Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

[Kurfürst]

This is incorrect. By using effective blind bombing aids and the willingness the actually aim at specific targets, good results could be obtained.

Like at Coventry?

Yes, now that you mention it, Coventry is also a good example of effective bombing of specific aircraft industry targets within a city. Coventry's extensive aircraft industry was largely destroyed in the air attack.

It was certainly possible to do that for the Luftwaffe in 1940, and certainly possible for Bomber Command, too, by 1942 the latest. Only that Bomber Command didn't really try to bomb anything specific (there were exceptions - under USAAF pressure in the wake of the utter failure of the Battle of Berlin, Harris reluctantly switched to oil and transportation targets, but then returned to his old and wasteful terror bombing strategy).

I also point your attention that the subject of the thread is "Allied Terror bombings" - do not attempt to siderail the thread in the future please.

[Michael Kenny]

Yes, now that you mention it, Coventry is also a good example of effective bombing of specific aircraft industry targets within a city. Coventry's extensive aircraft industry was largely destroyed in the air attack.

Egffective bombing being a euphemism for Terror bombing.

(there were exceptions - under USAAF pressure in the wake of the utter failure of the Battle of Berlin, Harris reluctantly switched to oil and transportation targets, but then returned to his old and wasteful terror bombing strategy

Absolute fiction.
The tonnnage of bombs dropped on 'oil targets' 1t = 100 lbs
USAAF................126,191
UK....................109,663

[RichTO90]

The point of a British mass air force was to avoid a mass army.

No it was not.

It might help if you actually exhibited some knowledge of the subject and if you weren't so very evidently trolling to start another flame war. The statement that the "point of a British mass air force was to avoid a mass army" is in its very essence correct, as even a casual perusal of the relevant source documentation would demonstrate to you. I suggest you begin with Gibbs' Grand Strategy Volume I, then Bond's British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, Peden's British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-1939, John Ferris' "Catching a Wave: The RAF Pursues a RMA, 1918-1939" in Imlay and Toft (eds.) The Fog of Peace and War Planning, and then go on from there.

They did not avoid anything, well, besides the fact that British contribution to allied victory was in the end very small: while the Soviet Union took the bulk of the job, the US helped significantly sending supplies and a middle sized army in Europe, the British deployed less than 10% of the allied armies in continental Europe as they were focusing their resources on killing civilians and destroying cities, for very small strategic military gain...

(Snip the rest of the usual trolling that seems directed a deliberately starting a flame war, given that this opinion-laden post, while full of hindsight - as usual - is devoid of any real facts or serious analysis.)

[Attrition]

Britain's War Machine: Weapons, Resources and Experts in the Second World War (2011) by David Edgerton isn't quite as weighty but well worth a look.

[Christian Ankerstjerne]

No it was not. They did not avoid anything, well, besides the fact that British contribution to allied victory was in the end very small: while the Soviet Union took the bulk of the job, the US helped significantly sending supplies and a middle sized army in Europe, the British deployed less than 10% of the allied armies in continental Europe as they were focusing their resources on killing civilians and destroying cities, for very small strategic military gain: in the end it's arguable that strategic bombing did not reduce German war production by a significant extent (to the point of reducing significantly allied casualties in the frontlines, even in 1945, after dropping enormous quantities of bombs on Germany, Allied casualties in 4 months were over 3 million men at the frontlines, the German army still had adequate supply of munitions to operate, aircraft output decreased but the binding constraint on the luftwaffe wasn't aircraft, it was fuel and pilots).

Allied victory was due to numerial superiority in the frontlines, strategic bombing helped a little by reducing the manpower available to the German army by perhaps 1 million men, employed in cleaning and manning flak guns, but it also reduced the manpower available to the allied ground armies, by way more than 1 million men.

Number of Allied personnel killed in action involved in strategic bombing was also very high, nearly comparable to the number of deaths in the Western front.

