Effect of Area bombing on German war production prior 1944

[Attrition]

~~~~~But alas, on the way towards that goal some will have to make greater sacrifices than other.
and those standing in OUR way are not worth to live.~~~~~

This is power, not ideology; it's a mitake to leave the 'liberal' capitalist states out.

[phylo_roadking]

Merely that by and large they adapted and got on with things, rather than dissolving in to a puddle of rioting and looting

There were many factors that combined to result in that non-occurance...

The strangest being the issue of SCALE...

In the case of German cities like Hamburg, Dresden, Cologne - victims of HUGE raids or huge series of them...that "getting on" was simply so hard for a certain amount of time; it took 101% of everything the survivors had in them to get themselves together, keep families together, find accomodation, food etc..even with the assistance of the various assistance organisations It channelled their energies and desperation...

London and other British cities - bombed in what could be described as the "early days" of strategic bombing - weren't hit enough to take their populations over the edge. By day there was no USAAF coming to finish/continue the RAF's attacks by night; there was a day, maybe two between raids, even on the same locations. People had just enough time to get their lives back into some sort of order - THEN after a time they had to deal with going through it again. There wasn't time to vegetate/brood about it; the Luftwaffe didn't manage to deliver quite the pressure required, or often enough/for long enough.

Interestingly - both Speer AND Goebbels noted privately that after the first six or so "1,000 bomber raids" that German civilian morale WAS on the ege of cracking - and they wouldn't have been able to take another raid or two. Unfortunately at THAT point....Bomber Command ran out of momentum for a time! They'd been cobbling together a force of old aircraft alongside new ones in service, borrowing back their old Whitleys and Wellingtons they'd passed on to Coastal for instance, to achieve that magic 1,000 total. But these were old by then, and had eventually to go back to their new duties; there was a several-month hiatus until the Lancaster/Halifax force matured...but so had German preparations to deal with the effects of them

Another factor has to be - the inability for public protest to gain momentum....or even awareness of among groups/areas of what was happening. In BOTH nations the media was strictly controlled - and there was no way major dissent could gain a "public" voice that could then spread. Word of mouth in a very small geographical area was IT - even news of worse things happening elsewhere, spread by telephone call or letter, was treated very much as "news from abroad". Yes, a street-full of housewives could give Churchill what-for...but when he turned the corner at the end of the street he was away from it again

There was also the "uniform" effect. In both nations, as I said before - there was a whole range of either official or voluntary organisations who assisted with rescue and relief....but in those vital hours afterwards, they were at least THERE - in uniform - be it as litle as a party organisation armband, or a lapel pin. Even in the UK you had areas swamped by the AFS/NFS, the ARP organisation, the Police, Red Cross/St Johns/Knights of Malta...and it would be very hard for a wave of spontaneous protest to start in a crowd of bombed civilians with quite SO many respresentatives of the organisations working for their benefit embedded in that crowd!

[Guaporense]

This was, after all - total war. ANY cost to your enemy in any aspect of his warmaking potential anywhere is beneficial.

However, there are different returns per dollar invested. The air war was inefficient because the money used in it could be better spent on other things. If my memory don't fail me, total costs were 43 billion dollars for the USAF in the ETO. Counting the RAF, with had comparable efforts, put's the total cost at nearly 100 billion dollars, or about 40% of the total war budget of the US during WW2.

For that cost it would be better to make more army divisions and produce less aircraft. The US army only had 89 divisions, with the manpower wasted into the air industry, bomb industry and airforce for the strategic bombing they could have mobilized more divisions or builded more transport ships, to invade Normandy.

The fact is that the impact of the strategic air war on ww2 was nearly null compared to the ground campaigns. The most important industry was the ammunition industry, with was particularly resistant to bombing.

Hi G

You are making huge generalisations based upon economic and almost accountant like Profit & Loss and Balance sheet ideals and principles.

They are not only based on that. They are based on a large set of my reading about:

1- The (lack of) effects of strategic bombing on German war production.

2- The (lack of) casualties inflicted by air forces.

3- The fact that even with a massive aerial superiority, the Western Allies still needed a massive superiority in the ground to win. In other words, air power doesn't substitute the army. It is only a complement and doesn't have a strategic role to play.

4- The Allies poured resources in their air forces. The US had a tiny army (about 2.6 million men in their field army of 89 divisions) compared to their manpower strength, with was 40% greater than Germany's (in terms of labor force size). However, the aircraft industry, in the US employed 3 times more personnel in 1943 than Germany's, while their armed forces were of the same size.

Efficency has a bearing upon the conduct of a campaign or the prosecution of a war but it does not exist in isolation or without context. WW2 was the first true global 3 dimensional war, fought with all the rigours of modern technology on land, on the sea and in the air.

So? That doesn't justify the fact that the US and Britain poured more resources into their air force than they should have. I didn't say that an air force was completely useless in WW2 in terms of efficiency, but that the amount of resources spent on the airforce was excessive.

The Allies thought that the air force could substitute an army, that an air force could be used as an effective strategic weapon, and could reduce personnel losses in war. Instead of having to kill the enemy in the battlefield, they could bomb their cities and hope that they surrendered.

The real effect was that the Allies lost 160,000 airmen during the war, for little to no benefit. Losses in the strategic bombing campaign in terms of permanent casualties were comparable to the losses in the western front.

Your assertion(s) based on purely on cost effiencies are crude and simple. The most important industry was the ammunition industry based on what premise! I could equally argue it was the steel industry, the POL industry, transportation, agriculture, it all depends on the interactions of each. Equally I could argue that its better to try and kill the man making the bullet than try and kill the man firing the bullet-but thats outside this thread scope.

Out of the armament industries, the most important was the ammunition industry, because that's the fuel that powers the army. However, the largest industry was the aircraft industry, however, aircraft didn't play a much decisive role in the war compared to ammunition.

[Guaporense]

