I had to look up what Patton was writing in 1921 and found this article in which he calls for "Tank Corps", but his idea is for an arm of sercice to co-operate with a manouvre force mounted on four legs.
COMMENTS ON “CAVALRY TANKS”
By Major George S. Patton, Jr., Cavalry
Cavalry Journal
July 1921
In response to a request for remarks on the foregoing article, I must begin by a most vigorous
dissent from the writer's picture of a senile and impotent cavalry, futilely butting it's head against
impregnable strong points. I can agree only to the extent of admitting that a cavalry which so
deported itself would certainly have no future; nor has it, when well led, had any such past in
history.
Cavalry, now as always, must advance by enveloping. When the ground, as in France, was so
limited as to prevent this, cavalry must await the breakthrough made by the tanks. However,
western Europe is the only country small enough and with sufficient population and roads to
render such a state of things possible. In other theaters of war, the constant power of envelopment
which the mobility of cavalry makes possible will render strong points nothing but asylums for the
safe keeping of the hostile idiots who infest them.
There are many cases, such as in raids, long turning movements, screening, etc., where cavalry is
and ever will be wholly self sufficient and where the addition of mechanical devices will be more
of a hindrance than otherwise. Cavalry has lived off the country and can yet do so. To it, lines of
supply are unnecessary. Tanks, on the other hand, depend wholly on lines of supply for the vast
tonnage of gas, oil, and spares. Without these they become merely inferior pill boxes. Hence, to
attach them to cavalry on lengthy operations is to seriously demobilize the latter.
In other cases, however, such as in short turning movements, advance and rear guard work of
mixed commands, counter attacks, etc., where lines of supply are not needed or already exist,
tanks will be of great assistance to cavalry, combining, as they do, great mobility with concentrated
firepower.
The point as to the economic impossibility of building enough tanks to constitute a mechanical
army is well taken. In addition, however, to this vital objection to the ubiquitous use of tanks
should be mentioned the restrictions due to unsuitable terrain and the difficulty of oversea
transport. I was, and believe that I still am, as enthusiastic a tanker as ever caterpillared, yet I
cannot bring myself to the point of picturing tanks, present or future, real or imaginary, as ever
operating in the mountains of Mexico, the rice paddies of the Philippines, the forests of Canada, or,
in face of competent artillery, on the sandy and gully infested plains of Texas. I cannot picture a
large oversea force giving up that priceless commodity, deck space, to large shipments of tanks;
nor can I imagine a sea born invasion so transporting them to our shores.
Tanks are a new and special weapon, newer than, as special, and certainly as valuable as the
airplane. Can one imagine infantry airplanes manned by detailed doughboys; or artillery airplanes
manned by wagon soldiers or cosmoline kids; or yet cavalry airplanes ridden by sturdy troopers
with the use of “lateral aids"? Hardly!
The tank is a special, technical, and vastly powerful weapon. It certainly is neither a cavalryman
nor an infantryman. Yet, give it half a chance, over suitable terrain and on proper missions, and it
will mean the difference between defeat and victory to the infantry or cavalry with which it is
cooperating.
What is wanted, then, is neither infantry tanks nor cavalry tanks, but a TANK CORPS, a special
mobile general headquarters reserve, to be detailed, as circumstances demand, with whichever arm
it can best cooperate.
