Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

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Richard Anderson
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#31

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Feb 2016, 14:01

Aber wrote:LFWMA only looked at the basic statistics for c 60 battles - it was a group of historians Charles McDonald, William Glasgow, George Russell, Graham Sibbles, Charles Luttichau, plus David Glantz on Russian sources.

Thanks for the reminder and the guest list. I had forgotten Mac McDonald got roped into it; when he realized what the scam was he was pretty embarrassed.
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#32

Post by Aber » 26 Feb 2016, 19:27

I assume the scam was concerned with the wider interpretation, not the work that LFW did (see example below)?
Aprilla I.PNG


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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#33

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Feb 2016, 19:53

Aber wrote:I assume the scam was concerned with the wider interpretation, not the work that LFW did (see example below)?
As I mentioned earlier, the majority of the "anomalies" "found" by LFW were a product of them beginning by redefining the definitions of the existing database. The changed the definitions of "total armor", "light armor", and "MBT", as well as what was included in "artillery". They also chose to change the defined scope and duration of engagements, which of course changed strength and casualty figures considerably.

I did the "review of the review", but don't remember if the sample I checked included Aprilia I? I do know that in every case I reviewed, the "discrepancies" found by LFW - except for a few minor typographical errors - all were due to the goalpost shifting.

That was part of the "scam", which apparently was generated by the origin scam. The original scam was that the actual purpose of the review was not actually to do a review and scrub of the database, but was intended to discredit Trevor and HERO/DMSi as part of a vendetta which developed between him and a federal government analyst who shall remain anonymous. I have long suspected the failure of the LFW SOW to match definitions to the original definitions used in the CHASE database was deliberate and was done in order to ensure the "anomalies" would occur. So yes, I suspect that at least initially LFW was in the dark with regards to the scam.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#34

Post by Aber » 28 Feb 2016, 10:23

OK I can see the differences in the definitions:

HERO - armour
HERO armour definition.PNG
LFW - armour
LFW armour definition.PNG
Key difference seems to be classification of assault guns and tank destroyers

HERO -artillery
HERO artillery definition.PNG
HERO artillery definition.PNG (7.06 KiB) Viewed 822 times
LFW artillery
LFW artillery definition.PNG
It's not so clear to me what the differences are in practice for artillery; possibly anti-tank guns?

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#35

Post by Richard Anderson » 28 Feb 2016, 17:02

Aber wrote:OK I can see the differences in the definitions:

It's not so clear to me what the differences are in practice for artillery; possibly anti-tank guns?
Honestly, after 25-odd years neither do I. :D

Another key difference I do recall was they did not have access to the documents HERO/DMSi had collected over the 20-odd years of archival research at NARA and the PRO (and for the ACSDB, BAMA), so much of their strength and casualty figures were drawn from secondary sources.
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#36

Post by Aber » 04 Mar 2016, 14:51

LFW seems to have due down a bit eg for Aprilla I strength
Aprilla strength.PNG
Aprilla strength.PNG (7.07 KiB) Viewed 764 times
but after 25 years there will no definitive answer - the usual historian's problem of understanding paper records. :D

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#37

Post by Richard Anderson » 04 Mar 2016, 22:34

Aber wrote:LFW seems to have due down a bit eg for Aprilla I strength
I think that was the problem. They used the strength of the division as it was loaded for the assault, not its strength three weeks later (IIRC) at Aprilia.
but after 25 years there will no definitive answer - the usual historian's problem of understanding paper records. :D
Yep.
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#38

Post by Aber » 07 Mar 2016, 14:49

Aprilla I was 25 January, and the first engagement for 1st Division after landing - using the loading tables seems to make sense.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#39

Post by Richard Anderson » 07 Mar 2016, 23:51

Aber wrote:Aprilla I was 25 January, and the first engagement for 1st Division after landing - using the loading tables seems to make sense.

