Eisenhower strategic influence

[Aber]

Please, every one knew that the assault was going to be increased once adequate troops and ships arrived.

There were adequate troops in the UK (apart from some specialised beach units).

Getting the ships was no trivial matter - it required cancelling an operation in another theatre, and delaying the invasion for over a month, breaking a promise to Stalin.

If it was so expected and easy, why hadn't the assault been increased before?

[Aber]

Incidentally, there were much greater changes between the COSSAC plan and the OVERLORD plan that merely expanding it as you suggest.

Broadening the assault and putting increased priority on Cherbourg are fairly obvious changes. There were also more subtle changes in the command arrangements, from IIRC the beachhead being controlled in turn by a British Corps, a US Army and 21st Army Group as the numbers ashore increased, to the final plan where the beaches were controlled by separate Corps so that units would not be passing through areas controlled by other Corps (perhaps a learning point from Alamein).

[steverodgers801]

The assault wasn't expanded earlier, because it was not just troops for the initial assault, but for the follow on. Im not saying Monty didn't have an important role in expanding the planning, Im saying its not as if Monty was the first to say we have to expand the amount of troops.

[RichTO90]

The assault wasn't expanded earlier, because it was not just troops for the initial assault, but for the follow on. Im not saying Monty didn't have an important role in expanding the planning, Im saying its not as if Monty was the first to say we have to expand the amount of troops.

No, sorry, the BOLERO build-up preceded development of the NEPTUNE plan. By the end of 1943 there were 265,325 Army Ground Forces in the UK. By the end of February, when the initial U.S. First Army and British Second Army NEPTUNE plan was completed, there were 442,474. The follow-on forces were there, but in January Montgomery and Eisenhower identified the multiple problems with the COSSAC Outline Plan. The debate about landing craft allocation estimates had already cropped up in August 1943, but the decision to wait till they could be provided, allowing the wider assault and delaying ANVIL, wasn't reached until 21 March on Eisenhower's recommendation, which was endorsed by Montgomery.

[steverodgers801]

The original three division plan was developed in 1942. It was not until towards the end on 1943 that there were the troops available to expand planning. When Roosevelt agreed to the North Africa and then the Italian campaign, it guaranteed a delay in the build up of troops. Monty had the luxury of knowing there would be more troops and an idea of how many.

[Sheldrake]

Some points of clarification:

There was no question of launching Overlord until there were enough troops in theatre to seieze the Lodgement area. That was a minimum of 25 Divisions.

The size of the assault force was limited by the number of landing craft that could provide transport and mount the fire support. IIRC, the landing craft for the additional two divisions had to be built, mainly in British ship yards using capacity which had been prioritised for used for small escort vessels, but not quite as important in 1944 as in 1943.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Rich,

The debate about landing craft allocation estimates had already cropped up in August 1943, but the decision to wait till they could be provided, allowing the wider assault and delaying ANVIL, wasn't reached until 21 March on Eisenhower's recommendation, which was endorsed by Montgomery.

Well, sort of - but I think it would be fairer to say that the final decision to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that Anvil should be abandoned "in its present conception of a two division assault building up to ten divisions" was finally reached by Eisenhower on 21 March as Montgomery (and Smith) had first recommended to him on 5 Jan 44. At that time, Eisenhower stated that he agreed "that OVERLORD must be more broadly based, but I do not agree that a threat of ANVIL will be as effective as the operation itself...Only in the event that OVERLORD cannot possibly be broadened without abandonment of ANVIL would I consider making such a recommendation to the Combined Chiefs".

Incidentally, the US Chiefs of Staff overruled Eisenhower and insisted that ANVIL not be abandoned but merely delayed (which left poor Eisenhower with the task of placating Churchill for the next 5 months, which can't have been much fun! ).

Sheldrake,

The size of the assault force was limited by the number of landing craft that could provide transport and mount the fire support. IIRC, the landing craft for the additional two divisions had to be built, mainly in British ship yards using capacity which had been prioritised for used for small escort vessels, but not quite as important in 1944 as in 1943.

Indeed, and as Ramsay put it in his diary entry of 15 Jan:

Saturday, January 15. Situation regarding Overlord plan is now as follows:- Monty has come down firmly with request for 5 Div assault. I have agreed, subject to necessary lift and naval forces for bombardment, minesweeping & escort being available. In doing so I am under no delusions as to the complexity of the naval operations entailed by this requirement & as to the extent to which success will be a gamble with fortune. The weather, both for air & surface participation could of itself mar success. The mine menace is very real, and the degree of training of the thousands of craft will be unknown up to a late date, the capacity of the beaches & their suitability for receiving the craft & ships of all kind is also largely guesswork. The making of the artificial harbours is also in the realm of fairyland & may or may not be a practical proposition. We now await information from Chiefs of Staff whether we are to get the extra lift or not. Until then we just cannot plan on any firm foundation.

His diary is a vital source to understanding the development of the OVERLORD plan but seems to have been mostly overlooked in favour of the army sources.

Cheers

Tom

[Carl Schwamberger]

The original three division plan was developed in 1942. ....

Developed in 1942 or 1943? I am aware of a single division/corps/beach plan outlined in 1942, but have been left with the impression that was the largest contemplated that year for attacking the continent. If you have sources for this please please share

[steverodgers801]

I know there was a plan for an emergency landing in 1942 after it was decided to go into north Africa. according to this site the formal planning began in Jan 1943 http://strategybydesign.org/d-day-and-t ... y-invasio/

[Carl Schwamberger]

I know there was a plan for an emergency landing in 1942 after it was decided to go into north Africa.

That sounds like the several Round Up operations. The best description of those seems to be on the Hyperwar site. I also have a essay that describes some of the 1942 British planning. it lacks breadth, but the author intended to focus a bit narrowly tho he does clarify a few general points about the several (Many?) invasion plans. I am getting messages the file is to large to attach, tho I've done so here before ??? Main point is some British leaders were working at the problem of planning for a invasion of NW europe and not dismissing it out of hand as some pop histories have it.

according to this site the formal planning began in Jan 1943 http://strategybydesign.org/d-day-and-t ... y-invasio/

That would coincide with the formation of COSSAC http://www.history.army.mil/documents/cossac/Cossac.htm. Sort of a planning cell for the Joint Chiefs on the cross Channel attack question. But there is worthwhile evidence the Brits, at least while Dill was CIGS, were trying to work out a viable plan for getting a army into France sooner rather than later.

Getting back to the question of the Anvil-Dragoon operations here is another version of the decisions and Eisenhowers take on it. http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_16.htm Two biographers of Ike; Pogue & Estes provide a slightly different view on Ikes attitude. That is he required no pressure from anyone to revive Op Anvil as Dragoon. He saw the advantages of possessing the south France ports as to great to not pursue.

[Aber]

Main point is some British leaders were working at the problem of planning for a invasion of NW europe and not dismissing it out of hand as some pop histories have it.

IIRC Truscott said that the British planners doing the detailed work were in favour of Sledgehammer, but Brooke squashed them. This seems to be mainly on the grounds that it would not be sensible to put the main part of the British Army into France in 1942 (with only a few US divisions) and allow the Germans to destroy them at their convenience.

Re Eisenhower's view on Anvil, I'm sure that removing an Army Group from Clark and adding it to his own command never entered his thinking...

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Re Eisenhower's view on Anvil, I'm sure that removing an Army Group from Clark and adding it to his own command never entered his thinking...

That seems to be a given. Churchill wanted to do the same, with a different destination. Marshall had no interest in seeing 'extra' Allied forces mucking about in Italy or the Balkans. The French were headed for France irregardless. Alexander and Clark were lucky to have what they did.

[Carl Schwamberger]

IIRC Truscott said that the British planners doing the detailed work were in favour of Sledgehammer, but Brooke squashed them. ...

The timing is right. The planning seems to have stopped not long after Brooke got his hand on the tiller as CIGS. Dill was of a differnt opinion and he seems to have supported Marshall in his desire for opening a NW Europe front.

[Aber]

The timing is right. The planning seems to have stopped not long after Brooke got his hand on the tiller as CIGS. Dill was of a differnt opinion and he seems to have supported Marshall in his desire for opening a NW Europe front.

Not sure I agree with you completely. Brooke's position IIRC was that the invasion of France would only happen if there were enough forces available to ensure its success. This meant in practice a US Army Group to complement the British Home Forces ie 30+ divisions. The US forces would not be available for September 1942 so no Sledgehammer, but were expected to be available for spring/summer 1943 for Round-up. The British were expecting the US build-up in Britain to continue even after the decision for Torch, and were surprised about the scaling back of Bolero (see Ruppenthaal).

As with all discussions about WW2 strategy, it is important to cover when arguments were made as people changed their minds as the situation evolved.

[steverodgers801]

It was the British that ensured Bolero was delayed by having the invasion of Africa and Italy. It did make sense to invade Africa and Italy, but it got messy when Churchill kept on insisting on more invasions in the Med. Im not sure if Churchill really thought over his phobia about France, especially when he wanted to attack insignificant islands or Yugoslavia.