKB on 10 Nov 2013, 04:51, edited 1 time in total.

Michael Kenny
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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#82

Post by Michael Kenny » 10 Nov 2013, 01:30

EKB wrote:In 1940, a substantial number of British troops passed right through the French bocage during Operation Ariel. Some of the combat units had been landed at Cherbourg in the first place. Did the combat photographers get any of this on record?
As has been stated many times they expected German reaction was flight inland.
The bulk of Commonwealth sector was not bocage country anyway. The Bluecoat area came closest.

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EKB
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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#83

Post by EKB » 10 Nov 2013, 04:13

Michael Kenny wrote:As has been stated many times they expected German reaction was flight inland.

That seems to be one of the potted excuses. But it doesn't make sense that Allied planners could be so ignorant, because they expected to have superior numbers, superior offensive firepower, and complete control of the skies over the battlefield. Most of the time, they did. That is not a situation that would, by any stretch, encourage the enemy to fight out in the open.

From air photos alone, it is obvious that French bocage country was the next best thing to a forest or jungle as a place to hide from observation. That factor was critical to the continued existence of the German Army (or for that matter, any outnumbered enemy in a similar predicament) so it follows they might make a stand in the bocage.

Michael Kenny wrote:The bulk of Commonwealth sector was not bocage country anyway. The Bluecoat area came closest.

Yes I know, but I was also wondering about the information exchange with the Americans concerning Operation Ariel.

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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#84

Post by RichTO90 » 10 Nov 2013, 16:58

EKB wrote:That seems to be one of the potted excuses. But it doesn't make sense that Allied planners could be so ignorant, because they expected to have superior numbers, superior offensive firepower, and complete control of the skies over the battlefield. Most of the time, they did. That is not a situation that would, by any stretch, encourage the enemy to fight out in the open.
It is not a "potted excuse"; it is an extremely well-documented reason, based upon the experience the Allies had to that point. The course of events in an amphibious assault against a German-held coast was: Allies land, Germans execute immediate Panzer counterattack, Allies hang on to the beachhead, Germans retreat to more defensible positions that protect the German heartland (or at least the route to it).

The problem with trying to hang onto the very defensible terrain of Normandy is that it is a very thin crust, very close to the coastline. Once it is penetrated, there is actually no really good contiguous defensive terrain until the old World War I battlefields of northeastern France and Belgium are reached - the Seine-Loire river line for example is almost completely indefensible; too many reentrants.

And, given that the cost of attempting to defend Normandy was that the Germans were incapable of halting the Allied advance before reaching the German fixed frontier defenses, I would venture to say the Allied analysis was correct. Where they failed was in not recognizing that much of the German strategic calculus was not based on good sense, but on intuition.
From air photos alone, it is obvious that French bocage country was the next best thing to a forest or jungle as a place to hide from observation. That factor was critical to the continued existence of the German Army (or for that matter, any outnumbered enemy in a similar predicament) so it follows they might make a stand in the bocage.
That may be, but except for that rather small bit of France the rest of it was rather exposed and rather far from Germany.
Yes I know, but I was also wondering about the information exchange with the Americans concerning Operation Ariel.
I don't know if information from the British skedaddle experience was used, but certainly the peculiar nature of the terrain was well-known. However, that does not mean the strengths of the terrain as a defensive position were well understood, which would have been difficult, since I don't think major battles had been fought in the region since Formigny... :lol:

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#85

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 10 Nov 2013, 22:01

Please don't take this the wrong way, and I know that it might be considered heretical, but was the American problem in the bocage just another example of the relative weakness in tank - infantry co-operation to that the British are normally accused of in the early stages of the Normandy campaign?

If Rich is correct (and he normally is :thumbsup: ) about the amount of training (other than amphibious) which the incoming American formations actually managed to achieve, then is it not at least possible that the problems in the early stages were just down to teething problems similar to those suffered by units like 7 Armourd Division which also arrived back in the UK at the end of 1943/early 1944?

