Effect of Area bombing on German war production prior 1944

[JonS]

.. certainly the Germans spent a huge amount on "formal" sheltering for urban populations - the multi-storey above-ground shelters for example ...

I was actually thinking of the diversion of AA and fighters, and the production and manpower needed to support all that. But, certainly, there was also the fortifications.

[phylo_roadking]

I was actually thinking of the diversion of AA and fighters, and the production and manpower needed to support all that. But, certainly, there was also the fortifications.

Well - arguably the British were in the nightfighter business longer than the Luftwaffe was I wonder what the aggregate cost of those extra 18 months-two years was...

Conversely - OFF the "total cost" of everything the British did in WWI - the cost in money and manhours spent on constructing air raid shelters that were built in the SPRING war scare in 1939 - and simply never taken away again - the distribution of Anderson Shelters etc. that people THEN built for themselves!!!

[JonS]

You have missed the point I was making.

[phylo_roadking]

Jon - not really - "it's all money" - or at least can be expressed in money terms What I'm saying is there was a lot of hidden "costs" on the British side that aren't normally counted into the "establishment" costs of air/civil defence the way we normally do for the Germans.

Also - we did hugely expand AA Command in 1940-41 IIRC - again the cost of that would have to be added into an aggregate total across the war.

[JonS]

Jon - not really - "it's all money" - or at least can be expressed in money terms ...

Yes, clearly you did.

It's not "all money", and I don't much care what the $ cost is, since it's irrelevant to what I've been saying. Germany could not afford the level of home defence they implemented, but they only attempted to implement that level because they'd bought into the myth of fragile home front morale that they themselves had cynically exploited. So whether it's measured in reichsmarks, pounds, groats, or seashells doesn't much matter either.

Whether Britian spent more, less, or the same, doesn't matter either since Churchill wasn't the one talking up the stab in the back myth.

[phylo_roadking]

As a resutl of this warped mythology, the Germans spent an awful lot more on home defence than they probably needed to - one of the lessons that came through all over the place was the amazing resilience of civilians when under attack, particularly aerial bombardment. The Spanish found that, British found that, the Japanese found that, and the Germans found that. But the Germans were the ones who spent so much on home defence - to stave of the mythical home front collapse they had created - that it contributed to their own actual defeat

Yes, money terms - but think of it this way...

The Germans spent it to shore up morale when things were going from bad to worse...

WE spent it when things were as bad as they were ever going to get - and the only way on from there was upwards

In other words - WE spent on civil defence on a shoestring "centrally" in a panic, with the voluntary sector - I.E. with those same "normal people's" participation - picking up the rest of the financial/psychological "bill" to keep us afloat as a functioning society. And one of the reasons we spend SO little "centrally" was....we were busy still building roadblocks/railblocks/pillboxes/stop lines at the same time And money was no object on THAT!

The Germans however had to REALLY start spending in a panic in 1942...and the pressure never let up after that After 1942, thanks to Bomber Comamnd and the USAAF, it wasn't a case of a few months' pressure then it slackened off - the German civil defence setup, both physical defences and material/psycohological bolstering of the civilian population, had to keep functioning day after night for the next three and a bit years...

...and especially in 1944 into 1945 the ability to do what they did for the people was just as inhibited by the same forces (literally!) that were preventing German industry moving raw materials and finished products around the country.

[Attrition]

I don't suppose it's possible that the Germans' judgement about the bombing threat after the failure to end the war in the west in 1940 was more accurate than subsequent analyses?

[vszulc]

This one I strongly disagree with.
The battle of the Atlantic where won before air raids on German yards started to make significant impact.
Quite contrary, Bomber commands insistence not to allow long range bombers to be used for ASW patrol kept the German subs alive.

Ah, but actually Merdiolu is right... In Toozes book The Wages of Destruction he describes how the Allied bombing campaigns damaged the output of submarines, which led the Kriegsmarine to transfer the responsibility for submarine production to Speer, who at the time had a reputation as someone who (almost singlehandedly) doubled the German armanent output. Speer introduced what had worked elsewhere: Instead of building uboats in one central location, he dispersed production to many subcontractors who each had to finish their section of the Uboat, and then send it off to the central shipyard which would assemble all the pieces.