That's right, I was thinking of the big Aprilia battle in February. I'll see if I can check the last corrected entry from the Access Database we converted the old LWDB to. It will include any changes I made during the LWF review and more importantly the changes I made after reviewing the database when we were correcting it 1999-2008.
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#40

Post by Sean Oliver » 10 Mar 2016, 02:21

Sheldrake wrote: There was quite a difference in efficiency between German formations. PanzerGruppeWest rated its divisions from A to D reflecting the quality of soldiers, leadership and training 2nd, 9th SS,12th SS and the Panzer Lehr were Category A. While the lowest , in category D were the 1st SS (bled white in Russia and for cadres for the 12 SS; discipline a sham and poor quality NCOs) and 10th SS (unfortunate in assignment of divisional commanders)
Could you tell me where this report(s) is and the date it was made?
I'm curious to see it. I've also thought LAH performed rather inauspiciously after Kursk, declining badly all the way to the end.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#41

Post by Sheldrake » 10 Mar 2016, 12:24

Its the USAEUR Foreign Military Studies Ethint B-466, based in a interview with general Geyr von Schweppenburg, who was inspector of Panzer troops West. There is a copy in the collection of translated papers called The German Army on D Day edited by David Isby.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#42

Post by Richard Anderson » 13 Mar 2016, 17:04

Sean Oliver wrote:
Sheldrake wrote: There was quite a difference in efficiency between German formations. PanzerGruppeWest rated its divisions from A to D reflecting the quality of soldiers, leadership and training 2nd, 9th SS,12th SS and the Panzer Lehr were Category A. While the lowest , in category D were the 1st SS (bled white in Russia and for cadres for the 12 SS; discipline a sham and poor quality NCOs) and 10th SS (unfortunate in assignment of divisional commanders)
Could you tell me where this report(s) is and the date it was made?
I'm curious to see it. I've also thought LAH performed rather inauspiciously after Kursk, declining badly all the way to the end.
I suspect that had to be from some time in March, probably around the first of the month, so not reflecting changes over the three months to D-Day.
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#43

Post by Sheldrake » 13 Mar 2016, 23:35

Richard Anderson wrote:
Sean Oliver wrote:
Sheldrake wrote: There was quite a difference in efficiency between German formations. PanzerGruppeWest rated its divisions from A to D reflecting the quality of soldiers, leadership and training 2nd, 9th SS,12th SS and the Panzer Lehr were Category A. While the lowest , in category D were the 1st SS (bled white in Russia and for cadres for the 12 SS; discipline a sham and poor quality NCOs) and 10th SS (unfortunate in assignment of divisional commanders)
Could you tell me where this report(s) is and the date it was made?
I'm curious to see it. I've also thought LAH performed rather inauspiciously after Kursk, declining badly all the way to the end.
I suspect that had to be from some time in March, probably around the first of the month, so not reflecting changes over the three months to D-Day.
Evaluation made by Panzer Gruppe West as at 1st June 1944. Its worth reading because it gives an insight into the issues that the German commanders thought important, but not always reflected in the discussions on this board. "Deficiencies in NCOs; training methods of divisonal and regimental commanders are the kind of levers than make the difference to combat efficiency.

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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#44

Post by Richard Anderson » 14 Mar 2016, 00:01

Sheldrake wrote:Evaluation made by Panzer Gruppe West as at 1st June 1944.
That would be odd, since the 9. and 10. SS were not part of Panzergruppe West on 1 June 1944. They, and II SS-Panzerkorps were part of 4. Panzerarmee of Heeresgruppe Süd until order to return to Ob. West on 12 June 1944.

Given it is Geyr's memory from after the war, I suspect he may be conflating dates and units a bit.
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Re: Relative combat efficiency - Normandy 1944

#45

Post by Sheldrake » 14 Mar 2016, 03:19

Richard Anderson wrote:
Sheldrake wrote:Evaluation made by Panzer Gruppe West as at 1st June 1944.
That would be odd, since the 9. and 10. SS were not part of Panzergruppe West on 1 June 1944. They, and II SS-Panzerkorps were part of 4. Panzerarmee of Heeresgruppe Süd until order to return to Ob. West on 12 June 1944.

Given it is Geyr's memory from after the war, I suspect he may be conflating dates and units a bit.
The value of General Geyr's comments lies in his judgment and their nature.

The 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were the responsibility of Panzer Gruppe West for training from January 1944 to April 1944 and trained to act as an anti invasion force. General Geyr had a good basis to assess their performance.

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