Goodwood: choice of ground

[Gooner1]

The German defenses weren't that significantly different either, but was reversed in content. GOODWOOD was a badly depleted infantry division in the frontline supported by a weak Panzer division in second line. COBRA was a badly depleted Panzer division in front line supported by a weak infantry division in second line.

The German defences for Cobra weren't significantly different to that at Goodwood, do you mean by ratio to the attackers or by layout and depth or both?
My understanding is that the badly depleted infantry division in the front line for Goodwood was supported by two weak Panzer divisions not one.

[RichTO90]

The German defences for Cobra weren't significantly different to that at Goodwood, do you mean by ratio to the attackers or by layout and depth or both?
My understanding is that the badly depleted infantry division in the front line for Goodwood was supported by two weak Panzer divisions not one.

Hey Gooner,

British VIII Corps attack in GOODWOOD struck 16. Inf.-Div. (LW), which was already pretty badly depleted, perhaps 9,000 out of 12,000 strong, reinforced by Becker's Hodge-Podge battalion and backed by 21. Pz.Div. The presence and intervention of various reinforcing elements comprised of KG from various divisions, mostly 1. and 12. SS, complicates things, but most of those did not play a role until late on 18 July when the British effort was already petering out. To the west, defending against the separate attack by Canadian II Corps, were 272. Inf.-Div. in the front line (which pretty much got savaged by the Canadians, who nearly wrecked the newly arrived division), backed by 1. SS Pz.Div.

U.S. VII Corps attack struck Lehr, reinforced by KG Heinz and 5. FJR, which was backed up 353. Inf.-Div. and various other odds and sods. The real difference was that the 7. Armee had its infantry elements badly chewed up in June and had already committed most of their mobile troops, 2. SS Pz.-Div., 17. SS Pz.Gren.-Div., and Lehr to hold the line while attempting to reconstitute the infantry. Panzergruppe West had just received 272. Inf.-Div. as a reinforcement and managed to stick it in the line, enabling them to withdraw and reconstitute the Panzers.

[Gooner1]

The presence and intervention of various reinforcing elements comprised of KG from various divisions, mostly 1. and 12. SS, complicates things, but most of those did not play a role until late on 18 July when the British effort was already petering out.

To be fair, Br. VIII Corps took more ground on the first day of Goodwood than U.S. VII Corps did the first day of Cobra so those reinforcements were probably very important to the petering out of the offensive ..

Still, as we know, Goodwood was never intended to be the break-out operation.

[RichTO90]

To be fair, Br. VIII Corps took more ground on the first day of Goodwood than U.S. VII Corps did the first day of Cobra so those reinforcements were probably very important to the petering out of the offensive ..

Yes...but. The intervention of the Panzers of 12. SS in the late afternoon of 18 July only put the quietus on an offensive that was already stalled. All that ground gained was just...ground gained. More important than the ground though was the destruction wrought on 16. and 272. Inf.-Div., which fixed the 1. and 12. SS even more firmly to the vicinity and I suspect led to the decision to commit 116. Panzer behind Panzergruppe West as HG reserve. That led to it taking an inordinate amount of time to get to the site of the COBRA breakthrough.

However, again, the two were very different in conception, planning, and outcome.

Still, as we know, Goodwood was never intended to be the break-out operation.

Actually it is more accurate to say that it was never planned to be the break-out operation, but all were in fact intended to be.

[Sheldrake]

Rich90 Gosh you are a very argumentative chap and perhaps a little quick to wave the stars and stripes. .

Sure there are differences, but in the big scheme of things the similarities are very striking in the use of heavy bombers for close air support

Your description of the differences in force strengths is a little partisan.

It plays down both the scale of the German defences and the scale and duration of the British/Canadian attack. The German situation maps here http://wwii-photos-maps.com/home_page_019.htm show

1. three Panzer divisions 1 SS 12 SS and 21 Pz a heavy tank battalion and parts of three infantry divisions opposing the VIII attack. (one 16 Lw has been eliminated by the attack.)
2) British/Canadian attacks from 19th to-21st which all form part of Op Goodwood/Atlantic.
Off my attachment but part of the same map are

18 July situation m,ap Caen sector.pdf

(452.51 KiB) Downloaded 48 times

3) attacks by XII Corps on II SS Pz Corps, the tail end of Op Greenline which kept two more SS panzer divisions busy.

