State of British Ground Forces, September 1940, Sealion

[Knouterer]

This Official (quarterly) Return is not 100% accurate - for example, 10,000 South Africans are listed as being in Britain instead of in East Africa where they actually were at the time - but a gold mine of facts and figures nevertheless.

Total British Army strength is given as 86,313 officers and 1,826,210 other ranks (without A.T.S.), of which 70,963 Off and 1,668,769 OR at home.

A.T.S. strength was around 36,000.

In addition, there were 1,383 "Colonial and Indian" troops in Britain, mostly muleteer units in Scottish Command I believe.

Canadians: 2,726 Off 45,385 OR. The 1st Canadian Division (VII Corps) was ready for action but the 2nd was still very poorly equipped at this time, no guns for the artillery until December IIRC.

Australians: 465 Off 8,805 OR.

New Zealanders: 380 Off 5,900 OR

32,766 foreign nationals were enrolled in the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps but their combat value can safely be put at zero.

[Paul_G_Baker]

Reproductions (unfortunately not very self-explanatory) of Churchill's 'at a glance' bar-chart status board for two specific dates - one of which is a September date - can be found in 'Their Finest Hour'.

[Knouterer]

Concerning the “Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps”, a title later (Nov. 1940) shortened to “Pioneer Corps”, it consisted of older reservists and new recruits (militia) of lower medical categories. Eastern Command had about 30 Pioneer Companies (about 280 men each) in September 1940. These units were only partially armed (25% or so) and therefore of minimal to zero combat value, although of course they could have made themselves useful in case of invasion building field fortifications, repairing bomb damage to roads, and so on.

Total strength of the AMPC at home as of 30 Sept. is given as 1,817 Off 71,997 OR. IIRC Peter Ustinov recounts in his memoirs (“Dear Me”) how in about 1940/41 he toured the country with a theatre company which included a small orchestra composed of middle-aged Austrian musicians, mostly political refugees. To give them some legal status (and entitlement to rations) they were all enrolled in the Pioneer Corps.

[Knouterer]

To be exact, I should note that the total numbers of British troops "at home" as quoted above included the troops occupying Iceland (Alabaster Force) and the Danish Faroe Islands (Operation Valentine), but it doesn't make much of a difference.

[Knouterer]

As regards divisions, which was the original question, the situation looked like this:

GHQ reserve:
IV Corps with 2nd Armoured Division, 42nd and 43rd Infantry Division plus 31st Infantry Brigade Group (2nd Arm Div in East Anglia was “under War Office control”, (preparatory to moving overseas in October) on 30 Sept. according to Philson, but according to the Div HQ War Diary (WO 166/814) they were still part of IV Corps (GHQ reserve) by that date).

Aldershot Command: no divisions

Eastern Command:
II Corps with 18th and 52nd Inf Div, 37th Independent Brigade
VII Corps (other main counterattacking formation besides IV Corps): 1st Arm Div, 1st Canadian Inf Div, 20th Arm Bde, 1st Army Tank Bde
XI Corps: 15th and 55th Inf Div, 1st Armoured Recon Bde
XII Corps: 1st (London) Inf Div, 45th Inf Div., Brocforce (1st MMG Bde on map, about division-sized), 29th Inf Bde Group, NZEF

Northern Command:
24th Army Tank Bde
I Corps with 1st, 2nd and 44th Inf Div, 2nd Motor Machine Gun Bde
X Corps with 54th and 59th Inf Div

Scottish Command:
5th, 46th and 51st Inf Div.

Southern Command:
21st Army Tank Bde, 70th Inf Bde, Australian Imperial Force
V Corps with 4th and 50th Inf Div
VIII Corps with 3rd and 48th Inf Div

Western Command:
23rd Army Tank Bde, 3rd M.M.G. Bde
III Corps with 2nd (London) Div, 38th Inf Div, 36th Inf Bde Group

Northern Ireland District:
53rd and 61st Inf Div, 148th Inf Bde.

