Which fiasco is greater ? Market-Garden or Wacht am Rhein

[merdiolu]

As I look Western Europe Campaign I realized that both Market-Garden and Wacht am Rhein-Ardennes Offensive were under great scrutiny ? So which failed operation caused greatest loss and caused wider consequences etc ? My evaluation :

1) Market-Garden was Montgomery's gamble to reach and cross Rhein , to reach Ruhr and end war before 1944 finished. Interestingly Montgomery who usually took his time , meticuously prepared and planned his operations , rushed Market-Garden in less than two weeks. In victory europhia after victory in Normandy and taking Paris Allies look everything with over optimism. If Market-Garden executed when Germans were still in retreat and rout it might have succeeded securing a bridgehead at Rhine at most ( beyond that there was little chance 21st Army Group extended itself and made itself vulnerable to German counterattack , a type of attack Germans excelled )

Result was almost destruction of 1st British Airborne Division and other heavy casaulties among US Airborne troops as well. Still 80 km long corridor was secured , southern section of Netherlands was secured with Eindhoven airfields and vital crossroads city Nijmagen and an important salient was captured to outflank West Wall from Reichswald. I think Market-Garden was a fiasco but far from a deveatating one. Just a disapointment. Allies just had to change their strategy. Maybe 21st Army Group's inability to reach Arnhem saved British from a worse defeat in Northern Germay.

2) Wacht am Rhein at the other hand was a complate shambles. Whole strategy created by Hitler to capture Antwerp was a fantasy. Several flaws in plan pointed by German commanders themselves. German armies did not have same qualty and quantity edge they had in 1940. They did not even had enough fuel to begin with. And in art of warfare Allies of 1944 were far ahead of French/British/Belgian forces of 1940. But they were ignored by Hitler. Just for a unreachable objective (Antwerp) Germans wasted their entire reserves in West. They left the entire ground they captured at the initial stages of the offensive. (which was worthless strategically anyway ) Even worse after it was clear that Wacht am Rhine failed and Germans could not reach even Meuse Hitler ordered to resume offensive operations thus multiplying German losses. That left West Wall and Rhineland vulnerable to Allied advance in 1945.

So what do you think ? Which had the greatest after effect and which is worse decision ? Try to secure bridges in Netherlands with a combined airborne land operation or a full scale assault on Ardennes with limited resources and reserves ?

[burferd]

IMHO, Market Garden was totally unnecessary for the allies.
The axis was in an untenable position at this time.
The Eastern front was closing in, resources and manpower were dwindling and the allies had, or were close to having total air superiority by this time.
This was an ego-trip by Montgomery that Eisenhower should never have allowed - but he liked to suck up to the Brithsh for some reason so thousands of people died in vain.

On the other hand, Wacht am Rhein was an act of desperation - it was a last gasp of a dying regeime.
Even if the objective had been obtained, the overwhelming resources of the allies and the ability to replenish then, along with air superiority dictated the outcome of the war by this time.
This action was also unnecessary, resulted in the unnecessary death oi thousands, and was the result of an ego-trip by Hitler.
The difference was that Hitler had total control, whereas Montgomery did not.

Both were unnecessary fiascos, both extended the war (IMHO) and both resulted in thousands of unnecessary deaths.
The question now becomes who was more irresponsible, Hitler who made the ultimate decision for the axis, or Eisenhower who made the ultimate decision for the allies?
One can argue the mental state of Hitler, but the same agruement has not been made for EIsenhower.
Personally, I think Eisenhower justified this, not on mental grounds, but on political grounds - which is worse?

[Tom from Cornwall]

Dear Burferd,

This was an ego-trip by Montgomery that Eisenhower should never have allowed - but he liked to suck up to the Brithsh for some reason so thousands of people died in vain.

Excellent work - would you care to supply some primary evidence for this contribution to the rigorous historical discussion on this Forum. I can hear the ghost of General Patton giggling

Personally, I think Eisenhower justified this, not on mental grounds, but on political grounds - which is worse?

Would you, personally, like to supply the evidence that Eisenhower was subject to political pressure from the British in early September 1944?

How about some evidence of real political pressure:

17 August 1944
MARSHALL TO EISENHOWER
"Stimson and I and apparently all Americans are strongly of the opinion that the time has come for you to assume direct command of the American contingent because reaction to British criticism has been so strong by American journalists that it could become an important factor in the coming Congressional Elections. The astonishing success has produced emphatic expressions of confidence in you and Bradley but this has cast a damper on public enthusiasm."

Of course, I would be delighted to read of similar letters from FM Brooke telling Eisenhower what to do because the criticism of British journalists was going to affect the upcoming elections.