I am sure you are right to draw an equivalence with 1st ASrmy operations. I am not trying top prove that the British were better. I suspect that had the allied armies positions in Normandy been reversed the Germans would have still focused on Caen and the allied breakout would have occurred in the West.

[RichTO90]

Rich90 Gosh you are a very argumentative chap and perhaps a little quick to wave the stars and stripes. .

I'm not waving the stars and stripes, I'm waving the facts. Which are always an excellent thing to argue about whether you're an argumentative chap or not.

Sure there are differences, but in the big scheme of things the similarities are very striking in the use of heavy bombers for close air support

I see...so then GOODWOOD, COBRA, TOTALISE, TRACTABLE, WELLHIT, WIDGEON, QUEEN, and BUCKLAND were all similar because of the striking use of heavy bombers for close air support? Which means of course that because of the striking similarity between an orange and a basketball they must be the same?

Your description of the differences in force strengths is a little partisan.

It plays down both the scale of the German defences and the scale and duration of the British/Canadian attack. The German situation maps here

Thank you, but I know the German situation maps very well. That is the Lage from the afternoon and depicts the German reaction to the initial break in and not the dispositions when the attack was executed. If you look at the same map for the same time on 25 July you will note that the VII Corps attack is being countered by similar reserve movements, the battlegroup of DR, the reserve 353. Inf.-Div., 15. FJR., and KG Heinz all directed at the breakthrough.

1. three Panzer divisions 1 SS 12 SS and 21 Pz a heavy tank battalion and parts of three infantry divisions opposing the VIII attack. (one 16 Lw has been eliminated by the attack.)

Er, no. 21. Pz.-Div. was already there and already mentioned, the Tigers were there from the start as well and did precious little but dig themselves out of bomb craters for most of the morning. 12. SS is moving from a reserve position...the only part engaged that day IIRC were elements of the Panther battalion, while 1. SS made a similar effort from the SW. Neither were very material to stalling the British attack on 18 July. The infantry engaged by VIII Corps was 16. Inf.-Div. (LW). 272. Inf.-Div. to the west was engaged by the Canadians, while the "third" division was a single battalion of 346. Inf.-Div. that engaged in a rather Quixotic attack on [EDIT] 3 British ID rather than 51 Highland ID, sorry [/EDIT].

2) British/Canadian attacks from 19th to-21st which all form part of Op Goodwood/Atlantic.

ATLANTIC was the Canadian operation by II Canadian Corps, GOODWOOD was the British operation. Different objectives. Different forces.

Off my attachment but part of the same map are
3) attacks by XII Corps on II SS Pz Corps, the tail end of Op Greenline which kept two more SS panzer divisions busy.

So you've just decided to move the goalposts and simply pretend that all British Second Army operations between 18 and 21 July were "GOODWOOD"? Seriously? I suppose then COBRA includes the operations by VIII Corps and V Corps as well?

I am sure you are right to draw an equivalence with 1st ASrmy operations. I am not trying top prove that the British were better.

I was not drawing any such equivalence. That is a strawman newly created by you. I described the operations of U.S. VII Corps compared to those of British VIII Corps. COBRA and GOODWOOD. It is you that is now trying to make it an army-level comparison. Nor did the point I made have anything to do with who was "better", it was to point out the flaws in your comparison.

I suspect that had the allied armies positions in Normandy been reversed the Germans would have still focused on Caen and the allied breakout would have occurred in the West.

Indeed, but then I was never arguing anything different.

Cheers!

[Gooner1]

Yes...but. The intervention of the Panzers of 12. SS in the late afternoon of 18 July only put the quietus on an offensive that was already stalled. All that ground gained was just...ground gained.

Which makes elements of 3 PzD involved in the first day!

