Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
FYI, the following is from Christy Campbell, TARGET LONDON: Under Attack from the V-Weapons, LB Book Group, 2012 (p.383-385,389):
8th September 1944:
“ Portal, who was on his way to Canada with Churchill was messaged by the Air Ministry late in the evening on the 8th:
Two incidents occurred today at 1843 hours, one at Chiswick and one near Epping. There were none of the normal indications of aircraft or flying bombs, and examination of relics indicates they were doubtless rockets and probably much of the size we had estimated. Blast relatively local and much less than from flying bombs. Casualties small and damage local. Nothing visual was observed on radar but sound ranging indicates likely area of discharges near Rotterdam. Home Secretary would be grateful if you would inform Prime Minister.
Field Marshall Dill was cabled in Washington:
Two rockets arrived in London last night, apparently from Rotterdam area. We are keeping matter dark until we see how things develop, but you can of course inform US Chiefs of Staff.
Field Marshall Montgomery at 21st Army Tactical HQ near Brussels was told:
Two rockets so-called V 2 landed in England yesterday … Would you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam. When this area is in our hands, the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared.
Montgomery had already formulated a plan at the beginning of the month, Operation Comet, to do more than that: it was to use the 1st Airborne Division, with no ground troops, to seize the bridges spanning the Meuse and the Rhine. Poor weather kept Comet grounded, but it was soon replaced by a more ambitious plan. Called Market Garden, it was designed to seize the same bridges by airborne attack and push large ground forces across them, then trap the Fifteenth Army, open the way to the Ruhr and win the war. According to Montgomery’s memoirs: ‘So far as I was concerned that [roping off of the coastal area] settled the direction of the thrust line … it must be towards Arnhem’.
When on 10 September General Sir Miles Dempsey, commander of the British Second Army, raised doubts, Montgomery replied that he had just received a signal from London that something needed to be done to neutralise the V 2 launching sites and that Market Garden must therefore proceed.
Montgomery went to see Eisenhower aboard his B-25 transport at Brussels airport that afternoon (the Supreme Allied Commander had injured his knee and was practically immobile). In an ill-tempered meeting inside the converted bomber, Montgomery explained his new imperative. ‘I told him about the V 2 rockets and whence they came,’ he recalled in his memoirs, and urged a concentrated northward thrust with the crossing of the Lower Rhine at Arnhem as the goal. Eisenhower was equally adamant that the advance should be on a broad front. However, he did consent to Market Garden, giving it ‘limited priority’ in terms of supplies.
The War Cabinet met at Downing Street at noon the same day, with Clement Atlee in the Chair. The agenda comprised a single topic: ‘attack by rockets’. It was explained that because there was no radar trace, no warning was received. Meanwhile, the meeting was told, Montgomery had been asked for the earliest time by which the launch areas in Holland could be captured. The Chiefs, by now in Canada for the Second Quebec Conference (Octagon) were still optimistic, expressing the view that ‘no serious attack could be developed by the enemy, whose organisation in Holland must have been hurriedly improvised.’
What to tell the people? Herbert Morrison argued that no publicity should be given for at least twenty-four, and perhaps forty-eight, hours, but that information could be passed confidentially to the press. Admiral Thompson sent sugar-coated gagging orders to newspapers. In the end it was agreed there should be no public statement of any kind - nor would there be, in fact, for weeks to come.
Norman Bottomley relayed the intriguing news from the Chiswick crater that ‘some parts of the casing were too hot to touch for a considerable time after impact … some other parts had a coating of ice and it was thought that the rockets had reached the height of approximately 30 miles.’ In his opinion the circumstances did not warrant very drastic measures of censorship ‘because of the military situation which would shortly see the launching sites overrun’.
But where were the rockets coming from? Radar was useless, sound ranging and flash spotting not up to it. Photo-reconaissance of Holland had thus far found nothing. Ultra was silent. But the launch of a rocket could not be concealed from those close to it. It was directed that SOE should try to obtain what information it could from the Resistance movement in Holland.
And it came good quickly. A stream of messages was passed to both Air Defence of Great Britain headquarters and the War Cabinet in the next forty-eight hours giving the likely places and map references for the rocket-launch sites - Duindigt and Waasenaar north of The Hague, ’where a strip had been evacuated between the beach and Rysksweg. Probably three mobile firing places’. Battery 2/485, in fact, was taking up new positions in the Dutch capital, while 1/485 was taking up positions in Waasenaar. Battery 444 had departed Houffalize in Belgium and was heading for a pre-surveyed site on the island of Walcheren to join the attack on London. They would be in position by the 15th. The stream of Resistance messages ended when German security forces clamped down, forcing people from their homes at gunpoint."
