Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

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Richard Anderson
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#16

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 Feb 2016, 19:42

Kingfish wrote:Was 77ID considered a mobile division?
My understanding is the KG it sent to Normandy took with it all the available transport, leaving the remainder essentially a static division.
I believe this was the same for the 266ID.
Yes, those were all rated as bewegung as opposed to behilfesmässiges bewegung or bodenständige. That did not mean they were motorisiert. In this case the most mobile elements went first and were later joined by the less mobile, including some moving by train. In similar fashion, some elements of the bodenständige divisions in Brittany were also sent, leaving the rest of the division behind in garrison.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

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WAKEN
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#17

Post by WAKEN » 23 Feb 2016, 23:45

According to Zetterling on June 7th 77ID was ordered to move to Normandy as soon as it could be relieved by elements of 5FJD. Lead elements of the division were in Valognes on June 10th


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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#18

Post by WAKEN » 23 Feb 2016, 23:49

I was hoping for more input on relative CEVs. I've just started reading Dupuy's 'A Genius for War.' I understand that most of the analysis that Dupuy and his team did that allowed them to formulate division CEVs was on Italy 1943-5.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#19

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Feb 2016, 14:49

WAKEN wrote:I was hoping for more input on relative CEVs. I've just started reading Dupuy's 'A Genius for War.' I understand that most of the analysis that Dupuy and his team did that allowed them to formulate division CEVs was on Italy 1943-5.
The original "80 engagement" Italian database was developed in the early 70s. Additional ETO, Pacific, Arab-Israeli engagements were created in the late 70s and early 80s, and then more regimental/brigade level engagements in the late 80s. Then in the late 90s and early 2000s we revisited and revalidated the Italian engagements and added a number of Italian, Eastern Front, and Ardennes engagements to the mix. In the end, some hundreds of engagements comprised the QJM/TNDM database.

The Combat Effectiveness Value is just that relative to a particular event and set of circumstances. Again, all things being equal - personnel strength, equipment, posture, terrain, and weather, then the CEV is the difference between what is expected and what actually occurred, which can be attributed to numerous intangibles - including luck.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#20

Post by Aber » 24 Feb 2016, 19:25

Richard Anderson wrote:Then in the late 90s and early 2000s we revisited and revalidated the Italian engagements
How did this tie-in with the US Army's "Review of anomalous data"?

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#21

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Feb 2016, 20:05

Aber wrote:
Richard Anderson wrote:Then in the late 90s and early 2000s we revisited and revalidated the Italian engagements
How did this tie-in with the US Army's "Review of anomalous data"?
Different beast.

You have to understand, the QJM/TNDM was produced by Trevor and was not funded by the government. The data used to produce the QJM/TNDM was generated by other government contracts, starting with a series of studies commissioned by the USAF in 1969, which looked at the effects of air power- particularly interdiction - in various campaigns. That multi-volume study was followed by one on opposed rates of advance, then a study of barrier effectiveness, and then breakthroughs. All involved the collection of discrete engagement data for analysis. In 1976, Trevor first published his expression of the QJM. Shortly after, he completed a series of studies on the Arab-Israeli wars and artillery effectiveness. Then surprise and breakthroughs were examined (concentrating on the East Front) and studies on personnel and equipment losses. All this was fed into the QJM modeling and was eventually produced as the proprietary QJM Database in 3 volumes (1,199 pages) in 1985. It also was the basis for the later TNDM Database, which had added and corrected engagements, most of which I worked on. Numbers, Predictions, and War and various other titles also refer to the engagements, beginning with the original "80 Italian" ones. It is usually from those that most people trot out the "errors" from, including my favorite "The Big Red One wasn't at Anzio!" (No shit, since it was the 1st British Division.) The rest are usually similar typos.

However, the actual "anomalous data" study I believe you are probably referring to was done by SAIC, looking specifically at the Combat History Analysis, History Study Efforts (CHASE) Database, which was commissioned by the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency (later Center for Army Analysis) in 1986. That 5-volume (775 page) work looked at some 450-odd battles from 1600 to 1973. It included all of the QJM database battles, but was in a different, less detailed format, as specified by the customer. Unfortunately, as often happens, after the fact various persons at CAA decided they were unsatisfied with the data set, had questions about it, and did not feel it could be resolved by simply asking the people that produced it. So contracted with SAIC to review it. Interestingly enough, the "review" essentially began with the reviewers deciding to rewrite the requirements and definitions, which meant that essentially everything in the database became "anomalous". I shit you not on this - I was there and was tasked by Trevor to basically review the review. The did things like ignoring what the statement of work said a MBT was and created their own definition, which could include everything from armored cars to heavy tanks.

The result - surprise - was a mess, which was also a huge waste of money. In the end, we produced the Land Warfare Database, which was CHASE with the corrections WE IDENTIFIED in the process of dealing with SAIC's lunacy.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
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Aber
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#22

Post by Aber » 24 Feb 2016, 23:14

Thanks for the explanation

Who are SAIC?

