Operation Market-Garden and the V 2 rockets

[Delta Tank]

Mike, Aber,

The origin for Op Comet and therefore strictly speaking for Op Market Garden, was identified by Hamilton (Monty vol 3, p.22) as the following signal sent by Montgomery to de Guingand at 1600, 3 Sep:

Second Army will advance from line BRUSSELS - ANTWERP on 6 Sep directed on WESEL and ARNHEM and passing round North side of the RUHR. Require airborne operation of one British division and Poles on evening 6 Sep or morning 7 Sep to secure bridges over RHINE between WESEL and ARNHEM.

He references M148 in the Montgomery Papers held at the IWM.

Additionally, on the same page, he refers to signal M149 sent at 2000, 3 Sep:

Consider we may want considerable airborne drop to make certain of getting over MEUSE and RHINE. Order BROWNING to come to see me tomorrow and you come to.

Tom,

Obviously this must be the guidance he gave his planning section to look at. From Wesel to Arnhem is about 75, so that was the guidance to look for a crossing site/bridges inside that area to get across the water obstacles? Off the top of your head how many times did the British Army attempt to use airborne troops after breaking out of the Normandy beachhead? I may be wrong but Bradley did not plan any, he thought it was a waste of transportation that could be better used carry supplies to the ground forces. I do remember reading that he cross his boundary with British 21st Army Group to capture an area in order to get an airborne operation cancelled.

Mike
Note that attempts to advance north of Antwerp were halted by the Germans while the Guards succeeded in securing a crossing over the Albert Canal, a success exploited in the following few days and for Market Garden.
Regards

Tom

[Delta Tank]

Tom and all,

I made a typo, it is approximately 45 miles from Wesel to Arnhem or about 75 kilometers. Sorry, I wrote down both numbers and got them reversed.

Mike

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi Mike,

Off the top of my head, not all the missions that were speculatively prepared for 1st Airborne Div were actually directed in front of the British sector - I'm thinking of some ideas about St Malo and also the whole Transfigure thing, which was a multi-division drop south of Paris between the Seine and the Loire. In addition, at the same sort of time as Comet and Market Garden were being planned, their was also a plan called "Naples Two" which seems to have been a plan for an airborne drop somewhere on the Rhine in the American sector. How many of these had Bradley's blessing is a point I am not sure about.

I seem to recall that Hamilton says there was only one small bridge across the Rhine between Wesel and Arnhem and the same problem on the Meuse between Grave and Venlo (IIRC) - hence the choice really came down to either Arnhem or Wesel. Of course, Wesel was smack in the middle of a heavy flak belt, so the arguments had over LZs/DZs at Arnhem would likely have been repeated there as well. The other thing I don't know (amongst many things that I don't know ) is where exactly the bridge at Wesel was - out in the country outside town, or smack in the middle of a built up area.

Regards

Tom

[Aber]

From wiki

In the following months, plans for eighteen airborne operations had been drafted but then cancelled at short notice, mostly when the rapidly moving Allied ground forces overran the intended drop zones

Sourced to Pogue p279-81

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA ... me-16.html

After the operation to seize Boulogne was canceled, an air drop at Tournai (LINNET I) was planned. This was set aside, in turn, on the evening of 2 September by 21 Army Group as a result of adverse weather and delay. General Eisenhower and Air Chief Marshal Tedder on 3 September gave their backing to an operation planned for the Aachen-Maastricht Gap (LINNET II). The final decision on this project was left to Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley. General Brereton believed that the disorganization of the enemy required immediate launching of the operation. He declared that the operation should be mounted on 4 September or not at all. General Browning, deputy commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, protested that insufficient time had been given. When General Brereton held to his resolution, General Browning tendered his resignation. The airborne army commander declared next day that only General Eisenhower could act upon the matter, and General Browning withdrew his letter. The entire problem was settled apparently as the result of the slowing of the ground battle; on 5 September LINNET II was canceled.

Airborne planners devised eighteen different plans in forty days only to have many of the objectives overrun by the ground troops before any action could be taken.