narrow thrust proposal

[steverodgers801]

One thing I have never understood about the Monty's narrow thrust proposal is did he really think Marshall and Roosevelt would approve the placing of two thirds or so of the US army in France in inactive status?? The political fall out from the American public would be enormous. For two years Britain pleaded for American aid and now its we don't need those troops. Marshall had to threaten not sending any troops to Europe if the invasion of France was not undertaken. The other part Im not sure Monty considered is what would prevent the Germans from taking troops from the inactive part of the front and transferring them to the North.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The usual view is Monty was a bit blind to political considerations at that point. He had a PoV of Allied and German strengths, weaknesses, & other conditions at the time and was exclusively focused on those in a strictly military or operational context. I'll leave it to others to debate the political thinking a commander at Montys level needed to be doing in September 1944.

The other part I'm not sure Monty considered is what would prevent the Germans from taking troops from the inactive part of the front and transferring them to the North.

Like a lot of others in August-September 1944 Monty did not think the Germans had many "troops" to transfer from one front to another. It was understood the Germans had lost over half a million men killed, maimed, or captured in France & Belgium in eleven weeks. Something of the nature of the enemy losses in the east sicen June was understood as well. It was assumed there were few reserves left, and the line strength was poor. Call it unwarranted optimism, or victory disease, but there was also the problem of the Allied intelligence services becoming a couple steps behind the situation. Aside from Enigma decrypts they did not have a good picture of the German replacement system or reserves.

[Michael Kenny]

The political fall out from the American public would be enormous

Why?

[Aber]

One thing I have never understood about the Monty's narrow thrust proposal is did he really think Marshall and Roosevelt would approve the placing of two thirds or so of the US army in France in inactive status?.

Can you be more precise on date, as the original 'narrow thrust proposal' in late August would have included most of the U.S. Army, with the key role of heading to the AAchen Gap given to US 1st Army.

[steverodgers801]

What is the point of sending troops to Europe if they will be idle since they can be used in the Pacific. found this article find it fascinating. The author does give criticism of Ike but he points out there was no way to separate the job of military commander and politician in a coalition army. HE also says that Monty's plan was not feasible logistically due to the lack of Antwerp's capacity. http://www.armchairgeneral.com/a-linger ... rategy.htm

[Tom from Cornwall]

One thing I have never understood is why people start a thread but then don't read the replies or enter into a debate!

Is this particular to AHF or common across other forums as well?

Regards

Tom

[ChristopherPerrien]

The other part Im not sure Monty considered is what would prevent the Germans from taking troops from the inactive part of the front and transferring them to the North.

A third part could have been the British Army mutinying, as the French Army did in 1917.

[Sheldrake]

The other part Im not sure Monty considered is what would prevent the Germans from taking troops from the inactive part of the front and transferring them to the North.

A third part could have been the British Army mutinying, as the French Army did in 1917.

????? where has that come from?

Montgomery was blind to political strategic issues such as whether it was politically acceptable for him to be the land commander. All he could see was the virtues of his own arguments and Eisenhower's shortcomings. When pushed Montgomery did offer to serve under Bradley.

Neither Eisenhower not Montgomery shone in mid August. Both seem to have been taken by surprise by the collapse of the Germans in France. The narrow front option did have the virtue of concentrating forces, but has been argued in "Ruckzuge" the folly was to switch to geographic objectives rather than the destruction of the German army in the west, which could have been caught had the allies focused on closing the escape routes of army group G and the 15th Army. Without the troops there could have been no westwall defences.

[Aber]

HE also says that Monty's plan was not feasible logistically due to the lack of Antwerp's capacity. http://www.armchairgeneral.com/a-linger ... rategy.htm

WHICH plan?

That article manages to conflate different arguments about different plans at different times; which point are you trying to make?

