State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

[Paul_G_Baker]

The Churchill 'chart' for 7th September and MG Carriers shows:

At full WE:-

Canadian Division,
1st Division,
3rd Division,
18th Division,
43rd Division, and
55th Division.

The NZEF (due to its size) may have had a little over WE, as might the 29th and 31st IBGs.

All other Divisions are shown as between 50% and 75% - except the Australians (shown as at about 33%).

[Knouterer]

2. How did a 1940 British infantry division without transport compare to a normal (horse-drawn+ 90 motor vehicles) German infantry division, does that mean that (assuming no railway travel) they travelled at the same rate or worse??

German infantry divisions of the 1. Welle nominally had 1,012 motor vehicles plus 527 motorcycles, 2. Welle 905 and 497, 3. Welle 578 and 415, and 4. Welle 977 and 329. The 5.-10. Welle divisions that were retained after the end of the French Campaign likely had fewer, but still substantially more than 90 motor vehicles. Even the late-war Infanterie-Division n.A. had over 100 motor vehicles, as did the Volksgrenadier division.

It's a bit off topic, but a few thoughts about the degree of motorization of the Seelöwe divisions.

Considering how much more deck space horse-drawn wagons and artillery would take up, compared to motor vehicles, the vulnerability of horses, and the much more laborious loading and unloading, it would seem logical to replace the horses in the Seelöwe divisions (largely) by motor vehicles. In fact, Halder noted in his diary for 26.7 about the results of an exercise in Emden:
“Proposal: reduce number of horses. 1st Staffel still has 4200 horses, 2nd Staffel 5700 horses. Too many! As much motor transport as possible.” (Klee, Dokumente, p. 160).

However, as we have seen, according to Schenk an unnamed division (but almost certainly the 35th ID) still had 341 horses in the barge convoy and 4,427 in the transporters coming from Rotterdam, and only marginally more motor vehicles than normal for a division of the 1st Welle, which extra vehicles in all probability belonged to the units added to the division (tank battalions, engineers, signals etc.).

See discussion at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0&start=75 (for those who have the stomach for it …).

Gröner (Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe 1815-1945, Vol. 7) provides a list of transports assigned to Seelöwe, with technical data. As we know, the ships were numbered in sequence per port of departure, so for Rotterdam that was RO1, RO2, etc.
Judging by Schenk’s little map of beach C (see below), the convoys (in that case from Antwerpen, A1 to A48) also sailed in that sequence, which would seem logical as it would make it easier for convoy commanders and escort vessels to keep order.
Assuming (for the sake of argument) that was the case, and further assuming that the 18 transports assigned to the 35th ID (according to Schenk) were out in front, we can construct a little table showing the load capacity – not necessarily the actual load of course – of those 18 ships. I’ve left out RO16, 17 and 18, because those were very small ships (under 400 GRT) assigned to the reserve.

Ship BRT/GRT Men Horses Vehicles
RO1 Loppersum 4691 250 110 56
RO2 Waalhaven 3552 250 80 54
RO3 Aldebaran 7891 860 194 127
RO4 Maas 999 400 0 32
RO5 Aludra 4930 900 206 123
RO6 Vesta 1854 350 82 47
RO7 Orestes 2663 850 138 76
RO8 Irene 1153 200 95 30
RO9 Orion 1722 300 94 28
RO10 Noordwijk 3697 300 40 80
RO11 Alkaid 5483 550 200 97
RO12 Damsterdijk 9338 2500 305 127
RO13 Drechtdijk 9338 2500 305 127
RO14 Kota Pinang 7300 2500 150 60
RO15 Westland 1258 200 95 30
RO19 Batavier V 1573 400 35 8
RO20 Wolsum 3668 600 0 63
RO21 IJssel 2262 150 0 70
Total 73372 14060 2129 1235



As the names suggest, these were (almost) all Dutch ships for which the Kriegsmarine had to find crews somewhere. Load capacity for the Damsterdijk is not given, because Gröner lists her in her later capacity as Zielschiff, but I have copied the data for Drechtdijk as they were sister ships. Similarly, the Westland is listed in her later role as Sperrbrecher 173, and I have taken the liberty of copying date for the (slightly smaller) Irene. The Kota Pinang was a relatively large and fast (14 knots) ship built in the 1920s with an eye to the Hadj pilgrimage trade between the Dutch East Indies and Jeddah, and could accommodate 20 first-class passengers and 2,000 pilgrims on deck. So she had a large number of boats, which might have been useful. She took part in the Bismarck raid as a reconnaissance ship and was sunk by HMS Kenya on 3.10.1941. I put the number of troops at 2,500 and the number of horses and vehicles at half that of the larger Damsterdijk/Drechtdijk, considering she was more of a passenger ship.

