State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

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Paul_G_Baker
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#196

Post by Paul_G_Baker » 02 May 2015, 23:25

Knouterer wrote:While I'm waiting for the definitive work on the Thompson in British service to be delivered, here's something else that may be of interest.

Defence Schemes, Operation Orders etc. of this period very often contain the almost ritualistic phrase: "The positions will be held to the last man and the last round, there will be no withdrawal."

However, Op. Instruction No. 10 of 134th Brigade (in WO 166/989) of 14 Sept. offered the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers (holding the Rye sector and the coastline to incl. Broomhill Farm) a bit more flexibility:

“1. In the event of a break through on the right of “A” sub-area (135th Bde, Romney Marsh - K) and/or on the extreme left of “B” sub-area (134th Bde), Comd. 1 R. Ir. F. may, at his discretion, withdraw his defences from the beaches EAST of CAMBER FM. 3937 to the switch line running thence to WALLHOUSE FM. 4337, forming a defensive flank facing SOUTH and Eastwards.

2. It is visualised that this operation will create a gap between “B” sub-area and “A” sub-area. The latter will fall back via SCOTNEY 4538 to LYDD 4839. In this event it will be the task of 1 R. Ir. F. to defend the left flank of “B” sub-area to the utmost and no further withdrawal should take place without orders from this H.Q.

3. As a last resort, however, and in the event of enemy moves round his left flank and threatening his left flank from the NORTH and EAST and if comns. with this H.Q. are impossible, Comd. 1 R. Ir. F. is permitted to withdraw to the line of the ROYAL MILITARY CANAL which will be defended to the last round and the last man. In this last event he is further permitted to make such adjustments to his front line WEST of R. ROTHER as the situation may thus demand, back to the ROYAL MILITARY CANAL, but no further.

(Signed) W. Michelmore
Brigadier
Commander 134th Infantry Brigade


(map is from c. 1920)
A bit surprising (to me) that the Germans would choose to attack on Romney Marsh, given how many ditches (etc.) are there. I'd say it would be rotten county for armour. Also, the terrain reminds me a little of Anzio, with that escarpment up to high ground to the North.

As to the orders, the permitted retrograde movement looks very slight and only seems to open an attack corridor northwards , and at what appears to be a Formation Boundary, into the bargain.
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#197

Post by Sid Guttridge » 03 May 2015, 13:41

Hi Paul_G_Baker,

In writing, "I'd say it would be rotten county for amour" you may be doing the residents of Kent generally, and Romney Marsh in paricular, a disservice.

I see no reason to doubt that they are as romantically passionate as anyone else.

Cheers,

Sid.


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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#198

Post by Paul_G_Baker » 03 May 2015, 14:36

Sorry, Sid Typo due to old keyboard - meant "armour", of course! :wink:
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#199

Post by sitalkes » 07 May 2015, 01:14

I just noticed Philson (p. 205) lists the number of guns in the 6th Anti-Aircraft Division (this covered Kent & Sussex etc but also as far north as Harwich) - pity he only gives this detail for the AA Divisions!!. Anyway, they are:
Heavy AA: 4.5" - 24, 3.7" static - 112; 3.7" mobile -112; 3" - 52
Light AA: 3" - 29, Bofors - 119; 2 pdr Naval - 38; Lewis Guns - 535
Searchlights - 150cm - 75; 90cm - 829

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#200

Post by sitalkes » 07 May 2015, 01:24

As I understand it, British infantry divisions were half without transport and half with transport, but with some elements missing, in September 1940.

1. Philson doesn't show which units were with, or without transport, but he does show which British units had up to three motor coach companies attached, while a very few have MT companies attached. If he doesn't mention any transport attached to a British unit (other than a mobile bath company), does that mean they are in the "didn't have any" category?

2. How did a 1940 British infantry division without transport compare to a normal (horse-drawn+ 90 motor vehicles) German infantry division, does that mean that (assuming no railway travel) they travelled at the same rate or worse?

