Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

[Gooner1]

I have not said that they were "weaker", and do not think so, on an absolute basis. I think however that a reasonable case can be made that in relative terms (i.e. in comparison to the Allied strength development), the Germans were weaker at the end of July than at the beginning.

Well off you go, but please leave out such silliness as 'no less than 15 divisions would have been needed to replace those casualties'.

No second pincer would have been needed. A (hypothetical) breakthrough in the Caen sector, followed by an advance to the South or South-East would have cut off the German forces to the West of it.

Except a beefed-up 7th Army should, if not stop the thrust, at least delay it long enough for their formations to withdraw. And then the Allied forces are further from where they want to go than when they started and probably tripping over each other.

[Mori]

Well off you go, but please leave out such silliness as 'no less than 15 divisions would have been needed to replace those casualties'.

Please develop.

The underlying assumption by Michate is the bulk of casualties are combat troops, although Cherbourg could include quite some casualties within non-fighting troops. Taking 6000 fighting troops per German division in 1944 is reasonable.

So what's the problem with the maths (100 000 / 6 000 = ca. 15 divisions) ?

[Gooner1]

Please develop.

The underlying assumption by Michate is the bulk of casualties are combat troops, although Cherbourg could include quite some casualties within non-fighting troops. Taking 6000 fighting troops per German division in 1944 is reasonable.

So what's the problem with the maths (100 000 / 6 000 = ca. 15 divisions) ?

Well you partly answered that yourself. Michate's assumption was not that the bulk of casualties were in the fighting troops but that they all were.

It also distracts from the salient fact that whereas German casualties were somewhat weighted on their 7th Army the bulk of the new fresh formations continued to be allocated to 5th Panzer Army.

[Sheldrake]

One feature of C 20th warfare is that the defender has the choice of positional or delaying defence. They can stand and fight, trading casualties in a battle of attrition, or give up some some space. Their call, not the attackers.

Not the attackers?
Isn't it the goal of the attacker to shape the battle in his favor?

The attacker decides when and where to attack and with what, and whether to continue attacking.
The defender decides whether to stay and fight.

If the attack is successful the defender no longer has the luxury of deciding. The attacker has made the decision for them.

Ah. But how do you determine when an attack in WW2 was successful? Only when the defender stopped committing troops to recover ground or evict attackers. The defender has a say. Operationally, the Germans were successfully defending Normandy until 25/26th July, when they no longer had the reserved to plug the gaps in the line.

[Kingfish]

Ah. But how do you determine when an attack in WW2 was successful? Only when the defender stopped committing troops to recover ground or evict attackers.

I think of a successful attack as one that achieves the stated goals, part of which is to deny the defender the opportunity or means for which to reverse that gain.

Technically you are correct that, for example, the German army in the west decided its best to not stand and fight within the Falaise pocket, but can we really say that was their decision, or one that was made for them by the allies?

[Gooner1]

The defender has a say. Operationally, the Germans were successfully defending Normandy until 25/26th July, when they no longer had the reserved to plug the gaps in the line.

Well the Allies fought against the better part of 8 additional divisions before the closing of the Falaise pocket.

And of course:

[Guaporense]

I am firmly of the belief that the Allies under rate their combat effectiveness. On D-Day, 8 Allied divisions were in France (of which 3 are airborne). By June 9th, the four divisions of the British sector were faced with three German Armoured divisions including the 21st Panzer Division, 12ss Panzer DIvision, and Panzer Lehr and multiple infantry and security divisions in various states of effectiveness. Despite the Germans best efforts, they were unable to succeed in their attacks against the Commonwealth formations and failed in their task of pushing the Allies to the sea. Blitzkrieg as developed by the Germans worked well in low density environments, or against untrained troops, but against regulars, or defended positions it failed.

The allies meathod of war, and in particular, I will comment upon the Commonwealths, was material heavy. To an extent it was slower, but it worked when higher level of troop concentrations were present and lines of defence needed to be broken. To an extent I believe it to be less examined by historians as it is less flashy, but it was ultimately a successful way to wage war.

The manpower "slice" of Allied divisions in Normandy was on average 35,000, of German divisions in the Western front ca. June 1944, 13,000. Of course, 4 Allied divisions of ca. 105,000 troops facing 3 German divisions of ca. 40,000 troops, with total air supremacy to booth, would be expected to be able to defend themselves. The fact that Germans were attacking with so little troops demonstrates their desperation and the vast numerical inferiority they were in by mid 1944.

In a sample of 78 engagements from 1943 and 1944 (mostly in Italy) we have that the Western Allies had 1,783,237 men while Germans numbered 940,198 men. Allied casualties numbered 47,743 while German casualties were 48,585. This roughly meant that German troops could inflict the same number of casualties with half the number of soldiers, in other words, German per capita "casualty inflicting power" was twice the Western Allies. This means that 1.4 Western Allies to 1 German would be a fair match using this aggregated data.

Using the individual data from battles we have that the Allies suffered 1.25% daily casualties versus 1.83% of the Germans, since they were outnumbered by 1.9 to one on average the difference in per capita casualty inflicting effectiveness was 247% which means that 1.57 Western Allies would be equivalent to 1 German soldier. Zetterling arrived at 1.5 to 1 with data from Normandy. Versus the Soviets the difference was much bigger, around 870% or a equivalency ratio of 2.9 to 1. CEV figures appear to diverge less than what Dupuy called "score effectiveness". Overall it's pretty clear that Germans enjoyed a large superiority in per capita combat power over the Allies in both Eastern and Western fronts and that the difference between 1940-1941 and 1944 was obviously due to the fact that in 1940-41 the Allies did not enjoy large numerical superiority against the Germans and so naturally lost engagements against a superior opponent.

[Guaporense]

Shock troops? That can only seriously be said about only some of the Panzer and Fallschirmjager divisions that were sent to the western front. Most German infantry divisions that were sent to reinforce the western front were second rate at best and can hardly be considered shock troops.

If the Germans had not Eastern front to worry about they could have tripled the number of divisions available on the western front, this includes Panzer divisions. Not only would the Germans have had more Panzer divisions to counterattack and plug in holes in the line, they would also have enough quality infantry forces to not only hold the line, but also in-depth. Not to mention all the extra resources that would have made the logistics of the western front much easier. They would have had plenty of troops to turn the allied bridgehead into an Anzio equivalent, and with others to spare for any landing in Southern France.

Tripled? In the Eastern front by June 1944 they had lost 4.5 million soldiers while they had 2.5 million soldiers deployed versus 880,000 soldiers all over the Western front (a large fraction of which in divisions in process of "reconstruction" and not fit for combat). Without the Eastern front to worry about it would be possible to increase German air-power in the Western front by a factor of 10 or more* and ground forces by a factor of 4.

*Given the tiny resources committed by the Luftwaffe there and the fact the budget of the air force would greatly increase with the resources freed from the Eastern front.

Well, without Hitler opening the Eastern front to worry about it would be a whole another war entirely. The Western Allies would perhaps not even be able to gain the strategic initiative (notice that before opening the Eastern front the Allies were just reacting to Germany), while Germany would be free to focus the vast industrial resources of continental Europe into taking the little island of Britain. One thing would be certain though, the number of civilian and military deaths of the Western allies would be at least an order of magnitude higher than the historical levels.

It was a risk the allies could have easily afforded. Given their superiority in material and airpower any German counteroffensive late in the Normandy battles had little chance of succeeding. Why would the allies risk it? They would've had plenty to gain. Not only would they be able to shorten the war by six months, they could've also reduced their own casualties as well as set themselves up for a better post-war political position. The German sichelschnitt plan succeeded despite allied numerical strength and their having quality equipment. The allies could have easily replicated its success in the summer of '44.

I don't think they would have been able to shorten the war much because if the Western front collapsed faster the Germans would just allocated more reinforcements there, since only about 20% of Germany's field army was there in the first place, increasing the strength of that individual front would be easy. Maybe if the Western Allies had the operational genius of a Manstein they could have driven straight for Berlin after breaking out quickly and taking out the head of the Nazis by the end of 1944 but that's like asking "what if Alexander the Great was incompetent".

If you look at maps of the war you notice that all fronts were retreating at similar rates and while Allied numerical superiority was higher in the Eastern front the lower quality of those troops plus the lower quality of their air support, implies that the relative strength of German/Allied forces adjusted by quality was similar across the 3 fronts: Italy, Western and Eastern. If Allied performance in a relatively small front like the Western or Italian (20% and 10% of German strength, respectively) resulted into the fast collapse of that front they would reinforce it with forces from other fronts: Hitler was playing a game of minimizing the speed of territorial loss since the failure of Stalingrad.

Obviously, the main factor in that was the Soviet Union, the Western allies were mostly profiting from Soviet blood by taking territories in continental Europe after the outcome was decided but before the war was over. Without Operation Overlord the war would have ended in 1945 anyway, maybe a few months later, but nothing else besides the post war borders would be changed.

[Guaporense]

#5 The corollary to my #1 is that at the start of the Normandy campaign the allies were wildly outnumbered in France. They had managed to land enough troops on D Day to overwhelm the local defenders. But battle for Normandy as a whole was a race between the Germans and the allies , with the Germans moving by road and rail and the allies by sea and air.

#6 The allies did not run short of fuel, but they did run short of ammunition, infantry replacements, and their logistics were at the mercy of the weather.

According to Zetterling while it's true there were more German soldiers over the whole Western front than Allied soldiers in Normandy it's not true that most German divisions were combat ready in the beginning of June. They eventually sent most of the combat ready troops they could assemble in the Western front to Normandy but over a long period of time to allow for the actual "formation" of these combat formations. So it was more of a race between Allies landing on Normandy versus German formations being formed and sent to Normandy.

I guess the fact that Bagration happening at the same time was decisive, if the Eastern front were more "calm", like suffering about 100,000 casualties a month instead of ca. 300,000 in the 3rd quarter of 1944, maybe they could focus more on reinforcing Normandy and the front wouldn't have collapsed.

[Michael Kenny]

while Germany would be free to focus the vast industrial resources of continental Europe into taking the little island of Britain......

Is that not what they attempted in the summer of 1940?
With 'little' success I might add.

[Michael Kenny]

If Allied performance in a relatively small front like the Western or Italian (20% and 10% of German strength, respectively)

I am sure your intention was not to suggest the remaining 70% of the 'Germans strength' was fighting in the east.

30% compared to 70% is less than half.
However 30% compared to (say) 50% is a bit more than half.
Lies, dammed lies and (deliberately misleading) statistics...........

[Michael Kenny]

I guess the fact that Bagration happening at the same time was decisive, if the Eastern front were more "calm", like suffering about 100,000 casualties a month instead of ca. 300,000 in the 3rd quarter of 1944, maybe they could focus more on reinforcing Normandy and the front wouldn't have collapsed.

Maybe you should focus on the US Divisions that were not committed until late 1944-45 and 'focus more' on what could be done to get them into action earlier to face any increase in Germany numbers.
Perhaps factor in what would be the results of going ahead with CHASTITY.
The German collapse in France was totally unexpected (the Germans performed far below how the Allies expected them to) and thus the original Allied plan was never implemented. It a constant source of amusement to watch the fanbois try and introduce any change that allows the Germans to fight on much better terms but the opposite is never contemplated.

[ljadw]

There is no such thing as a relative combat efficiency : relative to what ?

And combat efficiency also does not exist : war is about winning, not about being efficient . The allies won, the Germans lost .

It is also not so that a more "calm " eastern front could result in the transferring of considerable German manpower to the west : the eastern front would remain "calm " only if there was a strong German manpower in the east : if a big part was leaving, the eastern front would collaps .

[Sheldrake]

#5 The corollary to my #1 is that at the start of the Normandy campaign the allies were wildly outnumbered in France. They had managed to land enough troops on D Day to overwhelm the local defenders. But battle for Normandy as a whole was a race between the Germans and the allies , with the Germans moving by road and rail and the allies by sea and air.

#6 The allies did not run short of fuel, but they did run short of ammunition, infantry replacements, and their logistics were at the mercy of the weather.

According to Zetterling while it's true there were more German soldiers over the whole Western front than Allied soldiers in Normandy it's not true that most German divisions were combat ready in the beginning of June. They eventually sent most of the combat ready troops they could assemble in the Western front to Normandy but over a long period of time to allow for the actual "formation" of these combat formations. So it was more of a race between Allies landing on Normandy versus German formations being formed and sent to Normandy.

I guess the fact that Bagration happening at the same time was decisive, if the Eastern front were more "calm", like suffering about 100,000 casualties a month instead of ca. 300,000 in the 3rd quarter of 1944, maybe they could focus more on reinforcing Normandy and the front wouldn't have collapsed.

Sure, many of the Panzer formations were refitting or rebuilding. However, regardless of the combat readiness of German formations they would have committed more of what they had ready if they realised that Normandy was the only cross channel invasion. The reformed 16th Panzer Division was far from combat ready when it was deployed at Salerno as was the 4th Fallschirmjaeger Division at Anzio. Nor did lack of combat readiness prevent the Germans responding vigorously to the Op Market Garden landings.

Army Group B weekly reports from D Day onwards to referred to Army Group trying to replace Panzer troops with infantry. The Germans lacked infantry in Normandy. The offensive edge of the best German formations were used up holding the line on the Bayeux and Caen sectors. 2nd & 21st Panzer, Panzer Lehr, 12 SS, 9SS, 10SS and 1st SS all spent at least a month in the line.

There was plenty of infantry in the 15th Army, which had done nothing but train and build defences for the last two years and also formed part of Army Group B. The same reports also repeatedly mention the threat of a second landing, until the report for the week 17-23rd July that Army group B Concludes that the threat of a second landing is unlikely. At no point is the lack of training or combat readiness cited as the reason for not redeploying 15th Army.

The Western front was the point of main effort for the Germans in 1944. In his Hitler's directive for the year says he was willing to trade space in the east for an opportunity to destroy the invasion. The only troops switched from the east front to the west was the IInd Panzer Corps. The Germans could have withdrawn more but chose not to. The only forces switched from Normandy to Op, Bagration was the move of heavy artillery cancelled in early July.

[ljadw]

You forget the Panther batallion of Panzerlehr that on 6 june was moving to the east .