One conclusion that can be drawn (tentatively …) is that the 12,376 men indicated by Schenk as the second Staffel of the 35th ID would have fitted on board these 18 ships without any problem.

On the other hand, there seems to be room for only about half of Schenk’s 4,427 horses.

Schenk lists 933 “Fahrzeuge” (horse-drawn vehicles), 356 PKW (cars), 760 LKW (trucks/tractors), and 46 artillery pieces weighing over 1.5 tons, or 2,095 “bulky items” (disregarding motorcycles, light AT guns etc. which could be stuffed into nooks and crannies). That’s again a good deal more than the 1,235 vehicles (“Fahrzeuge” in a wider sense) in the table.

Those 18 ships would be towing 36 loaded barges, but clearly it would not be possible to stuff some 2,000 horses and 800 vehicles in those.

(regarding the second little map, the landing zone of the 17th ID is wrong, it extends to far towards Folkestone, but the 10km line I drew indicates, very roughly, where the transports would drop anchor - perhaps a little closer to the shore)

[Knouterer]

To round off the subject of the Thompson submachine gun (in this context), I have in the meantime received "Great Britain - The Tommy Gun Story" by Tommy Davis Jr., and it's largely based on the documents I have seen too, plus some other sources.

According to Davis, the shipment of 1,150 guns on the San Marcos in July was part of the (second) French order which the British had agreed to take over a week or two previously. In that case I could revise my estimate slightly upwards but I think I'll stick to somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 in the hands of troops by the end of Sept.

The negotiations with Beretta referred to above did actually lead to a contract with their agent, the firm of John Gray and Partners, Ltd., for 1,763 Beretta 38A guns with 37,000 40-round magazines and 2,250,000 rounds of ammunition. This contract was apparently signed in May and cancelled again on the 12th of July, for reasons which are not hard to imagine.

At the end of January 1940, the Swedish government bought 500 Thompsons from Auto-Ordnance. For those interested in that level of detail, this webpage about Swedish submachine guns has an interesting picture of one:
http://www.gotavapen.se/gota/artiklar/k ... ede_45.htm
The serial number, 14563, shows that this gun (or at least the receiver) is one of the last of the original 15,000 produced by Colt in 1921-22. The last digit of "Model of 1921" has been crudely overstamped with an 8, making it look like like a "B". The exact same thing can be seen on the Model 1928A guns supplied to the U.S. Navy for use by the Marines in 1932. The official records have gone missing but collectors believe that when production at Savage got going again in April 1940 they took up the numbering where Colt had left off, at S 15041.

Finally, as I thought, the stories about two-thirds of the British Thompsons being lost to U-boat or aircraft attacks, or 100,000 going down in a single ship, have no basis in fact. Davis calculates that of the 108,000 bought by the British Purchasing Commission (under "Cash & Carry"), 4,950 are known to be lost in transit, or about 4.6%. Of the 406,000 (or slightly more) supplied under Lend-Lease, 22,358 were lost, or 5.5%. However, he also has a picture of a handwritten Ministry of Supply document which indicates that of the first 55,250 ordered, 3,950 were lost, a slightly higher percentage.

The largest number to be lost in a single ship was apparently 5,837, on the Dutch S.S. Mariso, bound for Alexandria via Durban, which was torpedoed off Bahia, Brazil, by U-518 on 20 March 1943.

