Effect of Area bombing on German war production prior 1944

[ljadw]

Ljadw Said:

the Battle of Berlin (winter 43-44) was a defeat for Bomber Command :Harris claimed that the Germans would give up, they didn't and he had to abandon the attacks .It's that simple.

Perhaps you should consider that Harris wasn't allowed to finish the job, On the orders of SHAEF and against his and Gen Spaatz objections the Bomber force was taken off the attacks on German and were used in the preparation for and during the D Day landings

At the time the RAF considered it a defeat because of the number of casualties, 600 bombers shot down and no fire storm, and even admitted that compared to Hamburg and the Ruhr it was a defeat, the US Bomber survey make much of this. However with the opening up of archives previously held in the Old Russian Sector of East German perhaps a different interpretation could be place on the failure or other wise of the Battle of Berlin.

According to the German assessment of a raid in late '43, no bombs fell within several miles of the markers. The airfield in the periphery of Berlin were hit, airmen killed and planes destroyed or damaged. The main industrial plants all over Berlin were hit including many small factories making components for tanks and aircraft. The Great Eastern Front transit Railway station at Annalt was heavily damaged and a train with soldiers going back from Leave to Russia was hit almost 100 soldiers were killed and another 150 injured. To the German surprise a secret Luftwaffe technical testing and repair centre was completely destroyed, But only 24 houses were damaged. Not bad for a failed raid? ( taken from a British Legion Magazine and was a story of a Sergeant Navigator Shot down and his return to Berlin in Early 2000)

During the attacks on Berlin Speer had to bring 6000 technicians back from building the Atlantic Wall to keep Berlin’s utilities working, and troops from the surrounding Garrisons were continually used in rescue and keeping the streets and roads clear of rubble.

The destructions were not the aim,the aim was to break the morale of the population of Berlin,resulting in a popular revolt and the fall of the regime .The goal was not achieved,in contrast to the promises from Harris .
Saying that the reason was,that Harris was not allowed to finish the job,is a feeble excuse :there were no indications that the morale of the population was broken .

[Guaporense]

It is very difficult to quantify production that never took place, but one can say with certainty that German military production fell well below what was planned, even in its best year of 1944

Actually, German war production was nearly always the planned levels until the second half of 1944, when allies armies were cutting thought the supply of raw materials to the German economy.

What is more, if you compare German aircraft production in 1944 with British aircraft production you find that although Germany had nearly twice the population of the UK it only produced a similar number of aeroengines and weight of fuselages.

Germany produced about twice the number combat aircraft in 1944 than Britain (36,000 to 18,000). It is estimated that strategic bombing may have reduced German aircraft production between 1943 and 1944 by 7,500 units, or about 12% of actual production.

Britain produced greater airframe weight because they specialized in the production of heavy aircraft, like the lancaster, with had airframes 8-9 times the weight of a Bf-109. However, the cost of a pound of heavy airframe is much smaller than of a Bf-109 airframe (the relative cost per pound obeys the rule of of a third of a power of the ratio of weigh, if aircraft X's airframe is 8 times heavier than aircraft Y's, the cost per pound of the airframe of X would be half of Y's).

In terms of weigh, German production was smaller than British in 1941,1942,1943 and 1944, when they weren't being bombed or when they were.

So either the British were twice as efficient at producing aircraft as Germany was even in its very best year (which I doubt), or German productive capacity was held down well below its potential by some factor. Bombing seems the most likely candidate.

The British weren't twice as efficient as the Germans. In 1943, the Germans were 82% as efficient as the Americans, with were more efficient than the British, German efficiency was probably equal or superior to the British.

Also, Germany's population was not 2 times as large as Britain's, it was 1.6 times as large. And Germany was nowhere as specialized in aircraft production than Britain was, with devoted the majority of their resources to that end.

Air raids managed to disrupt temporarily war production. If you bombed factory X, it won't work for 2-3 weeks, after that production would resume.

[Guaporense]

Ljadw Said:

the Battle of Berlin (winter 43-44) was a defeat for Bomber Command :Harris claimed that the Germans would give up, they didn't and he had to abandon the attacks .It's that simple.

Perhaps you should consider that Harris wasn't allowed to finish the job, On the orders of SHAEF and against his and Gen Spaatz objections the Bomber force was taken off the attacks on German and were used in the preparation for and during the D Day landings

At the time the RAF considered it a defeat because of the number of casualties, 600 bombers shot down and no fire storm, and even admitted that compared to Hamburg and the Ruhr it was a defeat, the US Bomber survey make much of this. However with the opening up of archives previously held in the Old Russian Sector of East German perhaps a different interpretation could be place on the failure or other wise of the Battle of Berlin.