We have thus on the British mainland 2 armoured divisions, 23 inf div (1 Canadian), and a number of independent brigades (some of the tank brigades had only a small handful of tanks and can be discounted). The Poles could have contributed roughly 2 brigades and the Czechs 1. The Belgians, Dutch and Norwegians can be discounted, and the Free French ground troops (4,000 men or so) had left on the unsuccessful Dakar expedition.
Map is from Official History (Collier).

[Knouterer]

Hi all

I'm looking for reliable information on the relative strengths of British divisions in the UK in September 1940. I've read that only 5 divisions were at full strength, but I've never seen those divisions named. Some kind of table with accurate assessments of relative strengths would be great. I don't need too much detail, only the fact that one division might be at 75% strength whilst another only 50%, for example, but with those divisions named.

Anyone any ideas?

As the numbers quoted above suggest, the short answer is: all 100% or more, as far as manpower is concerned.

If Philson's order of battle for the end of Sept. can be relied on, all the infantry divisions mentioned above were complete, in that they had three brigades with three infantry battalions each, three Field Regts R.A., three Field Companies and one Field Park Company R.E., etc. Most had a machine gun battalion attached, some also an Infantry (Pioneer) battalion. Of course there may have been shortages of men with specialist skills and training (Signals for ex.) here and there.

As regards equipment, there were still severe shortages of (military) vehicles and radios. Other items, like motorcycles and Vickers machine guns, seem to have been relatively plentiful; many if not most infantry battalions added a motorcycle platoon although that was not part of official War Establishment, and MG battalions apparently had about 60 Vickers instead of 48 as per W/E.

At the infantry battalion level (in divisions and independent brigades, I'm not talking about all the Training, Holding, Home Defence and Young Soldiers battalions) weaponry was more or less complete as far as I can make out. Ammunition (1st and 2nd line) was also more or less up to establishment (with the exception of mortar ammunition, which was very short). Reserves behind that were minimal however, and after a day or two of fighting some redistribution of ammo between units might have been necessary, in my humble estimation.

[Knouterer]

Small correction: 4,000 Free French ground forces is too high, it was closer to 2,000 - either way, they had left Kent at the end of August.

[Knouterer]

Regarding the equipment of the field artillery:

The BEF lost most of its field artillery in France, over a thousand 18/25pdrs, 18pdrs and 4.5in howitzers.
On June 6th, 295 25pdrs and 18/25pdrs, 110 18pdrs and 195 4.5in howitzers were still on hand in Britain, so 600 field guns. In the following ten weeks, about 275 new 25pdrs (Mk II), 250 18/25pdr conversions (according to the Statistical Digest, 1,440 18pdrs were converted to 18/25pdrs in all, 611 prewar and 829 in the period up to June 1941), 280 reconditioned 4.5in howitzers and 65 reconditioned 18pdrs were added; 130 field guns returned from France later in June, which raised the number to about 1,600. By the end of September, the number may have reached 1,800, and by that time the 895 75mm guns from the USA had also (for the most part) arrived.

As Newbold (page 293) notes, that would mean that requirements were about 80% covered, if not with modern equipment.
As would seem logical, the counterattacking units had priority for such equipment; the Canadians received new 25pdrs as early as April, the New Zealanders a couple of months later. The artillery regiments of the newly formed 29th and 31st Independent Brigade Groups, which consisted of Regular battalions recalled from India, also got a full complement (24 each), it seems. By contrast, the 1st (London) Division and the 45th Division defending the invasion beaches were clearly not so well off and had to make do with a hodgepodge of older guns including even some 13pdrs. Even the 1st Armoured Division had to make do with 16 x 18/25pdrs (11th Royal Horse Artillery).

According to Newbold (quoting a CAB document) the ammunition situation was satisfactory by early August with 1,300 rpg for 25pdrs and 18pdrs, although the 4.5in howitzers had only 312. The Statistical Digest states that 1,901,000 field art. shells were produced in the third quarter of 1940. The American guns came with about 1,000,000 75 mm rounds.

Suitable towing vehicles were in short supply, many field regiments could have moved only part of their guns at the same time. That does not apply however to the counterattacking divisions (IV and VII Corps), which were fully mobile by this time, as were the 29th and 31st IBG.

