Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

Discussions on WW2 in Western Europe & the Atlantic.
Post Reply
Sid Guttridge
Member
Posts: 10158
Joined: 12 Jun 2008, 12:19

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#61

Post by Sid Guttridge » 20 Jan 2015, 13:32

In reply to my own last post, no, Supermarine were further south at Woolston, which was comparitively lightly hit on this occasion.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10056
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#62

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 20 Jan 2015, 17:14

Sid Guttridge wrote:Hi Carl,

I guess if one cannot discern the aiming points from the actual fall of bombs, the bombing cannot have been very accurate.

The only heavy concentration seems to be at Bitterne Manor, on the river foreshore. Was this the Supermarine works, one wonders?

Cheers,

Sid.
Either bombing was not accurate, or the aim points were multiple and dispersed. Either way you can't judge accurately without knowing the aim points.

I'v not had time to review any specific attacks. scattered across my shelves is some information of accuracy for specific attacks. I've studied the subject intermitantly. From memory I can categorically say some of the statistics for USAAF accuracy cited in this thread are badly distorted. They may be accurate for a subset of the overall bombing in the ETO but dont reflect in themselves all or even a large part of the bombing. In this I'm not challenging the numbers given here, but wondering why there is such a gross difference between accuracy of dispersion from the aim point/target in some cases and tight groupings in others.


Michael Kenny
Member
Posts: 8251
Joined: 07 May 2002, 20:40
Location: Teesside

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#63

Post by Michael Kenny » 20 Jan 2015, 17:16

The Supermarine factory was just north of the Ichen bridge which was built post-war.

Pre War
Ichen Ferry landing just below the factory. North to top of photo
Image

1947
Ruined factory, South to the top of photo. Ichen bridge built where the two landings can be seen just above the factory.
Image
Image

The images above are crops from this very good site for UK air views

http://www.britainfromabove.org.uk/

Michael Kenny
Member
Posts: 8251
Joined: 07 May 2002, 20:40
Location: Teesside

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#64

Post by Michael Kenny » 20 Jan 2015, 17:24

Sid Guttridge wrote:In reply to my own last post, no, Supermarine were further south at Woolston, which was comparitively lightly hit on this occasion.
It was not hit at all on the bomb map which just plots the 30th Nov/1st Dec raid(s). 3 bombs landed just south of the site of the factory arrowed in blue. .

Image

Michael Kenny
Member
Posts: 8251
Joined: 07 May 2002, 20:40
Location: Teesside

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#65

Post by Michael Kenny » 20 Jan 2015, 17:31

There is also a site where you can search Maps of the UK at various dates for free. You can see where industry was situated on the 1930s-1940s 1:2500 maps

https://www.old-maps.co.uk/#/

This for instances
Image
Image

Image


1933 photo
Image
1951 photo
Image

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10056
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#66

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 20 Jan 2015, 20:36

Kenny... those are very useful. Combined with the other bit on my shelves it helps build a picture of what was really going on. I looked at some photos of US 9th AF attacks in 1943-44. The dispersion from Mean Point of Impact & from aim point can be measured in meters and hundreds of meters, not thousands of meters or miles. what this is telling me is the question of accuracy & effects are 'complex' and cant be summed up in a couple general statements or some blanket statistics covering the whole war. Hopefully I'll have time to look into this further this week.

Thanks for excellent photos and graphics on the bomb impacts.

Sid Guttridge
Member
Posts: 10158
Joined: 12 Jun 2008, 12:19

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#67

Post by Sid Guttridge » 21 Jan 2015, 12:22

Hi Carl,

I suppose that the alternative to inaccuracy is to assume that there was no specific aiming point and that the Luftwaffe was, on this occasion, engaged in what the British later described as "area bombing".

Cheers,

Sid.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10056
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#68

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 21 Jan 2015, 14:15

Might be. we'd need confirmation of that as the few other examples I'd read they were searching for specific aim points. Lacking radar they were trying to ID the targets by moonlight and flares. Damaged aircraft were also releasing bombs with out reference to any aim point.