According to the German assessment of a raid in late '43, no bombs fell within several miles of the markers. The airfield in the periphery of Berlin were hit, airmen killed and planes destroyed or damaged. The main industrial plants all over Berlin were hit including many small factories making components for tanks and aircraft. The Great Eastern Front transit Railway station at Annalt was heavily damaged and a train with soldiers going back from Leave to Russia was hit almost 100 soldiers were killed and another 150 injured. To the German surprise a secret Luftwaffe technical testing and repair centre was completely destroyed, But only 24 houses were damaged. Not bad for a failed raid? ( taken from a British Legion Magazine and was a story of a Sergeant Navigator Shot down and his return to Berlin in Early 2000)

During the attacks on Berlin Speer had to bring 6000 technicians back from building the Atlantic Wall to keep Berlin’s utilities working, and troops from the surrounding Garrisons were continually used in rescue and keeping the streets and roads clear of rubble.

The Germans never lost the Battle of Britain, since damage done to Britain was significant, they lost a lot of fighters as well. They didn't let them finish the job because of the opening of the eastern front.

The Germans never lost Barbarossa, they inflicted over 4 million casualties and captured lands with 70 million people.

The fact is that to lose is to fail in acheiving what the planner set to achieve in the first place. The Germans set to destroy the RAF and convince Britain to make a peace agreement. They also set to Barbarossa to capture all the land up to the A-A line, while negotiating an armistice with the USSR.

The Brits set to ignite a popular uprising with a set of bombing raids. They didn't, hence, it was a failure.

Notice that these types of defeats happen when they set unrealistic objectives in the first place.

[ljadw]

Ljadw Said:

the Battle of Berlin (winter 43-44) was a defeat for Bomber Command :Harris claimed that the Germans would give up, they didn't and he had to abandon the attacks .It's that simple.

Perhaps you should consider that Harris wasn't allowed to finish the job, On the orders of SHAEF and against his and Gen Spaatz objections the Bomber force was taken off the attacks on German and were used in the preparation for and during the D Day landings

At the time the RAF considered it a defeat because of the number of casualties, 600 bombers shot down and no fire storm, and even admitted that compared to Hamburg and the Ruhr it was a defeat, the US Bomber survey make much of this. However with the opening up of archives previously held in the Old Russian Sector of East German perhaps a different interpretation could be place on the failure or other wise of the Battle of Berlin.

According to the German assessment of a raid in late '43, no bombs fell within several miles of the markers. The airfield in the periphery of Berlin were hit, airmen killed and planes destroyed or damaged. The main industrial plants all over Berlin were hit including many small factories making components for tanks and aircraft. The Great Eastern Front transit Railway station at Annalt was heavily damaged and a train with soldiers going back from Leave to Russia was hit almost 100 soldiers were killed and another 150 injured. To the German surprise a secret Luftwaffe technical testing and repair centre was completely destroyed, But only 24 houses were damaged. Not bad for a failed raid? ( taken from a British Legion Magazine and was a story of a Sergeant Navigator Shot down and his return to Berlin in Early 2000)

During the attacks on Berlin Speer had to bring 6000 technicians back from building the Atlantic Wall to keep Berlin’s utilities working, and troops from the surrounding Garrisons were continually used in rescue and keeping the streets and roads clear of rubble.

The Germans never lost the Battle of Britain, since damage done to Britain was significant, they lost a lot of fighters as well. They didn't let them finish the job because of the opening of the eastern front.

The Germans never lost Barbarossa, they inflicted over 4 million casualties and captured lands with 70 million people.

The fact is that to lose is to fail in acheiving what the planner set to achieve in the first place. The Germans set to destroy the RAF and convince Britain to make a peace agreement. They also set to Barbarossa to capture all the land up to the A-A line, while negotiating an armistice with the USSR.

The Brits set to ignite a popular uprising with a set of bombing raids. They didn't, hence, it was a failure.

Notice that these types of defeats happen when they set unrealistic objectives in the first place.

The Germans lost the BOB:they did not destroy the RAF and Britain was not making a peace agreement .
The Germans lost Barbarossa:the directive of Barbarossa was to defeat the SU in a quick campaign:the SU was not defeated in a quick campaign.
Maybe you have a book that's proving that the RAF was destroyed and that the SU was defeated ? If so,you could give us title and author ? And also ISBN number ?