[Paul_G_Baker]

Regarding the equipment of the field artillery:

By contrast, the 1st (London) Division and the 45th Division defending the invasion beaches were clearly not so well off and had to make do with a hodgepodge of older guns including even some 13pdrs.

Could that have had to do with the failure to appreciate (until rather late in the day) that Sealion was actually aimed at the Channel coast and not at somewhere in East Anglia, do you think? Also, could the Channel Coastal Batteries and fortifications (relics of a perceived French threat in the previous century) have been a factor?

[phylo_roadking]

In the meantime, I have a little more hard info, namely WO 73/146, the Quarterly Return of the Strength of the British Army, a very interesting document - a whole book in fact - giving War Establishments, actual strengths, and locations of all units as of 30 September 1940.
According to this document, there were 164,507 troops in the Home Counties Area as of 30.9 (including 6,180 officers), plus 2,488 A.T.S., not counting the 6,000 New Zealanders.
Another 19,000 troops were in the Chatham area, some of which, especially those belonging to 1st (London) Division, might also have been involved in the initial fighting.

This Official (quarterly) Return is not 100% accurate - for example, 10,000 South Africans are listed as being in Britain instead of in East Africa where they actually were at the time - but a gold mine of facts and figures nevertheless.

Total British Army strength is given as 86,313 officers and 1,826,210 other ranks (without A.T.S.), of which 70,963 Off and 1,668,769 OR at home.

A.T.S. strength was around 36,000.

In addition, there were 1,383 "Colonial and Indian" troops in Britain, mostly muleteer units in Scottish Command I believe.

Canadians: 2,726 Off 45,385 OR. The 1st Canadian Division (VII Corps) was ready for action but the 2nd was still very poorly equipped at this time, no guns for the artillery until December IIRC.

Australians: 465 Off 8,805 OR.

New Zealanders: 380 Off 5,900 OR

32,766 foreign nationals were enrolled in the Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps but their combat value can safely be put at zero.

ANY point in actually asking how many of those were fighting soldiers....and how many were support troops, RAMC, drivers, cooks, bottlewashers, artillerymen (who we've already been told by you elsewhere were more than a little short in small arms), etc.?

[Knouterer]

No, I don't know how many "bottle washers" (whatever that is supposed to mean) there were, but I can state, with complete confidence, that the number of "horse holders" was significantly lower than in the German army

[Knouterer]

Regarding the equipment of the field artillery:

By contrast, the 1st (London) Division and the 45th Division defending the invasion beaches were clearly not so well off and had to make do with a hodgepodge of older guns including even some 13pdrs.

Could that have had to do with the failure to appreciate (until rather late in the day) that Sealion was actually aimed at the Channel coast and not at somewhere in East Anglia, do you think? Also, could the Channel Coastal Batteries and fortifications (relics of a perceived French threat in the previous century) have been a factor?

It's possible. My impression so far from War Diaries and other sources is that apart from the divisions earmarked as counterattacking forces (IV and VII Corps), all other divisions were treated about equally as far as the allottment of scarce equipment, weapons and ammunition was concerned.
For interesting info on the defences of East Anglia, see http://www.walberswickww2.co.uk/
What has surprised me is that the Home Guard in East Anglia was better armed than in the invasion zone in Kent and East Sussex, according to the official returns. See http://sussexhistoryforum.co.uk/index.php?topic=4139.0

As regards the 19th century fortifications, the only permanently installed artillery between Dover and Portsmouth (both of which had impressive defences), was in Newhaven Fort (which dated from the 1860s), two 6" guns plus two 12-pounders. Two 6" guns were eventually installed on Dymchurch Redoubt, but were not yet there in 1940 as far as I can make out. The (almost) identical redoubt at Eastbourne was not armed at all during the war, except maybe for a light AA gun or two at some point. Many Martello towers were used as observation posts, some also as machine gun posts (Dymchurch, Pevensey), in some cases other remnants of 19th century defensive works were incorporated into the defence plans (at Dungeness for example). Overall however they were hardly a major factor, I would say.