[…]
17th September 1944:
“ Operation Market Garden had dropped an airborne army, with the result that the two batteries of Abteilung 485 were at immediate risk of being cut off. Their anti-tank platoon was briefly captured by British paratroops, before their captors were in turn captured. The rocket units were withdrawn to north-west of Münster, within Germany itself; then Kammler moved his headquarters from Nijmegen to the same area.”
8th September 1944:
“ Portal, who was on his way to Canada with Churchill was messaged by the Air Ministry late in the evening on the 8th:
Two incidents occurred today at 1843 hours, one at Chiswick and one near Epping. There were none of the normal indications of aircraft or flying bombs, and examination of relics indicates they were doubtless rockets and probably much of the size we had estimated. Blast relatively local and much less than from flying bombs. Casualties small and damage local. Nothing visual was observed on radar but sound ranging indicates likely area of discharges near Rotterdam. Home Secretary would be grateful if you would inform Prime Minister.
Field Marshall Dill was cabled in Washington:
Two rockets arrived in London last night, apparently from Rotterdam area. We are keeping matter dark until we see how things develop, but you can of course inform US Chiefs of Staff.
Field Marshall Montgomery at 21st Army Tactical HQ near Brussels was told:
Two rockets so-called V 2 landed in England yesterday … Would you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam. When this area is in our hands, the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared.
Montgomery had already formulated a plan at the beginning of the month, Operation Comet, to do more than that: it was to use the 1st Airborne Division, with no ground troops, to seize the bridges spanning the Meuse and the Rhine. Poor weather kept Comet grounded, but it was soon replaced by a more ambitious plan. Called Market Garden, it was designed to seize the same bridges by airborne attack and push large ground forces across them, then trap the Fifteenth Army, open the way to the Ruhr and win the war. According to Montgomery’s memoirs: ‘So far as I was concerned that [roping off of the coastal area] settled the direction of the thrust line … it must be towards Arnhem’.
When on 10 September General Sir Miles Dempsey, commander of the British Second Army, raised doubts, Montgomery replied that he had just received a signal from London that something needed to be done to neutralise the V 2 launching sites and that Market Garden must therefore proceed.
Montgomery went to see Eisenhower aboard his B-25 transport at Brussels airport that afternoon (the Supreme Allied Commander had injured his knee and was practically immobile). In an ill-tempered meeting inside the converted bomber, Montgomery explained his new imperative. ‘I told him about the V 2 rockets and whence they came,’ he recalled in his memoirs, and urged a concentrated northward thrust with the crossing of the Lower Rhine at Arnhem as the goal. Eisenhower was equally adamant that the advance should be on a broad front. However, he did consent to Market Garden, giving it ‘limited priority’ in terms of supplies.
The War Cabinet met at Downing Street at noon the same day, with Clement Atlee in the Chair. The agenda comprised a single topic: ‘attack by rockets’. It was explained that because there was no radar trace, no warning was received. Meanwhile, the meeting was told, Montgomery had been asked for the earliest time by which the launch areas in Holland could be captured. The Chiefs, by now in Canada for the Second Quebec Conference (Octagon) were still optimistic, expressing the view that ‘no serious attack could be developed by the enemy, whose organisation in Holland must have been hurriedly improvised.’
What to tell the people? Herbert Morrison argued that no publicity should be given for at least twenty-four, and perhaps forty-eight, hours, but that information could be passed confidentially to the press. Admiral Thompson sent sugar-coated gagging orders to newspapers. In the end it was agreed there should be no public statement of any kind - nor would there be, in fact, for weeks to come.
Norman Bottomley relayed the intriguing news from the Chiswick crater that ‘some parts of the casing were too hot to touch for a considerable time after impact … some other parts had a coating of ice and it was thought that the rockets had reached the height of approximately 30 miles.’ In his opinion the circumstances did not warrant very drastic measures of censorship ‘because of the military situation which would shortly see the launching sites overrun’.
But where were the rockets coming from? Radar was useless, sound ranging and flash spotting not up to it. Photo-reconaissance of Holland had thus far found nothing. Ultra was silent. But the launch of a rocket could not be concealed from those close to it. It was directed that SOE should try to obtain what information it could from the Resistance movement in Holland.
And it came good quickly. A stream of messages was passed to both Air Defence of Great Britain headquarters and the War Cabinet in the next forty-eight hours giving the likely places and map references for the rocket-launch sites - Duindigt and Waasenaar north of The Hague, ’where a strip had been evacuated between the beach and Rysksweg. Probably three mobile firing places’. Battery 2/485, in fact, was taking up new positions in the Dutch capital, while 1/485 was taking up positions in Waasenaar. Battery 444 had departed Houffalize in Belgium and was heading for a pre-surveyed site on the island of Walcheren to join the attack on London. They would be in position by the 15th. The stream of Resistance messages ended when German security forces clamped down, forcing people from their homes at gunpoint."