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Tom

RichTO90
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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#86

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Nov 2013, 20:08

Tom from Cornwall wrote:Please don't take this the wrong way, and I know that it might be considered heretical, but was the American problem in the bocage just another example of the relative weakness in tank - infantry co-operation to that the British are normally accused of in the early stages of the Normandy campaign?
Ya think? :thumbsup: Combined arms training in both armies' infantry divisions basically sucked, for no better reason than they both apparently thought it was simply a matter of "marrying up" an armored unit with an infantry unit that would consult the same doctrinal documents and thus "do it right" (whatever "right" was). There was little excuse for that in the case of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division (other than the relief of Terry Allen and Ted Roosevelt probably screwing the division's training, not to mention morale) and the British 50th Division, both of which had extensive experience operationally in tank-infantry cooperation. I think that indicates that "sucked" is not just an anecdotal observation, it is also a precise and technically analytical one. :cry: :roll:
If Rich is correct (and he normally is :thumbsup: ) about the amount of training (other than amphibious) which the incoming American formations actually managed to achieve, then is it not at least possible that the problems in the early stages were just down to teething problems similar to those suffered by units like 7 Armourd Division which also arrived back in the UK at the end of 1943/early 1944?
If you think I'm normally correct then why do you argue with me so much? :P :lol:

Seriously, AFAIK, NONE of the American infantry divisions engaged in any significant form of combined arms training with separate tank battalions at any point prior to entering combat. It was not part of the CONUS-based training regimen, although all divisions engaged in corps-level maneuvers at least once prior to deployment...which meant they at least SAW a tank prior to combat, but there was no time or place to do so in England prior to D-Day. The only units that DID engage in serious combined arms (infantry, artillery, and tank) maneuver training in the American army were the armored divisions. In England that meant the 2nd, which also had combat experience in North Africa and Sicily, and the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th AD. The 4th and 5th AD had already adopted their distinctive and different combined arms tactical organizations in training prior to landing in France.

Tom from Cornwall
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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#87

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 12 Nov 2013, 21:18

Rich,
If you think I'm normally correct then why do you argue with me so much?
I knew I should have been more careful about using the word "normally". :lol:
The only units that DID engage in serious combined arms (infantry, artillery, and tank) maneuver training in the American army were the armored divisions. In England that meant the 2nd, which also had combat experience in North Africa and Sicily, and the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th AD. The 4th and 5th AD had already adopted their distinctive and different combined arms tactical organizations in training prior to landing in France.
Very interesting - was this reflected in a formal change of doctrine?

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Tom

RichTO90
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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#88

Post by RichTO90 » 12 Nov 2013, 23:38

Tom from Cornwall wrote:I knew I should have been more careful about using the word "normally". :lol:
Then do so...
Very interesting - was this reflected in a formal change of doctrine?

Regards

Tom
Was what "reflected"? The fact that doctrine didn't actually reflect reality because not enough reality had been experienced? The initial doctrine, which was entirely theoretical, was less than four years old and based entirely on an outside read of what the Germans had done in Poland and France, the revised doctrine, still based on zero combat experience, was less than two years old, the revised-revised organizational (rather than doctrinal changes) were less than a year old, and based upon about four months of combat experience. All of them were focused on the doctrine of the armored division rather than on the red-headed stepchild of tanks supporting infantry (the problem of throwing the Great War infantry-armor experience that had guided interwar doctrine in the U.S. Army out with the bathwater of what the Germans had done to the ill-prepared Allies).

There was no "change", because interwar doctrine had been entirely focused on tanks supporting infantry, then shifted to the doctrine of the armored division as operationally decisive at the institution of the Armored Force in June 1940 - the GHQ Tank Battalion got lost in the shuffle. But it was no longer "fashionable" and so a lot of basic lessons had to be re-learned.