[Knouterer]

For those interested in statistics, numbers of different types of troops are given per Command in the General Return for 30 Sept. For Eastern Command:

Household Cavalry: 41 officers/758 other ranks
Cavalry: 23/636 (a training regiment, bound to disappear soon)
Royal Armoured Corps: 664/11,211
Royal Artillery: 4,654/114,121 (including AA and searchlight units)
Royal Engineers: 1,401/31,908
Royal Corps of Signals: 665/14,844
Foot Guards: 742/23,850
Infantry of the Line: 5,344/137,655
Corps of Military Police: 4/1,947
Traffic Control: 48/1,700
Royal Army Chaplains’ Dept.: 270/0
Royal Army Service Corps: 1,606/39,571
Royal Army Medical Corps: 1,205/9,832
Royal Army Ordnance Corps: 484/12,735
Royal Army Pay Corps: 410/3,976
Royal Army Veterinary Corps: 4/15
Army Education Corps: 7/33
Army Dental Corps: 236/346
A.M.P.C.: 251/12,619
Intelligence Corps: 0/298 (looks as if they couldn’t find any “intelligent” officers, but the “other ranks” include 26 Warrant Officers Class II)
Commandos: 129/1,532 (the men of the Commando-type Independent Companies are not listed as such, because officially they were still part of the infantry regiments from which they came).
Non-Combatant Corps: 0/502 (conscientious objectors mostly)

For a total of 20,226 officers and 430,090 other ranks (including some “non-regimental”), plus 248 officers and 7,485 “members” of the A.T.S.

Of course, those numbers do not tell us much about “fighting power”, as the 140,000+ infantry, for example, include a considerable number of men who had just started training in Infantry Training Centres, and all the various poorly equipped (and often poorly led) HD, Holding, Training and YS battalions.

In Aldershot Command (see map at the bottom of the previous page), there were 70,000 troops all told, with the R.A.S.C. strongly represented as one would expect (271/9,526).

[RichTO90]

ANY point in actually asking how many of those were fighting soldiers....and how many were support troops, RAMC, drivers, cooks, bottlewashers, artillerymen (who we've already been told by you elsewhere were more than a little short in small arms), etc.?

Is there actually "ANY point" to your question, given that all armies consist of quite a bit more than just "fighting soldiers"? Or is your reductio ab adsurdam based on the silly notion that since in your construct "support troops, RAMC, drivers, cooks, bottlewashers, artillerymen" don't fight because they might be "a little short in small arms", then they aren't really part of the army? :roll: I would love to hear you argue that with some artillerymen by the way...I just suggest you be running for the door when you inform them they "don't fight". :roll:

[Paul_G_Baker]

As regards the 19th century fortifications, the only permanently installed artillery between Dover and Portsmouth (both of which had impressive defences), was in Newhaven Fort (which dated from the 1860s), two 6" guns plus two 12-pounders. Two 6" guns were eventually installed on Dymchurch Redoubt, but were not yet there in 1940 as far as I can make out. The (almost) identical redoubt at Eastbourne was not armed at all during the war, except maybe for a light AA gun or two at some point. Many Martello towers were used as observation posts, some also as machine gun posts (Dymchurch, Pevensey), in some cases other remnants of 19th century defensive works were incorporated into the defence plans (at Dungeness for example). Overall however they were hardly a major factor, I would say.

According to Macksey's "Invasion -The German Invasion of England July 1940"; which - although a work of fiction, seems both to have been based on extensive research and to be reasonably accurate - Dover had two batteries of old 6" guns, two of modern 6" guns (one confirmed as being the 3 gun Langdon Battery) and the Citadel Battery on the Western Heights (two 9.2") as pre-war (indeed WW1) defences.

Whether the guns were returned to storage during the inter-war years, or not, the emplacements (which still exist today) would have remained and only required cleaning up and the guns/carriages remounting. Then again, the Dover/Folkstone area was pretty heavily populated by the Military, so they could have been left in-situ.