Eisenhower meeting with Middleton - 9 Sep 44

[RichTO90]

Was it Middleton who described the diversion of a corps to seize Brest and other French Atlantic ports as "winning the war in the wrong direction"?

If so, this might have been a stimulating topic of conversation with the boss who had unleashed him out of Normandy in diametrically the opposite direction to Germany.

Cheers,

Sid.

It was John "P" Wood, CG of the 4th AD, to Troy Middleton on the early morning of 3 August at Wood's HQ (the memo for record is dated 0300 3 August), "They're winning the war the wrong way!" Middleton's orders to Wood to advance westward were confirmed by Hugh Gaffey later that day, under directions from Patton, who was toeing the line ordered by Bradley (making sure that he didn't get into any trouble just three days into operations with Third Army). Patton didn't like it, but he was in his "yes sir, no sir, three bags full sir!" mode at the time.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Tom,

Today in the mail I got my response from the "Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum" The dates covered are August 16 to September 28, 1944. These are just his calendar appointment entries no real information on what was discussed. So, 9 September: "Granville. SHAEF forward. Visits General Middleton at VIII Corps headquarters at Brest. Overnight at Versailles with General Bradley. 8 September he was in fact in Paris and it lists the VIPs that were there with him.

Will make copies and mail to you.

Mike,

Many thanks. Very kind of you to keep trying for me. I hope the teaching went well!

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Rich,

Patton didn't like it, but he was in his "yes sir, no sir, three bags full sir!" mode at the time.

I bet that didn't last long.

Regards

Tom

[RichTO90]

Rich,

Patton didn't like it, but he was in his "yes sir, no sir, three bags full sir!" mode at the time.

I bet that didn't last long.

Regards

Tom

Well, he almost immediately turned a blind eye to the Third Army's QM depredations, but insofar as obeying orders he was Good Little Georgie for a while...

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi RichTO90,

Thanks for an authoritative reply to my question. If only all posts were as to the point.

Cheers,

Sid.

[RichTO90]

Hi RichTO90,

Thanks for an authoritative reply to my question. If only all posts were as to the point.

Cheers,

Sid.

Thanks Sid. I forgot to mention that in the usual manner of historians, each has taken Wood's statement as they desire to lambast whoever they wish. :roll: Wood's "they're" is usually followed by bracketed comments such as [Montgomery], [Eisenhower], [Bradley], [Patton], or [combinations of the previous]. In truth, they [historians] are apparently capable of divining Wood's full meaning somehow. I take his statement as the usual frustration from any subordinate talking to an immediate superior, who are commiserating with each other regarding the deficiencies of everyone above them in the food chain. In truth, emotions were running very high at the time and the Allied command's emotions were swinging wildly between the depression of late June and early July and the new-found exuberance generated by the breakthroughs along the Cotentin coast and east of Caen.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Rich,

In truth, emotions were running very high at the time and the Allied command's emotions were swinging wildly between the depression of late June and early July and the new-found exuberance generated by the breakthroughs along the Cotentin coast and east of Caen.

Except amongst the "lets sack Montgomery" brigade.

It's a wonder to me that the RAF chaps who plotted his dismissal due to the "stalemate" in Normandy had the nerve to continue in their posts.

Regards

Tom

[Aber]

Remember inter-service tensions, Bomber barons thinking an invasion was unnecessary, and that Tedder was scathing about the 'slowness' of 8th Army even before the arrival of Montgomery.

[Urmel]

But Tedder had good reasons for his view, considering what he had witnessed since becoming the boss in the ME.

[Aber]

I'm not convinced that Tedder could really justify the RAF view, including that the RAF had 'saved' the Eighth Army following Gazala, given that the RAF seemed more concerned about fighting its own battles than providing close support to the Army, which only happened after Broadhurst replaced Conningham.

Tedder had his own issues - accused of hoarding aircrew in the Middle East, and his less than tactful comments after seeing the Army command centre introduced by Montgomery.

[Urmel]

I'm not convinced that Tedder could really justify the RAF view, including that the RAF had 'saved' the Eighth Army following Gazala, given that the RAF seemed more concerned about fighting its own battles than providing close support to the Army, which only happened after Broadhurst replaced Conningham.

Tedder had his own issues - accused of hoarding aircrew in the Middle East, and his less than tactful comments after seeing the Army command centre introduced by Montgomery.