[Tom from Cornwall]

Another thing I don't understand is the inference that US public opinion (whatever that means) would have been disappointed if the war had ended in 1944! I would think the vast majority, especially those with sons, brothers, husbands, etc, in the forces would have been mighty relieved to see them come home without fighting.

Regards

Tom

[Michael Kenny]

One thing I have never understood is why people start a thread but then don't read the replies or enter into a debate!

Is this particular to AHF or common across other forums as well?

It is the anti-Monty hobby horse of the thread starter

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1904289

and he has posted the exact same thing on another forum.

[Carl Schwamberger]

One thing I have never understood is why people start a thread but then don't read the replies or enter into a debate!

Is this particular to AHF or common across other forums as well?

It is the anti-Monty hobby horse of the thread starter

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1904289

and he has posted the exact same thing on another forum.

I did not even note the person who wrote the OP & went straight into a discussion. I feel dirty somehow

[RichTO90]

Another thing I don't understand is the inference that US public opinion (whatever that means) would have been disappointed if the war had ended in 1944! I would think the vast majority, especially those with sons, brothers, husbands, etc, in the forces would have been mighty relieved to see them come home without fighting.

Perhaps because the inference is sheer tosh?

Will someone go along to the US archives and produce some documentary evidence that shows the logistic position of 12th Army Group during the first three weeks in September 1944? Then we can discuss whether any of the US operations during the period were sensible!

I'm not sure why you want to reinvent the wheel so badly Tom? Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume II, pp. 3-8 lays things out quite succinctly. For 12th Army Group as of D+90, it was supporting 16 divisions 150 miles beyond the Seine, when the planning expectation was 12 divisions on the Seine. Note also pp. 8-9, which lays out the assessment of requirements for a Third Army advance similar to that proposed for Second British Army...10-12 divisions moving, but with the requirement that all 24-odd other allied divisions be grounded.

Various of the General Board reports also lay things out pretty well, especially with regards to the transportation, depot, and port situation.

[phaze]

One thing I have never understood about the Monty's narrow thrust proposal is did he really think Marshall and Roosevelt would approve the placing of two thirds or so of the US army in France in inactive status?? The political fall out from the American public would be enormous. For two years Britain pleaded for American aid and now its we don't need those troops. Marshall had to threaten not sending any troops to Europe if the invasion of France was not undertaken. The other part Im not sure Monty considered is what would prevent the Germans from taking troops from the inactive part of the front and transferring them to the North.

1. What divisions are you counting here exactly ? The 9 or 6 divisions of 3rd Army don't constitute 2/3 of US army. I imagine 6th Army Group would be left to their own devices as their supply can't be used for the northern thrust.

2. Monty was leaving ~1/3 of his own forces in Pas de Calais anyway.

3. What prevented Germany from transferring troops from rest of France, Norway, Denmark to Normandy ? It is the defenders that need to defend everything. And before the beginning of September they would have very hazy orientation on where, which allied troops are. Concentrating your forces against the part of defensive line, is like bread and butter of operational art. Why do Germans and Soviets get praised when they do this but Monty gets lambasted escapes me.

The narrow front option did have the virtue of concentrating forces, but has been argued in "Ruckzuge" the folly was to switch to geographic objectives rather than the destruction of the German army in the west, which could have been caught had the allies focused on closing the escape routes of army group G and the 15th Army. Without the troops there could have been no westwall defences.

TBH I don't see how those two goals could have been realistically accomplished. It would require Patton to get to the Swiss border and I think at a pace much quicker then he has shown. To encircle 15th Army Monty would have to get to Hague. Both of those struck me as impossible tasks.

[OpanaPointer]

Another thing I don't understand is the inference that US public opinion (whatever that means) would have been disappointed if the war had ended in 1944! I would think the vast majority, especially those with sons, brothers, husbands, etc, in the forces would have been mighty relieved to see them come home without fighting.

Regards

Tom

The political fall out from the American public would be enormous

Why?

"Being in on the kill" was important for the home front.