This one I strongly disagree with.
The battle of the Atlantic where won before air raids on German yards started to make significant impact.
Quite contrary, Bomber commands insistence not to allow long range bombers to be used for ASW patrol kept the German subs alive.
Ah, but actually Merdiolu is right... In Toozes book The Wages of Destruction he describes how the Allied bombing campaigns damaged the output of submarines, which led the Kriegsmarine to transfer the responsibility for submarine production to Speer, who at the time had a reputation as someone who (almost singlehandedly) doubled the German armanent output. Speer introduced what had worked elsewhere: Instead of building uboats in one central location, he dispersed production to many subcontractors who each had to finish their section of the Uboat, and then send it off to the central shipyard which would assemble all the pieces.
Unfortunately it was a disaster. The subcontractors weren't precise enough in such a delicate work, which led to the shipyards having to rebuild some of the sections, and left many other unusable. The total effect of Speers involvement in the Uboat program (Which happened because of Allied strategic bombing, mind you), was that the revolutionary new submarine types that Germany was building was delayed with a whole year, and only a few of which were complete before the war ended. If Germany would have the subs in 1944 as originally planned, it could have made a dramatic difference in the war.
As a resutl of this warped mythology, the Germans spent an awful lot more on home defence than they probably needed to - one of the lessons that came through all over the place was the amazing resilience of civilians when under attack, particularly aerial bombardment. The Spanish found that, British found that
Pardon me, but the Spanish and the British does hardly compare with the devestation that was laid on Germany, not over a couple of months, but over years. The psychological effect alone was priceless. When Molotov visited Berlin in the autumn of 1940, to discuss Sovietunion entering the Axis, his meeting with Hitler was cut short by a British bombardment, and the Fuhrer and the Soviet foreign minister had to continue their discussions in a bombshelter. That kind of effect is also priceless.
Any regime exists basically to protect its citizens from harm. It's part of the contract, so to speak, between people and leadership. When the leadership can't uphold their end of the bargain, that has a devestating effect on public morale. Certainly you can probably never put a dollar figure on what the Strategic bombing campagin cost Germany in form of defeatism, doubt and uncertainty about the outcome of the war and so on, so you have to look at the whole picture.