It's possible if not probable that the total number of Western Allied KIA might have been smaller if strategic bombing were never attempted during the war. German munition production would have been perhaps 10-15% higher during the last 16 months of the war, the German army would be 10% larger, meaning that overall the size of opposing forces and the firepower employed against western allied soldiers in the Italian and Western fronts might have been 10-15% higher. Allied casualties at the front might have been 10-15% more intense, which would mean an extra 25,000 KIA in the western and Italian fronts if the war lasted as long as it did, compared to about 100,000 KIA involved in strategic bombing. And without the manpower wasted in the aircraft factories (3 million people worked in aircraft factories in the US, UK and Canada, many if not most involved in making strategic bombers) and in the strategic branches of the allied airforces, Allied ground forces could have been stronger as well, by a factor of perhaps 40-50% in Italy and the Western front, winning the war sooner as the force correlation would have favored the allies to a greater degree than historically did (as Germany would have to reduce the number of divisions in the eastern front with a bigger army in the western front, so both fronts would have collapsed faster than they did historically).

Against Japan, well, Germany defeated and occupied Poland, a country not much weaker than Japan in overall warmaking potential, and lost 16,000 KIA. US casualties in an invasion and occupation of Japan would probably not be that much higher (even if we factor the lower fighting power of US army, it wouldn't make that much of a difference) than that and Japan lacked the explosives and powder supply to equip their army with enough firepower to cause many casualties. In 1944, Japan's production of explosives and powder was 8% of Germany's and in 1945 the Japanese economy was collapsing from lack of raw materials as it was under US blockade, it's means of producing munitions were tiny and Japan would have been forced to surrender without any physical attack on the island due to lack of chemicals to be used in producing agricultural fertilizer which would result in mass starvation.

You post makes a lot of claims regarding the size of the British engagement in the war compared to that of other countries, as well as the effects of the Allied bombing campaign, yet you cite no sources to support your numbers. As per forum rules, please provide sources to support your claims.

[Guaporense]

No it was not. They did not avoid anything, well, besides the fact that British contribution to allied victory was in the end very small: while the Soviet Union took the bulk of the job, the US helped significantly sending supplies and a middle sized army in Europe, the British deployed less than 10% of the allied armies in continental Europe as they were focusing their resources on killing civilians and destroying cities, for very small strategic military gain: in the end it's arguable that strategic bombing did not reduce German war production by a significant extent (to the point of reducing significantly allied casualties in the frontlines, even in 1945, after dropping enormous quantities of bombs on Germany, Allied casualties in 4 months were over 3 million men at the frontlines, the German army still had adequate supply of munitions to operate, aircraft output decreased but the binding constraint on the luftwaffe wasn't aircraft, it was fuel and pilots).

Allied victory was due to numerial superiority in the frontlines, strategic bombing helped a little by reducing the manpower available to the German army by perhaps 1 million men, employed in cleaning and manning flak guns, but it also reduced the manpower available to the allied ground armies, by way more than 1 million men.

Number of Allied personnel killed in action involved in strategic bombing was also very high, nearly comparable to the number of deaths in the Western front.

It's possible if not probable that the total number of Western Allied KIA might have been smaller if strategic bombing were never attempted during the war. German munition production would have been perhaps 10-15% higher during the last 16 months of the war, the German army would be 10% larger, meaning that overall the size of opposing forces and the firepower employed against western allied soldiers in the Italian and Western fronts might have been 10-15% higher. Allied casualties at the front might have been 10-15% more intense, which would mean an extra 25,000 KIA in the western and Italian fronts if the war lasted as long as it did, compared to about 100,000 KIA involved in strategic bombing. And without the manpower wasted in the aircraft factories (3 million people worked in aircraft factories in the US, UK and Canada, many if not most involved in making strategic bombers) and in the strategic branches of the allied airforces, Allied ground forces could have been stronger as well, by a factor of perhaps 40-50% in Italy and the Western front, winning the war sooner as the force correlation would have favored the allies to a greater degree than historically did (as Germany would have to reduce the number of divisions in the eastern front with a bigger army in the western front, so both fronts would have collapsed faster than they did historically).

Against Japan, well, Germany defeated and occupied Poland, a country not much weaker than Japan in overall warmaking potential, and lost 16,000 KIA. US casualties in an invasion and occupation of Japan would probably not be that much higher (even if we factor the lower fighting power of US army, it wouldn't make that much of a difference) than that and Japan lacked the explosives and powder supply to equip their army with enough firepower to cause many casualties. In 1944, Japan's production of explosives and powder was 8% of Germany's and in 1945 the Japanese economy was collapsing from lack of raw materials as it was under US blockade, it's means of producing munitions were tiny and Japan would have been forced to surrender without any physical attack on the island due to lack of chemicals to be used in producing agricultural fertilizer which would result in mass starvation.