3. When a 1940 British infantry divison had its full complement of transport, how did it compare to a German motorised infantry division, did the German divison have less transport, or would they both have been able to move at about the same rate?

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#201

Post by Knouterer » 07 May 2015, 09:50

sitalkes wrote:I just noticed Philson (p. 205) lists the number of guns in the 6th Anti-Aircraft Division (this covered Kent & Sussex etc but also as far north as Harwich) - pity he only gives this detail for the AA Divisions!!. Anyway, they are:
Heavy AA: 4.5" - 24, 3.7" static - 112; 3.7" mobile -112; 3" - 52
Light AA: 3" - 29, Bofors - 119; 2 pdr Naval - 38; Lewis Guns - 535
Searchlights - 150cm - 75; 90cm - 829
Unfortunately, that is an error/misprint/mixup; it's a repeat of the numbers for the 5th AA division (see page 103). There were no 4.5" guns in the 6th AA division I believe.

Routledge, Anti-Aircraft Artillery 1914-1955, p. 380, gives the strength of the 6th AA Division as of 30.9.1940 as: 184 HAA guns (3.7" and 3"), 143 LAA (3" and 40 mm), 409 LMGs and 674 searchlights. His numbers for the 5th AA Div. do not quite agree with Philson, but are fairly close: 325 HAA, 188 LAA, 557 LMGs, 897 searchlights.
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#202

Post by Paul_G_Baker » 07 May 2015, 15:19

sitalkes wrote:As I understand it, British infantry divisions were half without transport and half with transport, but with some elements missing, in September 1940.

1. Philson doesn't show which units were with, or without transport, but he does show which British units had up to three motor coach companies attached, while a very few have MT companies attached. If he doesn't mention any transport attached to a British unit (other than a mobile bath company), does that mean they are in the "didn't have any" category?
If my understanding is correct, the only time RASC Transport Companies got attached to a British Infantry Division on anything other than an ad-hoc basis was when that Division was designated as "Motorised" - each RASC Transport Company being designed to 'lift' one Brigade.

However, one also has to reckon with vehicles 'organic' to the Div HQ and all the Division's subordinate components, down to Battalion level in every Division - if pooled, ISTR, those assets were capable of 'lifting' one Brigade at a time. Under normal circumstances, though, a (non) Motorised Division would be temporarily allocated enough RASC assets (from Corps, or higher, reserve transport) to execute the movement. Otherwise, they could always march!
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#203

Post by sitalkes » 08 May 2015, 11:57

Well if they march on foot then they are no better than an ordinary German infantry division as far as their movement speed is concerned

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#204

Post by Paul_G_Baker » 08 May 2015, 12:54

sitalkes wrote:Well if they march on foot then they are no better than an ordinary German infantry division as far as their movement speed is concerned
Only have in-unit transport breakdowns from "Handbook on the British Army 1943" - so take with pinch of salt, but listing for Battalion on the assumption that that TOE wouldn't change much over time:-

1 x Motorcar; 4-seater,
6 x Motorcars; 2-seater,
1 x 30 cwt Lorry,
2 x 15 cwt Personnel Trucks,
32 x 15 cwt Cargo Trucks,
1 x 15 cwt Water Truck,
13 x 3-ton Lorries,
27 x Motorcycles,
31 x Bicycles,
14 x Bren Gun Carriers,
7 x Universal Carriers fitted for 3-in Mortars.
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#205

Post by RichTO90 » 08 May 2015, 13:37

sitalkes wrote:2. How did a 1940 British infantry division without transport compare to a normal (horse-drawn+ 90 motor vehicles) German infantry division, does that mean that (assuming no railway travel) they travelled at the same rate or worse??
German infantry divisions of the 1. Welle nominally had 1,012 motor vehicles plus 527 motorcycles, 2. Welle 905 and 497, 3. Welle 578 and 415, and 4. Welle 977 and 329. The 5.-10. Welle divisions that were retained after the end of the French Campaign likely had fewer, but still substantially more than 90 motor vehicles. Even the late-war Infanterie-Division n.A. had over 100 motor vehicles, as did the Volksgrenadier division.