Well regardless of RAF performance, I think it is clear that the army performed very badly, and Tedder and Coningham were rightly incensed about what happend in January 42.

It is also neither right nor fair to claim the RAF did not support the army with close support or was 'fighting its own battles'. They were throughout the battle engaged in a mix of activities, to wit:

1) Gain and maintain air superiority through engagement of enemy fighters in the air and attacks on ground installations
2) Interdict supplies to the battlefield through attacks on M.T., harbours, shipping, air transport, and depots
3) Engage in the ground battle through bombing and strafing
4) Support the ground battle through tactical and strategic reconnaissance
5) Support the ground battle by flying in urgently needed supplies, such as ammunition for M3 37mm guns when these were running low

Even a cursory read of the available evidence in the form of ORBs should put this notion that the RAF was fighting its own battles to rest once and for all. From CRUSADER onwards, i.e. from when Tedder and Coningham were in charge, they fought an integrated battle in a way that the Axis could not even aspire to.

In particular, I think Coningham did wonders in establishing this close support system, which at the time (autumn 41) was clearly superior to the German system. It also still had a lot of problems that needed to be sorted out, but given the types and number of planes available, the fact that they did not have air supremacy, and that this was a fast-moving battle with a chaotic ground situation (referred to as a 'layer cake' quite often) and the difficulty to identify friend and foe, they did a good job.

http://rommelsriposte.com/2011/12/30/cl ... -crusader/

http://rommelsriposte.com/2012/04/15/4-battle-sorties/

http://rommelsriposte.com/2011/12/30/op ... 29-nov-41/

http://rommelsriposte.com/2012/07/03/no ... iving-end/

http://rommelsriposte.com/2012/06/24/th ... ve-bombed/

To use some concrete examples, how are the following related to the claim that the RAF was 'fighting its own battles'?

- Beaufighters on road interdiction
- Blenheims on shipping strikes
- Marylands on M.T. bombing missions
- Hurribombers on ground attack missions

What the RAF explictly decided not to do (and which gave rise to these complaints you repeat) was to put fighters over ground troops, arguing that this was not a good use of resources. The evidence bears out that view very clearly. Between their organic LAA defense, desert dispersion tactics, and the general fighter cover provided, there is little-to-no evidence that Axis ground attack sorties caused serious harm, and it appears to have had zero operational impact. The offensive thinking very clearly paid off, in my view.

I note in passing that Axis reports are rife with complaints about being dive-bombed by their own air forces throughout the operation as well.

[Aber]

I didn't intend to imply that the there was complete separation between the Army and the RAF, but that the 'RAF view' must be taken with a pinch of salt - with comments that the RAF saved the Army after Gazala, that anybody (including an RAF staff officer) could have won El Alamein, and Tedder's comments on Army command and control in his autobiography there is plenty of evidence of a 'chip on the shoulder' attitude.

The lack of close support refers to what Broadhurst did at the Mareth line, and the demonstrations at Tripoli earlier which showed that the RAF under Conningham had not really perfected close support at low level, preferring the higher-level 'Tedder carpet' approach.

An interesting question is why Tedder fell out with Montgomery, who was perhaps one of the more air-minded generals, and was welcomed by the RAF when he first arrived in the Middle East.

[Urmel]

I think anyone who wasn't part of the 8 Army clusterf... would have been welcomed.

I also think you're not considering what Coningham had to work with and the circumstances he worked under up to that point. Things had come quite a way by the Mareth Line.

Look, I am not endorsing everything Tedder said, I was just pointing out that he had good reasons to be dismissive of the army. In January 42 he came close to losing over a hundred fighters because the army failed to tell him that they were running east at high speed. Between that and Gazala it's hard not to have sympathy for his views.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Urmel,

Look, I am not endorsing everything Tedder said, I was just pointing out that he had good reasons to be dismissive of the army.

True up to a point, but then again the army had good reasons to be dismissive of the air force...

(eg Norway, France, Greece, Crete, etc)

BTW re 'Crusader' air support - IIRC the South Africans (1st Brigade) were on the receiving end of a whole sequence of Stuka attacks, and perhaps the fact that the army was finally getting hold of a decent number of heavy and light AA guns was beginning to redress the balance between the Stuka and the poor, long-suffering British army.

Regards

Tom

[Urmel]

I know they were, but from what I know they also didn't really suffer much from the attention. Stuka attacks on a spread-out formation were apparently impressive to watch, all smoke and fury, but the impact was nil.