[bf109 emil]

The Germans never lost the Battle of Britain, since damage done to Britain was significant, they lost a lot of fighters as well. They didn't let them finish the job because of the opening of the eastern front.

yup and to bad they turned tail and ran and hid in the moonlight as opposed to remaining slaughtered during the day!!

The Germans never lost Barbarossa, they inflicted over 4 million casualties and captured lands with 70 million people.

yup and again, the Germans ended Barbarossa where, on Hitlers scenic view of a mole?

[LWD]

...
The Germans never lost the Battle of Britain, since damage done to Britain was significant, they lost a lot of fighters as well. They didn't let them finish the job because of the opening of the eastern front.

They lost the BOB becuase they didn't accomplish their objecitves and it became clear that they couldn't. The BOB was over well before they attacked the USSR.

The Germans never lost Barbarossa, they inflicted over 4 million casualties and captured lands with 70 million people.

And ended up with Soviet forces in control of Berlin. That's loosing and badlly by any rational defintion.

The fact is that to lose is to fail in acheiving what the planner set to achieve in the first place. The Germans set to destroy the RAF and convince Britain to make a peace agreement.

The inital plan was also to allow for Sea Lion. Note that they failed in all this so by your own defintion they lost. Which is not what you stated above.

They also set to Barbarossa to capture all the land up to the A-A line, while negotiating an armistice with the USSR.
...

There is at least some indication that they wanted to destroy the USSR rather than signing an armistice. That of course deosn't mean they planned to conquer all of it. At leasat not in the short term.

[Sid Guttridge]

Guaporense - If you compare German planning from 1942 with what was produced in 1944 you will find it fell short in numerous areas. One reason was dispersal of production away from urban areas and major sites to avoid Allied bombing. This could cost weeks or months of production. What is more, dispersal delayed final assembly because components had to be concentrated from their dispersed points of production. This dispersal would not have taken place were the existing Allied bombing not damaging. As I said before, it is difficult to quantify losses of equipment never built, but it was undoubtedly very substantial.

Yup. Germany did produce twice the number of combat aircraft that the UK did in 1944. And it did so because it had to concentrate on producing fighters to counter Allied bombing. In the last year of the war Germany had to stop almost all multi-engined production. Why? Because successful Allied bombing forced Germany to concentrate on building single-engined fighters to oppose that very same bombing! In other words, Allied bombing was distorting even such production as Germany achieved!

Germany had 80 million people according to the wartime Reich year books, not including Czechs. The metropolitan UK had 45 million. Therefore, as I said before "Germany had nearly twice the population of the UK".

Even after the supposed productive miracle of 1944, the Reich was only producing about the same number of aero engines and weight of airframes as the UK.

Allied bombing was often crudely executed, but far from ineffective.

[Attrition]

Wasn't 1944 the time when Speer really began to cook the books? 3031 fighters delivered in a month but not 'new' aircraft, some were repaired ones delivered previously etc? Considering the effort Britain had to devote to naval construction and the far from token army, aircraft production looks all the more creditable.

[JonS]

... dispersal of production away from urban areas and major sites to avoid Allied bombing. This could cost weeks or months of production. What is more, dispersal delayed final assembly because components had to be concentrated from their dispersed points of production. This dispersal would not have taken place were the existing Allied bombing not damaging. As I said before, it is difficult to quantify losses of equipment never built, but it was undoubtedly very substantial.

You could, perhaps, get a sense of the losses by comparing the output of the dispersed production of Spitfires across Southern England with the concentrated production of same at Castle Bromwich in say, mid-late 1941. It should(!?) be relatively(!?) easy to get the number of manhours per airframe from the southern dispersal and for the CB factory.

Reading about the dispersal adfter the bombing of the Supermarine facility at Southhampton the speed and effectiveness of the dispersal, it's generally really talked up as a success story. but then they invariably get around to the numbers produced, and they're good but almost a rounding error* when compared to the number coming out of CB.

Jon

* exaggeration for effect I can't recall any specifc numbers off the top of my head, and without a comparative total of manhours - even a rough one - it'd be meaningless anyway.

[Sid Guttridge]

I've just had a look at "German Aircraft Industry and Production 1933-1945" by Ferenc Vajda.

