State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

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sitalkes
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#241

Post by sitalkes » 10 Sep 2015, 02:42

Hi, I modified the Normandy picture (Omaha Beach) to make a comparison of (A) Normandy and (B) British defences. I was hoping to include these pictures in an article but have not received a reply about the origin of the original picture from the web site where I found it. Has anybody seen the Normandy one before or recognises the style (e.g. is it Osprey or some other publisher?) - can you identify the book or the publisher?
(A)
Normandy beache fortifications diagram.jpg
Normandy (Omaha Beach) fortifications
Normandy beache fortifications diagram.jpg (84.07 KiB) Viewed 1267 times
(B)
British beache fortifications diagram.jpg
1940 British beach fortifications
British beache fortifications diagram.jpg (34.07 KiB) Viewed 1267 times
One thing the diagrams don't show is the different standards of construction. German pill boxes appear to be better built, without sharp edges (more circular) and protected from overhead fire - see (C). The British emergency gun batteries were basically in an open-fronted concrete box see (D)
(C) Image
(D) Image
Image
Or, they had no top covering at all:
Image
Image

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#242

Post by Knouterer » 10 Sep 2015, 13:06

British fortifications (gun houses, pillboxes) on the coastline were relatively flimsy and provided protection only against small arms fire and shell/bomb splinters I would say. Although the Martellos were much better and would have stood up to repeated hits from the heaviest calibre guns in the invasion fleet (105 mm on the M35 minesweepers), in my humble estimation. By the way, that gun at Newhaven did have overhead protection in 1940, if I'm not mistaken.

I'm sure many people will have difficulty believing it, but in terms of men and guns per kilometer - not necessarily in terms of concrete, mines and various other obstacles - Landing Beach B between Hythe and Dungeness was more strongly defended at the end of September 1940 than Omaha Beach was on 6 June 1944.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton


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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#243

Post by Knouterer » 10 Sep 2015, 13:48

With reference to the discussion about field artillery on page 14 of this thread: as noted there, in September the 55th Fd Regt in Romney Marsh (supporting the 135th Bde) had 2 x 18pdrs, 4 x 25pdrs, 6 x 4.5in how and 12 x 75mm guns, makes 24.

According to the War Diary of the 45th Division (WO 166/536), the divisional artillery (55th, 96th and 142nd Fd Regts) had by the end of October, when they were preparing to hand over their area to the 44th Division: 8 x 25pdrs, 20 x 4.5in how (of which 12 were to be handed over to incoming units) and 32 x 75mm guns, makes 60 instead of 72. In addition, the 55th and 96th between them had 6 x 6pdrs, presumably taken over from 274 Bty of the div. A/Tk regiment (the 69th) when the latter received more 2pdrs at the end of Sept. The 55th used its two 6pdrs to replace the single 18pdrs at "Moore's Fort" and Greatstone Holiday Camp.

Apart from the 4.5in howitzers, the division also had to hand over half (12) of its precious 2pdrs to the incoming units, indicating that the 44th Div was very short too, plus 8 x 4in guns (partly static, partly on lorries).
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#244

Post by sitalkes » 11 Sep 2015, 01:19

according to Wikipedia, production of the 6 pounder was delayed until November 1941 and its entry into service until May 1942. That would mean the 6 pounders mentioned would be the Hotchkiss 6 pounder as used on first world war tanks and on World War II armoured trains?

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#245

Post by Knouterer » 11 Sep 2015, 08:29

Yes, of course. The army had a large number of WWI 6pdr tank guns in store (about 600, mostly unused) which were mounted in pillboxes and on armoured trains, but also on improvised wheeled carriages. Originally, in WWI, these short-barreled guns fired mainly HE and canister, for use against machine gun nests &c, but it seems that in 1940 solid shot/AP shell was also issued. However, in view of the low muzzle velocity (about 415 m/s), it was in all likelihood (much) less effective in the AT role than the 2pdr.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QF_6_pound ... _Hotchkiss

Nice pictures of a pillbox for a 6pdr near Bodiam Castle on the river Rother:

http://en.tracesofwar.com/article/10436 ... Castle.htm

Pictures from A. Saunders, Bognor at War, 1995, and from F. Kosar, Panzerabwehrkanonen, 1978:
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#246

Post by sitalkes » 15 Sep 2015, 14:17

Some interesting extracts from "The German Airborne Threat to the United Kingdom", John P. Campbell, War in History 1997 4 (4) 411-33