More important than the ground though was the destruction wrought on 16. and 272. Inf.-Div., which fixed the 1. and 12. SS even more firmly to the vicinity and I suspect led to the decision to commit 116. Panzer behind Panzergruppe West as HG reserve. That led to it taking an inordinate amount of time to get to the site of the COBRA breakthrough.

116th PzD was already destined for the area before Goodwood? Monty thought so IIRC. Probably of greater benefit for Cobra was the move of 2nd Panzer eastwards.

Actually it is more accurate to say that it was never planned to be the break-out operation, but all were in fact intended to be.

[/quote]

I don't think any planning documents actually used the word 'breakout'? The geographical ambitions for Goodwood and indeed for Second British Army were not great. they were for First US Army.

[RichTO90]

Which makes elements of 3 PzD involved in the first day!

Yep. Elements, not whole divisions. All of 21. Panzer (less minor detachments). KG Pieper of 1. SS Panzer (one mixed tank battalion and the SPW battalion) committed against GAD late in the afternoon and early evening. Ditto KG Wuensche and Waldmueller of 12. SS (likely equivalent to about the same) committed late in the afternoon and early evening. Similar commitments were made against COBRA, elements of DR, 2. Panzer, and then 116. Panzer, but arrived later, on the morning and afternoon of the second day at earliest (28 July for the 116.).

116th PzD was already destined for the area before Goodwood? Monty thought so IIRC. Probably of greater benefit for Cobra was the move of 2nd Panzer eastwards.

Unfortunately almost all my files and books remain packed as we are in a holding pattern on selling our house and moving so I have trouble confirming that. The decision regarding the move of 116. Panzer west of the Seine was made the night of 18-19 July, so GOODWOOD indeed drove it. The problem - for the Germans - was that COBRA's effect was felt as the division was closing into position, which meant it began its new movement while already in route, leaving it scattered hither and yon for a while. Elements ended up tangling with the 28th and 29th ID advancing south on 30 July and then of course got roped into the northern prong of LUETTICH.

So Monty's intuition was certainly good. In "Notes on Second Army Operations 6th July-18th July" he remarked:

"3. The enemy.
There are a lot of enemy divisions in the area south-east of Caen:
21 Panzer Division 16 GAF Field Division
1 SS Panzer Division 272 Infantry Division
12 SS Panzer Division
Another one [116 Panzer Division] is coming and will be here this week-end."

I don't think any planning documents actually used the word 'breakout'? The geographical ambitions for Goodwood and indeed for Second British Army were not great. they were for First US Army.

Yeah, the "B" word wasn't used much. The tended to use terms like "break in" and "penetration" and then talked about "exploitation" instead of "breakout". The deepest exploitation assumed in the COBRA plan was for the 2d AD to Cerences as part of the blocking plan to isolate the German forces west of the penetration. At 0300 hours 16 July the 8 Corps Operations instruction was issued. The intention laid down in the instruction was:

"On 18th July, 8 Corps will debouch from the existing bridgehead east of the River Orne with a view to:
(a) Dominating the area Bourgebus-Vimont-Bretteville-sur-Laize."

That certainly is much less inclusive than the COBRA plan, envisaging an exploitation perhaps 10 to 15 kilometers at max...unless you include Monty's and Dempsey's remarks about armoured cars "cracking about" as far as Falaise.

Cheers!

[Gooner1]

Yep. Elements, not whole divisions. All of 21. Panzer (less minor detachments). KG Pieper of 1. SS Panzer (one mixed tank battalion and the SPW battalion) committed against GAD late in the afternoon and early evening. Ditto KG Wuensche and Waldmueller of 12. SS (likely equivalent to about the same) committed late in the afternoon and early evening. Similar commitments were made against COBRA, elements of DR, 2. Panzer, and then 116. Panzer, but arrived later, on the morning and afternoon of the second day at earliest (28 July for the 116.).

I always thought the defenders at Cobra were much weaker - below the critical level needed to hold the front and ergo (a number crunch analysis of the defenders at Cobra and Goodwood is most required!)
Come to think of it I really know bugger-all on the US side, any volumes you'd recommend?