You post makes a lot of claims regarding the size of the British engagement in the war compared to that of other countries, as well as the effects of the Allied bombing campaign, yet you cite no sources to support your numbers. As per forum rules, please provide sources to support your claims.

Main point is that the British army was a very small proportion of allied army forces in Europe. In June 1945, it was 10% of total allied forces, according to this: https://web.archive.org/web/20101116160 ... es/022.jpg

Allied forces in Europe were equivalent to 367 western allied divisions, of which: 264 Russian, 61 American, 35 British and a few others (including 1 Brazilian). British were 10% of allied forces in Europe. Also, according to Rich's data, out of the 294 German Heer and Waffen SS divisions in June 1944, 94 were engaged in the Western and Italian fronts, these numbers did not chance much over the next 10 months, British forces were 35% of Western Allied forces, so about 33 German divisions were engaged against British forces, or 11% of Germany's army was engaged against British forces. That's after Operation Overlord, before it was 5-6% from opening the Italian front and 1% during the North African operations. British overall contribution to victory, given Allied victory was primarily and obviously due to the defeat of the German army and the occupation of Germany, was a very small fraction of total Allied contribution, but still significant. It's a very well established consensus among historians that the Soviet Union was the central and most important factor in Germany's defeat, given they defeated the bulk of the German army and most German ammunition output was spend in the Eastern Front.

According to the USSBS report on the German war economy, in early 1945, German industrial production was reduced by 22% from it's 2nd quarter of 1944 peak thanks to the 1 million tons of bombs dropped over Germany over the past 12 months, in the first 4-5 months of 1944 effects of strategic bombing on overall industrial production were negligible. So on average, German industrial production over the last 16 months of the war would have been at most 10% greater without any strategic bombing. Number of personnel manning AA guns in Germany was several hundred thousand as well. Taking both factors into account I would think that German front armies would have been 10% stronger in terms of personnel and supplies over the last 16 months of the war without strategic bombing. Western Allied losses in Italy and Western front over the last 16 months of the war were around 200,000 KIA and died of wounds, so their losses might have been 10% higher. Allied personnel losses in strategic bombing were 160,000 men, most of which were killed, nearly all permanent losses since they became prisoners as well (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_ ... Ussb-1.svg).

[Michael Kenny]

British were 10% of allied forces in Europe.

Factualy incorrect.

[Michael Kenny]

So on average, German industrial production over the last 16 months of the war would have been at most 10% greater without any strategic bombing. Number of personnel manning AA guns in Germany was several hundred thousand as well.

How much of German production was used making fighters, radar, AA rounds and 8.8cm guns? Taking into account the air war consumed the bulk of the high tech (thus expensive) war equipment.
It was 1,100,000 ( v 2.5 mill soldiers on the eastern front?) in the flak arm. 1,717 heavy flak batt. were in firing west v 148 in Russia. 25% of the Wehrmacht budget went on AA weapons and monthly consumption of AA rounds in 1944 was 3.5 mill heavy and 12 mill light. The USSBS suggest army gun production could have doubled in there was no bombing threat.
I humbly suggest the huge cost/effort that went into countering the bombers gives the lie to any claims it was innefective.
If it didn't work then why not just ignore it?

Data mined from Flak, German Anti-aircraft Defenses 1914-1945
by Edward B. Westermann

[Guaporense]

British were 10% of allied forces in Europe.

Factualy incorrect.

https://web.archive.org/web/20101116152 ... .edu/PRO2/

Well, that's 35 out of 367 divisions, or less than 10% of the ground forces. In terms of tying up a proportion of the German army, if you exclude the ca. 45 divisions in the South East, Norway and in the Reich, we have 250 divisions engaged in the frontlines in mid 1944, of which, 94 were engaged in the west, British forces were 35 out of 104 in June 1945, so that's 1/3, which means about 31 German divisions out of 250 frontline divisions, were engaged against the British forces, or 12% of frontline German forces. Before Overlord, it was 5% in Italy alone, between June 1940 and June 1943, the British forces was insignificant in tying up portions of the German army.