Interestingly - both Speer AND Goebbels noted privately that after the first six or so "1,000 bomber raids" that German civilian morale WAS on the ege of cracking - and they wouldn't have been able to take another raid or two. Unfortunately at THAT point....Bomber Command ran out of momentum for a time! They'd been cobbling together a force of old aircraft alongside new ones in service, borrowing back their old Whitleys and Wellingtons they'd passed on to Coastal for instance, to achieve that magic 1,000 total. But these were old by then, and had eventually to go back to their new duties; there was a several-month hiatus until the Lancaster/Halifax force matured...but so had German preparations to deal with the effects of them

Just one more 1000 bomber raid and they would have collapsed! The 600,000 German civilians killed by air raids weren't enough, that's why it didn't work! If they killed 700,000, Germany would have collapsed!



The sad fact is that these air raids were futile. The 150,000 allied air men that lost their lives and the 600,000 German civilians were unnecessary casualties in the war.

[helitech]

I think we are ignoring pure availability of raw materials , the U.S could out build most anything they had . Volume defeats technology if they are anywhere close . From relatives on the ground , carpet bombing is a too accurate description .

[phylo_roadking]

Just one more 1000 bomber raid and they would have collapsed! The 600,000 German civilians killed by air raids weren't enough, that's why it didn't work! If they killed 700,000, Germany would have collapsed!

Did you actually bother reading the last three pages iof this thread????

In the first several months of 1,000-bomber raids, the Germans' many and various relief agencies, civil defence preparations etc. were in their infancy; if the British could have kept the pressure on at THAT point, German civilian morale COULD inded have craccked - people stayed at home and not gone to work, got into their shelters and not come out, trekked out of the cities to sleep in the fields and not come back. But for the reasons detailed earlier they couldn't keep up the pressure at THAT point in the war. By late 1944/early 1945, with over 3,500 four engined bombers in the Heavy Force, and over 1,500 precision bombers in the Mosquito-based FNSF - they could keep up the rpessure of ngihtly raids in several places THEN....but the German state and Party apparatus for supporting bombed German civilian populations was ALSO in full swing.

This is the sort of place where your "little knowledge is a dangerous thing"...what YOU see as a "problem", that the Allies didn't destroy as much hard industrial capacity as they did for instance housing - was what the Allies WANTED to do after 1942!

This is what the ENTIRE British area bombing doctrine change in 1942 was ABOUT - I do believe I've had to advise you already in the last 24 hours about passing comment on something that you know SO little about? - that they should target the residential areas of German industrial cities to destroy the moral of German WORKERS.

The RAF had tried and proved for three years that medium-and high-altitude precision bombing of individual targets - docks, factories etc. DIDN'T WORK - so instead they "targeted" German workers. What YOU see as a mistake or a failure, the Allies viewed as a success - a successful hitting of their NEW target!

Yes, it historically didn't work in that it didn't destroy German civilian morale - but that didn't happen in 1942-43 because of the British failing, not because of some magical invincibility on the part of German workers!!!! In other words - the sheer "mechanical" failures of wartime...exhaustion, lack of the right aircraft etc. etc....

(As an aside - but an enlightening one - the U.S. used "strategic" bombing in Vietnam for the wrong purpose; they looked at the BRITISH example of the use of air power in Malaya where it worked during the Emergency to pacify a rebellious country, and thought they could apply a "bigger and better" solution. But in malaya it worked BECAUSE it was tactical level - AND because the civilian population had been moved out - "concentrated" - beforehand. In other words the British created whole swathes of "free fire zone" where the only thing that could be moving was an enemy...in Vietnam the Americans resorted to trying to kill anything that moved in case it was an enemy; but they hadn't done the essential clearance first. The whole purpose of the Malayan Emergency clearances was so that properly-targeted tactical air power could be used in a given area NOT strategic bombing.)

[ljadw]

well,I have to admit(perish the thought )that in this case,Guaporense is not wrong,at least not 100 % ,of course,as always? ,he is exagerating .
The directives for Harris(I suspect he did write them himself),were to break the morale of the German civilians,it was assumed,and claimed by Harris,that that would result in a collapse of Germany .
But,it did not:German morale did not collaps,thus it was a failure.But,notwithstanding,Harris continued(his big ego could not accept that his private war was no success):in november 1943,he promised Churchill that he could destroy Berlin,the morale of the population would collapse and the war would be over.He was wrong .
Was anothet strategy possible ? And could this have more results ? Maybe(with hindsight ):to continue the attacks on the ball-bearing plants for example,would have been more dangerous for the Germans .
Of course,the area bombing had some-indirect-results:A-A guns had to be concentrated in Germany,consumption of ammunition,.....
But,the costs for the allies were not neglectable:raw materials,workers,fuel,...
I am not arguing as some that air attacks were useless,but I am doubting the efficiency of the area bombardments (considering the costs,benefits and results,for both parties)and I am wondering if another air strategy(not precise bombardments,these were impossible,but perseverating attacks on specific goals) would not have had more results,not that another air strategy would have made a land war superfluous.

[ljadw]

Interestingly - both Speer AND Goebbels noted privately that after the first six or so "1,000 bomber raids" that German civilian morale WAS on the ege of cracking - and they wouldn't have been able to take another raid or two. Unfortunately at THAT point....Bomber Command ran out of momentum for a time! They'd been cobbling together a force of old aircraft alongside new ones in service, borrowing back their old Whitleys and Wellingtons they'd passed on to Coastal for instance, to achieve that magic 1,000 total. But these were old by then, and had eventually to go back to their new duties; there was a several-month hiatus until the Lancaster/Halifax force matured...but so had German preparations to deal with the effects of them

Just one more 1000 bomber raid and they would have collapsed! The 600,000 German civilians killed by air raids weren't enough, that's why it didn't work! If they killed 700,000, Germany would have collapsed!



The sad fact is that these air raids were futile. The 150,000 allied air men that lost their lives and the 600,000 German civilians were unnecessary casualties in the war.

your last statement is wrong :you can argue that the air bombardments were useless(and I doubt very much that they had lasting effects),but there were no 150000 dead allied air men because of the area attacks (many died because of other causes:attacks on precise goals,accidents ....;the same for the civilian casualties).
The logic of your statement is that all air raids were futile and this is nonsense.

[Attrition]