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#206

Post by Knouterer » 08 May 2015, 18:12

According to the War Establishment in force mid-1940 (WE II/1931/12F/1, taken from Philson's OOB of the BEF), the transport for an infantry battalion looked like this, but in September only a very few especially favoured units had anything resembling a full establishment.

It includes an AT platoon with 3 x 25 mm guns, which were no longer available after Dunkirk, but by September infantry brigades generally had an AT company with 10 x Bedford OXA armoured lorries, with personnel drawn from the three battalions.

The intention was, following the recommendations of the Bartholomew Committee, to increase the number of 3" mortars in the mortar platoon from two to six, as in the German army, and to increase the number of carriers to 13, but that hadn't happened yet by September.
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#207

Post by Knouterer » 08 May 2015, 18:37

sitalkes wrote:As I understand it, British infantry divisions were half without transport and half with transport, but with some elements missing, in September 1940.

1. Philson doesn't show which units were with, or without transport, but he does show which British units had up to three motor coach companies attached, while a very few have MT companies attached. If he doesn't mention any transport attached to a British unit (other than a mobile bath company), does that mean they are in the "didn't have any" category?

2. How did a 1940 British infantry division without transport compare to a normal (horse-drawn+ 90 motor vehicles) German infantry division, does that mean that (assuming no railway travel) they travelled at the same rate or worse?

3. When a 1940 British infantry divison had its full complement of transport, how did it compare to a German motorised infantry division, did the German divison have less transport, or would they both have been able to move at about the same rate?
I don't quite understand what you mean by a British infantry division "without transport" - even the worst equipped division in Sept. 1940 probably had a thousand motor vehicles or so (excluding motorcycles). In principle, all units in an infantry division except the infantry battalions were fully motorised, and the latter could be made fully mobile by attaching 3 Troop Carrying Companies or Motor Coach Companies to the division.

In reality of course, most divisions were well below strength as regards motor transport - see for example tables about the 55th Field Regiment above, which had less than half the vehicles required to move the regiment in one go - but that does not apply to the formations earmarked for counterattacks (IV and VII Corps, 2nd Armoured Division, 29th and 31st Independent Brigade Groups) which were fully motorized, although for a good part not with "real" military (WD) vehicles but a variety of impressed/hired civilian vehicles.

In principle, the TCCs and MCCs would have been available to be assigned to other divisions after they had deposed their charges somewhere near the battle zone.

I think I've posted this little map before - of course it's just a schematic representation, I'm not suggesting that the divisions in question would follow that exact itinerary, or that they would all arrive at the same time.
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#208

Post by Knouterer » 08 May 2015, 20:40

For an impression of how things looked at unit level, a few selected entries from the War Diary of the 8th Royal Fusiliers (WO 166/4533) about the motor transport (M.T.) situation (and a few other things that may be of interest).

This battalion existed prewar and on duplication of the Territorial Army “threw off” the 11th Royal Fusiliers in April 1939. Strength 30 Off 607 ORs on 30.11.1939. In Sept. 1940 they were part of 1st London Brigade and guarding the North coast of Kent around Herne Bay.

30 May: “A Motor Cycle Platoon, composed of 30 m/cs (solo), was formed under 2/Lieut. G.N. Bromley-Martin. His immediate task is to patrol the coast at night and during fog from COLDHARBOUR SLUICE 6987 to WHITSTABLE.”