So from any way you look at it, the British side gave a small contribution in defeating the German army, but not insignificant. Brazilian forces were responsible for tying up 0.4% of the German army for a several months.

[Christian Ankerstjerne]

Guaporense
You make a number of fallacious assertions.

1. The number of divisions you cite is from a specific month, rather than the time span from 1940 to 1945.
2. The number of divisions you cite does not give any information about the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy, or logistical support.
3. A given number of divisions can not be converted to a specific number of soldiers.
4. A given number of soldiers can not be converted to a specific fighting strength.
5. A given fighting strength can not be converted to a specific front-line impact.
6. It is not possible to conclude that the British faced a third of the German divisions in Western Europe from the assertion that the British divisions made up a third of the Allied divisions on the Western Front. Also see points one through five.
7. That the Eastern Front was the most important front in terms of land warfare does not mean that other factors were not important, or that the combination of those other factors were not more important than the land warfare on the Eastern Front.

Main point is that the British army was a very small proportion of allied army forces in Europe. In June 1945, it was 10% of total allied forces, according to this: https://web.archive.org/web/20101116160 ... es/022.jpg

Allied forces in Europe were equivalent to 367 western allied divisions, of which: 264 Russian, 61 American, 35 British and a few others (including 1 Brazilian). British were 10% of allied forces in Europe. Also, according to Rich's data, out of the 294 German Heer and Waffen SS divisions in June 1944, 94 were engaged in the Western and Italian fronts, these numbers did not chance much over the next 10 months, British forces were 35% of Western Allied forces, so about 33 German divisions were engaged against British forces, or 11% of Germany's army was engaged against British forces. That's after Operation Overlord, before it was 5-6% from opening the Italian front and 1% during the North African operations. British overall contribution to victory, given Allied victory was primarily and obviously due to the defeat of the German army and the occupation of Germany, was a very small fraction of total Allied contribution, but still significant. It's a very well established consensus among historians that the Soviet Union was the central and most important factor in Germany's defeat, given they defeated the bulk of the German army and most German ammunition output was spend in the Eastern Front.

According to the USSBS report on the German war economy, in early 1945, German industrial production was reduced by 22% from it's 2nd quarter of 1944 peak thanks to the 1 million tons of bombs dropped over Germany over the past 12 months, in the first 4-5 months of 1944 effects of strategic bombing on overall industrial production were negligible. So on average, German industrial production over the last 16 months of the war would have been at most 10% greater without any strategic bombing. Number of personnel manning AA guns in Germany was several hundred thousand as well. Taking both factors into account I would think that German front armies would have been 10% stronger in terms of personnel and supplies over the last 16 months of the war without strategic bombing. Western Allied losses in Italy and Western front over the last 16 months of the war were around 200,000 KIA and died of wounds, so their losses might have been 10% higher. Allied personnel losses in strategic bombing were 160,000 men, most of which were killed, nearly all permanent losses since they became prisoners as well (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_ ... Ussb-1.svg).

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Guys,

Surely, every power wants to come out on the winning side with the minimum of expenditure of blood and treasure?

Is there something reprehensible that the UK and, even more so, the USA managed this, or something commendable that the USSR did not, and suffered horrendously on the road to victory? The Eastern Front may well have been the decisive one of the war, but this distinction was bought at tremendous cost. Furthermore, to look at it from a cynical Western Liberal Democratic perspective, wasn't it a thoroughly good thing that the Eastern Front largely destroyed one Totalitarian power and crippled the other? Win-Win!

The metropolitan UK was by far the smallest of the Big Four. It had barely half the population of Germany, about a third of that of the USA and a about a quarter of that of the USSR. It also had broader worldwide obligations than any of them. The UK was not in a position to carry nearly half the strategic air war in Europe, most of the Battle of the Atlantic, garrison it empire, take the lead role in D-Day, and still have the resources to play a leading role in the continental land war that followed from D+1.

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Regarding the effectiveness of Allied bombing, it might depend on the measure being used. If one takes the growth in German military production until late in the war, Allied bombing superficially looks pretty ineffective. On the other hand, if one compares German actual military production with German planned military production, Allied bombing looks very effective, because their military production fell so far short of what the Germans themselves thought was possible and planned for.