~~~~~Yes, it historically didn't work in that it didn't destroy German civilian morale - but that didn't happen in 1942-43 because of the British failing, not because of some magical invincibility on the part of German workers~~~~~

Surely this is best seen as a period in the bombing war when Bomber Command was beginning to benefit from quantity but had yet to gain the benefits of quality, in terms of night navigation and target finding? The area offensive took place at the time when Harris (of all people) said that the Germans lived in a tyranny and so didn't have the luxury of morale. Trying to create obstacles between workers and factories by making a wilderness of blocked streets and broken water mains etc seems quite a sensible way of making the most of what Bomber Command could do at the time. The battle of the Ruhr seems to Tooze (and Speer) to be the beginning of unprecedented precision as well as weight of bombs so the area offensive seems to be a bit of a misnomer - after this it was inconsistency rather than inability which diminished BC's results.

[helitech]

One telling story was when the incendiary bombs were being extinguished / removed by kids and house wives ( it was common to add sand to the attic floor to stop the spread of fire ). They added explosives to increase the burn radius and get rid of those pesky women and children .

[Attrition]

What's the point of dropping an incendiary which isn't?

[helitech]

Cost and silent penetration of a roof , if no one notices it continues to burn . But civilians noticed and put them out .

[Attrition]

Like in London.

[helitech]

Its hard on any civilian population , when they aren't part of the dispute .

" Dont hate the players hate the Game "

[phylo_roadking]

Maybe(with hindsight ):to continue the attacks on the ball-bearing plants for example,would have been more dangerous for the Germans

Not necessarily; Speer worked wonders with alternatives IIRC - turned phosphor bronze bearings running in oil, self-lubing sintered bronze bearings etc., in major applications replacing ballraces where possible. IIRC they ALSO upped their orders to SKF in Sweden and stockpiled a huge amount.

The directives for Harris(I suspect he did write them himself),were to break the morale of the German civilians,it was assumed,and claimed by Harris,that that would result in a collapse of Germany .
But,it did not:German morale did not collaps,thus it was a failure.

Surely this is best seen as a period in the bombing war when Bomber Command was beginning to benefit from quantity but had yet to gain the benefits of quality, in terms of night navigation and target finding? The area offensive took place at the time when Harris (of all people) said that the Germans lived in a tyranny and so didn't have the luxury of morale.

1/ WHILE they were area bombing they were ALSO destroying a lot of industry in the process - see the recent threads discussing the damage done to industry in Hamburg and Dresden.

But

2/ When the Allies carried out surveys after the war - they had to come to a disturbing conclusion from what German civilians said...They were more frightened of the GESTAPO than Bomber Command! Area bombing was regarded as a "random" hazard - whereas the Gestapo were highly selective!!!