3 June: “2/Lieut. G.C. Rawlinson and 23 O.R.’s posted to Brigade Anti-Tank Company.”
10 June: “100 men arrived from I.T.C. Hounslow (Royal Fusiliers - K) to bring the Battalion over W.E.”
12 June: “50 men transferred to the Battalion from I.T.C., The Buffs, Canterbury, and bring strength of Battalion to 925.”
15 June: “The Battalion, less “W” and “Y” companies, with attached troops, did as an exercise a rapid night M.T. move to area MARGATE – RAMSGATE to counter a landing. Such moves are still being hampered by lack of “A” Echelon Transport – the hired vehicles we have do not carry the necessary loads.”
20 June: “Five senior N.C.O.’s posted away to I.T.C., Royal Fusiliers, to train Army Classes.”
26 June: “Consequent to the arrival in the Isle of Thanet of 198th. Infantry Brigade, the Battalion was relieved of responsibility for the bridge at SARRE and the bridge at GRAYS FARM 6785.”
27 June: “2000 hrs to 0500 hrs. Divisional Exercise to practice rapid move to counter landing.”
30 June: “The Battalion defensive position is nearing completion. Eleven pill boxes have been put up in the Battalion Area to strengthen the defence, and these are being camouflaged as rapidly as possible. In addition, useful concrete road blocks have been fixed into most main roads by the Ministry of Transport. Railway sleepers have been dug vertically into most flat ground where aeroplanes might land. A start has been made to dismantle a section of the Pier at Herne Bay to prevent its use as a landing quay. The Battalion is now beginning to feel the results of having had to post a good many senior N.C.O.’s to Training Centres etc. during the last nine months. The Army Class intakes contain good material from which to find Lance Corporals, but owing to their youth none of these men are the best type for promotion to Sergeant without much further training.”

15 July: “150 civilian workmen arrived to continue digging the Battalion Position, and so to release the troops for training. As work on the Eastern Curtain – as the Battalion Position is called – is now confined to maintenance, there is not really enough work for these men to do.”
19 July: “The civilian labour was paid off and left after an unprofitable week.”
31 July: “Now that the Eastern Curtain position is completed, and as work on the 12 Corps line is being done by civilian labour under R.E. direction, the Battalion has had time during the last ten days to get down to the serious business of training so suddenly interrupted when we left Crowborough (on 11 May – K). Owing to the crops etc., only small exercises can be done, and the companies have been doing Section and Platoon Training. This is necessary too, because the “Bognor” Army Class and the two recent drafts from the I.T.C. have done no field training at all. Almost 600 O.Rs. in the Battalion are now post mobilization recruits.”

3 Aug.: “Two N.C.Os and 11 Fusiliers attached to 1st Bn. P.L.Ks (Princess Louise’s Kensingtons, a MG battalion – K) to man additional M.M.Gs brought into the area for coast defence.”
5 Aug.: “M.T. Inspection by Brigade Commander under active service conditions. All the cars, carriers and M/Cs on charge were harboured in groups in Strode Park under cover. The inspection was a very thorough one, and the Brigade Commander, before leaving, stated that he was very satisfied. The transport will look even more impressive when it contains a higher proportion of W.D. vehicles, as at present it contains a large number of hired vehicles quite unsuited to the purpose for which they have been hired.”
10 Aug.: “A number of self-igniting (Molotov) bombs were issued to the Battalion. These have been buried either under water or in the ground for safe keeping. When they have to be taken into use their safe transport will present difficulties.”
20 Aug.: “Two additional carriers arrived. The battalion now has six carriers and one armoured car.”
31 Aug.: “A strong report put into Brigade about the failure of Socks, A.V. The socks are inferior in quality, and are expected to be worn without changing or washing for a week. All ranks have complained that their feet are being damaged by them.”

5 Sept.: “Divisional Intelligence Summary again stresses imminence of invasion, and consequently special precautions are being taken. Two-thirds of “W” and “Z” companies, who are along the coast, are sleeping at their battle positions, and everyone in these Companies is sleeping in their clothes.”
8 Sept.: “Battalion put on 30 minutes notice at 0200 hours. Great air activity throughout the night. Return to normal state of preparedness at 0730 hours. (…) In order to obtain quick information about landings by enemy parachutists cycle patrols are being started by all Rifle Companies from midnight to 0615 hours.”
10 Sept.: “Authority obtained to hire vehicles locally to make up deficiencies during the present period of emergency. Several were obtained and will make the Battalion more mobile than it has recently been.”
15 Sept.: “Three Carriers arrived, bringing the number on charge up to 9.”