Defence against such an onslaught was bound to be a shared air/ ground responsibility. Slessor's letter of September 1939 was to ensure that the War Office would have enough mobile reserves standing by in case Fighter Command failed to intercept the air transports. During the summer of 1940, the Army's solution was to shoot down the Ju 52s over the sea, preferably while they still had gliders in tow; C-in-C Fighter Command, however, doubted that he could spare fighters from their prioritized anti-invasion duties to perform this additional one.48 Once the Sealion crisis was over, the problem that subjected Army-RAF relations to increasing strain was the ground defence of RAF stations, especially fighter stations in the south-east. After Dunkirk, the Army was in no position to provide mobile reserves or even enough troops to man the fixed defences surrounding airfields, while the RAF found that the number of airmen required to provide its own protection was far beyond its resources. The air staff came to regard airfields as the Achilles' heel of national defence. Yet the 'defence of aerodromes', while an army responsibility was not, apparently, an army priority. In the opinion of the air staff, the military authorities, above all those in the War Office, totally failed to grasp what it would mean to lose fighter cover and the power of counterattack in the air as the consequence of pre-invasion attacks on airfields by airborne troops.49 There was a lot to be said for the Air Ministry's position. The War Office paid lipservice to the importance of airfields and committed 80 000 troops to their defence, but basically the general staff believed that beaches and ports were more important and would be attacked first. According to the paper by GHQ (I) Home Forces, airborne troops would be dropped in the rear of beach defences or further inland to capture bridges and defiles so as to disrupt communications and hamper the movement of reserves; airfields were mentioned more or less in passing. B.H. Liddell Hart had a high regard for the potential of airborne forces but was the source of the 'bridges and defiles' idea, which was treated with some derision at the Air Ministry. Worse still, one of the most influential COS papers on invasion- COS(41) 161, 27 March 1941 -relegated airfield defence to last of a number of ancillary tasks, such as clearing debris and producing smoke.50 On the higher administrative level, the situation was not simplified by the fact that RAF commands were functional- Fighter, Bomber, etc.- whereas the Army's were regional- Eastern,
Southeastern, etc.
The result was an extraordinary muddle at ground level, where the story on the stations was one of divided control and absence of consistent doctrine or training. The RAF station commander had operational control over all defence forces, which usually consisted of a company of soldiers and RAF ground crew 'backers-up' armed with 200 rifles. Heavy AA and Bofors guns were controlled by the Army but RAF personnel manned the light automatic weapons. The station commander had the assistance of an army local defence commander and was required to seek the advice and approval of the Army area commander, who controlled the mobile reserves. The War Office understandably disliked tying down troops in fixed defences because they were then lost to the field army and restricted to individual training. Hence the tendency to assign second-class, poorly trained troops to defend RAF stations, troops unfit to defend the beaches. The cream of the Wehrmacht would have been opposed on the average station by a Home Service or 'Young Soldiers' company - 'untrained oafs', in the opinion of the future 'Bomber' Harris - and 200 fitters and riggers armed with rifles. One station's mobile counter-attack force notoriously consisted of 60 grooms of the
Royal Army Veterinary Corps. 51

[in 1941] Air Commodore Sanders, director of ground defence (DGD) at the Air Ministry, came to the conclusion that the likeliest German tactics would be indirect, involving a landing out of range and observation of the airfield before forming up for an infantry attack using the 75-mm guns and 81- mm mortars that were part of the equipment of a parachute battalion; support would be provided by low-level strafing and bombing and speed would be essential to avoid the mobile reserves. The RAF had indeed accepted responsibility for the obstruction of all open spaces within five miles of every airfield, and always attached great importance to any report about the transportation of tanks by air. Well before the Stewart committee convened, the theory of upward defence against aircraft, outward defence against an attack from beyond the perimeter and inward defence against troops landing on the airfield itself had been carefully worked out. 56 Lack of resources and perhaps an insufficient sense of urgency had, however, stultified most of the recommendations of Sanders' supplanted 'defence of aerodromes' subcommittee.

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#247

Post by sitalkes » 17 Sep 2015, 05:20

The table from Churchill's History of the Second World War Volume 2 Their Finest Hour
Churchills chart Their Finest Hour History of the 2nd World War p243.jpg
Readiness of British Infantry Divisions 7 September 1940
Newbold says that each division was supposed to have 90 Bren/Universal carriers (or 10 per battalion), and this table shows that most divisions had about 2/3 of that allocation. That would make a total number of about 1,800 Bren carriers on September 7.

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#248

Post by Knouterer » 17 Sep 2015, 11:52

This website gives the numbers of carriers on hand as 2,242 on 30 June, 3,181 on 31 July, and 3,784 on 31 Aug.: http://www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php? ... &Itemid=61
That tallies reasonably well with the Statistical Digest which gives the numbers of "armoured carriers, armoured cars, scout cars and command vehicles" produced as 1,617 in the second quarter and 1,985 in the third quarter, considering that the other three categories of armoured vehicles were produced in very limited quantities at the time.
The number of carriers lost in France is estimated at 1,000 minimum.
Bren Carriers, Scout Carriers and Universal Carriers were also used by other arms besides the infantry.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#249

Post by Knouterer » 17 Sep 2015, 12:28

The caption to this picture (IWH H 2384) says:" Universal Carrier Mk I with experimental armoured hood and Boys anti-tank rifle, Albury Heath, Surrey, 20 July 1940." I think it belonged to the 1st Royal Gloucestershire Hussars. The armoured roof was not generally adopted because it was too heavy and a hindrance when the crew had to jump out or in quickly.
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#250

Post by Knouterer » 17 Sep 2015, 12:54

The older Machine Gun Carriers, of which some 1,100 had been delivered in about 1936-38, were also still in service, although it seems most were converted to carry Brens.
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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#251

Post by sitalkes » 17 Sep 2015, 13:34

The problem with that web page is that no source seems to be given for the figures. 90 carriers per division X 30 divisions = only 2,700 total. If the figures given on that page are correct, then there were more than enough to equip every division. Why then does Churchill say that the majority were only 2/3 equipped? Maybe many were sent overseas?

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#252

Post by Knouterer » 17 Sep 2015, 14:19

Well, as I said, many carriers were with armoured units, the artillery used some as mobile observation posts, and it wouldn't surprise me if the Royal Engineers had some too. In any case, there clearly were many more than 1,800 on hand.

I don't know who drew up Churchill's charts, but they don't seem very reliable. For example, 42nd and 43rd Division were both in IV Corps (GHQ reserve), but according to the charts the 43rd was at 100% of everything, while the 42nd was badly underequipped and had barely more than half its artillery??? Admittedly the 42nd had been in France and lost everything, but by all accounts it had been (almost) fully re-equipped by Sept.

According to Newbold (p. 390): "Comparatively well equipped, with unusually plentiful transport and its constituent Brigade Groups of all arms well designed for rapid movement, 42nd (East Lancashire) Division was ideally suited to its new role. "A good division which will require a good deal more training," General Brooke wrote after an inspection on 17th September."

It seems to me that the best thing to do with those Churchill charts is to quietly forget about them.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#253

Post by Hatricvs » 18 Sep 2015, 19:51

An interesting read. I am about to start a game of Seelowe the old SPI game from 1974, I note that the game was referenced a little further up the list. Now the thing with this simulation of the what if of Seelowe is that the weather plays a very significant part in the ability for the Germans not only to land but, more importantly in game terms, for the next thirty odd days where they would need to land reinforcements and logistic supplies. The game abstracts this out to a die roll which invariably seems to go against the Germans thus limiting their ability to push on and gain ground. My thought was I could play using the historic weather patterns rather than randomly determining them as the game suggests. The game lists the possibly weather conditions as :
Clear....Germans can land on invasion beaches and captured ports and are also able to have control of the skies for air combat support
Rough... Germans can only land at Captured ports not invasion beaches if RV neither side can utilise their airforce as visibility is too poor.
Storms... Germans are stuck in the landing echelons and may not land in Britain or return to France. If SV neither side can utilise their airforce as visibility is too poor.

What I would like is any information that would allow me to replicate the actual weather on the dates from 19th September 1940 to around the 18th of October 1940. I note that there is a handy little section in front of this thread of the forum board which takes the weather up to 27th of September with wind force and sea state....is there anything that does similar going up to the 18th of October in the same fashion that anyone else has encountered? I did do a search on google but no real joy...however it did lead me to this forum thread!

Cheers

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#254

Post by sitalkes » 19 Sep 2015, 00:54

https://boardgamegeek.com/filepage/1186 ... ts-booklet download this file it has all the weather until July 1941. In fact only five days of bad weather during that period in the eastern Channel NB weather elsewhere at the same time eg the North Sea near the channel can be quite different
A new version of the S & T game is. Being tested at the moment ( Decision Games)

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Re: State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

#255

Post by Hatricvs » 19 Sep 2015, 13:38

Thank for the link...that is really useful. Funny enough I had just been checking this game on BGG but I had not downloaded the files. Thanks again that should definitely give me a starter for ten. Look like there would have been little chance of a real upset due to weather considerations after all. The Seelowe game by SPI often sees the Germans land and then be effectively cut off from ongoing supplies for large parts of the game. I will give the historic weather a go and see if the Germans are able to secure a win!

Cheers Andy B

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