User avatar
phylo_roadking
Member
Posts: 17488
Joined: 01 May 2006, 00:31
Location: Belfast

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#69

Post by phylo_roadking » 21 Jan 2015, 18:51

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
Sid Guttridge wrote:Hi Carl,

I guess if one cannot discern the aiming points from the actual fall of bombs, the bombing cannot have been very accurate.

The only heavy concentration seems to be at Bitterne Manor, on the river foreshore. Was this the Supermarine works, one wonders?

Cheers,

Sid.
Either bombing was not accurate, or the aim points were multiple and dispersed. Either way you can't judge accurately without knowing the aim points.

I'v not had time to review any specific attacks. scattered across my shelves is some information of accuracy for specific attacks. I've studied the subject intermitantly. From memory I can categorically say some of the statistics for USAAF accuracy cited in this thread are badly distorted. They may be accurate for a subset of the overall bombing in the ETO but dont reflect in themselves all or even a large part of the bombing. In this I'm not challenging the numbers given here, but wondering why there is such a gross difference between accuracy of dispersion from the aim point/target in some cases and tight groupings in others.
Just a minor point, Carl....but one that might have some input to this. There was a known issue with LW aircraft with vertical "bomb cells" like the He 111; bombs spread and didn't cluster well due to the tumbling as they dropped tail first from the cells.

It might be worth taking a sample number of well-documented raids...and any available pre-and post-raid aerial photographs...and check if the "tight grouping" came from any particular aircraft type ;)
Twenty years ago we had Johnny Cash, Bob Hope and Steve Jobs. Now we have no Cash, no Hope and no Jobs....
Lord, please keep Kevin Bacon alive...

RichTO90
Member
Posts: 4238
Joined: 22 Dec 2003, 19:03

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#70

Post by RichTO90 » 22 Jan 2015, 03:01

Guaporense wrote:From were this 11.12 million figure comes from, what's the composition? All figures I know regarding the size of the wehrmacht but it at 9.5-9.1 million in 1943-1944, from multiple sources. I believe this 11 million figure includes civilian administrative employees of the military.

4.7 million is what?
I can't help it if you use multiple defective sources and fail to understand what they tell you.

Generalmajor Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, MS #P-005 Personnel and Administration, Appendix 1:

Peak Wehrmacht strength was 1944: 12,240,000, but peak ground forces strength as a component of the Wehrmacht was 1943. That year, Wehrmacht strength was 11,120,000, comprised of 4,250,000 Feldheer and 450,000 Waffen-SS. The remainder was 2,300,000 in the Ersatzheer (since they aren't frontline combat troops I can't imagine you would count them), 1,700,000 in the Luftwaffe, 780,000 in the Kriegmarine, 100,000 in Freiwilligen (I suppose you might count them), and 1,700,000 in OT, NSKK, and other paramilitary units.

They were all counted as Wehrmacht by the Germans. Beamte - your "civilian administrative employees" (amongst their other roles) were a vital part of German divisions that in U.S. service was usually filled by warrant officers. How is one more important than the other?
You perceive a lack of logic because you did not understand the logic. Which proves that you did not understand it.
No, I understood your lack of logic quite well thank you.
They were obviously enormously superior considering the territories each faction controlled: Germany and it's European allies controlled territories with 350 million people in continental Europe, including 150 million in industrialized countries, the USSR controlled territories with 130 million people after Barbarossa, which were half-industrialized territories. The economic resources of occupied Poland and the occupied regions of the USSR alone were comparable to the economic resources of the territories Stalin had in 1942-1943.

The discrepancy in potential economic resources between USSR and Germany and it's European allies was similar in scale to that between Japan and the US. The fact that the USSR won despite all odds, show how incredible feat it was.
Why yes, it was a remarkable feat, but you seem strangely unaware how it came about. It was because the Soviets were able to maximize their resources on a single land front, where naval forces were unimportant. So compared to the Germans 703 major vessels built 1942-1944 the Soviets built 703. But twice the number of tanks the Germans built. It was due to single-minded allocations of manpower. In 1943, compared to the 11.12-million in the Wehrmacht, the Soviets were barely superior - 11.9-million in total. But of those, about 6.25-million were allocated to the ground forces at the front...versus less than 2.8-million German ground forces. So where were the rest of the German armed forces? In 1943, roughly 73.6% of Soviet GNP was allocated to defense, government, and security. And they could allocate virtually all of that to the war front. The Germans were less single-minded, but still exceeded the other Allies in their commitment...but where else did they have to allocate their strength?