Unfortunately it was a disaster. The subcontractors weren't precise enough in such a delicate work, which led to the shipyards having to rebuild some of the sections, and left many other unusable. The total effect of Speers involvement in the Uboat program (Which happened because of Allied strategic bombing, mind you), was that the revolutionary new submarine types that Germany was building was delayed with a whole year, and only a few of which were complete before the war ended. If Germany would have the subs in 1944 as originally planned, it could have made a dramatic difference in the war.

As a resutl of this warped mythology, the Germans spent an awful lot more on home defence than they probably needed to - one of the lessons that came through all over the place was the amazing resilience of civilians when under attack, particularly aerial bombardment. The Spanish found that, British found that

Pardon me, but the Spanish and the British does hardly compare with the devestation that was laid on Germany, not over a couple of months, but over years. The psychological effect alone was priceless. When Molotov visited Berlin in the autumn of 1940, to discuss Sovietunion entering the Axis, his meeting with Hitler was cut short by a British bombardment, and the Fuhrer and the Soviet foreign minister had to continue their discussions in a bombshelter. That kind of effect is also priceless.

Any regime exists basically to protect its citizens from harm. It's part of the contract, so to speak, between people and leadership. When the leadership can't uphold their end of the bargain, that has a devestating effect on public morale. Certainly you can probably never put a dollar figure on what the Strategic bombing campagin cost Germany in form of defeatism, doubt and uncertainty about the outcome of the war and so on, so you have to look at the whole picture.

[JonS]

Any regime exists basically to protect its citizens from harm. It's part of the contract, so to speak, between people and leadership.

Nonsense. That may be generally true now (although there remain exceptions), but it is a very recent development and certainly hasn't always and ever been the case. It definitely wasn't true in WWII.

[phylo_roadking]

Nonsense. That may be generally true now (although there remain exceptions), but it is a very recent development and certainly hasn't always and ever been the case. It definitely wasn't true in WWII.

Quite true - there are presently DOZENS of regimes around the world that survive and even thrive DESPITE not existing for the benefit and protection of its citizenry...but are there simply to ensure the continuance of that particular regime in power. One can look at eh the modern examples of Nyanmar, North korea, even Thailand at the moment.

During the war - governments spent on civil defence to protect themselves from their citizenry! This was done by following a TWO-stream path...

1/ the "traditional" idea of looking after - sheltering, feeding, rehousing etc. - bombed civilians, so that their morale DIDN'T collapse and they DIDN'T call en masse for the war to be brought to an end by whatever concessions necessary...

...but there was ALSO the SECOND stream -

2/ the increasing trend of governments to remove the functions of government in emergencies AWAY from the reach of civil populations! It's all well and good looking after, protecting, feeding civilians on the edge of mass hysteria and panic - but a government is even safer IF the 20th Century version of "Frankenstein's outraged villagers" with their pitchforks and torches simply can't REACH government to force it down a particular path of policy change!

How did governments do this? Simple! They created hidden redoubts, or simply removed the government functions AWAY from public view; how many Berlin workers wopuld be able to get to Rastenburg to pull down the fences and demand Hitler make peace with the British and stop the bombing??? How many London Eastenders would even KNOW where PADDOCK was???

Obviously - we can see the best examples of this trend in the POST-war "Cold War" Era - but the trend in the UK at least had started MANY years before even the Second World War - in the preparations made for the continuation of government during the 1929 General Strike!

[JonS]

As a result of this warped mythology, the Germans spent an awful lot more on home defence than they probably needed to - one of the lessons that came through all over the place was the amazing resilience of civilians when under attack, particularly aerial bombardment. The Spanish found that, British found that, ...

Pardon me, but the Spanish and the British does hardly compare with the devastation that was laid on Germany, not over a couple of months, but over years.

That may or may not be true, but you are using a splendid example of hindsight. Up to the end of 1940 - and actually well into 1942 - the examples of Guernica, London, Coventry, Southampton, et al were the best and only examples of what civilian populations would do under aerial bombardment. And what they showed was that the civilians would, to coin a phrase, "keep calm and carry on." Even the Germans found that, under the attacks they sustained up to the end of 1942, and even the '43-'45 attacks. There was simply no need for them to spend as much as they did* to stave off the imaginary threat of a stab in the back. What the Nazis really needed to worry about was being stabbed in the front, which is exactly what happened in WWII, and in WWI (though not to the Nazis, obviously ).

Jon

* which is distinct from spending nothing, so please don't be flinging that reductio ad absurdum about.

[phylo_roadking]

And what they showed was that the civilians would, to coin a phrase, "keep calm and carry on."