On p.133 he writes "It has been estimated that the Allied raids between mid-1943 and the end of 1944 cost the German aircraft industry some 14,000 fighters and 4,000 other types." As far as I can tell from a quick glance at the same source, actual German fighter production in this period was about 31,000. In other words, Allied bombing may have cost Germany between a quarter and a third of all fighter production in this period. It also obliged the suspension of almost all German multi-engined aircraft production in favour of more fighter production to oppose the bombers.

Allied bombing, for all its limitations, undoubtedly had a major impact on German aircraft production.

Germany's productive "miracle" in 1944 looks superficially impressive when compared with the low production levels of earlier years, but this flatters to deceive. When compared, for example, with the UK, the Reich was still, even after the supposed "miracle", producing only about the same number of aero engines and weight of airframes as the metropolitan UK, which had little more than half its population.

[ljadw]

I've just had a look at "German Aircraft Industry and Production 1933-1945" by Ferenc Vajda.

On p.133 he writes "It has been estimated that the Allied raids between mid-1943 and the end of 1944 cost the German aircraft industry some 14,000 fighters and 4,000 other types." As far as I can tell from a quick glance at the same source, actual German fighter production in this period was about 31,000. In other words, Allied bombing may have cost Germany between a quarter and a third of all fighter production in this period. It also obliged the suspension of almost all German multi-engined aircraft production in favour of more fighter production to oppose the bombers.

Allied bombing, for all its limitations, undoubtedly had a major impact on German aircraft production.

Germany's productive "miracle" in 1944 looks superficially impressive when compared with the low production levels of earlier years, but this flatters to deceive. When compared, for example, with the UK, the Reich was still, even after the supposed "miracle", producing only about the same number of aero engines and weight of airframes as the metropolitan UK, which had little more than half its population.

hm,
1) estimations are only estimations:it is dubious to claim that without the air raids,X fighters more would be produced .Some other factors would limit the aircraft production :spare parts
2)I doubt that the loss would be principally in fighters;in 1943,the production was OO fighters and 109OO bombers .
3)there was also a shortage on pilots,

[ljadw]

Stupid smilies :it should be :eight thousand bombers and 10900 fighters

[Sid Guttridge]

I agree that estimations are only estimations. I have said from the start that quantification of production that never actually took place is difficult to measure. However, the general order of magnitude of production lost due to Allied bombing was undoubtedly large, both in absolute numbers and proprtionally to actual output.

Thus the fact of the rise of German aircraft production until August 1944 cannot be used as an argument against the effectiveness of Allied bombing. It was clearly achieved despite the considerable impact of Allied bombing.

The crunch issues in the end were shortages of trained pilots and fuel rather than aircraft, but both of these owe much to Allied bombing as well. Allied bombing did holistic damage. It wasn't confined to one area.

[Marcus Wendel]

A discussion was split off into a new thread entitled Effect of strategic bombing in WW2.

/Marcus

[phylo_roadking]

The crunch issues in the end were shortages of trained pilots and fuel rather than aircraft, but both of these owe much to Allied bombing as well.

The shortage of fuel wasn't necessarily due to just the destruction of cracking plants; as late as mid-April 1945, for example, Heinrich Fey was able to tell his interrogators of at least four unknown cracking plants when he defected...and that's just ones HE knew.

AHF member Kurfurst on his website dedicatd to the Bf109 has some interesting Allied intelligence reports; you'd be suprised just HOW much aviation fuel of various types the Germans still had bunkered at the end of the war....

The problem was moving it around the country, to where it was needed THIS was affected by bombing....but tactical as well as strategic, and just as much if not more by the Allies enjoying air superiority and able to interdict road traffic.

Fey noted that the SAME issues also applied to engines, spares etc. - it was horrifically difficult to get their hands on Me262 engines from the factories due to the air interdiction, they had to sneak around by night in his testing unit's trucks and collect them themselves! Galland moved his unit closer to the southern border of Germany for the same reasons, so that he could get parts and spares from Czechoslovakia!

A while back a discussion came up on the various apparent marks of late Ju88G nightfighters in the last months of the war; German records don't give separate designations to them, whereas the Allies referred to them a G-6a, G-6b, G-6c, G-7, G-7b etc. etc....the only difference being the fitment of different combinations of engines and particularly radar equipment....depending on what the factories could get their hands on at any given time.

(Something I've always wondered- is the count of German aircraft produced an actual count of airframes....or just a count of werknummern allocated by the RLM??? )