State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

[Knouterer]

However, as this map (from c. 1930) shows, the defenders of this and other Medway crossings would be waiting in vain for the Germans, at least for the first week or so, because the perimeter of the initial bridgehead as planned would be about 15-20 km to the South of them.

[Knouterer]

While I'm playing with maps: in Sealion scenarios such as Forczyk's, a point that is often overlooked is that even if everything went (more or less) as planned for the Germans, if their losses during the crossing and while breaking through the coastal defences were not too heavy, and if they managed to bring a reasonable number of vehicles and guns ashore, they would still be dangerously thin on the ground and vulnerable to counterattack.
This map fragment shows part of the perimeter the Germans hoped to establish by the end of the second day (S+1), as far as I can make out from published documents. The dashes indicate the demarcation between the 16th and 9th Army. To the west of the dashes would be the 34th ID (XXXVIII Corps), to the east the 1st Mountain Division (VII Corps). As can be seen, the forward line of defence largely follows the river Rother and there is a good road running parallel to the front line and about 2500-3000 m behind it, so outside mortar range, looks like a good defensible position at first glance. However, the Gebirgsjäger would have a front width of about 10 miles/16 km to defend, and would need to detach a good part of their forces to secure the rear, given that at that point there would still be many scattered British troops and Home Guards behind them - among other things, their tasks included clearing out Hastings and St. Leonards after landing.
As this map also shows, the terrain is hilly and wooded, roads are many but mostly narrow and winding, it's clearly not good tank country, and that applies to most of the planned perimeter. Some Sealion authors make much of the British inferiority as regards armoured warfare, but any fighting developing around here would primarily be an infantry battle, IMHO.

[Knouterer]

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According to Newbold’s table for the end of Sept. there were then 64 Guys with the 20th Armoured Brigade, all with the 2nd Northamptonshire Yeomanry (the other two battalions were equipped with carriers and trucks). Normal complement for a Heavy Armoured Car Regiment was 58; the six extra cars were with a special detachment of this regiment tasked with the protection of King, Queen and Prime Minister, who themselves travelled at that time in specially adapted Humber Mk I armoured cars, driven by men of the 12th Lancers.

In that context : there was concern that at the start of an invasion the Germans might try to capture the Royal Family, as they had tried to do in various other countries. Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, King Haakon VII of Norway and Grand Duchess Charlotte of Luxembourg had managed to get away and had set up governments in exile in Britain; King Christian X of Denmark had been caught in the surprise attack on his country and King Leopold III had opted to stay in Belgium (his conduct was much criticized after the war and he had to abdicate in favour of his son).

The King and Queen were at Buckingham Palace most of the time where they were well guarded of course and there were hundreds of Grenadier Guards just across the road in Wellington Barracks. Nevertheless it was decided that in case of (imminent) invasion they would be evacuated to a safer place in the countryside. For this purpose, and also to escort them on their other travels around the country, in May 1940 a special motorized detachment was formed, known as the “Coats Mission” after its first commander, Lt Col James Coats. This unit was about 120 strong, mostly officers and men of the Coldstream Guards. The 12th Lancers provided drivers for converted Humber Reconnaissance Cars (known as “Special Ironside Saloons”, first one delivered on 13 Sept.) and the 2nd NY provided an escort of six heavy armoured cars. In addition, there were men of the Royal Signals, RASC drivers, MP motorcyclists and medical personnel.

Several stately homes were selected and discreetly supplied and prepared to receive the Royals in an emergency, in Worcestershire, Yorkshire and Shropshire (A to E on the map). Apart from general suitability and defensibility, good communications were an important consideration, as the King would need to remain in touch with the PM and the War Cabinet. Which one of these houses actually would be used was a closely guarded secret.
The order to move would be given by GHQ Home Forces, probably following a decision of the War Cabinet. There has been much speculation about plans for the Royals to go to Canada in case of invasion, but no evidence of any detailed plans or preparations for that has come to light, AFAIK.

Most of the above info and the map are from a new book by Andrew Stewart: https://www.amazon.co.uk/Private-Protec ... ew+Stewart

[Knouterer]

A page from the same book - the Pullmans used from January 1941 were no doubt more comfortable, and for reasons of morale the King and Queen preferred to be seen by the populace when they were travelling. The armoured car is not a Daimler, it seems to be a Humber Mk I (very similar to the Guy)

[Knouterer]

Further quote from Myatt (Page 50):
„After the fall of France in 1940 Hythe was very much in the front line; hit and run raids by German bombers became more and more frequent, and students and staff (of the Small Arms School - K) found themselves spending far too much time in manning the defences, many of these being the original ones built against Napoleon nearly a century and a half before. All this extra-curricular activity had a serious effect on training, so towards the end of 1940 the School was moved to Bisley.”
That was in early November, to be exact.