[John T]

A cypher telegram dated 8th July from the UK High Commissioner in Canada (who for some legal or technical reason was involved in buying guns in the US) announced that delivery of the 2,000 guns mentioned above was expected to be completed by 10th July. 160 were to leave New York the following week. Of the first order for 26,250, it was hoped that 6,000 would be delivered (Stateside, that is …) in July, 9,000 in August, 8,000 in Sept. and 3,250 in Oct. In another telegram the next day he added “1,150 guns now loaded San Marcos leaving next week.” However, the San Marcos did not dash straight across the ocean from New York, but first went to Halifax where presumably she had to wait for a convoy to be formed. So it seems a safe assumption that none of the guns delivered in July were in the hands of troops in Britain before August, and so on.

Yes according to Warsailors
she was planned to go with convoy HX 59, with ammo, see Advance Sailing Telegram
http://www.warsailors.com/convoys/hx59.html

but where delayed to the next convoy HX 60
http://www.warsailors.com/convoys/hx60.html
, Departed Halifax on July 23-1940 and arrived Liverpool on Aug. 7

Cheers
/John

[Knouterer]

Could the UK High Commissioner in Canada have had to be involved as the 'man holding the purse strings'? That's where all the liquid and negotiable assets ended up, wasn't it.

'Sixteen' thousand could well have been confused with 'sixty' thousand ("Send us three and foupence, we're going to a dance", remember!)

No, I don't imagine the High Commissioner was holding any purse strings, after all the government was still in London, and orders were placed by the Ministry of Supply after having obtained the requirements of the War Office (which also ordered stuff on its own authority, apparently) and the approval of the Treasury. There was even a special "Exchange Requirements Committee" which had to approve the release of the necessary dollars.

I'd have to look it up, but the fact that orders were placed through Canada may have had something to do with the American Neutrality Acts (or other American legislation) making it easier for American arms producers to do business with customers in the Western Hemisphere.

The British History of the Second World War, Volume "Studies of Overseas Supply", by H. Duncan Hall and C.C. Wrigley, explains the setup at the time (p. 66-67):

"In February 1940, the whole staff of the 'British Supply Board in Canada and the United States', set up in September 1939 under Colonel J.H.M. Greenly, numbered 33 persons, excluding clerical assistants, typists, draughtsmen, etc.; and its branch office in New York, the British Purchasing Commission, by which it was destined to be overshadowed, was as yet slightly smaller. (...) Before July 1940, there were only two sets of telegraphic correspondence on supply matters - one between departments in London and the Supply Board at Ottawa, the other between Mr Arthur Purvis, head of the Anglo-French Purchasing Board in New York and his opposite number in London, M. Jean Monnet. The former cables were mingled with the regular traffic between the Dominions Office and its High Commissioner."

So that explains why telegrams sent by, or in the name of, the High Commissioner refer to the purchase of guns in the U.S.

[sitalkes]

Re: the Dover batteries, I thought this picture of what was added between 1941 and 1943 might be of interest, as it confuses the 1940 picture somewhat

[sitalkes]

I created a short British OOB 1940 powerpoint presentation that summarises Philson and adds the sea and air forces, with maps here: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_JIBY ... lBqX0c2QzQ

[Knouterer]

An example that shows that British official records of the period must be approached with caution:
The 5th Royal Horse Artillery lost its guns (18-pounders) in France (where it was part of the Corps Troops of III Corps). At the end of 1940 it became part of the Support Group of the 8th Armoured Division then being formed.

The General Return of the Strength of the British Army as of 30.9.1940 (WO 73/146) indicates that (the HQ of) this regiment was at Littlestone (Romney Marsh) at that time, which is certainly incorrect. Elsewhere in the same document, where units are listed per arm of service and in sequence, the place is spelled "Littleston", a place which does not seem to exist. So I was wondering if perhaps "Littleton" in Hampshire was meant.

But the riddle is solved by Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery, The Years of Defeat 1939-41, p.103:

"Meanwhile 5th Regiment RHA was collecting itself together at Brecon in South Wales. It moved to Chelmsford (Essex) in an anti-tank role with 44 old naval 6-pounders and its gun positions stretched from Saffron Walden to south of Wickford with RHQ at The Manor, Little Easton."