And yes, you can use hindsight to claim that the German allocation to the U-Boat war, the surface navy, the air forces, was all wasteful...except that is a facile assessment based upon knowledge unavailable to them at the time - that's how hindsight works you know - and its a ridiculously superficial assessment as well.

User avatar
Guaporense
Banned
Posts: 1866
Joined: 07 Oct 2009, 03:35
Location: USA

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#71

Post by Guaporense » 22 Jan 2015, 03:55

RichTO90 wrote:
Guaporense wrote:From were this 11.12 million figure comes from, what's the composition? All figures I know regarding the size of the wehrmacht but it at 9.5-9.1 million in 1943-1944, from multiple sources. I believe this 11 million figure includes civilian administrative employees of the military.

4.7 million is what?
I can't help it if you use multiple defective sources and fail to understand what they tell you.

Generalmajor Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, MS #P-005 Personnel and Administration, Appendix 1:

Peak Wehrmacht strength was 1944: 12,240,000, but peak ground forces strength as a component of the Wehrmacht was 1943. That year, Wehrmacht strength was 11,120,000, comprised of 4,250,000 Feldheer and 450,000 Waffen-SS. The remainder was 2,300,000 in the Ersatzheer (since they aren't frontline combat troops I can't imagine you would count them), 1,700,000 in the Luftwaffe, 780,000 in the Kriegmarine, 100,000 in Freiwilligen (I suppose you might count them), and 1,700,000 in OT, NSKK, and other paramilitary units.
So the apparent difference can be explained by you including these paramilitary units in your figure. You are you counting them?
You perceive a lack of logic because you did not understand the logic. Which proves that you did not understand it.
No, I understood your lack of logic quite well thank you.
Try to prove it. :)
Why yes, it was a remarkable feat, but you seem strangely unaware how it came about. It was because the Soviets were able to maximize their resources on a single land front, where naval forces were unimportant. So compared to the Germans 703 major vessels built 1942-1944 the Soviets built 703.
German expenditures on naval vessels were ca. 8 billion RM, out of total military outlays of ca. 500 billion RM.
But twice the number of tanks the Germans built. It was due to single-minded allocations of manpower.
It was because they allocated a much larger proportion of their resources to producing tanks than the Germans did. Also in general for ground military equipment, the proportion of the 8 million tons of Soviet steel they had yearly was much larger than Germany's 32-35 million in 1942-1943. The Wehrmacht purchased only 75 million RM of tanks and SP guns monthly in the 3rd quarter of 1943, compared to total purchases from metalworking industries of 3,044 million RM monthly, 1.8 billion consisted of armaments. And total military expenditures were 9.5 billion RM monthly in 1943, tanks and SP guns were less than 1% of these, 2.5% of total expenditures from output of metalworking industry and 4% of total armament expenditures.
In 1943, compared to the 11.12-million in the Wehrmacht, the Soviets were barely superior - 11.9-million in total. But of those, about 6.25-million were allocated to the ground forces at the front...versus less than 2.8-million German ground forces. So where were the rest of the German armed forces? In 1943, roughly 73.6% of Soviet GNP was allocated to defense, government, and security. And they could allocate virtually all of that to the war front. The Germans were less single-minded, but still exceeded the other Allies in their commitment...but where else did they have to allocate their strength?

And yes, you can use hindsight to claim that the German allocation to the U-Boat war, the surface navy, the air forces, was all wasteful...except that is a facile assessment based upon knowledge unavailable to them at the time - that's how hindsight works you know - and its a ridiculously superficial assessment as well.
Well, discounting 1.7 million paramilitary personnel, it's 9.42 million, to 2.8/9.42 = 30%, of the Werhmacht were ground forces in the Eastern front, for the USSR it was 6.25/11.9 = 52.5%, so that's 57% of relative manpower allocation, in 1943. The bulk of Germany's resources were allocated against the USSR from 1941 to mid 1944, and the USSR managed to take the strategic initiative by mid 1943, when lend lease help was still relatively small.

