Op Totalize question

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Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Op Totalize question

#16

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 16 Feb 2014, 20:51

In a 'no-bomber' scenario the Can 4th AD would have pushed off at least a good 5 hours ahead of the historical.
OK, I see what you are getting at. Of course, poor old Simonds didn't know how successful his initial phase plan was going to be. With perfect hindsight it does become a lot easier... :)

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Tom

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Sheldrake
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Re: Op Totalize question

#17

Post by Sheldrake » 18 Feb 2014, 02:59

There are two problems with the "no bomber" scenario.

# 1 The Army had gone to enormous lengths to persuade the air forces to lend the strategic heavy bomber assets that were being deployed against the will, if not over the actual dead bodies of Harris and Spaatz. One way to really hack them off would have been to cancel it all at the last minute.

#2 It presumes that Simmonds and his staff could have second guessed the true extend of the German weakness on the Road to Falaise and had the confidence to gamble on speed rather than firepower. However, this was the opposi8te of the prudent minimax strategy that worked for the allies. Villers Bocage is the sort of thing that happened when commanders gambled on German weakness. Within 24 hours of the start of Totalize the fate of TF Wothington and the Poles would give another illustration.

There is no guarantee that a hasty rearrangement and an attempt to launch two fresh unblooded armoured divisions might not have been a monstrous disaster. Ther was a huge potential for confusion and SNAFU as the allied armour got in each others way and provided Wittman and chums with a target rich environment - Villers Bocage write large.

As it was Totallze wrote down a German infantry division and eliminated a disproportionately effective armoured unit - Wittman.


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Kingfish
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Re: Op Totalize question

#18

Post by Kingfish » 18 Feb 2014, 04:54

Sheldrake wrote:# 1 The Army had gone to enormous lengths to persuade the air forces to lend the strategic heavy bomber assets that were being deployed against the will, if not over the actual dead bodies of Harris and Spaatz. One way to really hack them off would have been to cancel it all at the last minute.
But I'm not suggesting any last minute cancellation. If anything, I am proposing a scenario where the second strike would not even be needed. By retaining the 4 regiments of Priests in their intended role, and sending them forward with the phase I assault, Simonds would have had the necessary artillery support for his phase II divisions.
#2 It presumes that Simmonds and his staff could have second guessed the true extend of the German weakness on the Road to Falaise and had the confidence to gamble on speed rather than firepower.
I don't see how you could come to that conclusion. The phase II plans were based on the assumption that the German second line was held by two SS Panzer divisions, and nothing in my proposal changes that. In fact, my proposal actually leans more towards the firepower side of the argument by allotting the phase II divisions far more artillery support then they had historically.

Now, I'll concede that an additional 76 SPAs couldn't deliver anywhere near the firepower of 600+ heavy bombers, but then again they are not dependent on weather or time of day, are far more responsive, and have zero chance of accidentally shelling a friendly unit 10 miles behind the lines.
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
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Tom from Cornwall
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Re: Op Totalize question

#19

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 18 Feb 2014, 21:08

Kingfish,
By retaining the 4 regiments of Priests in their intended role, and sending them forward with the phase I assault, Simonds would have had the necessary artillery support for his phase II divisions.
Blimey! Have you read the accounts of the night advance - don't you think this would have just led to enormous (or should I say even more enormous :lol:) confusion. As it was the two armoured division commanders complained about the complexity of the operation and the difficulty of exploiting forward on such a narrow front through two infantry divisions which would be fighting a 5 mile deep battle. The idea that they could have found space to deploy even more units in essentially uncleared German territory seems a bit of a stretch.

Of course, the plan for Goodwood is criticised because the fire support failed to address the depth of the German defence, IMHO it's a bit harsh to criticise Simonds too strongly for trying to learn that lesson. :)

Cheers

Tom

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Kingfish
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Re: Op Totalize question

#20

Post by Kingfish » 20 Feb 2014, 19:29

Tom from Cornwall wrote:The idea that they could have found space to deploy even more units in essentially uncleared German territory seems a bit of a stretch.
Tom,
The space would have been available anyway. Once the opening barrage ended, and the armored columns cleared the starting line, the artillery pulled up stakes and began their own move forward. These units redeployed to preassigned areas which were well clear of the preassigned routes for 4CA and 1PA. I'm merely swapping the pedestrian towed artillery with their far more mobile cousins.

