Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
The more I read U.S. infantry memoirs from November 1944 thru March 1945 the more I note how few soldiers were actually at the sharp end with very low density in a given attack: A depleted rifle company with maybe four AFVs attached if lucky.(not necessarily medium tanks)and little air support due to the terrain. I am surprised the Germans were regularly defeated and pushed back to the next town/crossroads/defensive point.
Latest reading is Ganter's Roll Me Over. I was reading some Battle of the Ardennes' related infantry memoirs prior to that one.
I was reading some of Patrick Delaforce's divisional histories which deal with the BCE contribution further North in the ETO and unit size diminution and scarcity is also evident.
What say ye?
Latest reading is Ganter's Roll Me Over. I was reading some Battle of the Ardennes' related infantry memoirs prior to that one.
I was reading some of Patrick Delaforce's divisional histories which deal with the BCE contribution further North in the ETO and unit size diminution and scarcity is also evident.
What say ye?
Last edited by Felix C on 25 Jun 2014, 22:36, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
There was a lack of combat soldiers, there were steps taken to remedy that, but it was one of the few mistakes Marshall made in underestimating the need for actual combat men. The difference maker was the vast amount of support in air, artillery and tanks the allies could use to make up the difference. For Germany, not only were they suffering even worse manpower shortages, they were also suffering from equipment losses they could not make up.
Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
The following message might be helpful ...
Newsgroups: soc.history.war.world-war-ii
From: [email protected]
Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2009 21:41:02 -0400
Local: Sun, Apr 26 2009 8:41 pm
Subject: German intentionally undersized & under-equipped units in the Bulge
I am editing a completely new and highly accurate transcription of the two post-war accounts by German General Otto Remer, regarding the actions of his Fuehrer Begleit Brigade in preparation for and during the Ardennes Offensive. These are manuscripts B-592 and B-838 of the Foreign Military Studies. I hope to complete the editing and post the complete transcription on the U. S. 7th Armored Division Document Repository web pages (http://www.7tharmddiv.org/docrep) sometime in May.
However, Remer makes a statement that I have found astounding, regarding the size of the units that the Germans sent into the Bulge. Much has been made of German units being under-strength or being brought up to strength before they launched their offensive. But Remer gives a perspective that I have never seen elsewhere. Here is the relevant text, which is from B-838 pages 15-17
"On the basis of experience gained in the East it had been ordered that the combat strength of rifle companies must not exceed 40 men, of heavy companies 60 men. Stronger companies could hardly be led in combat, particularly by the young company commanders available, and only caused unnecessary concentrations and resulting losses. The combat strength of large companies, especially inexperienced, youthful units, dropped to about a third of the original strength after the first battles in then usually remained on this level for some time. It was especially advisable to man the first armored personnel carriers only to the extent necessary for handling the weapons, for direct hits usually caused a loss of the entire crew. Equally as important as reserves was the retention of unneeded weapons such as machine guns and mortars, for the weapons, after the crews had been killed or injured, usually remained on the battlefield and were lost.
"A panzer grenadier company, with 18 light machine guns, 4 heavy machine guns, 4 mortars and 4 20-mm antiaircraft guns, carried with it 30 to 40 percent of its arms, depending on locations and mission. In general, a unit needs more weapons on defense than it does on offense. One reason is that in offensive the transportation of the heavy infantry ammunition is always a problem. With the same amount of ammunition, for example, it is often possible to achieve the same results with one mortar as with four. Defense differs in that it is possible to have available enough ammunition. The remaining 50 or 70 percent of the arms were retained in decreasing numbers by the supply trains of the companies, battalions, regiments, and the brigade. It was important that the companies were in position to replace immediately damaged or destroyed weapons. For this reason weapon repair services belong with the fighting troops at the front. Similar economies and stocking of reserves is necessary with precious radio sets. There should also be only as many non-armored combat vehicles on the scene of operations as are required for the transport of troops. Maintenance of the prescribed maximum strength of material reserve stocks was continuously controlled and supervised by the brigade. Inexperienced company and battalion commanders are often inclined to live from hand to mouth."
So it very much appears that, at least within the FBB, the reduction in unit size (40 men to a company is extremely small!) and equipment -- it seems appropriate to call it a streamlining -- was very much intentional.
Wesley Johnston.
Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
The OP is not correct .
Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
I mean the attack could have been division wide or multi-division but the troops on the ground were scattered and it seems to have been a company,platoon even squad type of battle with the remainder of the battalion or regiment also engaged in their own small battles.
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Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
ljadw -- Our readers expect more from posts and posters here than
The OP is not correct .
Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
Felix C wrote:I mean the attack could have been division wide or multi-division but the troops on the ground were scattered
Understood but bunching up is no good either. Having your troops dispersed is not always a disadvantage, such as when they happen to be caught in a murderous cross-fire of machine guns, a massed artillery barrage, or a bombing raid.
Over-concentration of troops and equipment is counterproductive and wasteful of resources. Moreover, experienced U.S. Army NCO's concluded that the 12-man rifle squad was too large for one man to control effectively, implying that the rifle company had too many troops which in turn reduced peak efficiency and increased losses.
Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
David Thompson wrote:ljadw -- Our readers expect more from posts and posters here thanThe OP is not correct .
The Op was saying :it seems that the (allied) margin of victory was very small in the ETO,using as exemple the fighting between november 1944 and march 1945. Translated,he is saying that during this period,the Germans still had a chance to win /for a pat .
This is a novelty: all historians are saying that in november 1944,it was over for Germany .
But for this novelty,no proof is given .It is the opposite, the OP is saying : (I am surprised ) the Germans were regularly defeated and pushed back ..... IMO this is debunking the claim that the margin of victory was very small.There was in 1944 only one exemple where the Allies were defeated : Market Garden .
I like also to observe that it is questionable to use infantry memoirs for the claim that the margin of victory was very small.Such memoirs are giving wrong and biased pictures only :they are ignoring the role of artillery,aircraft and tanks ,logistics....
Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
Was it a mistake ,or was it a deliberate policy ?steverodgers801 wrote:There was a lack of combat soldiers, there were steps taken to remedy that, but it was one of the few mistakes Marshall made in underestimating the need for actual combat men. .
The Germans and the Soviets were decreasing the manpower of their divisions,but gave these units more firepower .
Exemple :
1939 German infantry division:manpower : 17000;infantry : 8000;LMG:378
1944 German infantry division :manpower : 12772;infantry :5500;LMG:614
1939 Soviet infantry division :manpower :18800;infantry : 8000; SMG :O
1944 Soviet infantry division :manpower:9600;infantry : 6300;SMG:2398
Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
The bold face above is an impressive tangential extrapolation of what I actually wrote since the focus was on small attacking unit size. But the benefit of forums is for folks to respond whether or not they follow the topic is ok by me.ljadw wrote:David Thompson wrote:ljadw -- Our readers expect more from posts and posters here thanThe OP is not correct .
The Op was saying :it seems that the (allied) margin of victory was very small in the ETO,using as exemple the fighting between november 1944 and march 1945. Translated,he is saying that during this period,the Germans still had a chance to win /for a pat .
This is a novelty: all historians are saying that in november 1944,it was over for Germany .
But for this novelty,no proof is given .It is the opposite, the OP is saying : (I am surprised ) the Germans were regularly defeated and pushed back ..... IMO this is debunking the claim that the margin of victory was very small.There was in 1944 only one exemple where the Allies were defeated : Market Garden .
I like also to observe that it is questionable to use infantry memoirs for the claim that the margin of victory was very small.Such memoirs are giving wrong and biased pictures only :they are ignoring the role of artillery,aircraft and tanks ,logistics....
Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
No,the focus was : it seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO and I do not see that a discussion on small attacking unit size is relevant for the OP .
Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
So you are telling me what I wrote? Ok. Thanks and Good day.
Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
The size of an attacking unit isn't of much relevane to the "margin of victory" without taking into account how many units are attacking and how many units are defending as well as there size. Therefore focusing on the "small attcking unit size" where topic is "margin of victory in the ETO" is essentially nonsensical. Now Ijadw has a tendency to read things into statements that I wouldn't but in this case I think his assumptions and interpretation of the orinial post was about as close to on the mark as one could get.
Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
my understanding, the German Generals knew they didn't have enough of ANYTHING just prior [and of course after ] to the Normandy breakout [ the front was about to cave in ]....compare the populations of Russia, US, Britain, etc vs the Axis...the US alone, could keep re-supplying EVERYTHING, the Germans could not..as in the Pacific, it was really just a matter of getting the supplies forward, so the attacks could be made...
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Re: Seems the margin of victory was very small in the ETO.
Well in division scale( not small unit scale) the American divisional and German divisional structure is very different one and another. The American division focused its most of it troops numerically in the supporting unit. Not to mention also that the American division focused the best manpower to the supporting unit also. What the German did is quite the opposite.Felix C wrote:
I was reading some of Patrick Delaforce's divisional histories which deal with the BCE contribution further North in the ETO and unit size diminution and scarcity is also evident.
What say ye?
However this might explain how the Germans were keep being pushed back. The Germans quite lack the support for their frontline units. The Allies and especially the Americans had tons of support to be used. Not to mention about their air superiority. This mean the German frontline units are likely to be hit enormous amount of firepower.
Well, that is my opinion.