Even then, in 1942-1943, the USSR, with nearly 40% of their population under occupation, losing 5 men to each casualty inflicted in the opposing side, with a fraction of Germany's industrial resources, even if the western allies made Germany commit a substantial portion of their current manpower to defending Western Europe, it is still a incredible feat of resistance. It's was a situation like Germany in 1944-45, as if Germany in 1944-45, would have managed to drive the Western Allies and the USSR back and survived the onslaught of 3 major powers. Similarly, Japan drawn a much smaller proportion of US resources than the USSR did for Germany, but Japan was easily defeated.

The USSR managed to compensate for their material inferiority with much greater ability to replace casualties (even in proportion to labor force size, USSR's casualties were much higher than Germany even in 1944, even if we include the Western and Italian fronts for Germany), like North Vietnam in the Vietnam War (the US couldn't replace many losses for political reasons).
"In tactics, as in strategy, superiority in numbers is the most common element of victory." - Carl von Clausewitz

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10056
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#72

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 22 Jan 2015, 05:46

Sid Guttridge wrote:Hi Carl,

I guess if one cannot discern the aiming points from the actual fall of bombs, the bombing cannot have been very accurate.

The only heavy concentration seems to be at Bitterne Manor, on the river foreshore. Was this the Supermarine works, one wonders?

Cheers,

Sid.
Carl Schwamberger wrote: Either bombing was not accurate, or the aim points were multiple and dispersed. Either way you can't judge accurately without knowing the aim points.

I'v not had time to review any specific attacks. scattered across my shelves is some information of accuracy for specific attacks. I've studied the subject intermitantly. From memory I can categorically say some of the statistics for USAAF accuracy cited in this thread are badly distorted. They may be accurate for a subset of the overall bombing in the ETO but dont reflect in themselves all or even a large part of the bombing. In this I'm not challenging the numbers given here, but wondering why there is such a gross difference between accuracy of dispersion from the aim point/target in some cases and tight groupings in others.
Phylo wrote:...

It might be worth taking a sample number of well-documented raids...and any available pre-and post-raid aerial photographs...and check if the "tight grouping" came from any particular aircraft type ;)
That would be easy enough from the books I have, but the 'sample is probablly not broad enough to draw many conclusions.

RichTO90
Member
Posts: 4238
Joined: 22 Dec 2003, 19:03

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#73

Post by RichTO90 » 22 Jan 2015, 16:30

Guaporense wrote:So the apparent difference can be explained by you including these paramilitary units in your figure. You are you counting them?
Uh, no, the apparent difference can be explained by the GERMANS including these paramilitary units in THEIR figure. THEY counted them. :roll:

Try to understand. The Wehrmacht included elements that other nation's included as part of their military. The NSKK filled the same role that in the U.S. Army was filled by the Quartermaster Corps; Organization Todt filled the same role occupied by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and USN SEABEA's. Or, to look at it another way, the U.S. Army had a fractional commitment to a "Replacement Army" that in the Wehrmacht occupied 2.3-million of an "army" total strength of 7-million.
Try to prove it. :)
Your "logic" is to use either unsupported figures or manipulated figures to fit your conclusion.
German expenditures on naval vessels were ca. 8 billion RM, out of total military outlays of ca. 500 billion RM.
Source please?