I took a look around the area a few weeks ago. Until recently, I believe, it was possible to walk along the beach when the ranges were not in use, but the path is now permanently closed to the public. I found a sign with tourist info which states that during WWII "Hotchkiss guns" were installed on the Martello towers. That could refer to a number of different weapons, including the old 6pdr tank guns, but most likely those guns were .303 Hotchkiss LMGs, still used by the (horsed) cavalry in 1940. Early in the war, a number of firms received contracts to recondition 10,993 such guns (according to Skennerton). Orders from HQ Home Counties Area dated 26th July 1940 directed that certain army units defending airfields “…will send Instructors to 6 Cav. Trg. Regt. Maidstone under private arrangements, to be taught the Hotchkiss gun”.

Apart from that, the Small Arms School had a large collection of small arms from all over the world, including at least one 8 mm Hotchkiss M1914 MG.

[Knouterer]

A couple more pictures I took - what is not so apparent from maps is that the whole of the ranges, as far as I could see, lies lower than the embankment that runs along the shore, so any defenders dug in on the ranges would be unable to see the sea and the beach.

[Knouterer]

One of the guns from the S.A.S. collection - not a Hotchkiss but an M1924/29 Chatellerault LMG. The little copper disc on the butt shows the inventory number, S.A.S. 857. It's not impossible that this weapon was pressed into service in the summer of 1940.

Picture from Frederick Myatt, Modern Small Arms, Salamander Books, London 1976.

[Knouterer]

Having another look at the map at the top of this page: if the Germans had stuck to the initial plan and established their bridgehead as planned - of course, in reality, they would have adapted it according to local circumstances and events - they would have overrun the HQ of the 45th Inf Division, which was at Tongswood House (now St. Ronan's School) about a mile to the east of Hawkhurst. The HQ of XII Corps however was a few miles beyond the perimeter at (Royal) Tunbridge Wells. Under this hypothesis the Germans would also have overrun an important RASC depot at Tenterden, which among other things held the fuel reserves of XII Corps.

A few notes about the supporting units of 45th Div.:

(War diary for July-Dec. 1940:WO 166/536)
The 45th Div was a “Second Line Territorial Division” raised on the outbreak of war as a “duplicate” of the 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division. The division as such never went overseas (although many of the units rotating through it did) and was placed on a “Lower Establishment” in Dec. 1941.

From May 1940 to April 1941, the division was commanded by Maj. Gen. Sir Edmond Schreiber DSO. G1 (Ops): Lt. Col. Robertson.

In May 1940 it was moved to the East Sussex/Kent coast. In September, according to the division’s WD, it had to defend a coastline of 60 miles, of which 13 miles were cliffs. The division covered almost the whole of the planned invasion front, except Rottingdean near Brighton on the eastern flank (defended by Brocforce) and Dymchurch (Grand) Redoubt and the Hythe ranges (defended by the Shorncliffe Garrison) on the other flank.

Div HQ (16 Off 233 OR): Tongswood House (now st. Ronan’s School), Hawkhurst, map ref 215494, about a mile east of Hawkhurst.
Div Signals (21 Off 472 OR) nearby at Goudhurst
69th Anti Tank Regt, HQ Mayfield (official organisation as of 30 Sept. – 16 of the 2pdrs had arrived at Mayfield only days before (25.9), to replace a mixture of 6pdrs and 75 mm guns):
273 Bty Lydd 8 x 4” (static & mobile)
274 Bty Mountfield 8 x 2pdr
275 Bty Ham Street 8 x 2pdr
276 Bty Findon 8 x 2pdr
“X” Sqn with 9 x Malcolm Campbell Armoured Cars
261 Field Park Coy R.E., Lamberhurst
7th Devons (MG battalion), HQ Hawkhurst
5th Loyals (motorcycle battalion) & L.A.D., Wadhurst
RASC HQ at Hurst Green
Div. Supply Column, East Grinstead
Div. Ammunition Coy, Etherton Hill
Div. Petrol Column, Little Boarzell / Hurst Green (7 Off 305 OR)
13 Motor Coach Coy, Wadhurst (should, in principle, have enough coaches/buses to lift the marching elements of one infantry
brigade – Strength 10 Off 174 OR)
38 Fd. Hygiene Section, Sandhurst, 190, 191 and 192 Field Amb.
Total RASC strength Div. 41 Off 1,326 OR, slightly under W/E.
Total RAOC strength, including LADs, 7 Off 140 OR
18 Army Fd. Workshop, Crowborough
Div. Provost Coy, Hurst Green (HQ and 6 sections, about 100 men, most on motorcycles)
32 Sec. F.S.P., Hawkhurst (Field Security Police, about platoon strength)

[Knouterer]

To summarize the above as regards the state of the British ground forces in September 1940:

If we add up the initial deliveries of 750 and 2,000, and the 6,000 promised for July and the 9,000 for August, that would make 17,750 guns that theoretically could have been in the hands of British troops by the end of September. However, it appears from subsequent correspondence that Auto-Ordnance did not quite meet those targets. There may also have been some losses, and we don't know quite how fast the guns were shipped across and issued.