Errors like this indicate that communication within the British Army and the War Office relied heavily on the (civilian) telephone system, apart from teletypewriters and dispatch riders on motorcycles. With everybody looking for spies and Fifth Columnists everywhere, I wonder if there was ever any systematic effort to check the GPO switchboard operators, who were uniquely placed to pass the very latest info on British plans on to the enemy?
As I understand it, in case of invasion, the plan was to disconnect all civilians who had no defense-related tasks. Indeed it seems that that was the only thing to do, otherwise the system would have become overloaded with calls very quickly.

[Knouterer]

A few notes on machine gun units in the British Army at the time:

The Machine Gun Corps, which had numbered 158,796 all ranks at peak strength in 1918, was disbanded in 1922. For a time, infantry battalions had three rifle companies and one MG company, but that did not work so well from a tactical point of view (although other armies seemed to be quite satisfied with a similar setup …). From about 1935/36 inf bns reverted to four rifle companies, except for some 13 (later more) bns which were selected for conversion to MG units.

As for the guns themselves: at the end of WWI, about 15,000 had been put in storage. It may be assumed that in the following years a number went to countries that received British military aid, such as the newly independent Baltic States, and to the White Russians in the civil war.
Apart from aircraft and AFV guns, new tripod-mounted ground guns were still ordered in small batches in the 1930s, while at the same time guns in store were repaired and reconditioned. In the course of 1939 Vickers received orders for 950 new guns (plus 132 AFV guns) while Enfield received contracts to repair/recondition 3,700 old ones (Skennerton). New production ran at about 250 per month by July 1940.

Shortly before the war, a new dial sight for indirect fire was introduced which was graduated to 4,400 yards, and the new Mk VIIIz cartridge with a heavy boat-tailed bullet actually could reach that far, although dispersion must have been extreme.

Machine gun battalions were fully motorized (enabling them to quickly reach any part of the front where the enemy threatened to break through) and consisted of a HQ and HQ company (No. 1 platoon Signals, No. 2 AA, No. 3 Admin) plus four companies (platoons numbered 4 to 15) with 12 Vickers each. In the early stages of the war some MG platoons were commanded by Warrant Officers. The battalion also had 13 Brens and 18 AT rifles (according to War Establishment, that is …) Companies had three platoons with two sections each. In principle, (defensive) positions were always occupied by at least a two-gun section, so that if one gun ceased firing for one reason or another, the other one could keep covering the assigned target/sector.

According to a 1938 War Establishment the battalion had 3,500 rounds per Vickers with the guns, makes 168,000, plus 216,000 in reserve, for a grand total of 384,000.

Picture is from a later date when MG battalions had become Corps Troops.

[Knouterer]

There were some 14 machine gun battalions with the BEF, so even if they had lost all their guns, which was not the case, the loss would have been no more than 700-800 including spares. Battalions returning from France were issued new guns fairly quickly and on a generous scale. By September both the 1st Kensingtons attached to 1st London Division and the 7th Devons with the 45th Division had platoons with 5 guns instead of 4, and companies with 15, judging from their WDs (for ex. 7th Devons, 4.9: “Commanding Officer, Asst. Adjt. Visited “D” Coy. all 15 guns. Conditions good; very much improved.”), which would bring the total per bn to 60. The strength of MG battalions was correspondingly higher than W/E, varying from 60 to 160 men more than W/E of 24 officers plus 721 other ranks.

“Surplus” guns are also mentioned, for example, in the WD of the 8th Royal Fusiliers (WO 166/4533) for 3 Aug.: “Two N.C.Os and 11 Fusiliers attached to 1st Bn. P.L.Ks (Princess Louise’s Kensingtons – K) to man additional M.M.Gs brought into the area for coast defence.”
As with infantry units, the MG battalions apparently enjoyed considerable latitude in how they wanted to organize themselves. The 5th Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders (35 Off 945 OR as of 30.9) and the 5th Devonshires (36 Off 875 OR) (both with Brocforce) had five MG companies, “A” through “E” (“E” Coy of the former attached to 29th Independent Brigade Group and “D” of the latter to the 31st IBG), which presumably means they had 60 (or more) guns as well. Apart from MG battalions, Vickers MGs were also used by the Motor Machine Gun battalions (cavalry regiments without tanks) and some other types of units. Some were issued to the RAF for airfield defence.