BTW, to answer your question - no, in fact if you - or I - am asked for a source for a factual statement it is our responsibility to provide it under the rules of this forum. Most readers here realize that I am quite able to support my statements of fact with sources, however, I am not so sure the same is true for you?
It was because they allocated a much larger proportion of their resources to producing tanks than the Germans did. Also in general for ground military equipment, the proportion of the 8 million tons of Soviet steel they had yearly was much larger than Germany's 32-35 million in 1942-1943. The Wehrmacht purchased only 75 million RM of tanks and SP guns monthly in the 3rd quarter of 1943, compared to total purchases from metalworking industries of 3,044 million RM monthly, 1.8 billion consisted of armaments. And total military expenditures were 9.5 billion RM monthly in 1943, tanks and SP guns were less than 1% of these, 2.5% of total expenditures from output of metalworking industry and 4% of total armament expenditures.
Gee, I wonder where the rest went?
Well, discounting 1.7 million paramilitary personnel, it's 9.42 million, to 2.8/9.42 = 30%, of the Werhmacht were ground forces in the Eastern front, for the USSR it was 6.25/11.9 = 52.5%, so that's 57% of relative manpower allocation, in 1943. The bulk of Germany's resources were allocated against the USSR from 1941 to mid 1944, and the USSR managed to take the strategic initiative by mid 1943, when lend lease help was still relatively small.
I am curious what you think the composition of that 2.8-million commitment was? Do you know what the composition of the "Army" in the East typically was? Do you understand how integral those "paramilitary personnel" were to operations?
Even then, in 1942-1943, the USSR, with nearly 40% of their population under occupation, losing 5 men to each casualty inflicted in the opposing side, with a fraction of Germany's industrial resources, even if the western allies made Germany commit a substantial portion of their current manpower to defending Western Europe, it is still a incredible feat of resistance. It's was a situation like Germany in 1944-45, as if Germany in 1944-45, would have managed to drive the Western Allies and the USSR back and survived the onslaught of 3 major powers. Similarly, Japan drawn a much smaller proportion of US resources than the USSR did for Germany, but Japan was easily defeated.
Er, no, it wasn't that similar a situation at all. The Soviet force generation capability during 1941-1943 was at its peak; Germany's in 1944-1945 was at its nadir.
The USSR managed to compensate for their material inferiority with much greater ability to replace casualties (even in proportion to labor force size, USSR's casualties were much higher than Germany even in 1944, even if we include the Western and Italian fronts for Germany),
So they compensated for material inferiority with personnel superiority? So they didn't exceed German aircraft, tank, and artillery production?

Mil-tech Bard
Member
Posts: 678
Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#74

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 03 Feb 2015, 17:33

In the discussion of the effectiveness of Allied Strategic bombers, recall that to hit one 60 ft. x 100 ft. target in WWII required 1500 B-17 sorties carrying nine thousand 250 lb bombs because they had a circular error probability of 3300 feet. [1]

Circular error probability is defined as 50% within the CEP circle around the target and 50% landing somewhere else outside it.

That level of performance assumed,
1) Good daylight visibility and
2) Good target contrast from the background to achieve a good aim point.

Radar methods, as shown below, were less accurate.

Electronic navigation methods like OBOE and SHORAN (Not shown) were typically as or more accurate than visual methods as they could target low contrast aim points, given both good maps and recent, high quality, aerial photographs.
Average Bombing Errors - 1.gif
[1] "Effects-Based Operations" Col Gary Crowder, Chief, Strategy, Concepts and Doctrine Air Combat Command. See Document Link:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod ... 85-024.pdf

Mil-tech Bard
Member
Posts: 678
Joined: 06 Jan 2010, 16:50

Re: Effectiveness of Allied Strategic Bombing

#75

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 03 Feb 2015, 17:50

The following is the accuracy of B-29 bombers in attacking Japanese targets with Radar in 1944-45.

RADAR IN WORLD WAR II
BY HENRY E. GUERLAC
PG. 1054

Table III. AN/APQ-7 and AN/APQ-13 bombing results.

Estimated radius of circle which contains 50% of aimings

APQ-7 against coastal oil targets -- 3000 ft.
APQ-13 against coastal cities -- 4000 ft.
APQ-13 against coastal inland cities 5500 ft.

Note that the term is "... which contains 50% of aimings" not "circular error probability."

There is a reason that 20th Air Force was moving to both low level incendiary and lead bomber-navigator with "Crawfish" radio-remote bomb toggling of whole formations at war's end.

Post Reply

Return to “WW2 in Western Europe & the Atlantic”