Furthermore, Allied bombing did much to distort German military production away from the Germans' own preferences. It wasn't though choice that the Germans virtually abandoned bomber production in the last year of the war in favour of fighter production. It wasn't through German choice that such a high proportion of 88mm guns were in the Reich's anti-aircraft defences, rather than operating in an anti-tank role at the front. It also wasn't through choice that Germans relocated much of their military industry at such cost in production.

And much of what the Germans did produce very late in the war never reached the troops due the paralysis of Reich road, rail, canal and riverine by Allied bombers.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Michael Kenny]

Well, that's 35 out of 367 divisions, or less than 10% of the ground forces.

I knew you would get there in the end.

The RAF and RN were active 'in the West'.

Oh and not all soldiers are in divisions either.

I wonder if anyone can explain to me something I have always struggled with. How can Germany and The Soviet Union both have armies bigger than the UK?
I have absolutely no idea what it is that allows both these countries to find more soldiers ............

[Guaporense]

Guaporense
You make a number of fallacious assertions.

1. The number of divisions you cite is from a specific month, rather than the time span from 1940 to 1945.

British relatively contribution was obviously smaller from before June 1944, compared to it's proportion in June 1945 of western allied forces.

In the last 11 months of the war relative distribution of German divisions across fronts was similar:

http://www.axishistory.com/books/134-ca ... rld-war-ii

[*]The number of divisions you cite does not give any information about the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy, or logistical support.

True. But I was supporting the assertion that British forces were 10% of the ground forces in Europe.

[*]A given number of divisions can not be converted to a specific number of soldiers.

The size of divisions in that document was adjusted by that factor. The Russian divisions numbered nearly 600 but were converted to 264 "equivalent divisions", to be comparable numerically to western allied forces.

[*]A given number of soldiers can not be converted to a specific fighting strength.

Well, the correlation between German deployments against allied forces and size of allied forces suggest the relative number of divisions was similarly proportional to fighting strength. Although losses in the Eastern front in terms of killed and wounded were higher in per capita terms (about 800,000 KIA/WIA in the last 7 months of 1944 compared to 216,000 KIA/WIA for the last 7 months of 1944 in the western front), which suggests fighting there was more intensive.

[*]A given fighting strength can not be converted to a specific front-line impact.

Why not?

[*]It is not possible to conclude that the British faced a third of the German divisions in Western Europe from the assertion that the British divisions made up a third of the Allied divisions on the Western Front. Also see points one through five.

True, but I suspect that's true: if Germans were heavily outnumbered in one section of the front relative to others they would tend to reinforce this section, keeping the relative distribution of forces proportional to the size of enemy forces.

[*]That the Eastern Front was the most important front in terms of land warfare does not mean that other factors were not important, or that the combination of those other factors were not more important than the land warfare on the Eastern Front.[/list]

It's a consensus among historians that the Eastern front was more important than all other fronts combined. Glantz said that all the western allies did was to shorten the war by 12 months. Even Tooze, who is focused on the economic superiority of western allies, said that the eastern front was the most important factor in Germany's defeat. Overy claims the eastern front was the decisive front of the war.

In terms of ammunition expenditure it also appears that way: in 1943, more than 70% of German ammunition production was consumed in the eastern front, in 1944, about 60%. And ammunition production consumed 50% of all steel allocated to the German war effort by 1944, it was the most important industry in the German war effort:

[RichTO90]

British relatively contribution was obviously smaller from before June 1944, compared to it's proportion in June 1945 of western allied forces.

Nonsense. The British contribution ("relative" to what?) INCREASED throughout the war. As did the American, Soviet, German... :roll:

True. But I was supporting the assertion that British forces were 10% of the ground forces in Europe.

Nonsense. Christian's statement is simply true. You were making the fallacious attempt at equating "percentage of ground forces committed" with "relatively [sic] contribution" to the war effort.

The size of divisions in that document was adjusted by that factor. The Russian divisions numbered nearly 600 but were converted to 264 "equivalent divisions", to be comparable numerically to western allied forces.