PMN1
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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#89

Post by PMN1 » 17 Nov 2013, 23:35

From Carlo D'Este's 'Decision in Normandy' - P87

'Sir Alan Brooke had been extremely pessimistic at all times about our prospect of fighting through the bocage country...'

This was apparently from an Eisenhower interview.

This would suggest that there was some knowledge high up.

Key is as has already been said, can you develop counters in time with the resources available.

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Re: 1944 Preparing for the Bocage - Should it have been bett

#90

Post by Sheldrake » 24 Dec 2013, 02:54

Any analysis of the Normandy campaign needs to be with the context of an extremely successful campaign. Criticism focuses on on whether the campaign could have been won earlier or with fewer casualties, or whether the plans worked exactly as the generals had intended.

Another way to phrase this topic is whether some of the time spent training for the D Day assault should have been better spent training for fighting in the bocage. There is also thw question of whether the allies appreciated the difficulties of fighting in the bocage ahead of the landings and whether their existing tactical doctrine suited to adapting to the hedgerow country.

It is sometimes forgotten that the campaign was not a foregone conclusion. The invasion of Europe was expected by the Germans who had ample troops and had made the defeat of the second front their main priority for 1944. The allied priority was to establish a big enough beachhead to deploy their army. (What follows is a summary of the opening lecture from the combined operations training courses briefings run in1943-44./ You can find these on the internet.)

All of the invasion beaches were defended by German troops with strong fortifications and belts of obstacles. An amphibious invasion was one of the most difficult operations to mount. Wherever the allies attacked, the initial attack would take the form of a frontal assault on defensive positions similar to those which held out for four years from 1914-18. Yes the allies had tanks, but the Germans had lots of anti tank guns .

An amphibious assault had to take place under conditions where the army, navy and airforce were all at a disadvantage. An army attacking a defensive position can deploy supporting weapons in depth to smash and suppress defences. Ships are vulnerable close to land and must stay some distance off shore. WW2 era aircraft could not easily engage point hard targets such as concrete bunkers.

WW1, and Anzio and Salerno taught the allies that it wasn't easy to break into a defensive position and carve out a big enough beachhead to win a campaign. It was obvious to give a priority to ensure that the initial assault succeeded. Many of the senior commanders might have recalled the training in open warfare practiced before the 1916 Battle of the Somme, never needed because the campaign never progressed beyond the German lines of trenches.

So, for the assault divisions themselves it made a huge sense to focus on training for the assault. Without a success on D Day there would be no subsequent operations.

Did the Allies appreciate the difficulties of fighting in the hedgerow country?

The hedgerow country of Normandy isn't that different to the hedgerow country of England, which covers large swathes of the South West where the US Forces Trained as well as parts of Kent and Essex. The Eastern part of the Normandy battlefield is open field country, rather similar to the open fields of the English midlands and East Anglia. This countryside should not have been a surprise, and nor was it to some allied troops. E.g. the history of 43 Wessex Division mentioned the similarity between Normandy and the areas of Kent where they trained.

Were allied tactical doctrine suited to fighting ion the Bocage?

I think there is a tendency for all tactical doctrine to be optimised for military training areas, which tend, for obvious reasons to allow manouvre. Fighting in forests and built up areas tends to be regarded as special cases. The North African Campaign and the big tank battles on the steppes of Russia may have focused attention on the problems of manoeuvring masses of armour and integrating theirs moves with the other arms. In 1942-43 the British were wrestling with how to integrate infantry and armour and playing the Okey Cokey with a 3rd Infantry brigade vs a tank brigades in infantry divisions. They were also developing concentrated firepower at Corps level. The USA was still in the process of expansion and of absorbing lessons from Tunisia. Optimising tacics for the fine-grained countryside of Normandy wasn't particularly a high priority.

Incidentally the bocage country was essentially neutral. it made it as hard for the Germans to deploy their tanks as for the allies. Given that the first priority for the allies was to avoid being thrown into the sea, defensible terrain may have aided the allies more.

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