Yeah, the "B" word wasn't used much. The tended to use terms like "break in" and "penetration" and then talked about "exploitation" instead of "breakout". The deepest exploitation assumed in the COBRA plan was for the 2d AD to Cerences as part of the blocking plan to isolate the German forces west of the penetration. At 0300 hours 16 July the 8 Corps Operations instruction was issued. The intention laid down in the instruction was:

"On 18th July, 8 Corps will debouch from the existing bridgehead east of the River Orne with a view to:
(a) Dominating the area Bourgebus-Vimont-Bretteville-sur-Laize."

That certainly is much less inclusive than the COBRA plan, envisaging an exploitation perhaps 10 to 15 kilometers at max...unless you include Monty's and Dempsey's remarks about armoured cars "cracking about" as far as Falaise.

Cheers!

Actually I was thinking back to the Army Group Commander's earlier directive(s) - Caen and Villers Bocage are mentioned for British Second Army, Rennes, Le Mans and Alencon for First US Army

[RichTO90]

I always thought the defenders at Cobra were much weaker - below the critical level needed to hold the front and ergo (a number crunch analysis of the defenders at Cobra and Goodwood is most required!)
Come to think of it I really know bugger-all on the US side, any volumes you'd recommend?

I've never known what the "critical level to hold the front" in any particular engagement was...it seems to be a moving target.

Anyway, one of these days I'll go back and recreate the missing parts of my GOODWOOD analysis from 13-odd years ago that vaporized when I suffered a disc crash and then do the comparable study for COBRA I've never had a chance to finish. All in my copious free time.

Actually I was thinking back to the Army Group Commander's earlier directive(s) - Caen and Villers Bocage are mentioned for British Second Army, Rennes, Le Mans and Alencon for First US Army

That was some expansive thinking...

BTW, just checked Hinsley and the evidence from ULTRA was that the bulk of 12. SS didn't arrive from its reserve areas until the morning of 19 July. It also confirms the minimal intervention by 1. SS on the evening of 18 July, but I still seem to remember that elements of the Panther battalion of 12. SS was engaged late on 18 July...I may be mixing 1. and 12. SS?

Cheers!

[RichTO90]

BTW, WRT the "similarity" of the bombing program for GOODWOOD and COBRA, I was able to do some checking to confirm their dissimilarity. The GOODWOOD heavy and medium bomber program commenced at 0615 with heavy bombers targeting three distinct and separated target areas, was followed at 0700 by medium bombers striking five targets (four essentially contiguous and the last separate), and finally the second heavy bomber strike at 0830 targeting three separate areas. The GOODWOOD target areas were spread over about a ten by ten mile (c. 17,000 by 17,000 yard area) COBRA concentrated all heavy and medium bombers within the same 7,000 by 2,500 yard target area.

[Kingfish]

BTW, just checked Hinsley and the evidence from ULTRA was that the bulk of 12. SS didn't arrive from its reserve areas until the morning of 19 July. It also confirms the minimal intervention by 1. SS on the evening of 18 July, but I still seem to remember that elements of the Panther battalion of 12. SS was engaged late on 18 July...I may be mixing 1. and 12. SS?

I'm almost certain they were 1st SS Panthers.

[RichTO90]

I'm almost certain they were 1st SS Panthers.

That's what I remember too, but my copy of Daglish, who went into the German unit identifications pretty well, is packed away. I do have quite a few of the I and PW reports for the period, if I get a chance I'll go through those and see what they might tell us. Hinsley has some time of arrivals too, so I'll look there again.

[Attrition]

~~~~~Actually it is more accurate to say that it was never planned to be the break-out operation, but all were in fact intended to be.~~~~~

Greetings Rich, it's been a while. I think this puts it rather well. French and British offensives 1915-1918 tended to have provision for exploitation, on the assumption that each offensive might be the one where the German army collapsed. I can't imagine Monty fighting an attrition campaign, with no plans or organisation ready for when the Germans folded.