Sheldrake wrote:# 1 The Army had gone to enormous lengths to persuade the air forces to lend the strategic heavy bomber assets that were being deployed against the will, if not over the actual dead bodies of Harris and Spaatz. One way to really hack them off would have been to cancel it all at the last minute.
But I'm not suggesting any last minute cancellation. If anything, I am proposing a scenario where the second strike would not even be needed. By retaining the 4 regiments of Priests in their intended role, and sending them forward with the phase I assault, Simonds would have had the necessary artillery support for his phase II divisions.
#2 It presumes that Simmonds and his staff could have second guessed the true extend of the German weakness on the Road to Falaise and had the confidence to gamble on speed rather than firepower.
I don't see how you could come to that conclusion. The phase II plans were based on the assumption that the German second line was held by two SS Panzer divisions, and nothing in my proposal changes that. In fact, my proposal actually leans more towards the firepower side of the argument by allotting the phase II divisions far more artillery support then they had historically.
Now, I'll concede that an additional 76 SPAs couldn't deliver anywhere near the firepower of 600+ heavy bombers, but then again they are not dependent on weather or time of day, are far more responsive, and have zero chance of accidentally shelling a friendly unit 10 miles behind the lines.
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb