TF Ezell and Bastogne

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi,

I'm reading John Nelson Rickard's "Advance and Destroy: Patton as Commander in the Bulge" and have come across mention of Task Force Ezell (one coy 8th Tank Bn, one coy 10th Armd Inf Bn and a Bty of 22nd Armd Field Arty Bn all from CCB, 4th Armored Division) which entered Bastogne on the Neufchateau road at about noon on 20 December 1944 and then was ordered to withdraw again at 1400 and rejoin the division at it's assembly area at Arlon. The subsequent 4th Armored Division drive to Bastogne then began on 22 December and in the meantime (later on 20 Dec?) the road had been cut by 5 FJ Division, and it eventually took five days for 3rd Army to relieve Bastogne.

Rickard does discuss possible alternative courses of action and suggests possible explanations for the unwillingness to commit CCB in full on 20 December. Was this one time when Patton took counsel of his fears or simply a question of the uncertainty facing 3rd Army as it moved north? Rickard suggests that Patton was acting under a tightly controlled plan from Bradley and SHAEF, but even so it certainly doesn't appear a characteristic Patton decision. In other campaigns he seems happy to push the boundaries of his instructions. Are there any other analyses that deal with this particular aspect of 3rd Army operations?

Regards

Tom

[Sheldrake]

You could try ARMOR AT BASTOGNE 1948-49 http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/comp ... 498/rec/19
This looks at the operations of CCB 10 AD and 4 AD in some detail. This is what it has to say about the attachment of TF Ezell

The 4th Armored Division was fortunate in being employed as a unit, an advantage not enjoyed by the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions. .At first CCB of the 4th Armored was attached to VIII Corps and disposed separately north east of the'''corps headquarters VIII Corps also ordered a tank-infantry-artiilery task force to proceed into BASTOGNE to,aid the lOlst Airborne Division. General Dager, the commander of CCB, was opposed to this
move as he felt CCB was being ,frittered away in small pieces. 'Then the Combat Command reverted to Division control under III. Corps, the Division was reassembled as a united force. .This was fortunate as the attack to relieve BASTOGNE could hardly have been executed by anything'less than the entire division.

So the armored corps professionals thought their leadership did the right thing. It is hard to see how CCB 4 ADS would have been more use inside the Bastogne Duck egg than outside as an integral part of an armored Division

[Tom from Cornwall]

Sheldrake,

Thanks for the link - I'll have a look at that over the next few days.

It is hard to see how CCB 4 AD would have been more use inside the Bastogne Duck egg than outside as an integral part of an armored Division

I think what has been suggested is that as the road was still clear during the afternoon of 20 December, the whole of 4 Armored Division could have been moved up without resistance either into Bastogne or more likely to form a reserve for VIII Corps just to the south-west and used to counterattack the rather weak forces that were to form the southern pincer that actually created the "Duck Egg". In this case, it is suggested that Bastogne would never have been cut-off.

I'll see if there are any AARs that spell out what CCB and the rest of the Division were actually doing that day.

Regards

Tom

[Sheldrake]

Sheldrake,

Thanks for the link - I'll have a look at that over the next few days.

It is hard to see how CCB 4 AD would have been more use inside the Bastogne Duck egg than outside as an integral part of an armored Division

I think what has been suggested is that as the road was still clear during the afternoon of 20 December, the whole of 4 Armored Division could have been moved up without resistance either into Bastogne or more likely to form a reserve for VIII Corps just to the south-west and used to counterattack the rather weak forces that were to form the southern pincer that actually created the "Duck Egg". In this case, it is suggested that Bastogne would never have been cut-off.

I'll see if there are any AARs that spell out what CCB and the rest of the Division were actually doing that day.

Regards

Tom

Tom,

ARMOR AT BASTOGNE says that 4 AD had just driven 160 miles in 24 hours over Winter roads. An Armoured Division had around 2,000 -2,500 vehicles which took up 40 - 50 km with 50 vehicles per km. Time past the post for a division plus the drive might be a minimum of C 2.5-3.5 hours extra on top of the long drive. This assumes that they made a non tactical move without no halts or security screens and a big risk.

I also suspect that the operational logic behind the 4 AD move was not to "relieve Bastogne at all costs" but to "destroy Army Group B by a counterstroke from the South" The easiest way to relieve the paratroops was not to have put them there in the first place. The Bastogne Garrison had been reinforced with armour from two CC from different divisions and field artillery and would outnumber its besiegers.

I doubt if 4 AD would have achieved much as an addition to the garrison. Furthermore while paratroops are used to operating surrounded, armoured Divisions need a supply line for fuel and ammunition. 7 AD had these problems at St Vith and fought their battle in a very different way to 101 AB.

Nor was 4 AD the right organisation to defend a long single road South either. Stringing this infantry light formation out along a road would be the one way that it might have lost to infiltrating Fallschirmjaeger. Its an armoured Division and delivers fightign power through momentum not static defence.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Sheldrake,

Thanks for the reply.

According to Rickard, Middleton had asked specifically if he could use CCB, 4 Armored Division to "bolster the defense of Bastogne". It seems that during the night of December 18, Bradley had ordered the 3rd Army Chief of Staff to send a combat command north immediately and told Middleton that this reinforcement could be expected. Additionally, "Patton informed Middleton on the night of December 19 that a combat command from Gaffey's [4th Armored] division was on its way to Bastogne to be attached to the 101st Airborne Division..."

I'm not actually sure that there was such a "long road south" anyway, as the whole of CCB was actually only 9 miles south of Bastogne for a whole day, before Patton ordered it to withdraw all the way to Arlon. This is a particularly confusing period and perhaps that explains the classic order, counter-order, disorder aspect of the commitment of 4th Armored Division.

Regards

Tom

[Sheldrake]

Tom,

The thrust of the analysis of "Armour in Bastogne" by the post war Armored school was that Middleton was wrong to penny packet armor and that the commanders of 4 AD managed to diplomatically avoid compling with Middletom in an almost British act of insubordination.

[Tom from Cornwall]

I would agree that on principle it appears wrong to "penny packet" armour, but in Middleton's defence he was only given command of CCB - the decision seems to have been Bradley's.

Regards

Tom

[Sheldrake]

I would agree that on principle it appears wrong to "penny packet" armour, but in Middleton's defence he was only given command of CCB - the decision seems to have been Bradley's.

Regards

Tom

So the Army Group commander decides where individual Combat Commands go. A long screwdriver at play!

The (British) Custom is for commanders to be willing to think two down in defence. So Platoon commanders site individual trenches, the battalion commander cares about platoons, the Divisional; commander cares about battalions and the Army commander thinks about divisions. The Army Group Commander should leave the deployment of Combat Commands to the Corps Level at the highest. Bradley was too far removed to make a sensible decision about the best way to deploy 4 AD.