So to be on the safe side, I would put the number in the hands of troops by the end of Sept. at somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000.

This tentative estimate of the number of Thompsons in British service was still too high, it seems. Tom Davis Jr. the author of a book on that very subject (https://www.amazon.co.uk/Great-Britain- ... +gun+story ) has in the meantime pointed me to the actual production numbers (by Savage for Auto-Ordnance) and these did indeed lag behind expectations. Production started in April and by the end of August only 10,990 guns had been produced. It is estimated that two-thirds of these reached the British. So it seems that the number of guns in the hands of troops by the end of Sept. was probably no more than about 7,500, although production and deliveries picked up soon after that (5,607 guns produced in Sept.).

[Knouterer]

A few notes about armoured cars in service:

[Guy Mk I/Mk Ia: a heavy armoured car, initially called a “light wheeled tank”. The first fifty (Mk I) were armed with a .50 and a .303 Vickers MG, the next fifty (Mk Ia) with a 15 mm and a 7.92 mm Besa MG. Production apparently complete by mid-1940; as Guy was fully occupied with the production of artillery tractors, the design was passed on to the Rootes Group, which used it as the basis for the Humber armoured car. Six went to France with the “Phantom” mission and were all lost; when “Phantom” was reorganized shortly afterwards, it was re-equipped with Daimler Scout Cars, better suited to their task of discreet intelligence gathering. According to Newbold’s table for the end of Sept. there were then 64 Guys with the 20th Armoured Brigade, all with the 2nd Northamptonshire Yeomanry (the other two battalions were equipped with carriers and trucks). Normal complement for a Heavy Armoured Car Regiment was 58; the six extra cars were with a special detachment of this regiment tasked with the protection of King, Queen and Prime Minister, who themselves travelled at that time in specially adapted Humber Mk I armoured cars, driven by men of the 12th Lancers. Some more Guys may have been with training units.

A little footnote to that: a document entitled “Statement of the Tank Position as known on the 10th June, 1940” (in CAB 70/1) gives the number of available “Light Tanks Wheeled” as 43: 38 with the 20th AB, 2 in training establishments and 3 in depots. Expected production 15 per month in June, July and August, which would have brought the total up to 88.

[Knouterer]

Here's that whole table, because it's interesting. The 1st Armoured Division was still in France on this date; note that there is not a single Cruiser tank with operational units in Britain.

[Knouterer]

BTW, ran across this while searching the web (hoping for a photo of that blockship in its duty position - but no luck);


Seabrook Promenade. No idea exactly when it was taken (and there's work still going on) but the defences seem rather sparse!

The picture is IWM H2178 and was (allegedly) taken in July. See also here: http://sussexhistoryforum.co.uk/index.php?topic=4126.0

I assume the brick blocks in the road behind the seawall are anti-tank blocks, but they look like they have embrasures in them. Is that just a bit of black paint used to make them look like that? They look too small to fit a person + usable weapon inside them, but they are spaced a long way apart, which seems to limit their use against tanks crossing the road (even if they stop tanks running along the road).

A couple of pictures taken from that same location. I looked for any traces of the wartime defences, but no luck. There were a few triangular-shaped slabs of concrete at the base of the seawall, but too small to have been the base of a pillbox. From this angle, the skyline of Hythe is practically unchanged compared to 1940.

[Leros87]

BTW, ran across this while searching the web (hoping for a photo of that blockship in its duty position - but no luck);


Seabrook Promenade. No idea exactly when it was taken (and there's work still going on) but the defences seem rather sparse!

The picture is IWM H2178 and was (allegedly) taken in July. See also here: http://sussexhistoryforum.co.uk/index.php?topic=4126.0

I assume the brick blocks in the road behind the seawall are anti-tank blocks, but they look like they have embrasures in them. Is that just a bit of black paint used to make them look like that? They look too small to fit a person + usable weapon inside them, but they are spaced a long way apart, which seems to limit their use against tanks crossing the road (even if they stop tanks running along the road).