8 Nov.: “Tank Hunting Platoon disbanded. All Companies will now be trained to know how to deal with tanks. The Carrier Platoon had 16 Fusiliers attached today for training for three weeks, in view of the increase in its size recently foreshadowed.”
9 Nov.: “9 W.D. 15cwt trucks arrived today, which will be invaluable.”

5 Dec.: “Socks A.V. were discontinued as from today’s date, and nobody will be sorry.”

14 April 1941: “13 30-cwt Dodge lorries arrived, i.e. full W.E. 30-cwt lorries of other makes are being withdrawn. The Dodge lorries are enormous for their weight, and unfortunately have left side steering. Drivers are being very carefully trained before sent out in them for duty, and we are hoping for the best.”

So it took until April 1941 before this battalion was fully equipped with "real" military vehicles built according to War Department specifications (or bought in the U.S.). The Dodges in question were probably the type in the picture (from Bart H. Vanderveen, The Observer’s Fighting Vehicles Directory WWII, p. 87), and it does seem to be quite a bit larger than British 30cwt (4x2) lorries such as the Austin K30 or the Bedford OXD.
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#209

Post by Knouterer » 09 May 2015, 17:14

Looking at the big picture, no European army, not even those that largely relied on horses, could afford to buy enough motor vehicles to equip the whole army upon mobilisation. Many nations had some kind of subsidy scheme, under which civilian operators like trucking companies agreed to buy certain types of militarily useful vehicles, keep them in good working order and hand them over when mobilisation was declared. This was then supplemented by large scale requisitioning.

In the French army, for example, at the beginning of Sept. 1939, the situation was as follows:
Motorcycles: military 8,890, requisitioned 57,973
Cars (voitures de liaison): mil. 6,756, req. 57,209
Trucks: mil. 24,358 + 2,768 ambulances, req. 158,561
Special vehicles (tractors, halftracks etc., all AFVs except tanks): mil. 28,875, req. 13,324.

Source: François Vauvillier and Jean-Michel Touraine, L’automobile sous l’uniforme 1939-40)

As regards the British army, on the outbreak of war in 1939 it was motorised to a higher degree than any continental army.
According to the plans as they stood in 1938, six Territorial divisions would become “motorised” divisions (50th (Northumbrian) and 1st (London) among others), whose role would be to exploit a gap in the enemy front created by the Mobile Division, renamed the 1st Armoured Division in April 1939. These motorised divisions were smaller than a normal infantry division, with two brigades; however none were sent to France as such and by mid-1940 they were all reorganised as standard infantry divisions.

As usual, numbers concerning the losses in France vary, but David Fletcher, British Military Transport 1829-1956, p. 75, thinks 85,000 is a reasonable number (excluding AFVs, but including motorcycles, apparently). The proportions of WD and “impressed” vehicles seem to have been roughly 60-40. According to a table compiled from records of the Central Ordnance Depot at Chilwell for the main load classes:
15cwt: 11,442 WD / 26 impressed
3-ton (4x2): 11,782 WD / 14,009 impressed
6-ton: 122 / 454
10-ton: 195 / 384

According to the Statistical Digest, in 1940 the production of military vehicles (for War Office and Air Ministry, excluding Admiralty) was:
5 tank transporters, 447 lorries 10-ton and over, 569 6-ton lorries, 60,445 1-3-ton lorries, 28,121 15cwt trucks, 3,938 ambulances, 13,173 heavy cars, 21,232 light cars and vans, 1,539 heavy tractors, 4,108 light tractors, 68,532 motorcycles and 14,098 trailers.