The "review of anomalous data" I have seen was by LFW Management Associates in 1987; - various papers have been declassified.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#23

Post by Michate » 25 Feb 2016, 10:51

The Flak corps appears to have had good radio communications and survey. I read somewhere (possibly by Arko of II SS Panzer Corps) that they could provide a TOT type of concentration not easily or often achieved by the Germans in Normandy.
Pickert mentions this, as well as the Arko of I. SS-Panzer-Korps (FMS B-832, IIRC).
Yes, Pickert mentions that the tactic they used came to be called the "Normandy" method for calling for fire, which simply meant radio instead of phone or flare was used. The form was a sudden 5 to 15-minute concentration right at the point of an Allied penetration or main effort. However, it remains that the heavy batteries were deployed in the depth of the German position and deployed to cover the MSR (linking to the rear-area Flak, some of which was eventually attached to III Flak Korps), which makes the use of much of it as artillery problematic due to range limitations. Pickert also notes it was the all-around traverse that made it possible for batteries to be massed.
Not quite.
The massed fire strikes (40-50 batteries concentrated on 1 target area) that the flak participated in had a normal duration of 1 minute. This was simply what German artillery doctrine called for, and was standard procedure. The 5-15 minutes mentioned were the time between the request of the fire strike and its execution.
Fire control of such fire strikes by radio, executed by the artillery regiment commander or Arko, was also a normal procedure from roughly 1942 onwards. It is however probable that this was less established in the poor quality infantry divisions fighting in Normandy.

The specifics of the so-called "Normandie-Verfahren" mentioned by Pickert were target designation by map square. Though the Arko of I. SS-Panzer-Korps in the mentioned study says traget designation in "his" fire strikes was by Zielpunkt (target reference point).

The larger point is however true, first priority of the flak was anti-air.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#24

Post by Richard Anderson » 25 Feb 2016, 13:53

Michate wrote:Not quite.
The massed fire strikes (40-50 batteries concentrated on 1 target area) that the flak participated in had a normal duration of 1 minute. This was simply what German artillery doctrine called for, and was standard procedure. The 5-15 minutes mentioned were the time between the request of the fire strike and its execution.
Fire control of such fire strikes by radio, executed by the artillery regiment commander or Arko, was also a normal procedure from roughly 1942 onwards. It is however probable that this was less established in the poor quality infantry divisions fighting in Normandy.

The specifics of the so-called "Normandie-Verfahren" mentioned by Pickert were target designation by map square. Though the Arko of I. SS-Panzer-Korps in the mentioned study says traget designation in "his" fire strikes was by Zielpunkt (target reference point).

The larger point is however true, first priority of the flak was anti-air.
Thanks Michate, I thought you would chime in to correct my recall.

Cheers!
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#25

Post by Michate » 25 Feb 2016, 17:16

My pleasure. Cheers!

WAKEN
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#26

Post by WAKEN » 25 Feb 2016, 23:23

Richard,

I have 3 of Trevor Dupuy's books: Numbers, Prediction and War, Attrition and A Genius for War. Since you were one of the team that did this work can you point me to the books/publicly available sources where I can find the data on division CEVs for 1943-4 in Italy and France please?

Thanks

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#27

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Feb 2016, 06:02

Aber wrote:Thanks for the explanation

Who are SAIC?
Science Applications International Corporation, now Leidos.
The "review of anomalous data" I have seen was by LFW Management Associates in 1987; - various papers have been declassified.
Long out of business I believe. Its probably still classified because it was an unbelievable waste of money and a complete screw up.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Richard Anderson
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#28

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Feb 2016, 06:04

WAKEN wrote:Richard,

I have 3 of Trevor Dupuy's books: Numbers, Prediction and War, Attrition and A Genius for War. Since you were one of the team that did this work can you point me to the books/publicly available sources where I can find the data on division CEVs for 1943-4 in Italy and France please?

Thanks
Nothing beyond what you have there since it is all proprietary. You can pretty well extrapolate from NPW though.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#29

Post by WAKEN » 26 Feb 2016, 08:35

Thanks. I understand Van Creveld wrote a book on the topic too. Do you know of it and do you have an opinion on it?

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#30

Post by Aber » 26 Feb 2016, 09:08

Richard Anderson wrote:
Aber wrote:Thanks for the explanation

Who are SAIC?
Science Applications International Corporation, now Leidos.
The "review of anomalous data" I have seen was by LFW Management Associates in 1987; - various papers have been declassified.
Long out of business I believe. Its probably still classified because it was an unbelievable waste of money and a complete screw up.

LFWMA only looked at the basic statistics for c 60 battles - it was a group of historians Charles McDonald, William Glasgow, George Russell, Graham Sibbles, Charles Luttichau, plus David Glantz on Russian sources.

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