[…]
17th September 1944:
“ Operation Market Garden had dropped an airborne army, with the result that the two batteries of Abteilung 485 were at immediate risk of being cut off. Their anti-tank platoon was briefly captured by British paratroops, before their captors were in turn captured. The rocket units were withdrawn to north-west of Münster, within Germany itself; then Kammler moved his headquarters from Nijmegen to the same area.”
Last edited by EKB on 10 Jan 2014, 07:25, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
I'd expected this to to have created all manner of heat and smoke in a hurry. 12+ hours & not a single post
Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
The rockets were perfectly visible on radar, and the Chain Home was used to pinpoint the location of the launching sites (operation Big Ben).
Probably the radar operators weren't briefed in advance about the V2s and their flight characteristics so they dismissed the sightings as glitches in the system.
At that time radars were quite counterintuitive in their functioning (frequently they are even today) so without proper information operators weren't able to guess what was going on.
But all that commotion described above, all the big names disturbed in their work because of two, not very big, explosions was a stunning victory for the militarily pointless V2s.
Probably the radar operators weren't briefed in advance about the V2s and their flight characteristics so they dismissed the sightings as glitches in the system.
At that time radars were quite counterintuitive in their functioning (frequently they are even today) so without proper information operators weren't able to guess what was going on.
But all that commotion described above, all the big names disturbed in their work because of two, not very big, explosions was a stunning victory for the militarily pointless V2s.
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Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
Just one comment:
Regards
Tom
I'm not sure I understand the reference to "no ground troops", a 30 Corps advance from Brussels to relieve the airborne troops was part of the overall "COMET" plan.Montgomery had already formulated a plan at the beginning of the month, Operation Comet, to do more than that: it was to use the 1st Airborne Division, with no ground troops, to seize the bridges spanning the Meuse and the Rhine. Poor weather kept Comet grounded, but it was soon replaced by a more ambitious plan.
Regards
Tom
Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
Was there a separate code name for the ground phase with Operation Comet?
Operation Market was the amended airborne phase.
Operation Market was the amended airborne phase.
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Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
To all,
Mike
This operation was already planned as Comet, so the signal really didn't change anything, the operation would go forward but now on a larger scale. But, increasing the size of the operation had been decided before Monty received the signal? Except it made Dempsey arguments mute?When on 10 September General Sir Miles Dempsey, commander of the British Second Army, raised doubts, Montgomery replied that he had just received a signal from London that something needed to be done to neutralise the V 2 launching sites and that Market Garden must therefore proceed.
Mike
Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
IIRC Dempsey's doubts were about whether Wesel would be a better objective than Arnhem.
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Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
A post from Delta Tank, duplicating the post at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1846470, was removed by this moderator - DT.
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Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
To all,Aber wrote:IIRC Dempsey's doubts were about whether Wesel would be a better objective than Arnhem.
The following comes from the book entitled: "The Military Life and Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey" by Peter Rostron"
Page 135-136:
If 2d British Army would of advance on the left flank of the US 1st Army this would of been the concentration of forces that Monty desired and argued for, or at least as good as it was going to get. Once 2d British Army hits the Rhine they then could of cleared the west bank of the Rhine towards Arnhem."Arnhem was not the only option. Having decided on 9 September that COMET must be postponed until the night of 11/12 September at the earliest, Dempsey now had the chance to rethink his plans. His preferred choice no was to cross the Maas at Venlo and the Rhine at Wesel, 40 miles further east towards the flanking Americans. Dempsey's reasoning was this:
After Brussels there were various plans for the use of the Airborne Forces, and by about the 8th or 9th I was convinced we ought to go for Venlo and Wesel. The reasons were that this only involved two major river crossings rather than three, and it also brought us down closer to the Americans. We had asked Bradley to extend 1st Army's boundary northwards, so as to help us if we went to Arnhem but he couldn't do this because his right wing was being continually dragged southwards by Patton. Consequently I felt that if Bradley couldn't come up to us we would have to go down to him" (fn 9)
However, it was not to be. On 9 September, Montgomery received a signal from London concerning the landing of the first V2 rockets, with a request to 'report most urgently by what approximate date you can rope off' the area from which they were launched. When Dempsey flew up to see him the next day with his plan for Wesel, Montgomery met him at the door to his caravan with the telegram in his hand and said. 'Let us save England.' That decided the question. I don't think Monty had really made up his mind on Arnhem before he got the telegram' (fn 10) This begs consideration of two factors. The first relates to the importance of the V2 threat in making up Montgomery's mind. The second is the wisdom or otherwise of this decision."