Regards from one of those nasty, devious, under-handed Brithshers!! [sic]

Tom

[Aber]

, both extended the war (IMHO) ?

How did Market Garden extend the war?

[Tom from Cornwall]

Oh BTW,

Dear burferd,

Welcome to the Forum, I hope you enjoy the historical debates.

Don't worry about Michael,

There really should be a paddling pool here where the new kids can splash around in safety..............

He's not normally that grumpy!

Regards from across the Atlantic!

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Oh BTW,

Dear burferd,

Welcome to the Forum, I hope you enjoy the historical debates.

Don't worry about Michael,

There really should be a paddling pool here where the new kids can splash around in safety..............

He's not normally that grumpy!

Regards from across the Atlantic!

Tom

[Marcus Wendel]

Several posts containing little but personal remarks about other posters were removed.

/Marcus

[Lockington]

This was an ego-trip by Montgomery that Eisenhower should never have allowed

Burferd’s evaluation of the origins of Market Garden throws up an interesting parallel with Sichelschnitt’s development.
Fall Gelb also went ahead against a background of egotistic jealousies amongst army commanders haggling over strategy. Manstein’s master plan, like Market Garden, were both high risk operations looking for great strategic gain, key being operational surprise by the rapid appearance of armour in strength deep behind enemy lines.
This concentration, forcing the main effort through one army group, seeks a strategic decision by unbalancing the enemy via use of a novel & brilliant plan.

Perhaps the most prominent difference between the two plans was in execution. Case Yellow was unleashed with full operational backing whereas Market Garden, devoid of clout, dribbled its way to a shambolic conclusion, shackled by defensive supreme thinking and political intrusion.

[rendulic]

Burferd’s evaluation of the origins of Market Garden throws up an interesting parallel with Sichelschnitt’s development.
Fall Gelb also went ahead against a background of egotistic jealousies amongst army commanders haggling over strategy. Manstein’s master plan, like Market Garden, were both high risk operations looking for great strategic gain, key being operational surprise by the rapid appearance of armour in strength deep behind enemy lines.
This concentration, forcing the main effort through one army group, seeks a strategic decision by unbalancing the enemy via use of a novel & brilliant plan.

Perhaps the most prominent difference between the two plans was in execution. Case Yellow was unleashed with full operational backing whereas Market Garden, devoid of clout, dribbled its way to a shambolic conclusion, shackled by defensive supreme thinking and political intrusion.

You are massively overstating the resemblance between Fall Gelb and Market garden.'the rapid appearance of armour in strength deep behind enemy lines' is not really a notion applicable to Market Garden.

[ljadw]

Market Garden was a reasonable gamble :if if succeeded,war would be over before Christmas.
Wacht am Rhein also was a gamble,reasonable in the sense that there was no alternative for the Germans ;the chance of success was abyssimal small,but,if it succeeded,the results would be excellent .

[rendulic]

One small bridghead over the Rhine with a slim corridor behind it would not lead to a quick end of the war.

[Paul_G_Baker]

One small bridghead over the Rhine with a slim corridor behind it would not lead to a quick end of the war.

Would the bridgehead have been all that small, though - With at least 1 Corps-sized formation to establish it?

Troops tend to get nervous about the possibility of finding themselves cut off, if for no other reason that they will rapidly start running out of supplies!

A sustainable bridgehead across the Rhine would have also 'turned the flank' of the Westwall - a very militarily desirable outcome. Montgomery 'turned the flank' a number of times in North Africa IIRC, with his famous "left hooks".

[rendulic]

The bridghead would be under high danger of being cut off itself and the scope for a decisive breakthrough in depth did not exist in view of the logistical problems.
The westwall was a myth. It is significant that eventually the Rhine was crossed first by the US army in spite of the fact that the british had been very near the Rhine months before and not did not have to contend with the Westwall.

[Paul_G_Baker]

The westwall was a myth. It is significant that eventually the Rhine was crossed first by the US army in spite of the fact that the british had been very near the Rhine months before and not did not have to contend with the Westwall.

Not a myth (which implies that it did not exist, which it did) just less formidable an obstacle than intelligence reports (probably helped along by Nazi propaganda) had led people to believe.

And the US Army crossed the Rhine by capturing a bridge - at a little place called Remagen and by the US 9th Armoured Division, if memory serves!!

Actually, the British had been across the Rhine months before, but they'd landed by parachute and glider!

[Kingfish]

The US 7th army was poised to cross the Rhine as early as December, against minimal opposition, but was overruled in favor of flank support for 3rd Army's Saar campaign.