1st Kensingtons (36 Off 772 OR as of 30.9) (War Diary from July WO 166/4350) were widely scattered when serving with the BEF; most of A and D companies went into captivity with the 51st (Highland) Division at St Valéry-en-Caux, the rest of the battalion escaped via Le Havre. The battalion was reformed and in early July was attached to the 1st (London) Division. From then on, Bn HQ was at Hothfield Place, about 4 miles west of Ashford. Companies moved around quite a bit but by mid-September B and C were also at Hothfield, as part of the divisional reserve, in which role they would have come under command of 2/5 Queens, which was responsible for the area around Ashford including Divisional HQ at Kennington north of the town. A Coy was on the Isle of Sheppey and D Coy in Sub-Areas A.7 (Ramsgate-Margate) and A.6 (Deal). This just as a general indication, platoons and sections were regularly detached and moved around to reinforce perceived weak spots. At the very end of Sept., from about the 28th, the 4th Cheshires took over (most of) their positions.

The 7th Devons (strength 34 Off 801 OR on 30.9, against W/E of 24 + 721) (War Diary WO 166/4201) did not go to France and became part of 45th Inf Div in March. The battalion moved to Kent and Sussex in May. Bn reserve of 80,000 rounds (37% of W/E above) mentioned on 13.6.
Disposition by the last week of Sept., as far as can be made out from the WD:
HQ and HQ Company: Hawkhurst.
A Coy (supporting 134th Inf Bde): Positions at Camber Sands mentioned 15.7. Platoon in new pillboxes at Rye Harbour mentioned. No. 5 platoon at Bexhill in Aug. 15.8: “C.O. visited R.I.Fus. at Rye and made arrangement for manning of 2 further guns”. Pillboxes Rye Harbour mentioned again 13.9.
B Coy: HQ Eastbourne, then Pevensey? Martello towers at Langney Point – Pevensey in July. Newnham (?) Platoon at Bexhill Front July. Pl in Eastbourne Redoubt? 21.9: No. 9 platoon took over position in Pevensey Castle from No. 10.
C Coy (supporting 136th Inf Bde): Newhaven. 1 platoon in Fort, 1 platoon on high ground overlooking Newhaven (Denton), 1 platoon at Cuckmere Haven (west side).
D Coy (supporting 135th Inf Bde): HQ Dymchurch 13 Plt Aldington 14 Plt New Romney 15 Plt Greatstone. “Positions in Martello tower” mentioned 5.6. This must refer to No. 24 where an artillery observation post (56th Heavy Regt.) and the Observer Corps were pushed out. 30.6: “C.O. visited “D” Coy and sited positions to cover Lyme (sic) Aerodrome.” 16 Aug siting of 3 guns in Martello towers. 6 Sept: “… a new site for 1 section was found at Littlestone.”
Assuming 5-gun platoons, 2 of 14 Plt’s guns may have been in New Romney and 3 in Dymchurch, 2 in Martello 24 and 1 in Martello 22 (as on a Nov. 1940 map of the 5th Royal West Kents, when the 6th Cheshires were the MG battalion in occupation). 15 Plt with sections at Greatstone and Littlestone, 13 Plt near Aldington with one section covering RAF Lympne.

[Knouterer]

As regards tactical use, Vickers guns were normally not firing to the front, sweeping from left to right and back again and scything down the advancing enemy infantry at close range, as seen in the movies; instead, the gunners normally aimed at a certain point where enemy troops were concentrating, or where enemy troops had to pass, and fired as many belts at it as required. The natural dispersion of the bullets (increased by the vibration of the gun and the heating up of the barrel) resulted in a “cone of fire”.

According to G.S. Hutchinson (Machine Guns – Their History and Tactical Employment (Being Also a History of the Machine Gun Corps 1916-1922), page 199), “… the effective beaten zone within which 75 percent of the bullets fall from a machine gun firing at 2,000 yards is an area 70 yards long and 20 feet wide; while, owing to the steepness of the trajectory at this range, the bullets have an excellent effect upon enemy troops in shell-hole defences, indeed in body cover of all kinds.”
The “cone of fire” and “beaten zone” of several machine guns could be combined as shown in the drawing below from a 1917 manual.