At this time was Freddie on sick leave in England?
Mike
Mike
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Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
Mike,
Of course, even Montgomery admits that he made a mistake in thinking that he had sufficient forces to achieve both Market Garden and open Antwerp at the same time. In fact, I think Montgomery called it a "serious mistake"...showing how open he was to self criticism!
As for Freddie, I'm not sure when he got back from sick leave, although I'm not sure how much influence he had over Montgomery at this point.
Cheers,
Tom
Agreed. However, there was Antwerp to consider as well as the V-2 rockets. If, as some historians argue, Market Garden was a mistake because it delayed the opening of Antwerp, then I expect if 2nd Army had moved even further south there would be even more complaints about the delayed opening of Antwerp.If 2d British Army would of advance on the left flank of the US 1st Army this would of been the concentration of forces that Monty desired and argued for, or at least as good as it was going to get. Once 2d British Army hits the Rhine they then could of cleared the west bank of the Rhine towards Arnhem.
At this time was Freddie on sick leave in England?
Of course, even Montgomery admits that he made a mistake in thinking that he had sufficient forces to achieve both Market Garden and open Antwerp at the same time. In fact, I think Montgomery called it a "serious mistake"...showing how open he was to self criticism!
As for Freddie, I'm not sure when he got back from sick leave, although I'm not sure how much influence he had over Montgomery at this point.
Cheers,
Tom
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Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
Tom,
But the first V-2 Rocket fell on England on 8 September? But Operation Comet had already been planned before that, so Monty had planned to go for Arnhem before the first Rocket had even been launched?? When was Operation Comet planned? And it's original execution date? You really never really see much written about Operation Comet, only in passing, and how it was the basis for Operation Market Garden.
Mike
But the first V-2 Rocket fell on England on 8 September? But Operation Comet had already been planned before that, so Monty had planned to go for Arnhem before the first Rocket had even been launched?? When was Operation Comet planned? And it's original execution date? You really never really see much written about Operation Comet, only in passing, and how it was the basis for Operation Market Garden.
Mike
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Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
Tom,
According to Wiki, Operation Comet was scheduled for 2 September, which means it was planned sometime before that date, end of August?
Mike
According to Wiki, Operation Comet was scheduled for 2 September, which means it was planned sometime before that date, end of August?
Mike
Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
That looks wrong
The operation scheduled before Comet was Linnet where the target was Tournai, but was cancelled on 3 September (per wiki) as the US First Army got there first.
Planning for Comet may have started on the 2nd but that certainly was not its planned execution date.
The operation scheduled before Comet was Linnet where the target was Tournai, but was cancelled on 3 September (per wiki) as the US First Army got there first.
Planning for Comet may have started on the 2nd but that certainly was not its planned execution date.
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Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
Mike, Aber,
The origin for Op Comet and therefore strictly speaking for Op Market Garden, was identified by Hamilton (Monty vol 3, p.22) as the following signal sent by Montgomery to de Guingand at 1600, 3 Sep:
Additionally, on the same page, he refers to signal M149 sent at 2000, 3 Sep:
Regards
Tom
The origin for Op Comet and therefore strictly speaking for Op Market Garden, was identified by Hamilton (Monty vol 3, p.22) as the following signal sent by Montgomery to de Guingand at 1600, 3 Sep:
He references M148 in the Montgomery Papers held at the IWM.Second Army will advance from line BRUSSELS - ANTWERP on 6 Sep directed on WESEL and ARNHEM and passing round North side of the RUHR. Require airborne operation of one British division and Poles on evening 6 Sep or morning 7 Sep to secure bridges over RHINE between WESEL and ARNHEM.
Additionally, on the same page, he refers to signal M149 sent at 2000, 3 Sep:
Note that attempts to advance north of Antwerp were halted by the Germans while the Guards succeeded in securing a crossing over the Albert Canal, a success exploited in the following few days and for Market Garden.Consider we may want considerable airborne drop to make certain of getting over MEUSE and RHINE. Order BROWNING to come to see me tomorrow and you come to.
Regards
Tom
Re: Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets
Thanks, I hadn't started digging into the pile of books, but 2September for Comet just sounded wrong.
NB that first signal is very early; IIRC Brussels was liberated on the afternoon of the 3rd, and Antwerp on the 4th.
NB that first signal is very early; IIRC Brussels was liberated on the afternoon of the 3rd, and Antwerp on the 4th.