A couple of pictures taken from that same location. I looked for any traces of the wartime defences, but no luck. There were a few triangular-shaped slabs of concrete at the base of the seawall, but too small to have been the base of a pillbox. From this angle, the skyline of Hythe is practically unchanged compared to 1940.

This photo is one held by the IWM and forms a montage of fixed defences in the Folkestone to Hythe sector. The building is actually a disguised pill box and the blocks are indeed anti tank blocks. I can't confirm why there are black slots on the side but they are definitely not embrasures.

[Leros87]

Having another look at the map at the top of this page: if the Germans had stuck to the initial plan and established their bridgehead as planned - of course, in reality, they would have adapted it according to local circumstances and events - they would have overrun the HQ of the 45th Inf Division, which was at Tongswood House (now St. Ronan's School) about a mile to the east of Hawkhurst. The HQ of XII Corps however was a few miles beyond the perimeter at (Royal) Tunbridge Wells. Under this hypothesis the Germans would also have overrun an important RASC depot at Tenterden, which among other things held the fuel reserves of XII Corps.

A few notes about the supporting units of 45th Div.:

(War diary for July-Dec. 1940:WO 166/536)
The 45th Div was a “Second Line Territorial Division” raised on the outbreak of war as a “duplicate” of the 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division. The division as such never went overseas (although many of the units rotating through it did) and was placed on a “Lower Establishment” in Dec. 1941.

From May 1940 to April 1941, the division was commanded by Maj. Gen. Sir Edmond Schreiber DSO. G1 (Ops): Lt. Col. Robertson.

In May 1940 it was moved to the East Sussex/Kent coast. In September, according to the division’s WD, it had to defend a coastline of 60 miles, of which 13 miles were cliffs. The division covered almost the whole of the planned invasion front, except Rottingdean near Brighton on the eastern flank (defended by Brocforce) and Dymchurch (Grand) Redoubt and the Hythe ranges (defended by the Shorncliffe Garrison) on the other flank.

Div HQ (16 Off 233 OR): Tongswood House (now st. Ronan’s School), Hawkhurst, map ref 215494, about a mile east of Hawkhurst.
Div Signals (21 Off 472 OR) nearby at Goudhurst
69th Anti Tank Regt, HQ Mayfield (official organisation as of 30 Sept. – 16 of the 2pdrs had arrived at Mayfield only days before (25.9), to replace a mixture of 6pdrs and 75 mm guns):
273 Bty Lydd 8 x 4” (static & mobile)
274 Bty Mountfield 8 x 2pdr
275 Bty Ham Street 8 x 2pdr
276 Bty Findon 8 x 2pdr
“X” Sqn with 9 x Malcolm Campbell Armoured Cars
261 Field Park Coy R.E., Lamberhurst
7th Devons (MG battalion), HQ Hawkhurst
5th Loyals (motorcycle battalion) & L.A.D., Wadhurst
RASC HQ at Hurst Green
Div. Supply Column, East Grinstead
Div. Ammunition Coy, Etherton Hill
Div. Petrol Column, Little Boarzell / Hurst Green (7 Off 305 OR)
13 Motor Coach Coy, Wadhurst (should, in principle, have enough coaches/buses to lift the marching elements of one infantry
brigade – Strength 10 Off 174 OR)
38 Fd. Hygiene Section, Sandhurst, 190, 191 and 192 Field Amb.
Total RASC strength Div. 41 Off 1,326 OR, slightly under W/E.
Total RAOC strength, including LADs, 7 Off 140 OR
18 Army Fd. Workshop, Crowborough
Div. Provost Coy, Hurst Green (HQ and 6 sections, about 100 men, most on motorcycles)
32 Sec. F.S.P., Hawkhurst (Field Security Police, about platoon strength)

Indeed. 45th Div reserve was based on the 5th Loyals, a motorcycle unit at Wadhurst, which had the role of reaching and holding stop lines either behind the Pevensey Levels, behind Hastings or behind the Royal Military Canal. 1st London Div's admin tail was also threatened, with units in the Ashford -Charing- Tenterden area and 1 Corps Ammo Dump at Pluckley.

[Leros87]

However, as this map (from c. 1930) shows, the defenders of this and other Medway crossings would be waiting in vain for the Germans, at least for the first week or so, because the perimeter of the initial bridgehead as planned would be about 15-20 km to the South of them.

Even though he wasn't privy to the German plans, one of the first thing Alan Brooke did was to stop further work on the stop lines and direct resources to be closer to the coast. 45th Div recorded in its defensive plan the breaking up of its TAOR into squares, complete with "fences" and "gates" but did not say who would be manning them. Given the paucity of formed troops behind the coastal crust stopping the Germans from attaining their initial beach head objectives would have been a titanic struggle for General Schreiber (and General Thorne).