The WD of the Kensingtons (as quoted by Robert Gardner) notes for 20.8 regarding a section of D Coy, near Sandwich:
“Sandilands – 3 Vickers, firing from pill box (1 gun) and from house (2 guns) in S. direction along beach. Fixed line ranges 1400, 1700 and 1900 yds. 15,000 rounds Mk. VII and Mk. VIII mixed per gun.”
Two other Vickers guns, presumably of the same platoon, were sited in Sandown Castle about 3,000 m to the south so that the fire of these two positions could overlap.

In the Martello towers at Dymchurch and Pevensey, the guns were apparently not positioned on top of the tower but on the first floor where the small windows on each side permitted fire along the beach.

The wall to the right of the windows had to be cut away to allow the assistant gunner to place the ammo box/chest and assist with loading. This is also confirmed by the WD of the 7th Devons of July 4th, on the Martello tower near Langney Point; “Guns very badly mounted – no room for Nos. 2. This matter was mentioned to O.C. “B” Coy. “

[Knouterer]

This webpage about Martello Tower 66 at Langney Point shows brickwork cut away to create some space for the No 2 and ammunition:
http://www.pillbox.org.uk/concrete_evid ... asp?ID=839
Apparently, there were concrete platforms for Vickers guns on top of the tower as well.

[Knouterer]

To return to the subject of motor transport: the army acquired civilian vehicles in two ways: impressment and hiring. As explained by David Fletcher, British Military Transport 1829-1956, p. 70:

“Impressment was a War Office responsibility, through the Chief Inspector of Supplementary Transport. It involved RASC officers visiting companies that owned vehicles and earmarking suitable examples of selected makes and models for service. Each vehicle had to be well maintained and fit for at least three years’ further service. (…) As soon as the government announced that the country was to mobilise for war the lorry owner was responsible for delivering his vehicles to one of four centres around the country where they would be repainted and prepared for military service. The owner, naturally, being reimbursed in much the same way as he would have been under the old subsidy scheme.
Hiring was done at a local level, based on the Army Command district. The principle of inspection and selection was the same but a wider range of vehicles could be considered since they were intended for local use for a shorter period.”

Page 77-78: “A scheme to requisition civilian transport in anticipation of invasion turned out to be illegal so it was necessary to extend the hiring scheme. (…) There were, it seems, some 50,000 public service vehicles in Britain at that time, presumably not counting trolley-buses and trams. Many were ordinary short-haul buses, mainly double-deckers, which were needed in any case to get people to work. The Army already had about 3,000 single-deckers, and some had even been lost in France, but the present requirement was estimated at 1,900. The plan was to form thirty-two Motor Coach Companies RASC, staffed by men returned from France, each company to consist of three sections of twenty coaches each. (…) Subsequently, the force was increased by another eleven companies with an additional 400 coaches in reserve.”

As may be imagined, many of these vehicles were old, many did not even have self-starters. Many were damaged when soldiers tried to drive them off road, and instead of being kept in reserve for an emergency (and invasion-related exercises) as the War Office intended, they were used to convey troops all the time, further reducing availability and the level of maintenance.
From about mid-1941 they were replaced by the Bedford QLT troop carrying lorry and released back into the civilian world.

Picture from the same book:

[Knouterer]

Apart from the MCCs, there were also Troop Carrying Companies RASC (TCCs) equipped with 3-ton lorries, which could also lift an infantry brigade each (in principle). The tables below are from Philson’s Order of Battle of the BEF, Vol. 1, p. 154 and 156.

[Knouterer]

The “Return of Strength etc. as of 30.9.1940” below lists 7 TCCs and 43 MCCs, which latter number tallies exactly with Fletcher.
In addition, there were RASC companies providing full mobility for the 29th and 31st Independent Infantry Brigade Groups, with the same number as those formations.
The 1st Canadian Division was made mobile by Nos. 1 and 12 Canadian TCCs, plus No. 10 MCC RASC.