From which it can be deduced that the losses of 15cwt trucks, for example, represented about five months’ worth of production. That doesn’t mean that five months after Dunkirk all divisions were back up to full W/E as regards this item, of course; the divisions that had not gone over to France had been badly under-equipped and many new units were being raised that also all needed transport.

As regards Bren/Scout/Universal Carriers: on this website the numbers on hand are given as 2,242 on 30 June, 3,181 on 31 July, and 3,784 on 31 Aug. (http://www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php? ... &Itemid=61 ) That would have been enough to equip all divisions and independent brigades by the end of Sept., plus a certain number for cavalry units, and indeed it seems from war Diaries, as in the case of the 8th R.F. above, that most infantry battalions had a full complement, more or less, by September.
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#210

Post by sitalkes » 13 May 2015, 05:09

RichTO90 wrote:
sitalkes wrote:2. How did a 1940 British infantry division without transport compare to a normal (horse-drawn+ 90 motor vehicles) German infantry division, does that mean that (assuming no railway travel) they travelled at the same rate or worse??
German infantry divisions of the 1. Welle nominally had 1,012 motor vehicles plus 527 motorcycles, 2. Welle 905 and 497, 3. Welle 578 and 415, and 4. Welle 977 and 329. The 5.-10. Welle divisions that were retained after the end of the French Campaign likely had fewer, but still substantially more than 90 motor vehicles. Even the late-war Infanterie-Division n.A. had over 100 motor vehicles, as did the Volksgrenadier division.
This is really interesting, i suppose the 90 vehicles figure (which is usually used in Sealion threads) comes from the 1941 campaign, when most units were stripped of their vehicles and given horse-drawn carts so the remainder on the Russian front could be motorised or partly motorised. Nearly all the German Sealion invasion divisions of the first and second waves were 1. Welle or 2. Welle units. Does that mean they had a few less horses than would normally be expected, even if the first wave divisions hadn't divested themselves as much as possible of the need for horse-drawn transport?

If a 1. Welle division had that many vehicles (and added more if it was in the first wave), then it might have been expected to have a similar movement rate to a British unit that was short of vehicles.


Designer notes from Seelöwe, SPI game, 1974 (not the best source, but some interesting notes if true nevertheless:)

The Germans were not the only ones with significant transport problems. The severe equipment losses in the evacuation from Dunkirk had not been replaced by September. Even less so by July. The only fully motorized units were the Canadian First Division, the armoured divisions. and the motorized machinegun brigades which were actually armed almost exclusively with weapons carriers mounting machine guns. These, of course, have their full motorized Movement Allowances of eight. Certain other units were in the process of becoming re- motorized, but still did not have sufficient equipment so move a large part of a division (Movement Allowance of five). Other divisions almost completely lacked transport (those with a Movement Allowance of three). The British had assigned the divisions to certain areas in the event of an Invasion alert, something which occurred several times. Supposedly, the local lorries, buses, and whatever other transport could be scraped together would hurry to division headquarters to be assigned to various battalions. In the actual alerts this was found to be a less than satisfactory system, since many people chose to sleep through the morning, many of the driven were insufficiently learned of road systems outside of their own county, and communications with this haphazard transport system were sketchy at best. The fact that so many divisions and other u flits did depend upon local drayage was one reason why the British are scattered across the map in an apparently nonsensical fashion. Although it was frequently proposed that units be concentrated on the beaches, or at some other point, this could never be effected as long as the units depended on local transport. In the immediate area of either the Thames defence line or the Kent invasion area, there was insufficient transport for all of its units. The British had been a motorized army for more than two years and could not operate in the absence of the motorization. This is the reason for the activation rule concerning units beginning on the map. These units were simply taking their time getting their transport together and moving forward. Additionally, British reinforcements were expected to have severe problems in arriving at the front. The Germans would have utilized night raids led by pathfinders in order to attempt to disrupt the rail system which was necessary to move the reinforcements forward. Thus, the reinforcements may or may not arrive on the Game-Turn that they are scheduled for.

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