Jon - not always There's the famous episode of Churchill tourning the damage in October 1940, and when making an impromptu speech on Mile End Road, declaring that "We could take it"....he was told in no uncertain terms by the local women what they could or could not take!

I'm also getting hints in various sources that that "hot welcome" was by no means unique... apart from the politicians' hot receptions, there's also Queen Elizabeth's comment that the Royals "could look the East End in the eye now" after Buckingham Palace was bombed. Looks like awareness of the problem had made it right to the top...

THIS was what "the authorities" feared Not a sort of mass panic, head for the hills throwing-slower-moving-children-and-old-ladies-out-of-the-way flight - but a groundswell of popular opposition to the war because of what had been brought down on their heads by the war.

One streetcorner rabblerouser might have made all the difference - except they were A/ in jail for the duration or B/ were in the National Government!

[JonS]

I - and no one else, AFAICT - didn't say the civilians were enjoying themselves. Merely that by and large they adapted and got on with things, rather than dissolving in to a puddle of rioting and looting.

[John T]

This one I strongly disagree with.
The battle of the Atlantic where won before air raids on German yards started to make significant impact.
Quite contrary, Bomber commands insistence not to allow long range bombers to be used for ASW patrol kept the German subs alive.

Ah, but actually Merdiolu is right... In Toozes book The Wages of Destruction he describes how the Allied bombing campaigns damaged the output of submarines, which led the Kriegsmarine to transfer the responsibility for submarine production to Speer, who at the time had a reputation as someone who (almost singlehandedly) doubled the German armanent output. Speer introduced what had worked elsewhere: Instead of building uboats in one central location, he dispersed production to many subcontractors who each had to finish their section of the Uboat, and then send it off to the central shipyard which would assemble all the pieces.

Could you please give me the page reference of Tooze?
For instance U-Bouat.Net do not use bombers at all to explain why Speer where given the task.

A detailed production plan was worked out between July and December 1943.

At least 18 months were required to build a Type XXI U-boat under a conventional construction procedure (with boats built from start to finish on a single slip). This effectively meant that prototypes would be ready only in November 1944 and regular production boats would be ready for operational use in 1946. This was not acceptable.

Therefore the Minister for Armaments, Albert Speer, decided to consult the matter with Otto Merker, with experience in the mass production gained in the car industry.
...

http://www.uboat.net/technical/electroboats2.htm

But the bombing did delay production, no doubt about it. But that's from 1944 onwards (and thus not in this thread)

If Germany would have the subs in 1944 as originally planned, it could have made a dramatic difference in the war.

Might be, but I am always sceptical about German V-waffen and their possible effect.
German plans from the bunkers tended to be a bit optimistic.

I still insist that merdiolu's conclusion do not follow the timeline, regarding the second front. the new subs would never been available in number enough, early enough to hamper D-day. at Maximum chip off a few Battleships used for artillery support but not influence the outcome.

But I know most important results of air raids was delaying several German Secret Weapons programs....Especially delaying of new generation U-Boats to service they contributed huge to the Allied vctory in Battle of Atlantic ( without they would be no Second Front )

And the Battle of the Atlantic where first won by the allies during the summer of 1943 when
1- enough number of four engined patrol bombers where given good Radar and improved weapons ( FIDO- air launched ASW-torpedos)
2. Enough escort carries where available for short range ASW.


cheers
/John T.

[John T]

Any regime exists basically to protect its citizens from harm. It's part of the contract, so to speak, between people and leadership.

Nonsense. That may be generally true now (although there remain exceptions), but it is a very recent development and certainly hasn't always and ever been the case. It definitely wasn't true in WWII.

Once again I disagree a bit on the wordings , but this will wander of towards the "meaning" of totalitarian rulers.

The leadership did have a contract with the people, but the goal where not individual freedom and well being.
But rather a utopia worth to die for as long some of our children where able to live there.
I have studied communism (Know your enemy during the cold war) more than Nazi Germany,
but I see some similarities of a reasoning akin to :

The leadership will bring us (the German people/ World proletariat ) to "heaven" (1000-year Reich / World communism)
But alas, on the way towards that goal some will have to make greater sacrifices than other.
and those standing in OUR way are not worth to live.

So I say both Hitler and Stalin did believe in a higher cause for their citizens, however perverted.
From your western point of view a surprisingly large number of the population supported the leader for their personal benefit or belief in the same higher goal.
The rest the population did more or less accept or at least did not see a way to oppose.


Cheers
/John