BTW, the two armored divisions did not move "through" the phase I forces. 1PA went wide right around 51H and squeezed (or tried to) between St. Aignan and the eastern bomb zone. 4CA found the going a bit harder as it crawled down the Caen-Falaise Hwy, but suffice to say the Totalize planners had tried to give both divisions clear routes from their assembly points to the phase II start line.
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Re: Op Totalize question

#21

Post by Sheldrake » 21 Feb 2014, 11:47

Kingfish wrote:
Sheldrake wrote:# 1 The Army had gone to enormous lengths to persuade the air forces to lend the strategic heavy bomber assets that were being deployed against the will, if not over the actual dead bodies of Harris and Spaatz. One way to really hack them off would have been to cancel it all at the last minute.
But I'm not suggesting any last minute cancellation. If anything, I am proposing a scenario where the second strike would not even be needed. By retaining the 4 regiments of Priests in their intended role, and sending them forward with the phase I assault, Simonds would have had the necessary artillery support for his phase II divisions.
#2 It presumes that Simmonds and his staff could have second guessed the true extend of the German weakness on the Road to Falaise and had the confidence to gamble on speed rather than firepower.
I don't see how you could come to that conclusion. The phase II plans were based on the assumption that the German second line was held by two SS Panzer divisions, and nothing in my proposal changes that. In fact, my proposal actually leans more towards the firepower side of the argument by allotting the phase II divisions far more artillery support then they had historically.

Now, I'll concede that an additional 76 SPAs couldn't deliver anywhere near the firepower of 600+ heavy bombers, but then again they are not dependent on weather or time of day, are far more responsive, and have zero chance of accidentally shelling a friendly unit 10 miles behind the lines.
An interesting argument, but sadly flawed. 21 AG artillery was quite capable of developing plenty of firepower capable of suppressing identified German defences to the depth that the field artillery (13,000 yds for the 25 pdr). So why not rush an additional artillery group forwards to provide support for the second phase of the attack?
Two points.

1. The reason that the bombers were called in was because the artillery techniques developed would not work if the defences were deeper than the artillery could reach from surveyed positions. The power of the Commonwealth artillery lay in the ability to concentrate the fire of the guns on targets which could be controlled at the lowest tactical level. So if the armoured trust encountered opposition an FOO with the tanks could bring down enough firepower to neutralise it. A single observer could call in the fire of 24, 72 or even more guns and control that fire with simple fire orders. However, there is a catch. This only works if the guns are on a common survey and every battery thinks that grid 123456" and "North" is the same (and as long as the FOO knows where he is. The Gunners could not help TF Worthington - geographically misplaced by 9km.) There was no GPS in 1944 and surveying was carried out by small teams of surveyors , an activity which could not be carried out in a forward area. Furthermore, while SP guns can move through bullet swept areas, this is not a conducive working environment for a battery in action and fatal for the soft skinned vehicles bringing forward ammunition. Yes, the armoured Divisions could have been followed up 72 or even more SP guns, but without survey their fire could not have been controlled and applied. The implications of this was spelled out in an Army Training Memorandum dated Oct 1943 entitled "Artillery in the Corps Battle." The heavy bombers were a substitute for a couple of AGRAs which they would have preferred to use had it been practical.

2. Retaining the Priests as SP guns was not an option. These were guns which had been used to equip the artillery of the three assault divisions (3ed, 50th & 3ed Cdn) on D Day allowing them to support the assaulting troops on the run in and in the surf. The use of a different ammunition system to the rest of the artillery of 21 AG was a logistic stress and it was always planned to replace these guns with 25 Pdr equipment in August. The guns themselves were worn out after three months of heavy use. In any event there were parks of spare brand new artillery pieces in England, but not three regiments of trained artillerymen to use them! The innovation was to use APCs to allow infantry to traverse the battle area safe from small arms and shell fragments.

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