Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

[Richard Anderson]

Hi Richard

Nothing really to disagree with in your last post.

This is from the forward by Glantz and shows the intention behind the two books.
"C.J. Dick's two-volume study is a comparative critique of the differing approaches employed by the Allied powers as they conducted military operations in western and eastern Europe against the Wehrmacht of Hitler's Germany during the summer of 1944. It's uniqueness rests in its comparative nature. Rather than detailing the course of military operations, emphasizing battles and leaders as so many previous books have done, Dick analyzes and compares Allied approaches to conducting war strategically and more importantly operationally. As he states in his introduction, 'My purpose is to put forward broad arguments about the conduct of the war at the operational level - the handling of armies and army groups by both Western Allies and the Red Army in contemporaneous campaigns.' This he accomplishes objectively, sometimes caustically but always thoroughly, with the 'jewelers eye' of a professional army officer and a skilled student of military history and with the analytical tools of an accomplished military theorist."

It sounds interesting and like I say, I'll happily look for it. I would question though if "armies and army groups" were the operational level in World War II. As we understand it now, that would have been the theater commands - SHAEF and AEAF versus the Germans. Worse, at the time, corps-level operations were considered by most in the US and British Army as the operational or grand tactical level. So problems with definitions impinge on the analysis too.

I think it's getting closer to what I would like to see which is a proper analysis of these (and other) campaigns using the analytical concepts and techniques outlined in the latest version of AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning - "Ends", "Ways", "Means", "Risks", "Decisive Conditions", "Lines of Operation" as well as the more traditional "Cetres of Gravity", "Culmination", etc.

Also, getting closer to an analysis across the Lines of Development, currently I think there is too much emphasis on Equipment and numbers. In particular, Training (both individual and collective), Personnel, Logistics, Concepts and Doctrine, Organisation, and Information (in particular intelligence).

I agree and the US and British Army both changed significantly (if not always beneficially) as a result of the lessons identified. I have commented before on the schematic and unimaginative nature of NEPTUNE for example and much of it was rooted in poor use of ends, ways, and means.

All of these combine together to produce combat effective forces and only by understanding these can relative combat effectiveness be understood.

Over the past few years there has, I think, been some good work done in some of these areas - I think "Colossal Cracks" for example is a good start.

Regards

John

I think Raising Churchill's Army was much better.

[Sheldrake]

I don't know what you think military leaders do, but Warfare is a human activity, and getting people to fight and fight well is a major part of military leadership. Generals exercise that leadership through subordinates. That comes through from Geyr's comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the Panzer formations.

Indeed, subordinates he had no contact with for three months and then some 24-48 hours to reconnect.

Actually Geyr assumed command of Panzer Gruppe West at the end of June 1944 at a time when II SS Corps were one of the Corps under his command, and committed to battle in the nearest operation that the Germans mounted to a counter offensive in Normandy before the breakout. I find it hard to believe that the status and capabilities of this formation would not have weighed on Geyr's mind, and been pretty high up in the general's priorities for reports. The battle of Gettysburg lasted for three days, but that was plenty enough for the commanders on each side to form enough of an opinion of how their subordinates performed to fill books and articles for over a century...

No, he assumed command of Panzergruppe West in December 1943. He lost command at 2245 hours on 10 June and then was placed in command at 1700 hours on 28 June...in order to plan the grand counterattack to oust the Allies. The problem was the four corps he was nominally assigned were already closely engaged, the commander of II-SS Panzer Korps was bumped up to take command of 7. Armee vice Dollmann, and Geyr made a big stink about the situation on the evening of 30 June to Rundstedt, sparking the tiff that resulted in Rundstedt and Geyr being relieved the evening of 1 July. So two days in which he had actual operational command of any description...quite a bit less than the interactions between most of the Confederate and Union general officer commands, who had been interacting - in some cases - for two years at that point.

I don't think we are going to agree about the merits and reliability of general Geyr's assessments of the Panzer Divisions. But to return to the thread topic, the reason we have spent some time debating this was about the importance of leadership and command style to the performance of military units.

Military capability is not simply a matter of equipment and wargame modelling. War is an art as well as a science. Whether you think Geyr was right in his assessment of each unit, (and which of the assessments did you disagree with? 10ss?) he obviously believed that senior officers, such as Witt and Meyer could make a big difference made to the performance of the 12 SS division. Nor was he not alone in commenting on the flawed human material of the 21st Panzer Division. Allied commanders too believed that the personality of the commander made a difference. The US Army had a habit of holding its unit and formation commanders personally responsible.

[Richard Anderson]

Sigh. I think my original reply from nine months ago still applies.

The value of General Geyr's comments lies in his judgment and their nature.

And the limitation of the value of his comments lies in the simple fact they are entirely dependent on his memory for dates and units. There is ZERO documentation for this grading and, if it was used as described, it was unusual. Standard German evaluation was Kampfwert I-IV and not a "letter grade".

The 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were the responsibility of Panzer Gruppe West for training from January 1944 to April 1944 and trained to act as an anti invasion force. General Geyr had a good basis to assess their performance.

As noted earlier, the "responsibility of Panzer Gruppe West" ended as of 26 March 1944 when the corps and its two divisions were ordered to the Eastern Front. The only evaluation Geyr could make of those organizations as of 1 June 1944, would be based on the last set of unit reports prepared 1 March 1944. And it is questionable exactly WHY Panzergruppe West would make a report for units on 1 June 1944 which were not under its command and had not been for over two months.

Yet again, Geyr's comments regarding II. SS-Panzerkorps were likely accurate for the period up to the end of March 1944. However, given he had limited operational control and contact with them except for a roughly 24-hour period in late June 1944, then it is unlikely his postwar "1 June 1944" (or was it "6 June 1944"?) "assessment" was anything more than his ex post facto fudging of the data.

[Richard Anderson]

BTW, it appears that 9. SS-Panzer was possibly the least hardest hit of the divisions mauled in France and it seems unlikely it suffered significant casualties to men or material in its sojourn in the Ukraine. 10. SS-Panzer may be a different matter though.

[Urmel]

BTW, it appears that 9. SS-Panzer was possibly the least hardest hit of the divisions mauled in France and it seems unlikely it suffered significant casualties to men or material in its sojourn in the Ukraine. 10. SS-Panzer may be a different matter though.

It did suffer not insignificant casualties during the Tarnopol/Ternopil relief effort I believe, Rich:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=90546

[Richard Anderson]

BTW, it appears that 9. SS-Panzer was possibly the least hardest hit of the divisions mauled in France and it seems unlikely it suffered significant casualties to men or material in its sojourn in the Ukraine. 10. SS-Panzer may be a different matter though.

It did suffer not insignificant casualties during the Tarnopol/Ternopil relief effort I believe, Rich:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=90546

Indeed, I know the thread. However, what is interesting is the summary casualty report from the SS for the period.

9. SS-Panzer 1 January-31 August 1944: 827 KIA, 2,055 WIA, 270 MIA, 4,151 ill, 189 died from accidents. Now, subtract the known Normandy casualties:

1-31 July: 465 KIA, 1,628 WIA, 277 MIA.

[Delwin]

I know this is primary Normandy 1940 topic but I am interested whether has anybody run similar (even partial) studies for 1939 and 1940 battles? It woudl be especially interesting to analyse Fall Rot.