Nonsense. It was "adjusted" by a War Office SWAG at what Soviet ground forces strength was at the end of the war. It is simply an argumentum ab auctoritate by you seeking to validate your nonsensical and fallacious attempt at equating "percentage of ground forces committed" with "relatively [sic] contribution" to the war effort.

Well, the correlation between German deployments against allied forces and size of allied forces suggest the relative number of divisions was similarly proportional to fighting strength. Although losses in the Eastern front in terms of killed and wounded were higher in per capita terms (about 800,000 KIA/WIA in the last 7 months of 1944 compared to 216,000 KIA/WIA for the last 7 months of 1944 in the western front), which suggests fighting there was more intensive.

Nonsense. Aside from the use of dodgy and unreferenced figures - again - it "suggests" no such things. "Relative number of divisions" is only possibly proportional to ground forces strength. Over the entire period from 1 June 1944 to 30 April 1945, counting only those divisions in the "West", "Italy", or "East" the ratio was about 60:40 East-to-West.

Why not?

Seriously? :roll:

True, but I suspect that's true: if Germans were heavily outnumbered in one section of the front relative to others they would tend to reinforce this section, keeping the relative distribution of forces proportional to the size of enemy forces.

That is self evident, but has nothing to do with proving your argument.

It's a consensus among historians that the Eastern front was more important than all other fronts combined. Glantz said that all the western allies did was to shorten the war by 12 months. Even Tooze, who is focused on the economic superiority of western allies, said that the eastern front was the most important factor in Germany's defeat. Overy claims the eastern front was the decisive front of the war.

What happens if the Western Allies are removed from the equation?

[Christian Ankerstjerne]

British relatively contribution was obviously smaller from before June 1944, compared to it's proportion in June 1945 of western allied forces.

Why? See point two through five.

True. But I was supporting the assertion that British forces were 10% of the ground forces in Europe.

You wrote the following statement in a response to a statement about the balance between the British Army and the Royal Air Force, which you went on to elaborate with references to US supplies and strategic bombing:

[...] British contribution to allied victory was in the end very small [...]

You can't retroactively alter your arguments to refer to only a subset of the arguments you made in your initial post.

The size of divisions in that document was adjusted by that factor. The Russian divisions numbered nearly 600 but were converted to 264 "equivalent divisions", to be comparable numerically to western allied forces.

While it is not entirely clear whether the document refers to the theoretical or actual organization of the divisions, the most probably interpretation is the former. If so, the conversion is not reliable.

Well, the correlation between German deployments against allied forces and size of allied forces suggest the relative number of divisions was similarly proportional to fighting strength.

Why? If the fighting strength of the two forces were about the same, how do you explain the almost completely one-sided success of the Allies on the Western Front?

Although losses in the Eastern front in terms of killed and wounded were higher in per capita terms (about 800,000 KIA/WIA in the last 7 months of 1944 compared to 216,000 KIA/WIA for the last 7 months of 1944 in the western front), which suggests fighting there was more intensive.

Is there any particular reason why you haven't included prisoners of war in those numbers? Also, you didn't actually address my point.

Why not?

This is a very trivial matter. The employment of a unit is not a function of its fighting strength. The success of a unit is not a function of its fighting strength either. Whether a unit will succeed in its objectives can not be determined by statistics.

True, but I suspect that's true: if Germans were heavily outnumbered in one section of the front relative to others they would tend to reinforce this section, keeping the relative distribution of forces proportional to the size of enemy forces.

Speculation. You also imply that the Germans had an efficient intelligence branch. In fact, British counterintelligence infiltration of the German intelligence network within the UK was total, and the decryption effort in Bletchley Park was very significant.

It's a consensus among historians that the Eastern front was more important than all other fronts combined.

That is a very strong assertion, which, if true, you should have no difficulties supporting with sources. It is also an argument from authority, which means that even if you can show that the such a consensus exists, you will not have demonstrated the truth of the actual claim.

In terms of ammunition expenditure it also appears that way: in 1943, more than 70% of German ammunition production was consumed in the eastern front, in 1944, about 60%. And ammunition production consumed 50% of all steel allocated to the German war effort by 1944, it was the most important industry in the German war effort:

The impact on the war can not be measured by ammunition consumption or any other such trivial metrics. Furthermore, you mentioned US supplies yourself, such as the lend-lease program.